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Introduction
A Proposition on Go-ordinative Influence
An historically-minded generation is one which looks back... for those critical insights which 
are necessary both to the understanding of its 
existing situation and to the realisation of the 
values which it holds.
E.H. Carr The New Society
cUrban transport planning is one of the most contentious areas 
of contemporary public administration. The effective functioning 
of the metropolis as a whole depends more on the quality of the 
planning, operation and management of transport facilities than on 
any other factor. Transport is a determinant of the environmental 
character of city and suburb, workplace and home; of the location 
of residence and industry; of the effectiveness of public and 
private facilities; of safety and increasingly of health; of 
local political involvement and of the distribution of the 
benefits and costs of urban living. Transport administration is 
central to the formulation and implementation of urban policy, and 
the influences on the efficiency of the various processes in that 
administration can be considered to be of especial significance in 
the study of public policy generally. Decision-making in urban 
transport is very complicated and the role and responsibilities of 
the administrator are commensurately important.
Since the Second World War, however, urban transport 
authorities have been subjected to increasing criticism regarding 
their administration of existing services and the scope and intent 
of their planning of new systems. In most major cities the trans­
port networks were developed before the First World War and are 
still in operation —  and deteriorating. The penalties of 
obsolescence are numerous: costs (and fares) are rising, equipment 
and rolling stock are inadequate, uncomfortable and difficult to 
maintain, networks are overcrowded at peak hours but are unsuited 
to the bulk of non-peak trips due to structural changes in the 
cities, and personnel arrangements are commonly anachronistic.
The relationship between public and private transport facilities 
has changed enormously, particularly since 1945, making new and 
expensive demands on transport authorities but without relieving 
them of the debt burdens of existing and past systems; the 
inability to respond to changes in demand patterns has compounded 
financial problems.
Even where new planning and construction have taken place, 
planners have been accused of adopting policies that are 
deleterious to the efficient and equitable management of the 
metropolis. There have been rapid changes in popular notions of 
the purpose of urban transport, ecological responsibility, and the 
distribution of the benefits and costs of investment programmes, 
leading to a new consciousness of the processes of urban society 
and a strict accounting of transport investment. Transport 
planners have acknowledged this, although in many cities in the 
world the dominant conventions of planning philosophy, methodology 
and technology have been criticised by politicians and the public
as being simplistic and socially irrelevant and planners have not 
given ground. Technocratic philosophies have developed and become 
entrenched, often further disadvantaging bureaucracies that are 
confused by the rejection of their policies and even their 
standards of common sense.
The problems of transport administrators are not unique: many 
of the preceding comments may be found to apply to other areas of 
public policy, in different measure perhaps but with the familiar 
themes of high and rising costs, obsolescence of methods and 
equipment, and a perserverance with policies that are aligned more 
to the needs of bureaucracy than the community. In transport 
however there is a significant complication. V/hile ’transport" 
can be identified as a single functional sub-system of the 
metropolis (with interdependencies arising therefrom), it also 
consists of specialised activities, for instance trains, buses, 
ferries, trams, main and local roads, airports, taxis, carparks, 
footpaths, and traffic regulation and control. Each of these can 
be administered separately as has been the case in Sydney for most 
of its history, or in combination with the rest. Administrators 
therefore have to deal with an extremely complicated policy field 
in which co-ordination is the key word; there are overlapping 
spheres of action and important policy and operational 
interdependencies. The performance of each administrative agency 
and each service will be affected in some way by that of the others. 
Decisions made within one body can influence not only the effective­
ness of the other agencies but can also affect the overall perform­
ance of the urban transport function and that of the metropolis as 
a whole.
There are important theoretical issues involved in such a 
multi-organisational system, especially with regard to the 
difficulty of co-ordinating policies and actions between separate 
agencies. Disagreements between organisations in related areas
( i ) (?)are common, for instance in national defence, J economic policy, '
and in a somewhat analogous situation, nation states participating( 3)m  international organisations. ' Even cases of agencies such as 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers proceeding with works and policies 
against the wishes of the superior levels of the official hierarchy
1. One example concerning Australian Defence investment is Paul 
Kelly, "Who wins the billion dollar tug o'war?”, National Times 
October 18-23, 1976.
2. See for example C.L. Schultze, The Politics and Economics of 
Public Spending (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1968}.
3. See especially A. Etzioni, Political Unification (N.Y.: Holt, 
Rinehart and ’Winston, 1965) for a discussion of integrating power 
in regional unions; also T. Hovet, Bloc Politics in the Upited 
Nations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Rress, 196C).
H
have been recorded fairly frequently.^ Inter-organisational 
competition and conflict is institutionalised in the American
( c; )budgetary system. ' In the case of urban transport planning, 
there may be disagreements between authorities over particular 
issues, for instance at the simple and obvious level of the 
division of costs of common works (such as ancillary investment at 
railway stations, that is, carparks, road and bridge adjustments, 
and so on), or the equally obvious disagreements over spending 
priorities between local councils and State instrumentalities.^^ 
More fundamental in the longer term is the possible effects of any 
independence allowed to separate authorities on planning 
priorities. Even if independent authorities co-ordinated them­
selves through processes of bargaining, mutual understanding and
( 7)other forms of "partisan mutual adjustment", J the results may be 
far from satisfactory in the view of elected governments or 
statutory co-ordinative agencies.
Co-ordination is a concept which, although often mentioned in
the literature of public administration, is generally approached
at the case-study level without adequate consideration of its
importance in policy formulation, programme implementation,
political accountability and the like, in multi-organisational
governmental systems. 1 The science of public administration has
been largely concentrated on the study of established organisations
where participation in co-ordinative mechanisms is virtually
assured by the characteristics of the organisation. Co-ordination
is seen as a task of "the greatest importance, complexity and 
( 9 )difficulty",wy but by definition, if the organisation is to 
function effectively and survive, its internal structure will 
promote co-operation over elements of c o n f l i c t . T h e r e  may be
4. See in particular A. Maass, Muddy Waters (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1951); R.A. Dahl and C.E. Lindblom, 
Politics, Economics and Welfare (N.Y.: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), 
p. 343 and elsewhere.
5. A. Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 19647"^
6. These aspects are discussed in later chapters.
7. C.E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (N.Y.: Free 
Press, 1965).
8. In this thesis the term "governmental system" will refer to 
any group of officially-constituted bureaucracies and institutions 
which are interdependent, that is which occupy a common policy 
field in which the policies of all bodies are directly or 
indirectly connected. For a full definition of interdependence 
see Lindblom, ibid., pp. 21 f.
9. H.A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (N.Y.: Free Press, 1965), 
p. 103.
10. On this subject see: Simon, ibid., chapter VI; H.A. Simon,
disagreement at personal and group levels but the organisation, 
with its inducements, punishments and structure of authority, will 
itself function as a co-ordinative system to produce a favourable 
outcome for the whole. The situation between organisations may be
co-ordination that unify the sections and departments of an 
organisation (albeit perhaps imperfectly) also give organisations 
their own individual orientation:
A bureaucracy tends to have a life of its own; it tends 
to become an organic whole with a sense of common 
commitment among its membership and a readiness to close 
ranks and protect the common interest.... it is more or 
less organic and self-protecting as well as systematic
The permanent civil servant has a major investment in 
his agency, and he will seek to protect it in his 
relations with others outside the agency.... the 
bureaucrat high enough in the hierarchy to make 
responsible decisions is probably also devoted quite 
sincerely to his agency’s cause.... (His) psychic
mes a motivation to fight
D.W. Smithburg and V.A. Thompson, Public Administration (N.Y.:
Knopf, 1950), chapters 8, 9 and 14; J.A. Litterer, The Analysis of 
Organizations (N.Y.: Wiley, 1965), part 3, "Achieving Coordination" 
especially chapter 15; B.M. Gross, Organizations and their Managing 
(N.Y.: Free Press, 1968), chapter 3, "The Gonflict-Gooperation
Nexus", especially p. 60; A. Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of 
Complex Organizations (N.Y.: Free Pressé 1961), pp. 78 f; and 
J.G. March and H.A. Simon, Organizations (N.Y.: Wiley, 1958), 
especially chapter 4. One reference on survival and schism under 
conditions of conflict is H. Assael, "Constructive Role of Inter- 
organizational Conflict", Administrative Science Quarterly, 14 (4)-, 
December 1969.
11. Conflict may exist regardless of the effectiveness of 
co-ordinative mechanisms; the issue lies more in the outcome of 
conflict. A general reference is W.M. Evan (ed), Interorganiza­
tional Relations (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), Part One, 
especially Reading 3.
12. See Simon, Administrative Behavior, ibid., pp. 12, 103 and 
elsev/here; and J.K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), chapters 11 to 15, also pp. 272 f.
13. D. Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government
(N.Y.: Macmillan, 2nd edition, 1969) , p7 150.
14. Ibid. Such statements are common in the literature of public 
administration. For a discussion of the issues involved vis-à-vis 
accountability and the role of the Public Service, see H.V. Emy,
"The Public Service and Political Control", and subsequent comments 
by L. Benham and L. Peres, in Appendix 1.B to the Report of the 
Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (Canberra: 
A.G.P.S., 1 976) . Also P . Self, Administrative Theories and 
Politics (London: Allen & Unwind 1972), chapters 6 and 7; and
A. Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 
generally.
and deliberate...(13)
Further,
(>
There is a complication, namely at what level in a system such as 
an organisation does identification take place? This comes close 
to the conventional view of organisational conflict, as seen in 
the following quote from Simon's Administrative Behavior:
The principal undesirable effect of identification is 
that it prevents the institutionalized individual from 
making correct decisions in cases where the restricted 
area of values with which he identifies himself must be 
weighed against other values outside that area. This 
is a principal cause of the (inter-section) competition 
~"J n ' ‘ch characterize any large administrative
The implication is that the behaviour of the institution might not 
be too different from that of the "institutionalized individual". 
This applies particularly in situations where a technocratic 
professional ethos is pervasive, producing what has been called a
authority is basically physical and technical, and because 
internal standards of promotion and remuneration are founded on 
technical soundness, the outlook of senior administrators tends 
to be closed to pressures which lie outside the mainstream of 
organisational standards. As one engineer, E.D. Storr, put it in 
an article in The Professional Engineer in 1974, concerning the 
narrowness of perspective of the institutionalised engineer, "His 
whole conduct may be patterned by the compelling nature of the 
institutional imperatives which he is unlikely to question because
( i 7 )he sees them as the only possible way".v J The value system of 
the authority becomes more and more closed in accordance with the 
standards of performance of the defined organisational task. J
To generalise therefore, the consequence of interdependence 
in a multi-organisational system may well be conflict, in what 
can be considered to be a parallel case to the internal conflict 
described by Simon. However in a governmental system, where the 
survival of both the constituent units and the system itself is 
virtually assured, conflict will not necessarily be reflected 
directly in economic performance or organisational disintegration.
15. Op. cit. , p. 13. Again this is a common view of administrat­
ive theorists.
16. See J.M. Power, "The Emerging Politics of Engineering", in 
H. Mayer and H. Nelson (eds), Australian Politics (Melbourne: 
Cheshire, 4th edition, 1976).”
17. Quoted ibid., p. 305.
18. This topic is taken up further in. R.P. Gibbons,
"Co-ordinative Causes of Decision-Making Failures" ,
Institution of Engineers, The Dilemma of Transport Decision-Making: 
A Symposium (paper available from author; 7th June, 1977.)
The stakes in any contest between official bureaucracies will be 
measured in influence and policies, especially in interdependent 
policy fields. Which agency will prevail, and why, and what might 
be the significance of victory or defeat (or compromise) for the 
overall functioning of the system?
The strength of the individual commitment of organisations to
separate policies will vary with a number of factors such as the
potency and permanency of the benefits and costs of compliance
with central direction, the degree of established responsibility
of a particular agency for a defined policy area, and so on. In
some cases where central co-ordination is considered necessary by
those in political authority, there may be little trouble in
reconciling individual aspirations, in other cases there may be
great difficulty with a commensurate load on co-ordinative
mechanisms. Little attention has been given to such questions by
administrative theorists: very few writers have developed the
( 19 }analogy between intra-organisational conflict^ ' and inter-
organisational conflict in governmental systems. Conflict and
inconsistency may be regarded as fundamental to government, not as
aberrations, and the mode and quality of the resolution of
differences in goals and policies deserve careful study. Such
matters have received extensive attention in the literature of(2 1)nolitical influencev ' and more particularly by economists
19. "Conflict" will be used in a very general sense, covering all 
states of disagreement ranging from inconsistency to actual 
struggle. More specific meanings will be distinguished as the 
context requires.
20. The major exceptions are Lindblom, op. cit., who derived his 
original stimulus from the study of economics (see R.A. Dahl and
C. E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare (N.Y.: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1963, originally published 1953), for example chapter 
7); Self, op. cit., chapters 3 and 4; and R.N. Spann, Public 
Administration in Australia (Sydney: N.S.W. Government Printer, 
1973), particularly Part I wherein the parallel is constantly 
implicit, for example at pages 20 and 35. (A main instance is 
Spann’s consideration of both intra- and inter-organisational 
factors in chapter 4, "Structure and the Division of Work".) All 
these writers refer to other sources, such as Downs’ Inside 
Bureaucracy. but the generalisation has considerable force even 
tTIough it is not absolute.
21. The major sources are: R.A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), especially chapter 
6; Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill, Forth 
Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1953); D. Bell,
The End of Ideology (N.Y.: Free Press, I960); N. Polsby,
Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1963) ; P~^ Bachrach and M. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power",
American Political Science Review, vol 56 1962; and works by
D. B. Truman, C. Wright Mills, Talcott Parsons, and others as cited 
in Lockard, op. cit., chapters 7 and 8.
Iconcerned with oligopoly, the existence of ’few” firms in a
( ??) (23)market. J In fact the administrative analysts' who have
written about co-ordinative problems have tended to resort to the
economic theory of oligopoly to explain organisational behaviour
in government systems, despite the substantial differences between
the two situations. Most important of these are the statutory
connections between official agencies and the existence of formal
(24)co-ordinative mechanisms.'
A manor characteristic of governmental systems per se is the 
systematic framework in which the constraints, inducements and 
threats and so on, which all agencies must endure whether they are 
private or official, are effected. Political accountability is 
basically centripetal (or unitary) in the face of the ultimate 
contingency, be it election or revolution, even though 
responsibility may be decentralised or delegated. Thus administra­
tion must be placed in the context of the "success of the 
government as a whole”:
It is certain that occasions will arise on which 
individual ministers and their departments will seek 
to exercise their powers to a degree or in ways which 
ignore, or seek to ignore, constraints necessary for 
the success of the government as a whole and the 
welfare of the community. Essential therefore to any 
form of government in which authority is entrusted to 
a number of ministers will be the means by which the 
discipline of such constraints is made effective.
... This process can 
’co-ordination'. ( ^ 3)
briefly be referred to as
In this sense co-ordination is pervasive although not necessarily 
effective. The mechanisms of co-ordination vary but as implied 
above are orientated to the centre and are (at least in a technical
22. See for example S.G. Sturmey and D.W. Pearce, Economic
Analysis (London: McG-raw-Hill, 1966), chapter 17; R.G-. Lipsey,
Positive Economics (London: Weidonfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 
chapter 26; W7 Êëllner, Competition among the Few: Oligonoly and 
Similar Market Structures (N.Y.: Knopf, 1949); and J.K. Galbraith, 
American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970), chapter 4.
23. A major example is March and Simon, Organizations, o p . cit., 
pp. 131-3, for these authors relied on a simplistic presentation 
of the theory of oligopoly and the theory of games. Among the 
writers who have integrated political and administrative theory 
are Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy, and Dahl and Lindblom, 
Politics, Economics and Welfare; and Spann, on. cit., Part I 
especially chapter 5.
24. See K.W. Heydon, "Public Sector Management and Related 
Information Requirements", Appendix 1.E to the Report of R.C.A.G.A., 
op. cit., Appendix Volume One, pp. 171-2; Self, on. cit., pp.
11-12 and elsewhere; and in particular Spann, ibio., pp. 11-16
and references given there.
25. Report of R.C.A.G.A., op cit., p. 355.
sense) structured to produce predictable and politically acceptable 
results. Similar considerations apply in the case of functional 
interdependence, although if the consequences of inefficient co­
ordination are not likely to be expressed in terms of that 
"ultimate contingency" then politicians may not give functional 
factors the same weight that they give to matters nearer to their 
collective survival. In fact the Royal Commission on Australian 
Government Administration saw a danger of contamination of the 
political unity of a government (or ministry) because "... permanent 
heads of the various departments do not have political or other 
continuous cause to think collectively or to act in close concert. 
Differences between departments in the scope of their functions and 
relative pov/er tend rather to promote a sense of competition among 
some of them, so that it may require a degree of conscious effort 
on the part of a minister to maintain an appropriate detachment 
from the consequences of departmental rivalries".^2 )^ The potential 
for conflict between central political needs and functional needs, 
and individual organisational aspirations, is very real.
The preceding discussion can be summed up in the proposition 
that in a multi-organisational governmental system in which 
individual policy areas are interdependent, the nature of 
organisational behaviour will tend to produce competition between 
agencies, that this will strain the co-ordinative mechanisms in 
the system, and that those mechanisms may not be capable of 
overcoming such divisive forces to the extent that is required by 
the interdependencies. The urban polity is an extremely important 
example of multi-organisational governmental systems. It will be 
the purpose of this thesis to explore the implications of such an 
environment in a major policy area, transport administration, and 
to draw conclusions as to the significance and effectiveness of the 
various co-ordinative mechanisms.
At the outset, while the indicative framework which has just 
been presented would have some theoretical and empirical application 
to most (if not all) policy fields, two major qualifications must 
be made. First, there are always difficulties in measuring the 
effect of any suspected influence on decision-making, often because 
decision outputs are poorly defined, unknown or abstract (even 
non-decisions^), as has been established in the literature of 
political influence as cited previously. This is especially true
26. Ibid., p. 58. Gf Emy, op. cit.. for example at p. 50.
27. See M .A. Grenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins, 1971), pp. 2 ff and elsewhere.
](
where outputs have to be compared against some conceived standard
of adequacy, that is, what is "bad” planning or a "bad" decision?
Normally it is argued that policy decisions should be part of and
consistent with the formal chain of accountability in the
Westminster system, so that where statutory organisations do
specialise their decision-making and are judged to be too separate
f 2Q)from Ministers and unco-ordinated, their planning is "bad".
This line of argument is invalid where the intention of the elected 
Government is in fact to "hive off" all but the most electorally 
potent decision-making without significant regard to co-ordination. 
This has been a prevailing convention of urban government in 
twentieth century Sydney. V/hile consequent corporate planning 
might be judged to be inadequate on other grounds, it would not 
necessarily be "bad" by contemporary political standards.
This does not make co-ordination a minor consideration for the 
political analyst. Co-ordination must be defined to include 
political institutions such as Cabinet, perhaps more so than self- 
regulatory mechanisms such as inter-departmental committees. 
Co-ordination can also include the various societal interests 
affected by different decisions, to the extent that such interests 
can be fundamental determinants of the constraints and pressures on 
formal co-ordinative mechanisms. While this might stretch the 
definition it does emphasise the fact that even in a system like 
that of New South Wales, where the statutory corporation has 
dominated urban administration (as will be seen in later chanters), 
failures of co-ordination can be obvious, or can indicate more 
essential weaknesses of a political system. This does not 
necessarily vindicate statutory incorporation for many weaknesses 
will be identified later, in a long-term and substantial context. . 
However one major inter-departmental committee will be seen to have 
been ineffectual, and several major planning developments to have 
been based on internalised organisational values, because 
governments were not seriously concerned with the quality of 
operational performance. This will be a recurring theme in this 
thesis. It is suggested that the treatment of planning as a 
decision-making output, against the background of major structural 
influences on planning processes, will allow a critical examination 
of the "theory" of co-ordinative influence advanced in this chapter,
The second major qualification is that every policy field, 
organisational task and political environment makes more or less 
unique requirements on organisational structure and performance.
28. This has been an important theme in the papers of Professor 
Peter Wilenski's Review of N.S.W. Government Administration. An 
important example is P. Wilenski, "Urban Administration and Policy 
in New South Wales" (roneo; UNESCO Seminar on Urban Management 
Processes, Adelaide, 1977).
This is contrary to the classical Weberian guidelines of efficient
bureaucratic administration but this basic proposition has been
subject to extensive documentation in the last twenty years,
( 2 9 }especially from the ’’contingency theorists”.v In simple terms, 
their argument is that inherent policy field characteristics (such 
as stability, diversity and so on) affect internal practice in 
many ways especially through delegation of authority, the operation 
of ’’boundary” (or externally oriented liaison) groups, the 
’’shallowness” or ’’depth” of authority chains and so on. Also the 
way the policy field is organised ab initio affects organisational 
behaviour. Contingency theorists have been typically concerned 
with internal operations and adaptation rather than with system 
outputs and inter-corporate co-ordination yet the school of thought 
has obvious relevance. Some of its insights on internal 
organisational change will be related to Sydney's experience in the 
appropriate chapters. At this point brief attention needs to be 
given to the main features of the transport ’policy environment” 
at a general level, as background to the later empirical treatment.
Transport "administration” consists of a diverse range of 
policy processes. At the start a broad distinction must be made 
between planning and managerial^0  ^ decision types on the basis of 
the functional characteristics of urban transport. In its simplest 
terms the distinction can be expressed as the difference between
29. There is a wide range of literature on this point, especially 
in the Administrative Science Quarterly, most issues. Some major 
references are: H. Aldrich, "Organizational Boundaries and 
Interorganizational Conflict", Human Relations, vol. 24, 1971;
J.K. Benson, "The Interorganizational Network as a Political 
Economy”, A.S.Q., 20 (2), June 1975; T. Burns and G.M. Stalker,
The Management of Innovation (London: Tavistock, 1961);
E.E. Emery and E.L. Trist, "The causal texture of organizational 
environments", Human Relations, vol. 18, 1965; W.M. Evan, "The 
organization set”, in J.D. Thompson (ed.), Approaches to 
Organization Design (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
19'66); H. Guetzkow, "Relations among organizations”, in R. Bosers 
(ed.), Studies in Behavior in Organizations (University of Georgia 
Press, 1966); R.H. Hall, Organizations:" Structure and Process 
(N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972)7 P.M. Hirsch, "Organizational 
Effectiveness and the Institutional Environment", A.S.0., 20 (3), 
September 1975; T.A. Kochan, "Determinants of the Power of 
Boundary Units in an Interorganizational Bargaining Relation",
A.S.0., 20 (3), September 1975; P.R. Lawrence and J. Lorsch, 
Organization and Environment (Homewood, 111.: Irwin, 1967);
J.W. Lorsch and P.R. Lawrence, Studies in Organizational Design 
(Homewood, 111.: Irwin, 1970); J.D. Thompson, Organizations in 
Action (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1967); P.E. White, "Resources as 
Determinants of Organizational Behavior", A.S.Q., 19 (3),
September 1974; and J. Woodward, Industrial Organization (London: 
O.U.P., 1965). A close study was made of this general literature 
at the suggestion of Professor R.N. Spann. This list contains 
only works which were found to be fairly directly relevant to this 
thesi s.
30. Managerial has been chosen in preference to such words as 
operational, short-term, tactical, corporate, aaministrative, 
temporary and so on; its meaning will be defined in the following.
long-term strategic rankings of priorities which provide the(3 1)continuing backgroundv J for more flexible ad hoc or tactical 
decision-making. The first factor underlying the division is the 
nature of transport works for these are typically very expensive 
and have a long operational life. They are often difficult to 
modify and reviews of their operational effectiveness are therefore 
only periodically made. Thus decisions concerning substantial 
investment programmes normally have to provide for long-term 
factors, with any flexibility that might be needed coming from 
for instance pricing policy. The second reason relates to the 
nature of the interaction between transport and other major urban 
processes. Roads, railways, airports and the like not only must 
be planned to anticipate long-term traffic growth but themselves 
influence land use and traffic purely through either being 
available for use, or being inadequate, or not being available as 
the case may be. Thus transport planning tends to be self­
reinforcing and it is often only exogenous factors such as 
technological change and societal change (for instance the popular 
adoption of the motor vehicle) that necessitate major reviews of 
priorities and operational effectiveness.
The third reason is the intrinsic and exceptional importance 
of short-term decisions. Apart from investment in traffic control 
systems on roads and railways and similar expenditure, management 
in the present sense includes fare and pricing policy, the level 
and type of service provided by different modes of transport, and 
regulatory policies. Like other public services transport 
authorities depend on revenue from user charges (fares, fees and 
taxes and the like) for their financial viability; yet the 
transport administrator is almost unique in having to consider 
demand factors and market forces as major influences on policy. 
Public transport for example is essential yet it has close 
substitutes, such as trips on foot or by bicycle, by car and taxi, 
and even perhaps by commercial delivery services. Motor vehicle 
registrations and petrol tax receipts could also be affected by 
pricing policies. The political and functional importance of such 
considerations must be emphasised. Managerial decisions such as 
fare-setting (which is not normally related to individual route 
performance but to annual overall financial results) can affect 
long-term trends in transport patterns and because of the physical 
inflexibilities mentioned above can be of fundamental significance 
in making existing transport systems effective or redundant. Even 
decisions such as the installation of extensive traffic control
31. While this statement does not preclude the possibility of 
"incremental" policy-making, it does imply a limitation on such processes (for which see Self, or., cit. , pp. 39 ff) .
( x2 )systems on roads can affect travel patterns substantially, ' 
although this is not generally the intention.
The distinction between planning and management which has 
been outlined has considerable empirical validity but not of course 
in a black-and-white sense. There are many facets (time span, 
functional complexity, impact on long-term priorities, finance, 
extent of interdependencies and so on) which might be mixed-up in 
a particular process and it is more realistic to speak of three 
catagories —  strategic planning, ad hoc planning and management. 
Strategic planning has three basic characteristics: (i) it is 
concerned with the "long term" (the definition of this is flexible); 
(ii) it deals more in priorities than details of route, construc­
tion timing and finance, etcetera; and (iii) it is comprehensive 
in that it should encompass all elements of the policy field and 
all interdependencies. Ad hoc planning deals with detailed 
planning, especially specific issues. It builds on the broad
framework of priorities provided by the strategic planning, but if 
prior strategic planning (in effect, the co-ordination of conflict­
ing goals in the policy system) is lacking then it should be at 
least compatible with the long-term priorities of the government; 
and it should be sufficiently comprehensive to incorporate the 
interdependencies relating to the specific subject of the planning. 
(Ad hoc also implies that the problem is more or less unexpected 
and requires individual attention, although here the sense will be 
extended to cases which were anticipated but left for later 
detailed attention.) Obviously the difference between ad hoc 
planning and managerial decision-making might be slight in the 
sense that both are concerned with short-term matters; the 
distinction lies in the subject matter, managerial policies being - 
essentially repetitive and operational, based on the management of 
existing facilities rather than the addition of new works and such 
like. Decisions in the managerial class are also typically 
flexible and reversible (even though the policy effects of 
decisions may not be).
32. Jane Jacobs argued in The Death and Life of Great American 
Cities (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), chapter 18, that the 
potential of such policies for controlling the use of cars in
a negative direction (Mthe attrition of the private automobile") 
is considerable. See that source for examples.
33. Planning is a particular type of policy process which seeks 
to foresee and control the direction of change in a policy field, 
whether that field is broad or narrow. "A plan is a course of 
action which can be carried into effect, which can be expected to 
lead to the attainment of the ends sought, and which someone (an 
effectuating organization) intends to carry into effect"
(M. Meyerson and E.G. Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public 
Interest (N.Y.: Free Press, 1964), pp. 312 and following).
Strategic planning has the most public and best-documented 
type of decision process and it will receive brief attention here 
for three main reasons. First, ’’grand plans’* are a notable part 
of transport planning and often have substantial political and 
operational importance. (Not all strategic plans are as ambitious 
as the Sydney Area Transportation Study which is discussed below 
but normally definite decisions have to be made on priorities and 
these are normally well publicised.) Second, this type of planning 
has the most obvious decision processes and thus sources of 
co-ordinative influence can be defined in a manner that has more 
general relevance. Finally, the methodologies of past ’grand plans” 
are distinctive and have attracted a great deal of attention. It 
is important to say that while such methodologies can have 
untoward implications which are not immediately obvious, it is 
generally true that the methodologies employed at different times 
in Sydney were consistent with the predominant organisational and 
political intentions and had no real mysteries to the users. That 
is, the methodologies were less significant than the factors which 
explain their adoption. The treatment here will be brief(34) •bu  ^
it will indicate the general scope for co-ordinative influence in 
this policy field and the type of co-ordinative influence which 
might be explored in later empirical chapters.
The conventional methodology for strategic transport planning 
is characterised by the use of relatively standard assumptions and 
procedures of data collection and modelling, which are intended to 
produce an abstract framework of causal relationships to simulate 
and simplify the urban world. The methodology has been evolved and 
standardised (even to the extent of commercial computer ’’packages”) 
by the engineering profession and has been applied in most major 
cities since the Second World War.v There are four major steps:
(i) establish the main social parameters for the planning 
period (typically 10-30 years), such as population, employment, 
income and travel trends;
34. This subject was covered in more depth in R.P. Gibbons, 
’’Transportation Planning in Sydney, Post 1945: Politics, the 
Environment, and Sociospatial Dynamics” (Colloquium paner, 
Department of Government and Public Administration, University of 
Sydney, April 1975).
35. Some general references of value are: T.M. Cowling and
G.C. Steeley, Sub-Regional Planning Studies: An Evaluation (Oxford: 
Pergamon, 1973Ti E.K. Mori ok, ’’Methodologies in the Selection and 
Evaluation of Transportation Alternatives”, in High Speed Ground 
Transportation (Research Report, Transport Research Institute, 
Carnegie-Mellon University, 1969); and P.G. Pak-Poy,
’Comprehensive Transportation Study Techniques”, Australian 
Planning Institute Journal, 4 (4), October 1966.
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(ii) project the expected increase in traffic on the basis 
of present base-year traffic patterns;
(iii) evaluate the existing transport facilities in terms of 
the projected traffic loads; and
(iv) design new facilities and policies to accommodate the 
traffic increase within policy objectives for pollution and the 
like.
This procedure, which is depicted in graphical form in Figure One, 
is realistic in the special terms of the "grand plan" or systems 
approach, as seen in the methodology of the Sydney Area 
Transportation Study, can pU  ^into a more generalised
form as a policy process, as follows. Goals and objectives are 
first formulated; technical models are used to depict relation­
ships, define problems and suggest alternatives; the choices are
evaluated; and the preferred solution is (hopefully)
('57')implemented.v '
The critical question to be considered is, what structural 
characteristics of a political system might affect the planning 
process in the stages set out immediately above? A detailed 
typological analysis was written on this point in the course of 
preparation of this thesis which suggested that three first order 
parameters were significant.^®^ These are:
(a) the degree of specialisation of administration, that is, 
is there central unified responsibility for the various transport 
and land use areas or are there separate specialised agencies?
(b) the type of accountability — is there for example a 
greater metropolitan council based on direct representation, or is 
a State Government (and Ministerial system) responsible, the latter 
containing a less direct nexus between authority and accountability; 
and
(c) the types of finance such as betterment tax, triennial and 
annual grants or loan allocations, and user charges.
There are other factors such as statutory, personality or 
manpower advantages of specific organisations but these are 
generally dependent on or included in the three categories, and/or 
are independent of governmental structure. For example it is
36. See Gibbons (as cited in note 34 above); also Sydney Area 
Transportation Study (Sydney, 1974-5), vol. II.
37. This is basically the "synoptic" approach analysed by
D. Braybrooke and C.E. Lindblom, A Strategy for Decision (N.Y.: 
Free Press, 1963), chs 2 and 3. See also Y. Dror, "The Planning 
Process: a facet design", in F.J. Lynden and E.G. Miller (eds),
Planning, Programming, Budgeting (Chicago: Markham, 1968).
38. That discussion was much too long to be included here. The 
comments thereon of Dr M. Painter were very helpful in adapting 
that treatment to the present context.
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axiomatic that an organisation with a dominant advantage in terms 
of "system resources" as defined later will exercise most influence 
in a policy process, either because it can directly influence the 
terms of reference or recommendations and the like, or because it is 
in the best position to take positive action and is therefore 
favoured in programme recommendations, and so on. Some 
organisations may be so disadvantaged that they can participate in 
name only. In general such circumstances arise as a consequence of 
structural factors and while temporary influences may be important 
at a specific time, it is preferable to identify the structural 
factors. While the typology is necessarily simplified it has 
considerable indicative value in terms of interpreting the dynamic 
performance of a policy system.
Although it is not possible to develop the typology at length
in this place, and it would be meaningless to summarise it in
tabular form because of its complexity, the "goal setting" stage
will be analysed briefly. (Financial parameters will be examined in
Chapter Six.) It will be necessary to assume that the planning
study is being conducted by a representative and "objective"
team of specialists, which is unfortunate because bias can be
reflected in the composition of a study team. However the analysis
is intended to be indicative only and this weakness is not
significant. Further, in the interest of simplicity the main
structural parameters will be arranged in three basic ( 59)combinations, namely:
Case A : central unified administrative structure; greater 
metropolitan council based on direct representation and with 
overall responsibility for urban policy; and funding from a land 
tax (calculated according to the incidence of benefits of a 
programme), triennial funding, and user charges;
Case B: decentralised administrative structure but with 
effective co-ordination through Parliamentary and interdepartmental 
committees and officer communications; Ministerial responsibility 
in a State Parliamentary system; and annual and triennial funding 
from consolidated revenue; and
Case C: dispersed administration without effective 
co-ordinative mechanisms; Ministerial responsibility; and finance 
from user charges.
These alternatives are not meant to be totally comprehensive nor 
do they directly relate to any particular policy system apolying in 
Sydney.
The first task of the transport planning team is the 
determination of the goals of their study and the translation of 
their brief into the terms of their methodology. This is an
39. An alternative framework which has some relevance was provided 
by Richard S. Bolan in "Community Lecisioji Behavior: The Culture of 
Planning", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXXV (5), September 1911.
extremely complicated topic. The brief may for instance be in 
very general language, specifying values to be sought after and 
directions to be taken; it may be more specific and consist of 
objectives, measureable and attainable and specific to the 
circumstances. ^ 40) The brief may be all but sufficient for the 
derivation of operational criteria by the study team; or the team 
may have to go to a local knowledge of politics, a scrutiny of the 
minutes of the responsible planning authorities, formal and informal 
discussions at all levels, and so on. Some issues will rarely be 
specified, as one prominent urban economist has implied:
The first crucial issue involves one's point of view; 
that is, it involves designating whose interests and 
welfare are of concern and at stake. In more direct 
terms, the analyst must specify with some considerable 
care the particu 
being sought...(
The planners will have a varying degree of discretion in the 
formulation of overall and specific priorities, in the specification 
of performance criteria of all types, and in the balancing of 
conflicting community interests:
... the sheer complexity of the work... means that the 
planner will himself make many of the important value 
judgements. It is impossible to consult the whole 
community on many value judgements and it is often 
considered impracticable to consult even elected 
representatives on the grounds that, if this were done, 
the task would never be completed, or data would have 
decayed to the point of uselessness before publication 
of the plan.(42)
For the moment it will be assumed that the brief given to the 
planning team is sufficiently detailed to eliminate the need for the 
planners to derive operational objectives from nominated goals. We 
are therefore interested in the effects that governmental structure 
can have on the constitution of the brief.
lar41) people for whom the "best" plan is
The first requirement for determining goals and objectives is 
that the individual problems and requirements of each service 
(trains, buses, roads and so on) are properly understood by the 
policy-makers. In the first system, Case A, the central greater 
metropolitan council has responsibility for each service and the 
potential for understanding is maximised. Objectives can therefore 
be related to performance and be attainable. In Case B, where the
40. See for example R.C. Young, "Goals and Goal-Setting", 
Journal of the American Institute of Planners, March 1966.
41. M. Wohl, Another View of Transport System Analysis (RAKD 
Publication P-3785, February 1968), p) 3.
42 Cowling and Steeley, o p . cit♦, pp. 23-4.
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services are administered separately but are centrally co-ordinated 
there is again a good possibility that individual requirements will 
be understood properly although there may be weaknesses in the 
communication of that understanding to the Minister and thence 
Government. In Case G, however, the burden of monitoring and 
understanding the separate administrations falls to the Minister(s) 
and the level of understanding will depend largely on the 
independence allowed by the Minister and on the quality of the 
Ministerial research facilities.
The second factor relates to the source of accountability of 
the policy-makers, respectively the greater metropolitan council, 
and (for Cases B and G) the Minister (or Ministers as the case may 
be). In Case A the boundaries of the electorate of the council are 
broadly coincident with the operations of the transport services 
and therefore the political rewards and punishments for planning 
goals and objectives (other things being equal) will be meted out 
in proportion to the judgement of the planning clientele. ^ 3) 
is not necessarily the case in the other two systems because the 
allocation of Ministries would usually divorce the Ministers’ 
electorates from their clientele. Also the communication between 
the urban electorate and the more broadly-based Government is less 
complete cost hoc than in Case A. This could affect the selection 
of goals and objectives through (say) the imposition of partisan 
values on the planning process.^^)
The third influence relates to the initial planning 
commitments of the authorities controlling the respective services. 
In Case A, where activities are controlled centrally (and we can 
assume have been so controlled for a substantial period), 
commitments to investment programmes and administrative policies 
will probably be co-ordinated between services and the chance that
43. Clientele and constituency will be used interchangeably to 
indicate the interests affected by a planning study. See
J.K. Friend, J.M. Power and C.J.L. Yewlett, Public Planning; the 
Inter-Gorporate Dimension (London: Tavistock^ 1974), pp. 29-30.
44. Distortions in value-judgements arising from political 
processes are conceptually difficult, if not impossible, to 
identify let alone measure. Governments never merely represent 
majorities, for they cannot afford to ignore minorities, and there 
is a strong normative element in social planning; that is, they 
provide the people with improved policies or with practical 
compromises, "as rnay be required in the circumstances". Even if a 
Government with strong support from rural electorates chose to 
allocate a disproportionate share of its total road funds to the 
country, it would not necessarily mean that the Government had 
distorted planning values — but it may have. Cf Stephen L. Elkin, 
Politics and Land Use Planning:: The London Experience (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1974), chapter 3. An excellent general 
discussion is Simon, Administrative Behavior, op. cit., chapter III
one service will not be as flexible towards new planning as the 
others (given physical constraints which would be allowed for in 
the planning process) will be minimised. The same can be said of 
Case B. However in the third instance the opportunities for the 
separate administrations to act out-of-step are maximised; this 
will possibly mean that one or more services will be disadvantaged, 
or worse, out-of-step, when the new planning is undertaken. If 
the policy-makers are aware of this, the goals and objectives which 
they would have otherwise specified would have to be altered. Such 
an alteration might be significant.
The remaining factors follow on from the third in that they 
are all potentially destructive of an ’’objectively-defined optimum 
mix” of goals and objectives.
The fourth requirement is that there be no undue bias towards 
either social or operational objectives. In Gases A and B the 
shared political responsibility for all types of urban agencies 
(in different measure) and the past history of effective 
co-ordination will tend to produce balanced objectives in the terms 
of the preceding paragraph. The dispersed structure of Case C 
again suggests that there may be a tendency towards imbalances 
between authorities and that this could prejudice the goal/ 
objective-producing processes. The determination of the importance 
of this factor rests on the characteristics of those processes; 
the final point is concerned with this.
It is generally accepted that the outcome of any decision­
making process will largely depend on the distribution of what 
might be called ’’system resources’’ between competing groups, the 
use of those resources, and the sensitivity of the decision-making 
process to the use of those resources over a range of issues.
Thus the lifth requirement for a balanced mix of planning goals and 
objectives is a composite: a reasonably even distribution of 
resources between service administrations (where the resources are 
defined according to the characteristics of each political sub­
system), an impartial agency in overall authority, and a set of 
issues which do not arouse combative instincts of say self-survival 
It cannot be determined a priori which of these are ’’necessary” 
and/or "sufiicient" conditions; in any case, this analysis is 
concerned only with broad principles.
There are four main types of system resources which are 
available to transport planning agencies. The first is the 
political strength of the respective bureaucracies: do they enjoy 
the favour of politicians; do they have influential constituencies 
such as motor-lobby pressure groups (or even influential enemies, 
such as environmental groups); and do they have special statutory
9 t C i
powers, one against the other? The second resource is the 
administrative and research strength of the agencies and their 
ability to wield their resources. (The willingness to do so is a 
separate question.) The third possible resource in a multi- 
organisational planning framework is the agencies’ respective 
control over finance, manpower and materials to enable them to 
confidently plan ahead. The fourth is in some respects a mirror 
image of the third: the ability of an agency to assume planning 
responsibilities and participate in the planning process will be 
inversely related to its initial financial disabilities and 
continuing debt commitments. If an authority is unable to incur 
new investment itself, and depending on the characteristics of and 
resources within the planning system, it may be removed from the 
goal-setting process and the use of its other resources may be 
nullified. These four aspects of resource allocation within a 
system of organisations underlie all other considerations which 
have already been discussed.
The influence of ’’resource allocation’’ on goal/objective- 
setting can be fundamental in certain circumstances. In Case A the 
system resources are concentrated in the central city parliament 
and its subsidiary bureaucracy and there is no question of inter- 
organisational competition. There may however be interaction 
between the internal divisions of the bureaucracy and it is 
possible that basically the same processes will go on within the 
managerial structure as between different agencies. This is a very 
real possibility but as the main difference between the two types 
may be the hierarchial nature of the internal processes, no 
special attention needs to be given to this point in addition to 
what follows. One important factor is however the fairly direct . 
relationship between the cost of and funding of investment 
programmes in Case A, with a land tax depending on the spatial 
distribution of the benefits of, for instance, railway 
construction^^ being supplemented by triennial funding and user 
charges. This combination provides an adequate degree of certainty 
and evenness between different services and can help to overcome 
initial financial handicaps in particular areas. From the point 
of view of organisational interplay then, Case A represents an 
ideal framework for the determination of goals and objectives, 
with the only competition for attention coming from within 
bureaucracies. This latter factor is independent of governmental 
structure in this case only to the extent that the greater 
metropolitan council allows its apnarat to influence its community 
policy-making.
4 5. See N. Clark, "Analysis of the Melbourne underground railway 
proposals", in N. Clark (cd.), Analysis of Urban Development: the 
Tewkesbury Symposium (Melbourne^ 1 ).
The governmental structure of Case B introduces the 
possibility of separate organisations influencing the central 
co-ordinating mechanisms through the employment of system resources. 
The organisations can try to influence the Government through the 
Minister, directly or indirectly, especially if more than one 
Minister has transport and other urban responsibility; then the 
personal resources of the Ministers are relevant. The fact that 
there is effective co-ordination between the separate agencies 
does not imply that the goals and objectives of a study dealing 
with the general range of transport administration will necessarily 
be "balanced" between the needs of the authorities, nor does it 
imply that the only major value-judgements will result from 
political decisions relating to the urban human environment. One 
qualification is, however, that the existence of an effective 
co-ordinative mechanism will tend to minimise the divergence of 
resource holdings between the agencies, so that at the outset of 
the planning process there is a fair probability that no particular 
authority will be severely handicapped and therefore be excluded 
from the goal-setting procedures. The system for funding 
investment allows adequate scope for the Government to help a 
specific service authority to overcome an existing debt burden, 
although the inbuilt flexibility is less than in Case A.
The potential for inter-organisational competition in Case C 
is basically the same as in Case B but with the difference that 
there is not necessarily any mechanism to restrain the divergence 
in resources between authorities in the long-run. An authority 
with a large debt burden, for example, will not be able to 
participate as fully as necessary in new works programmes and may 
as a consequence lose patronage and thus revenue. Even where 
extensive new planning is not involved, the reliance of each 
authority on user revenue and the inevitable differences in 
revenue and costs between services will lead to a progressive 
imbalance in system resources. To some extent therefore, the 
conventional notions of interest group interaction, as applied to 
inter-organisational systems, will not hold true: some agencies 
could be so badly disadvantaged as to be excluded from the 
bargaining processes. This would be reflected in the goals and 
objectives expressed in the planning brief.
The main conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing analysis 
is that the determination of the goals and objectives of major 
transport studies can be influenced substantially by the structural 
characteristics of the urban governmental system. While the main 
structural features (including, for the present purposes, finance) 
have been grouped into specific combinations, the influences have 
been traced both to the combinations and to the individual features
themselves, and so the analysis is more general than may at first
(4 6 )appear. '
Similar analyses can he developed for each of the decision 
stages identified earlier hut the central point is clear. While 
planning might he judged to he inadequate at a particular time, 
the causes of the weaknesses may not he so much in temporary or 
superficial or short-term factors. These might he important hut 
are in turn caused to a great extent hv more basic forces which 
arise from the way the political system works. As an example of 
the need to reach basic causes, too many explanations of why 
contemporary transport planning has been inadequate stop with a 
conclusion that conventional methodologies cannot embrace economic, 
social, political and technological complications. This conclusion 
implies a search for better methods yet it should he obvious that 
it would he better to ask why was a particular methodology used? 
Other causes are given as shortages of finance or the failure of 
politicians to adequately define a particular objective, yet again 
while these factors might have some inherent validity they are 
otherwise subsidiary to the more basic forces of how finance is 
raised and allocated, or how organisations influence politicians, 
and so on. Such essentially co-ordinative factors are endemic to 
the working of a political system.
It is the purpose of this thesis to examine transport 
administration and planning in Sydney with particular reference to 
the period after 1945 in order to assess the influence of 
co-ordinative factors on corporate and system performance. There 
are three main tasks inherent in this undertaking. First, the 
historical record of planning is established in the broad sweep.
In terms of the policy classes distinguished earlier, most atten-. 
tion will necessarily be given to strategic planning although an 
attempt has been made to document performance in other areas.
Second, the main co-ordinative factors are identified empirically, 
using the discussion which has been presented in this Introduction 
as a framework. This amounts to critically evaluating the 
governmental system of New South Wales as it applies to transport 
and related fields. Thirdly, an attempt is made to identify and 
relate the features of planning and governmental structure to test 
the proposition advanced earlier, that transport planning has 
relatively stringent co-ordinative requirements, that organisational 
behaviour tends to be closed and "egocentric", and that
46. The relaxation of the previous assumption that the brief is 
adequate for the planning team’s purposes, taken with a realistic 
presumption that the team is not isolated from political processes, 
would not appear to modify the preceding analysis very much. The 
influences on goal-setting would be extended in a basically 
unchanged form to the deliberations of the team, and the end 
result would probably be essentially the same as when inter- 
organisational pressures were confined to the formulation of the 
brief (as input to the team).
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co-ordinative agencies might not be able to provide adequate
input to achieve results which meet the requirements of inter-
( a n\dependence and effectiveness.
Each of the three tasks has been challenging, particularly 
because the respective literatures of public administration, town 
planning and related disciplines have not critically addressed the 
question of co-ordination in New South Wales, let alone transport 
planning generally. Even in comparatively famous planning episodes 
significant misconceptions and inaccuracies have emerged and 
persisted. The research programme has consisted of extensive 
literature searches and formal and informal interviews and 
discussions. The findings reinforce the view of the importance of 
co-ordination for effective policy-making that has already been 
expressed. While the thesis necessarily consists of a range of 
subjects and sub-themes, the central conclusion is that the 
government system of Sydney has been deficient as to the organisa­
tion of administration and planning and the mechanisms of co­
ordination, and that consequently closed value systems have 
developed in organisations, biased planning methodologies have 
occasionally been used, inadequate consideration has been given to 
social and political priorities, and imbalances in resources have 
emerged. Other contributing causes are identified. A number of 
definite suggestions are made for improvement in the Conclusion.
The thesis is organised in ten chapters of which this 
Introduction has been the first. The period before the Second 
World War is dealt with in four chapters in Part 1 which relate to 
the main contemporary planning and administrative developments.
The period after 1945 is also treated in four chapters, the first . 
providing an analysis of the general governmental framework and the 
rest dealing with the main functional areas of main roads, public 
transport and explicit co-ordination. The final chapter, the 
Conclusion, evaluates the detailed discussion in terms of the 
overall theme of the thesis and presents a prognosis for reform in 
several critical parameters. The chapters will now be briefly 
discussed to indicate the progress of the argument.
47. It has already been said that there are great difficulties in 
defining what constitutes a deficiency in policy. This matter is 
often far more clear in historical perspective. Otherwise in this 
thesis effectiveness is taken to mean that the outcomes of policy 
processes accord with the objectives of policy-making and that 
the initial goals and objectives are consistent with the wishes of 
the elected Government. For a more limited definition see Report of 
R.C.A.G♦A ., op. cit., pp. 31 ff; also Self, op. cit. , p. 264. This 
is not intended to constrain the eaually vexacious question of 
defining co-ordinative influence. I shall follow Grenson, or. cit., 
chapter IV.
Chapter Two deals with the first and in some respects the most 
significant strategic planning study, the Royal Commission for the 
Improvement of the City of Sydney and its Suburbs (1908-09). A 
combination of political, social and economic circumstances 
produced an awareness of the causes of previous urban management 
problems and created an ideal environment for a comprehensive 
planning and (in a limited sense) administrative programme of 
reform. The Commission's Report contained recommendations for 
physical works (roads and railways) and planning powers which 
constituted the beginning of "modern" planning in Sydney. The 
Commission was independent of narrow organisational ties and was 
able to produce a Report of high technical quality which also 
integrated the contemporary conceptions of social improvement and 
environmental standards. The Commission was a model for 
comprehensive decision processes and its success (as defined) will 
be compared with later attempts.
Chapter Three is concerned with the subsequent developments 
to the Improvement Commission and especially with the contribution 
of Sydney's most famous planning advocate, Dr J.J.C. Bradfield. 
Bradfield's impact is examined critically in the context of the 
planning lobbies of the time and the actual contributions of others 
to the design and planning, rather than advocacy, of the Harbour 
Bridge, the innercity underground rail system, and the 
electrification of the Sydney railways. This chapter is apparently 
the first attempt of its type and produces conclusions which 
challenge the conventional understanding of the planning processes 
of that time. Chapter Two performs a similar role in relation to 
the Improvement Commission although it is possible to present a 
more definitive analysis there than in the Bradfield chapter.
There is a comparative and in some instances absolute absence of 
complementary secondary sources for Chapters Two and Three and 
these are the most thoroughly documented in the thesis for that 
reason.
The 1920s were to a large extent a technological climacteric 
for Sydney in that private road vehicles replaced public transport 
modes for many uses and this resulted in new emphases and pressures 
in urban planning. Chapter Four examines the main elements in the 
road planning movement, namely the "planning" of main road 
improvements on a fairly progressive and integrated basis, and the 
management of traffic to achieve goals of "control" and efficiency. 
Attention is naturally focussed on the Main Roads Board which was 
established by the Main Roads Act of 1924, but several other 
actors who have been largely forgotten in the subsequent literature 
are studied, particularly the Traffic Advisory Committee. The 
chanter v/ill also deal with the tram Vs bus controversy insofar as
it is relevant and will summarise the contributions of Sir Michael 
Bruxner as Minister for Transport. This period is comparatively 
well covered by secondary sources and the treatment is predominant­
ly interpretative.
Chapter Five consists of a brief analysis of the main 
administrative reforms of the period 1930 to 1932 in which Premier 
Lang and Lieutenant-Colonel Bruxner alternatively juxtaposed their 
ideas on the administrative system, with Bruxner finally deciding 
in 1932 what sort of system would survive, virtually without major 
change, for forty years. Again the treatment is interpretative 
and attention is concentrated on the main points of conflict and 
agreement on organisational design. The evolution of the transport 
governmental system is touched on in some way in every chapter in 
Part 1 and Chapter Five rounds out the discussion.
One very interesting observation that can be made on the basis 
of Part 1 is that in the case of major urban rail works there was 
a long period of gestation in which organisational and popular 
commitment was gained, followed by a period in which legislative 
backing was ootained, and then implementation. By the time that 
the city underground and suburban electrification were tackled in 
iorce, the railways had lost their basic technological imperative 
although the hard-won commitment was strong enough to sustain the 
programme of construction almost to completion. A similar pattern 
obtained in the case of the comparable road works, the Department 
of Main Roads' Main Roads Development Plan (that is, the freeway 
programme), which will be discussed in Chapter Seven, except that 
tne commitment was in the end not strong enough to overcome adverse 
societal trends. None the less there were parallel factors of 
organisational specialisation and commitment, progressive societal 
and political endorsement, and partial eventual irrelevance. These 
factors point to what are perhaps fundamental features of the 
governmental system of Sydney which have not been previously 
analysed to this writer's knov/ledge.
Part 2. consists of four chapters, the first of which is 
Chapter Six. This is a general discussion of the postwar evolution 
of Sydney's governmental system and particularly of such matters as 
the succession of bodies concerned with central land use management 
local road planning, Commonwealth and inter-governmental relations, 
and transport funding. This chapter provides the background to the 
more specialised analyses which follow.
Chapter Seven deals with the planning of the Department of 
Main Roads, the organisation's internal values and drive, and the 
success which it had in having its philosophy (that is freeways)
endorsed in the wider context of metropolitan planning. Although 
the Department was not very successful in terms of bricks-and- 
mortar and has not influenced urban development as much as other 
statutory authorities, its experience poses fundamenta] questions 
of political accountability and Ministerial control, organisational 
dynamics, and inter-corporate co-ordination.
Chapter Eight is concerned with similar subjects of planning, 
organisation and co-ordination but in the context of public 
transport administration. In this area the statutory authority 
has been the dominant form of organisation but there have been 
recurring questions of efficiency and operational co-ordination.
In 1972 the Askin Government experimented with the amalgamation of 
the Departments of Government Transport (buses) and Railways in the 
form of the Public Transport Commission. That experiment has 
answered none of the earlier questions and has posed new ones of 
organisational control and adaptation: it has to 1977 been a 
pronounced yet irremedial failure. Chapter Eight will briefly 
analyse the P.T.C. and its predecessors with regard to their 
planning of rail and bus systems and their administrative 
experience.
Chapters Six to Eight in effect are concerned with the 
performance of the operational components of the transport system. 
Chapter Nine deals with the agencies which at times have had 
nominal responsibility for co-ordination, at times effective 
responsibility, and at times not even nominal responsibility. 
Political institutions such as Cabinet and Ministers are discussed 
briefly as are the Traffic Authority of New South Wales, the
Ministry of Transport and Highways, and the main interdepartmental 
committees, CUMTAC and its successor URTAC. In each case actual 
roles are defined and performance is assessed as far as possible.
It will be seen that political will and task specialisation are 
the crucial elements in inter-corporate co-ordination, and that 
political will has been notably absent for most of the postv/ar 
period, until the mid-1970s when the elements of a basic effective 
system emerged.
The final chapter, the Conclusion, is predominantly focussed 
on the main concern of the thesis, namely the identification and 
assessment of co-ordinative influences on decision-making and the 
consideration of improvements to the existing governmental system. 
It is suggested that there are compelling reasons for retaining a 
functionally specialised administration system, through statutory 
authorities unless the Departmental form can be significantly 
improved, but in a very firm framework of organisational 
accountability both to the Government and to each other (in line
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with functional and other interdependencies). Suggestions are made 
to improve the administrative system through the full use of inter­
departmental committees and special purnose task forces, but more 
importantly through an improved budgetary system and a conscious 
effort to appraise the distribution of “system resources".
Specific reference is made to the Departments of Main Roads and 
Motor Transport, the Traffic Authority, the Public Transport 
Commission, the Ministry of Transport and Highways, the Urban 
Transport Advisory Committee, and the Cabinet system of government.
In a thesis covering a complicated topic it is perhaps 
inevitable that several sub-themes will emerge. The main ones in 
this thesis are concerned with organisational specialisation and 
external planning; the roles of specific actors such as the 
Improvement of Sydney Commission and Bradfield; the validity of 
the theoretical emphases of the present chapter; and the adequacy 
or inadequacy of specific planning efforts. Such a range of sub­
themes is in large part the result of the paucity of critical 
analyses of Sydney’s twentieth century experience. It became more 
and more apparent as the research for this thesis progressed that 
many problems which politicians and administrators are now facing 
can only be properly understood through historical study.
One disclaimer can be entered at the outset, namely that this 
thesis is concerned with a complex topic which does not have 
adequate theoretical^^ or empirical precedents. For example 
transport planning methodology is quite technical in content and 
has been very poorly covered by political and social analysts. 
Obvious faults such as the bias of engineering models towards 
measurable data are widely recognised, but there has been no 
comprehensive analysis of the various models employed and the 
importance of the data processing methods in policy terms. More 
importantly, very little critical material has been published on 
transport planning in Sydney, especially on the rationale of major 
planning decisions but more generally on interdepartmental 
relations, the operation of interdepartmental and Cabinet 
committees, budget-making and finance, (49) re]_ations between
48. In some respects Friend, Power and Yewlett, op. cit., had a 
similar task to the present thesis but their analysis has not been 
particularly helpful. One reason for this was their comparative 
emphasis on reticulist (or inter-personal) co-ordinative linkages 
at the expense of the formal communication, allocation and 
accountability channels which this thesis must be concerned with. 
Reticulists will however be dealt with in Chapter Fine.
49. A partial exception is K.W. Knight and K.W. Wiltshire, 
Formulating Government Budgets (St. Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press, 1977). Tnis has excellent genera] discussions of several 
aspects discussed later but unfortunately appeared too late to 
enable full use to be made of it. Another valuable general source 
is R.S. Parker and P.N. Troy (eds), The Politics of Urban Growth
ministers and departments, and the operation of statutory bodies. 
Each of these areas has been researched more or less successfully: 
some areas are regarded as politically confidential or as not 
worth publicising, some have only bits and pieces of information 
scattered in the various archives and libraries, and of course some 
have inherent difficulties. For these reasons the analysis will be 
qualified as necessary. As far as possible interviews have been 
used and indeed the thesis has benefitted greatly from the 
generosity and perspicacity of those listed (and not specifically 
listed) in footnotes and the Bibliography; however deficiencies in 
information availability will be recognised as the occasion 
requires.
(Canberra: A.N.U. Press, 1972), especially the chapters by Parker,
France and Hughes, and Harrison.
PART ONE
HISTORICAL LEGACY 1900-1943
Chapter Two
First Planning: The Improvement of 
Sydney Commission 1908-09
In (our) Interim Report... we referred to the 
difficulties of evolving a symmetrical scheme of 
improvement of the City of Sydney and its suburbs. 
Further inquiry and deliberation have convinced us 
that those difficulties cannot be wholly overcome without great sacrifice on the part of the citizens. 
Our aim has been to ascertain how, at a reasonable 
expenditure, the transit facilities of Sydney and its 
suburbs may be improved, while at the same time adding 
character and dignity to a city in harmony with its 
situation on one of the finest harbour sites in the 
world.
Improvement of Sydney Commission, 
Report (1909).
The first decade of the twentieth century saw the beginning 
of nlanning in Sydney. The past development of the metropolis 
had been completely unregulated and there were critical backlogs 
of services and civic works as well as weaknesses in controls over 
housing and building standards, pollution and the like. These 
problems had been recognised in the past but in this decade they 
received intense scrutiny in connection with the introduction of 
overseas ideas of urban improvement and the critical element of 
governmental reform. In fact there was an almost continuous 
debate in the decade over the functions and form of local 
government: social improvement was linked by politicians and
publicists to the realisation that effective solutions would be 
based on controlling future development, and that the government 
system of the past could not provide that control. The result of 
general acceptance of these propositions was an environment 
conducive to planning and Australia’s first true planning enquiry, 
the Royal Commission for the Improvement of the City of Sydney and 
its Suburbs.
The decade started with two extremely important influences. 
First, general recovery from the drastic depression of the 1890s 
was well under way and Australians were becoming more and more
( i )aware of the social weaknesses of their habitats. Secondly,
the work of Haussman in Paris and the English municipal reform of
1888 (the formation of the London County Council) inspired a
relatively small number of well-travelled politicians and public
figures to evaluate conditions in Sydney in terms of overseas
perspectives, and to make good use of improving internal
( 2 )communications to spread their knowledge.s ' Thus the major
deficiencies of Sydney's development, and these had long been
( 1)recognised, were given a sharper focus and a popular consensus 
developed among journalists, politicians and the prosperous 
professional classes, and in various public meetings and in the
1. See E.C. Fry, ’Growth of an Australian Metropolis" in 
R.S. Parker and P.N. Troy (eds), The Politics of Urban Grov/th 
(Canberra: A.N.U.P., 1972), p.157 See also R.P. Gibbons, ^he 
Development of Sydney: the Improvement of Sydney Commission 
1908-09” (unpublished undergraduate thesis, Department of Economic 
History, University of Sydney, 1972), pp.6-15 for general economic and social background. This is hereafter cited as: Gibbons, 
"Improvement Commission".
2. There is a good section on overseas ideas in F.A. Larcombe,
"The History and Development of Local Government in N.S.W. 1857-1919 (M.Ec thesis, Department of Government, University of Sydney, 1944), 
vol.II, pp. 308 ff. The activities of the "advocates" is dealt with 
in R.P. Gibbons, "An Improvement Programme for Greater Sydney" 
(unpublished postgraduate essay, Department of Government and Public
Administration, University of Sydney, 1974), which is hereafter cited as: Gibbons, "Greater Sydney*".
5- See E. Irvine, Sydney As It Might Have Been (Svdnev: Alpha 1974;, throughout. --- -------------------- —
Dress, along two main lines. These were respectively the need 
for planning and the need for governmental reform.
The physical deficiencies of the metropolis were obvious, 
even if commentators were sometimes rather weak on analysis.
There were no structural means of communication between the city 
and the north shore: there was severe congestion on the Harbour 
and the development of the prestigious areas to the north was held 
up. The suburban railway terminated at Redfern Station until 1906 
and then at Central, worsening tram congestion on the innercity 
streets. Substantial areas in the eastern and western suburbs 
were not served at all by railways. The innercity streets were 
ugly and lacked distinction; government buildings were scattered 
and offered no scope for beautification (unlike in overseas cities). 
It was later realised that the pattern of city streets was extremely 
deficient and caused congestion (see below). Atmospheric pollution 
on the Harbour and on land was uncontrollable given the absence of 
sufficient municipal powers and resources; the same applied to 
hoardings and public advertisements. There had never been housing 
and building regulations and attempts at slum eradication were 
expensive and basically counter-productive because adequate housing 
could not be found for the purposes of relocation. New suburbs 
were unimaginative and unplanned. And so on.^^ There was a quite 
general recognition that many of these problems were caused by the 
weaknesses of regulatory powers and by the lack of resources and 
cohesion among government bodies. Hence while the range of issues 
was confusing, there was a genuine consensus about the main policy 
areas which needed action and disagreement within the metropolis was 
centred mostly on details.
Consensus extended to many aspects of governmental reform.
Much attention was given to the differing policies and quality of 
local government bodies in whom a great deal of the responsibility 
for urban affairs was vested. State Governments were generally 
favourably inclined to the main metropolitan issues with Premiers 
such as Carruthers taking an active interest but facing strong 
opposition from country representatives and the Legislative
( 5 )Council.v ' Throughout the decade there was widespread support 
from nearly all quarters of the city for one major prognosis of
4. See J.D. Pitzgerald, Greater Sydney and Greater Newcastle
(Sydney: N.S.W. Bookstall Co., 1906); Gibbons, "Greater Sydney",
especially pp. 1-4» and "Improvement Commission", pp. 63-75.
5. Quite apart from the anti-city prejudice that was common at 
the time, it should be remembered that rural development was an 
overriding priority in the pre- 1 9 3 9 period and fundamentally 
affected Government policy. Cf W.A. Sinclair, "Capital Formation" 
in C. Foster (ed), Australian Economic Development in the Twentieth 
Century (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), pp. 14-15 and elsewhere.
9 V 
1 # *
problems and one major proposition, namely Greater Sydney. The 
Carruthers, Wade and McGowen ministries all included Greater 
Sydney in their platforms and even many local councils, whose 
status was potentially threatened by the pronosal, favoured the 
basic concept. This subject is extremely important and warrants 
careful attention.
Greater Sydney was argued in two basic forms. As developed 
along the London precedent it referred to the consolidation of 
municipal boundaries to form a single area of "continuous 
settlement", governed and serviced by an elected central parliament. 
A federal Greater Sydney on the other hand would leave the 
responsibility for purely "local" issues in the hands of municipal 
councils but with a co-operative central body of council 
representatives to manage the main system services (transport, 
water and sewerage and perhaps gas) which were then in the hands 
of separate statutory authorities. The dominant stream of thought, 
as reflected in Government policy and most popular agitation and 
City Council policy, was "centralism", but local councils could 
not only see advantages in "federation" but diverted some of the 
popular force of Greater Sydney by adapting the concept to protect 
themselves.
The first concrete steps towards Greater Sydney were taken in 
1900 by two "conferences", one supporting a unificationist reform 
and attended by (among others) three men discussed later, namely 
Thomas Hughes, Dr James Graham and John Barlow. In the second 
local government interests countered with a recommendation for 
federation. There was substantial common ground between the two 
groups for they both wanted (i) a strong central body; (ii) 
municipal ownership and control of the great common services;
(iii) initiation of experiments in humanitarian and aesthetic 
policies along new overseas lines; (iv) wider municipal powers;
(v) slum clearance; and (vi) a workingmen's rehousing programme.^ ^ 
In 1902 a Select Committee on Greater Sydney was appointed but its 
investigations were interrupted by the prorogation of Parliament
and there was ostensibly insufficient interest to reappoint it;(8 )its Minutes of Evidence were not published until 1912. ' Then in
6. A different but more detailed treatment will be found in 
Gibbons, "Greater Sydney", passim.
7. Eitzgerald, on. cit., pp. 37 ff.
8. Report of Select Committee on Municipal Government for 
Greater Sydney, V,P,L.A ., Session of 1911-12, voi. III. See 
Hughes's statement on p. 14 that the government system provided 
for too many aldermen to "misgovern the metropolitan area", also 
Fitzgerald's analysis of financial problems at p. 94.
1906 Sir Joseph Garruthers, the self-professed champion of local 
government,^' presented his Local Government Act including what 
was known as the Cities Extension Bill. Garruthers was forced to 
drop this Bill because of opposition to the proposed mode of 
municipal consolidation and franchise and it is only partly true 
that the unificationist Greater Sydney which was implied in it was 
the cause of the opposition.
The 1906 Act rationalised the local government system in 
New South Wales but disadvantaged the City of Sydney because it 
was the only municipality in the metropolis to be denied the 
independence of the land tax (the rate on unimproved capital value). 
Between 1906 and 1908, when the tax was transferred to the City 
along with certain responsibilities which had previously been 
tended by the State Government, the Council was able to arouse 
considerable sympathy for its programmes and problems. It was 
generally acknowledged to be the best-run and most progressive 
council. It was dominated by Lord Mayors Thomas Hughes and Allen 
Taylor, who alternated every few years, and was served by 
aldermen of the ability of J.D. Fitzgerald, Edward O'Sullivan and 
James Grahami9 l0  ^ The Council was on the whole strongly 
unificationist and provoked complaints of central-city imperialism, 
and the land tax issue aroused interest in its philosophies. In
1907 moreover an acrimonious public debate between Thomas Keele, 
President of the Water Board, and the Government over the health 
problems arising from the division of responsibility for dams 
between the Board and the Department of Public Works attracted 
attention to what were known as the "evils of divided control".
The debate ended in Keele's transfer from the Board and further 
sympathy for governmental reform.
"Divided control" was central to the political economy of 
Greater Sydney. The rationale of the movement lay in the growing 
"irrelevance" of the existing system in relation to the pattern 
of development. To paraphrase the basic philosophy (which was 
common to unificationist and federalist interpretations): 
metropolitan services were necessarily inter-municipal in an age of 
metropolitan expansion and communication but municipal polities 
could not maintain control of inter-municipal institutions. Even 
if bodies such as the Water Board were "representative" of local 
government, they were not "responsive" and would not be unless the
9. See F .A. Larcombe, The Stabilization of Local Government in
N.S.W. 1858-1906 (Sydney: S.U.P., 1976), pp. 273"ff.
10. See Gibbons, "Greater Sydney", pp. 8-9. This paragraph is 
based on contemporary newspaper reports.
electors controlled the bureaucracies involved; as for the
Harbour Trust, said Thomas Henley, member of the Water Board and
leading anti-unificationist, because it was an elected body it was
"naturally autocratic, unpopular, and out-of-touch with the 
1 1 -1 \people" .v 1 The inevitable result of such a system of central 
bureaucracies, it was agreed, was a multiplicity of controlling 
bodies set up on an ad hoc and unco-ordinated basis, unresponsive 
and inefficient.^12^
As has been said, even local government interests agreed with 
the bulk of the above prognosis if not the (centralist) 
prescription. The distinction between centralism and federalism 
was maintained throughout the decade and beyond. As Colonel Onslow 
of Waverley remarked on a Greater Sydney bill in the third reading 
stages in the Legislative Assembly in 1911:
Here we are committing ourselves to a scheme that 
means overcentralisation, because unification always 
means that. In saying that, I do not wish it to be 
inferred that I do not approve of a Greater Sydney, 
but the Greater Sydney I believe in is a federalisa of municipal government instead of a unification. \ ‘
The unificationists basically did not accept this argument because
of their view of the inherent requirements of regulatory functions
and also because of the financial and institutional weaknesses of
local government, even after 1906. While the federalists countered
the slogans of "economy" and "efficiency" with "local democracy",
few could deny the judgement of J.F. Fraser in 1910 that "many of
these local municipalities (in Sydney) are in antagonism one with
the other, with the result that there is an absence of desire to
work together for the benefit of the city as a whole".^ 1 ^  The
federalist Henley had circularised local councils in 1907 to
organise opposition to unification; some municipalities had
rejected his advances but most of the replies "favoured retaining
control of local works, and electing experienced and trusted
aldermen to form a Metropolitan Board of Works to control
( 1 5 )inter-municipal services".
The importance of the movement as outlined is obvious, 
especially in terms of governmental and planning perspectives, and 
moreover the movement was truly important in contemporary terms.
11. Daily Telegraph, June 3, 1907.
12. The best contemporary analysis was Fitzgerald, op. cit. See 
also J.D.B. Miller, "Greater Sydney 1892-1952", Public Administ­
ration (Sydney), vol. XIII, no. 2-3; F.A. Bland, Greater Sydney
(H.S .W. Government Printer, 1943).
13. N.S.W. Parliamentary Debates, 2nd series, vol. 45, p. 4215.
14. J.F. Fraser, Australia (Cassell, 1910), p. 163.
15. Daily Telegraph, 15 July 1907, p. 3; also 3 July 1907, p. 13.
It was the dominant issue in urban politics (even at the State
level) and had very widespread support, from newspapers,
professional commentators, politicians and especially the Sydney (16)City Council. ' However from the first it lacked unified support,
its political force was dissipated between various major civic
issues as well as internecine conflict between councils and
unificationists versus federalists. The most important proponents
(17) (18)such as J.D. Fitzgerald' ' and Thomas Hughes' had a comprehen- 
sive conception of their movement but they had considerable 
difficulty in marshalling the diverse interests as well as arousing 
the masses. However from the middle of the decade, as far as can 
be judged from a careful reading of all major newspapers and 
journals and other sources, the tone of the Greater Sydney movement 
began to change somewhat. As one newspaper commented in early 1907 
on Hughes’s performance as Lord Mayor:
A Greater Sydney, under whatever constitution, is not 
attainable while the people are apathetic. Mr Hughes 
evidently recognises this very clearly. He puts forward 
a practical and suggestive programme of necessary 
reforms, and essays to arouse the indispensable force of 
a consolidated public opinion in support of it...'~°/
Hughes recognised the links between civic reform and urban 
improvement and the greater political potential of the latter. He 
was part of a lobby which was centred on the City Council and 
included E.W. O ’Sullivan, John Sulman (who published The Improvement 
of Sydney, first in the Daily Telegraph then in book form in 1908), 
J.D. Fitzgerald, Sir James Graham and the like. They developed the 
link as a deliberate strategy, with the help of newspapers (such as 
the Daily Telegraph, the Sydney Morning Herald, the Sydney Mail. 
Building. Art and Architecture and the Bulletin) which ran frequent 
stories on specific problems and editorials intended to arouse 
politicians and the populace. As the demands for improvements
16. Cf Gibbons, "Greater Sydney”, pp. 5 ff.
17. Fitzgerald was a leader in both the analysis and politics of 
municipal reform. He was President of the First and Second Town 
Planning Conferences (1917 and 1918) and first Minister for Local 
Government appointed to administer the Local Government Act, 1919, 
which he largely drafted. He was a major force in introducing 
overseas ideas including the Burns Bill of 1909 (see later). See 
for example P. Spearritt, ”An Urban History of Sydney 1920-1950” 
(unpublished Ph.D thesis, A.N.U., 1976), pp. 24-5, 223-4. (Cited 
with permission.)
18. Hughes was Sydney's first Lord Mayor and was extremely active 
in municipal politics. He was appointed to Legislative Council in 
1908; educated in law at London University, director of numerous 
companies and Member of the Board of Health 1902-08. See Larcombe, 
Stabilization of Local Government, pp. 41-2; Gibbons, "Improvement 
Commission”, pp. 16 , 86 .
19. Daily Telegraph, 13 March 1907, p. 6.
accumulated, the immensity of the physical investment required and 
the need to approach the matter systematically reinforced the 
awareness of the need for governmental reform. The following 
quotes from the Daily Telegraph were typical of the editorials of 
the time:
(i) Before systematic progress can be made with (road
improvements, resumptions and redevelopment, new city 
markets and a North Shore bridge), it is requisite that 
the metropolitan constituency should recognise that it 
has a large, important, and interesting sphere of 
practical politics in the city.... So long as these 
populous (suburbs) remain divided into so many separate governing areas, each doing sectionally what ought to be 
corporate work, so long will the whole be inevitably
and debarred from realising its
(ii) The system that sufficed for Sydney as a smaller city, 
almost self-contained, is not suitable to the Sydney of today, so surrounded by contiguous suburbs that the 
boundary line of the metropolis is imperceptible except 
in the legal sense. The metropolitan community, enlarged 
and woven together, has common requirements, and therefore 
needs a system that would facilitate co-operative action, 
for instance in the supply of services, in the homogeneity of methods, and so on.(21;
One consequence was a request for the appointment of a Royal 
Commission into the need for an improvement programme in Sydney.
This request originated in the City Council. In the first half 
of 1907 in a meeting of the V/orks Committee of Council, one 
alderman drew attention to the desirability "of having a definite 
scheme submitted for the improvem“"1- 'L1‘~ -----
Surveyor was subsequently instructed to prepare such a plan but it 
would appear from an examination of the Minutes of Council and 
newspapers that nothing positive was done in this direction.
On the 4th December, 1907, the Hon. E.W. O’Sullivan, M.L.A. 
and city alderman, asked Premier Wade (who had recently succeeded 
Carruthers), the following question without notice:
20. Ibid., 12 March, 1907.
21. Ibid., 14 March, 1907. The Telegraph was more involved in 
civic issues than the Sydney Morning Herald (Sulman for instance 
was a director of the former, see Gibbons, "Improvement Commission" pp. 19-20), but the editorial lines were similar. A more extensive 
survey of newspaper opinion will be found in Gibbons, "Greater 
Sydney", throughout.
22. Letter to editor by G. Sydney Jones, Daily Telegraph
May 1, 1907. Jones was apparently paraphrasing the unnamed alderman1s speech.
the council might have something
During the forthcoming recess, will he take into 
consideration the desirableness of appointing a
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Royal Commission, consisting of Members of Parliament, 
City Aldermen, and others, to inquire and reoort upon 
the best means of improving and ornamenting the City 
of Sydney and its environs?
( p-a; )Wade reolied, "This matter will be considered". ' It is likely 
that O'Sullivan had discussed this matter with others, such as 
Hughes, perhaps Wade, and John Sulman, the latter of whom was about 
to publish a series of articles in the Daily Telegraph called "The 
Improvement of Sydney". (This was later published under the same 
title.) Hughes echoed O'Sullivan in a Council minute dated the 
7th January, 1908, which was presumably written before that date, 
in which he recommended a Royal Commission of similar scope to the 
former suggestion except that it would make recommendations as to 
the best method of carrying the scheme into effect and of financing 
it: Hughes was explicitly concerned with the political context of 
the s c h e m e . Q n 1 4 -th 0f January the Works Committee of the
City Council carried a motion that a deputation argue the merits 
of the Lord Mayor's idea with the Premier.
The deputation met the Premier on a date not specified in the
Town Clerk's annual report for 1908. The proceedings of the
deputation were reported and they provide an important insight into
the Government's policy. The deputation urged that immediate
action was necessary to widen existing streets and plan new ones
in view of escalating land values, and that general remodelling
work should not be left to the City Council without assistance from(25)the State and the 41 other city municipalities. y Wade replied 
that Cabinet had been considering a "wider form" of the 
deputation's requests. He recognised that transport was the 
dominant issue: the inner city area had been unplanned and costly 
and chronic congestion resulted from the concentration of 
commercial activity in this zone. He said,
... there should be some general scheme whereby the 
question of traction and passenger traffic to and from 
the city should be dealt with; secondly, side by side 
with that went the question of the thoroughfares.... 
Thirdly, some provision should be made as to the most 
simole and effective method of making the dace more 
ornamental.... Without committing the Government to any 
details, the Government recognised the absolute urgency 
of providing for the future of the nublic travelling to 
and from the city......
But after saying that, Wade stated that "The vague references (of 
the deputation) to finance appeared premature at the present stage,
23. V.P.L.A.N.S.W., 2nd Sess., 1907, vol. 1, p. 132.
24. Reports and Proceedings of the Municipal Council of the City 
of Sydney, 1907, p. 443.
25. Ibid., 1908, pp. 19-21 of Clerk's Report.
as the reDort must come first”. He added that:
As far as possible, at that juncture, the bone of 
contention of a Greater Sydney would be eschewed, as 
the imDorting of that matter might result in engendering 
the hostility of the adjoining municipalities, instead 
of widening their co-ooeration.
/ 25)Wade took action quickly over the Council's suggestion. '
He announced on the 27th February, 1908, that a Royal Commission
"to be of a wide and comprehensive nature" would be apDointed "to
deal not only with the city, but also with the adjoining 
(27)suburbs".' y At the time of this announcement the exact terms of 
the Commission had not been determined, nor had the personnel.
Wade stated that he intended to have "representatives of all chief 
interests concerned" - commerce, architecture, the government and 
the municipalities. He stated that traffic would be a main factor 
to be investigated. It would seem that the announcement of this 
Commission was prompted by the City Council's deputation.
The Commission's warrant and personnel were not announced(28)until April the 23rd. 1 There were to be 11 Commissioners, as
follows (known supporters of Greater Sydney are marked with
asterisks ):
* 1. Thomas Hughes, President, Lord Mayor (lawyer);
2. Robert R.P. Hickson, President of Sydney Harbour 
Trust (engineer);
* 3. Sir James Graham, M.D., M.L.A., ex-Mayor of Sydney, leader of Municipal Reform Party and Government 
representative;
* 4. James McGowen, M.L.A., leader of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party;
* 5. E.W. O'Sullivan, M.L.A., city alderman and leader 
of parliamentary Independent Party;
* 6. John Wheeler, M.L.A., Vice-President of Local 
Government Association;
7. Edmund Fosbery, M.L.C., former Inspector-General of Police, representing vehicular interests;
8. Henry Gorman, representing real estate interests;
* 9. Ernest Scott, President of the Institute of 
Architects of N.S.W.;
* 10. Norman Selfe, engineer and civic reformer;
* 11 . James Wall, President of the N.S.W. Master Builders 
Association.
(Scott and Wall are shown as known supporters of Greater Sydney 
because of the policy of the bodies they represented; their 
personal views are not known.)
26. See Daily Telegraph and S .M.H., 28 February, 1908.
27. Daily Telegraph, 28 February, 1908, p. 7
28 See Daily Telegraph, 24- April, 1908
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The warrant of the Commission read in part:
... to diligently examine and investigate all proposals 
that may come before (it) for the imnrovement of the 
City of Sydney and its suburbs, and to fully inquire, >. into the whole subject of the remodelling of Sydney. ' '
The Commissioners were directed to three specific questions, 
namely: (i) the present ’’circumstances’' of the city and its
population; (ii) the expected growth of the metropolis over the 
following 25 years; and (iii) specific train, tram and road works. 
The investigation of a harbour bridge or tunnel was implicitly 
included in the scope of the Commission^ but this became the 
subject of a separate Royal Commission on Communication between 
Sydney and North Sydney.
The Improvement of Sydney Commission's task reflected directly 
the political background to its appointment. It was assigned the 
major problems facing the metropolis as its province: transport, 
"town planning”, beautification. But it was not given a warrant 
to investigate the financial aspects of its recommendations, nor 
did it investigate such aspects except in the questioning of two 
witnesses (see below). This was in keeping with the political 
intent of the Government and Hughes. It was nominally represent­
ative and reasonably expert; its labours were unpaid; and its 
members were well-informed and well-travelled. The Commissioners’ 
investigations are now dealt with.
The Improvement Commission took evidence from 40 witnesses in
90 sessions over nearly a year. Its warrant was dated 14th May,
1908; it issued an Interim Report on the 3rd December, 1908; and
its final Report, with Minutes of Evidence, was dated 29th June,
1909. Evidence was received from overseas authorities and local
experts and pressure groups; the Commissioners themselves made
specific contributions and several were called as witnesses. The
investigations and recommendations can be dealt with under the
three heads — transportation, beautification, and town-planning(31)(including social welfare issues). J '
29. See Report of the Royal Commission for the Improvement of the 
City of Sydney and its Suburbs, P .P.N.S.W .t 1909, vol. 5, pp. xvii, 
xxi. (Hereafter cited as: Commission Report.)
30. See Sydney Morning Herald, 24 April, 1908, p. 8; Art and 
Architecture, vol V, no. 2, p„ 49. This was apparently one reason 
for the inclusion of Selfe on the Commission for he was at the time 
the pre-eminent civil engineer. He had been described by Sir Peter 
Nicol Russel as "a most brilliant designing engineer and one who 
had lived long before his time". (P.H. Russel, "Sir P.N. Russel", 
R.A.H.S. Journal, vol. 50, pt. 2, p. 130.) See Gibbons, 
"Improvement Commission", p. 88.
31. The present account largely follows the exDOsition in
Gibbons, "Improvement Commission", parts C to E, and is accordinglv abbreviated.
4.1
The Commissioners gave a great deal of attention to the
analysis of obvious problems, to the physical changes needed in
the transport systems, and to the societal impact of those changes
They conducted a true pianning enquiry of exceptional auality:
they tried to establish the best base for population and land use
( zo)projection, particularly the former,v J and in their questioning 
revealed an active interest in the current state of knowledge of 
transport and urban dynamics. A programme of significant works 
was recommended on the basis of functional need, "beautification1', 
popular support (in a deliberate attempt to generate symbolic 
identification), and to a lessor extent available resources.
While their interest was mainly with the central city district the 
Commission was favourably aware of the suburban housing movement 
and fostered the values behind that movement. As a prominent 
planner put it recently, "In a farsighted manner (the Commission) 
adopted the working hypothesis that any plan for the improvement 
of the city must be predicated on a solution to the transport 
problem....
Three main structural problems were identified in the central 
business district (CBD). First there were 10 roads which ran 
north-south but these discharged into only 4 arterials (Elizabeth, 
George, William and Oxford Streets). The inadequacy of port roads 
on the western side of the CBD worsened the resulting congestion. 
Second, the termination of the railways at the newly-opened 
Central Station (1906) increased the load of trams on city streets 
Finally, there was no structural access between the city and North 
Shore and although this question was in the hands of a concurrent 
Royal Commission, the Improvement Commission considered the matter 
at some length because it was so central to all other issues.
The solutions to all three problems (and more) were connected 
The Commissioners recommended the widening of Elizabeth Street to 
serve the south; the extension of Bathurst Street to the west and 
the replacement of Pyrmont Bridge; and the widening and realign­
ment of Cathedral, Oxford and William Streets, together with a new 
road parallelling Oxford Street and another through Ultimo. These 
roadworks were secondary and complementary to the construction of 
an underground rail loop in the CBD, connecting with existing 
systems at Central and North Sydney and with loops to the near 
western and the eastern suburbs. These changes were in accordance 
with plans for port, tram and passenger recommendations, that is 
with land use and related trends, and they were intended to be 
mutually consistent - a balanced allocation of resources. The
32. See Gibbons, "Improvement Commission", po. 24-27.
33. A.J. Powell, "Planning and Government" (unpublished M.T. & 
C.P. thesis, Universitv of Svdnev. 1969). p. 3-12.
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Commissioners favoured the construction of a Harbour Bridge but 
had to adopt the tunnel scheme of the Royal Commission on 
Communication between Sydney and North Sydney. This affected the 
placement of the Circular Quay railway station and the develonment 
of the Quay generally. Specific roadworks were proposed to ease 
port congestion. The Commissioners did not feel that trams should 
be placed underground in the central city but recommended that they 
should be confined to feeder routes to railways, thus reducing the 
congestion caused by them. (As will be seen later traffic 
congestion was an extremely important problem over the whole 
period before 1 9 3 9, indeed up to the removal of trams in the late 
1950s and early 1960s.)
Painstaking attention was given to the geographical structure 
and engineering design of the railway works, especially those for 
the eastern and northern suburbs and the central underground loop 
and connections. Many witnesses, from T.R. Johnson, Chief 
Commissioner for Railways and Tramways, and Royal Commissioners 
Selfe and Hickson to Sulman and Fitzgerald, described the systems 
they preferred, with preliminary attempts at costing and explicit 
attention to aesthetic effects. The Commissioners were sufficient­
ly expert to exhaustively examine the proposals.
In general the proposals of Tom Johnson were adopted, with 
some modifications which were worked out between Johnson, other 
witnesses (notably Sulman and Commissioner Selfe) and the 
Commission. The railway was to be extended from Central Station 
as outlined above. Electrification was urged. As far as goods 
trains were concerned the Commission slightly amended Johnson’s 
proposals for the western suburbs network.
The Commission recommended the reconstruction of the suburban 
radial tram system so that trams would only serve as feeders. 
However they left the planning of this entirely to the State 
bureaucracy and it is unlikely that they expected the enormous task 
to ever be undertaken. They did seriously propose a multi-modal 
development of Central Station, including trams, thus implicitly 
recognising the difficulties of abolishing the radial routes. The 
Central Station proposal had great symbolic importance as will be 
seen later.
The train recommendations^^ can be regarded as the genesis 
of Sydney's present railway system yet in terms of contemporary
34. For maps see Gibbons, "Improvement Commission", Map 4; and 
Daily Telegraph, July 1, 1909, p. 4. The map opposite p. 27 in 
D. Winston, Sydney's Great Experiment (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 
1957) is inaccurate. Road recommendations are shown in Map 3 of 
"Improvement Commission".
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political demands the road proposals were as crucial. In general 
the Commission preferred to widen existing roads than create new 
ones exceot where a different road structure was definitely 
reauired, and they were conscious of the relationships between 
road construction, local retail economics, slum clearance and 
redevelopment. Apart from the functional basis of road works, 
beautification was considered as in the case of Macquarie Street 
which was to be extended from Circular Quay as a tree-lined avenue 
down to Central Railway via a viaduct along the new Wentworth 
Avenue, and enhanced by the construction of new public buildings. 
Moore Street would be extended to Macquarie Street and possibly be 
developed as a Martin Plaza (as suggested by Fitzgerald).
The beautification aspect was generalised by the Commission
because they were seeking a symbolic identity in very much the same
manner as Olmsted and Haussman overseas and Bradfield later in
Sydney. The Harbour Bridge was not the issue then that it was to
become and in any case that subject was out of the Commissioners'
formal domain. They therefore gratefully accepted the notions of
"city portals" and "radial centres" which Fitzgerald had introduced 
( 3 5 )m  his evidence' y and they based many of their policies on these. 
Both concepts referred to nodal centres of transport such as 
Circular Quay and Central Railway Station. Fitzgerald made basic 
suggestions, as did other witnesses such as Sulman, but the 
Commissioners developed the idea themselves in recommending the 
development of Circular Quay, the widening and beautification of 
Macquarie Street, and the construction of an amphitheatre of tall 
buildings around Belmore Park, incorporating the substantial 
remodelling of Central Station. Conceptually the three elements 
constituted a monumental landmark. The Commissioners failed to 
make full use of its potential in their Report, although it 
received considerable attention in the press. In any case the 
concept lacked the main virtues of Bradfield's Bridge, namely 
visibility, utility and urgency, and it is understandable that the 
Commission gave the Bridge its unofficial endorsement in its 
Minutes of Evidence and regretted the restriction on its domain.
The Commissioners did not identify the dynamic consequences 
of their improvements in their formal Report with reference to 
population redistribution and externality effects, but they did 
show a good understanding of the social and economic effects of 
roadworks in the examination of witnesses. Road construction can 
"improve" blighted areas because of the need for extensive 
demolition but it also affects commercial activity. The 
Commissioners evaluated such negative and the positive effects when
35. See Gibbons, ibid., pp. 58 ff.
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examing architect John Barlow (the only witness to foresee the 
imDact of the automobile) and Government Valuer Sievers over the
/  'zr Nalternatives to widening Oxford Street. ‘ Barlow emphasised the
importance of goodwill in retailing and pointed out that relocation
could lead to "deleterious competition"; the creation of a new
road could take away trade without compensation while new
businesses would be faced with competition from established rivals.
He gave overseas and local examples of the difficulty of generating
such new commercial development; Sievers outlined comparable
experience. However the Commissioners emphasised the slum
clearance and residential redevelopment potential of proposals in
Surry Hills, Woolloomooloo and Ultimo in their questioning. They
thought that in specific cases the combination of road and rail
schemes would "open up what is a comparatively poor neighbourhood,
and give an impulse to the general improvement of the whole 
( 3 7)district". ' To a considerable extent the Commissioners balanced 
social costs, social benefits and physical costs in the analysis 
behind recommendations.
The transport recommendations were not without fault. The
Commission's total population projection was remarkably accurate
but insufficient attention was given to the distribution of
population growth although general movements were established.^®^
The effect of new works on traffic flows were not specifically
analysed while no provision was made for changing technology,
despite evidence of the marked changes caused in London by motor
( 39 )cars and buses. Generally the Commissioners did not try to cost
proposals although some of their "beautification" proposals were 
comparatively inexpensive and of obvious benefit. The 
propagandistic intention should be remembered in the context of 
costing.
A wide range of miscellaneous recommendations were made 
including the provision of more parklands and the resumption of 
Harbour foreshores for public access; the planting of trees; the 
cultivation of vacant blocks by children and residents; the 
remodelling of the Rocks "with an eye to the general artistic effect 
of the waterfront"; the regulation of building heights and
36. Ibid., pp. 61-63
37. Commission Report, p. xlv.
38. Gibbons, "Improvement Commission", p. 26 and elsewhere.
39. Evidence of Barlow; see ibid., p. 47.
40. It is true that the Report contained no costing but such 
aspects had been at least partially considered in Questioning as in 
Graham's comment to Sulman: "Your scheme is architecturally very 
good and feasible, but I fear if we' recommended it it would not be carried out - the difficulties are so greatV" (Commission Report, Minutes of Evidence, p. 83.)
commercial hoardings; and the construction of scenic drives around 
the foreshores. As in other cases some of these schemes were not 
original. The Macquarie Street project had been adopted from the 
State Government while the City Council had recommended the widen­
ing of Elizabeth and Oxford Streets. The same applied to the 
Council's attempts to obtain and enforce legislation over smoke 
pollution and hoardings; the resumption of the foreshore had been 
agitated for also by the Harbour Foreshores Vigilance Committee 
(chairman Thomas Hughes). These are among the main recommendations 
remembered by Winston in his praise of the Commission.
The other very important area dealt with by the Royal 
Commission, and the one closest to government reform, was town 
planning. This was still regarded largely in moralistic terms in 
the early twentieth century but the Greater Sydney movement and 
overseas concepts gave the general issue a rationalist basis through 
for example the Building Bill and housing policies which Fitzgerald 
and others had campaigned for on the City Council. The Council, 
architects, builders and others had pressed strongly for a Building 
Act because this issue embraced speculative builders, fire hazards, 
health conditions and living areas, inspection rights, the 
definition of acceptable housing standards and adequate public 
control — all major considerations in times of health scares, 
inadequate fire-fighting facilities, slum eradication, rapid 
population growth, and housing shortages. The Royal Commission 
examined all these issues and recommended the adoption of the 
Building Act and the like. They disagreed however with Fitzgerald 
who favoured the promotion of tenements, for economic and "moral" 
reasons,^^ and wanted workmen to be encouraged "to reside in 
separate houses in suburban areas". ' Moreover they wrote that 
"(we) fail to see how (housing) can be adequately dealt with while 
a system of divided control obtains in the metropolitan area".
While the Commission endorsed such progressive policies their 
central contribution to the development of town planning thought 
was their attempt to devise a consistent policy package which 
recognised the interconnectedness of institutional deficiencies, 
development control, planning and present problems. Apart from 
their other proposals they recommended the adoption of the 1909 
Local Government Act of Mr John Burns which to them represented the 
most advanced thinking in the Western world. Fitzgerald had
41. Winston, on. cit. pn. 26-28.
42. See Gibbons, "Improvement Commission", pp. 64-68 for a full 
analysis.
43. Commission Report, n. xxix.
44. Ibid., p. xxviii.
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introduced the Act (in Bill form) at his third and fourth 
appearances, when he supported both it and Greater Sydney in very 
strong terms. (45) rp^ e was recommended without qualification
by the Commission even though it would have put all planning
issues (including road, water and sewerage, lighting, park and
similar planning) in the hands of a central ’’Local Government 
Board”. Apart from Fitzgerald the only witness questioned on
Greater Sydney was Osgood, Mayor of Marrickville (the sole municipal 
witness —  it would seem that the Commission avoided hostile opinion 
on this matter), who said that he did not favour Greater Sydney. 
However he was pressed by Hughes with a short statement of classic 
federation:
Q.4334. Hughes: You are against the unification of the
municipal (sic) area, but you are not opposed to the
creation of an overlording body in connection with 
general improvement works, to raise its own revenue, 
leaving the local municipalities to conduct local 
affairs themselves? Yes.
Apart from the implications of the Burns Bill and innuendoes 
in questioning, the Commissioners gave a definite indication of 
their political intent in their Report in the following terms:
Seeing, therefore, that the interests of the State, the 
city and its suburbs, are so intimately associated in 
the scheme of improvement which we have outlined, your Commissioners are of opinion that a central authority 
should be appointed to initiate and carry out street improvements which extend beyond the boundaries of any 
one municipality, and that the State should bear its due 
proportion of the cost of improvements of a general character.(47)
The Commission’s Report was greeted with great enthusiasm by 
the various reform interests and aroused little opposition as far 
as can be seen in newspapers, journals and contemporary writings.
The Report was not seen as a political document: most attention 
was focussed on the improvement proposals and the references to 
Greater Sydney received no prominence. To that extent the 
expectations of Wade and Hughes as previously quoted were borne 
out: the Commissioners and others used the Report as a major
justification itself for metropolitan reform, Hughes himself said 
the following at a meeting on Greater Sydney on July 19, 1909, 
little more than two weeks after the release of the Report:
He had just finished a very long inquiry on city 
improvement, which, he thought, furnished the basis of 
a (improvement) scheme. The real bogey in the way was 
that of divided control. The remedy appeared to be 
either unification or some form of federation, as they had in London.(4°J
45. Fitzgerald's evidence is analysed in Gibbons, "Greater 
Sydney", pp. 22-3.
46. Ibid., p. 22.
47. Commission Report, p. lx.
48. Reported in Daily Telegraph, 20 July 1909, p. 7.
The Daily Telegraph and Sydney Morning Herald appraised the 
recommendations very carefully and although they concentrated on 
transport and gave little attention to town planning, their 
editorials correctly pointed out that the overall scheme was 
predicated on intermunicipal organisation. George Taylor wrote
in Building that ’’The immediate effect of the report of the
------- ( 49)Commission will he the establishment of a Greater Sydney”.
Hughes moved a motion at the July 19th meeting ’’That in view of
the report of the Royal Commission... it is necessary that
immediate steps should be taken to create a Greater Sydney in some
form".^0  ^ The convenors of the meeting included Hughes and Wheeler
(both Commissioners), Sulman, Fitzgerald, George Taylor, William
Morris Hughes and a number of suburban mayors. (Perhaps because
the Commissioners had not officially opted for a centralist
Greater Sydney, criticism from local government interests was
minimal.) That meeting set up a Greater Sydney League. By one
measure then the Royal Commission was very successful; even as
late as 1913 the Royal Commission for Greater Sydney agreed that
the ’urgency (of improvement and town planning) is a strong reason,
both for a Greater Sydney being brought into existence and for the(5 1)new body giving (them) immediate and earnest attention”.
The Commission’s impact on planning philosophy cannot be
clearly assessed because as has been said they adopted proposals
which were already popular. However to the extent that they tied
specific progressive policies into a consistent package (and they
succeeded in doing this to a large extent^^^), they were a major
influence in shaping the planning consensus which Spearritt has
( 53)analysed in a later p e r i o d . T h e  Commission was the first major 
step in the introduction of town planning and public housing 
legislation and they ’’foreshadowed”(^4) every maj0r planning 
initiative that was taken up to and even beyond 1939.
49. Building, July 12 1909, p. 35.
50. Daily Telegraph, 20 July 1909, p. 7.
51. Report of Royal Commission into the Constitution of a Greater 
Sydney (1913) N.S.W.P.P., 2nd Session 1913, vol. 2, p. xix.
52. Sandercock's statement that the Commission’s recommendations 
were based on an ’’odd amalgam of values and conflicting approaches” 
which made "concerted action unlikely” lacks logical or empirical 
foundation. See L. Sandercock, "Property, Politics and Power: A 
History of City Planning in Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney Since 
1900" (Ph.D. thesis, A.N.U., 1974), p. 17. This statement was 
repeated in the same author's Cities for Sale: Property, Politics 
and Urban Planning in Australia (Melbourne: M.U.P ., 1975).
53. P. Spearritt, "The Consensus Politics of Physical Planning in
Sydney: Case Studies from the Interwar Years" (unpublished B.A.
(Hons) thesis, Department of Government, University of Sydney, 
1972), especially pp. 1-2.
54. Ruth Atkins agrees with Winston's assessment, "Sydney”, in W.A. Robson and D.E. Regan (eds), Great Cities oi tneoric
Vol. II (London: Allen and Unwin, 1972), p. 934.
48
The success of the Commission in terms of their transport 
recommendations will be discussed in the next chapter in 
connection with Bradfield's planning but it can be said that they 
were well-received and in the end adopted. (The tunnel proposal 
was abandoned in 1911-12 and this eventually necessitated the 
amendment of the Commission’s underground railway.) The 
recommendations were only debated in Parliament once and then 
three years after the Commission had reported, in an adjournment 
debate in the Legislative Assembly on "The extension of the 
railway into the city" in early July, 1912. There was virtual 
unanimity in demanding that the Commission's scheme be effected at 
once. The Hon. C.A. Lee, Secretary for Public Works, was 
stimulated by the gentle criticism of government members and 
harsher criticism of others to declare that definite steps had 
been taken to implement two major recommendations. First, a 
Martin Place - Lavender Bay railway, estimated to cost $1,500,000, 
had been referred to the Public Works Committee in December, 1909, 
for its attention in connection with the Harbour tunnel. Second, 
the goods train recommendations had also been referred to the 
Committee at the same time, cost $1,414,000; these works had been 
suggested by Tom Johnson who was largely responsible for railway 
planning in any case. Sir James Graham remarked rather sadly in 
the debate,
We tackled the work (of transport planning) as far as 
we could in that spirit (of urgency), and one has been 
waiting and watching, and hoping that the day was not 
very far distant when the Government would see its way 
to take action.(55)
The Improvement of Sydney Commission of 1908-09 was 
unquestionably a watershed in the planning of Sydney. It was the 
first of very few inquiries to take a comprehensive view of urban 
planning and it did that in an explicit context of governmental 
reform. It was significant in terms of Greater Sydney, transport 
and town planning generally. The Commissioners were a group of 
dedicated people of mixed backgrounds and skills. These factors 
and their status as an independent Commission enabled them to 
overcome the dangers of technical narrowness of vision and to 
achieve an integrated planning perspective.
55« N.S.W. Parliamentary Debates, 2nd Series, vol. 37, p. 590. See pp7 596-8 for Lee and 587 ff generally.
Chapter Three
The Impact of Bradfield
Neither the City Railway, the Sydney Harbour 
Bridge, nor any scheme of Suburban Railways can 
really be claimed to be the thought or the work 
of an individual. These works, when completed, 
will be the materialization of the best thoughts 
of a considerable number of able men...
James Fraser, Chief 
Commissioner, N.S.W. Government 
Railways and Tramways (1926),
The late years of the 1900s were especially favourable to 
urban planning and the Improvement of Sydney Commission enhanced 
the prospect of effective government action on the more obvious 
infrastructural deficiencies of Sydney» That Commission had not 
been set up to forestall such action and in fact the first 
positive steps were taken about two years after its Report, as 
will be seen. Perhaps more importantly in view of the imminent 
War, the Commission had encouraged the formation of a better 
informed planning lobby which was able to keep the main issues in 
the political arena while circumstances were temporarily 
unfavourable. The man who was to benefit most from the planning 
"consensus” was John Job Crew Bradfield.
Bradfield was born in Queensland in December 1867, completed 
his primary and secondary education there and came to Sydney in 
1886 to matriculate at the University of Sydney. J He completed 
the Bachelor of Engineering course in 1889 with Eirst Class 
Honours and the University Gold Medal. He worked as a Railways 
draftsman in Queensland for two years and then joined the N.S.W. 
Department of Public Works as a draftsman in the Roads and Bridges 
branch. In 1896 Bradfield graduated Master of Engineering with 
First Class Honours and medal at Sydney University and published 
a paper (his first) on Australian timbers. He worked on general 
design tasks including dams and in 1909 became Principal Designing 
Engineer in Public Works’ Drawing Office. (In fact Bradfield was 
classed as a draftsman until 1909 when he was appointed Assistant 
Engineer 2nd Class, this making no difference to his then salary 
of £400 p0a.)* (i)v ' He had been a founding member of the Sydney 
University Engineering Society in 1895 and was President in 1902/03
1• Dr Peter Spearritt is to date the main biographical source on 
Bradfield. His following works were used in this section:
(i) "An Urban History of Sydney 1920-1950 (op. cit.; hereafter
cited as: Spearritt, "Urban History"); (ii) chapter II in "The 
Consensus Politics of Physical Planning in Sydney", op. cit., hereafter cited as: Spearritt, "Consensus Politics"; and
(iii) "J.J.C. Bradfield 1867-1943”, draft entry in N.B. Nairn and G. Serle (eds), Australian Dictionary of Biography Vol. 7 (to be 
published by M.U.P.), which will be cited as: Spearritt, 
"Bradfield". All are cited with permission.
2. Details provided by Ms L. Yandell from official records.
Ms Yandell is preparing what will be the first complete critical 
appraisal of Bradfield and his impact in her "The Life and Work 
of J.J.C. Bradfield" (Ph.D. thesis in preparation, School of 
Transport and Highways, University of New South Wales).
and 1919/20. In his Presidential Address in April 1903 he 
discussed the Harbour Bridge competitions of that time and apparent­
ly maintained an interest in this subject. So by 1908-09 
Bradfield had demonstrated unusual academic ability and had 
established a strategic work position for the critical developments 
that were to follow. Although he moved in the highest professional 
c i r c l e s , h e  was not known then as a planning advocate. He was 
not mentioned in the Improvement Commission's documents and did not 
prepare his first proposal for an underground railway until 1909, 
after the Commission's Report and under its stimulus.
Prom 1909 Bradfield apparently used his position within
Public Works, which was then the main planning and construction
authority for railways, to turn his personal interest in the main
urban projects into an occupation. In July 1911 the Acting Premier,
W.A. Holman, announced at an extremely perilous stage of N.S.W.'s
( 5 )first Labor Government' that Cabinet had decided on a bridge for
tram, vehicular and pedestrian traffic and a tunnel for the railway.
This was a political decision. As principal designing engineer' J
Bradfield advised the Minister for Works that both structures would
be navigational hazards and he was given permission to prepare his(7)own designs. 3 4567 He presented designs and estimates for cantilever, 
suspension and cantilever arch types of bridge (he preferred the 
cantilever) to the Public Works Committee in 1912-13; the 
Committee's Report of July 1913 endorsed his preference and design.
Bradfield's initial internal and subsequent public work on the 
Harbour Bridge proposal won him increased influence and in July 
1912 he was promoted to Engineer-in-Charge of the Sydney Harbour 
Bridge and City Transit section of the Public Works Department 
(salary^£1000 p.a.) and in 1913 to the position of Chief Engineer,
3. Bradfield in fact had become involved in 1900 when he checked
the calculations of entries for the Minister for Works. See 
J.J.C. Bradfield, "History of the Bridge, Largest Arch Type in the 
World", Sydney Harbour Bridge. Official Souvenir and Programme 
(Sydney: N.S.W. Government Printer, 1932). It was not until 1911
that he began to take an active interest in the design of a bridge.
4. Spearritt, "Bradfield", p.2.
5. G.N. Hawker, The Parliament of N.S.W. 1836-1963 (Sydney:
N.S.W. Government Printer, 1971), p.204. Some background is given 
in C. Pearl, Wild Men of Sydney (Sydney: Universal, 3rd ed., 1970).
6. Bradfield had been appointed 1st Class Assistant Engineer at 
£450 p.a. in 1910 and in two steps in 1911 went to Principal Design 
Engineer at £630. information supplied from official records byMs L. Yandell.
7. This is Bradfield's account: J.J.C. Bradfield, "Sydney Harbour Bridge", Commonwealth Engineer. 1st March 1932; reprinted by Department of Main Roads (n.d.), p.2. Spearritt's account is 
somewhat different.
Metropolitan Railway Construction.^8 910^ Bradfield did not neglect 
the railway aspects of the innercity transport problem and 
participated in an extended cycle of modifications to the 
Improvement Commission's underground railway, starting in 1912 with
( Q )the appointment of an English consultant, Mr David Hay. ' Hay 
recommended a highly complicated and expensive rail system which 
attracted nothing but criticism. Separately Bradfield had suggested 
a minor amendment to the Commission's plan to the Public Works 
Committee Inquiry on the Bridge, namely a small connecting loop 
between the Town Hall and Liverpool Street Stations. This was 
adopted by Tom Johnson, the Chief Commissioner, in December 1912 
when he amended his 1909 scheme (as approved by the Improvement 
Commission) to allow for the Bridge instead of tunnel and a 
realigned route to the sports grounds and zoo (then on Cleveland 
Street). Bradfield came back very quickly with a suggestion that 
the alignment of the city railway be changed at Central and Town 
Hall Stations and Johnson accepted this almost immediately on the 
31st January 1913. This amended scheme was acceptable to the 
Government except that it was desired to postpone the expense of 
electrification of the suburban railways for five years, so tunnels 
carrying the Eastern and Western Suburbs trams onto the under­
ground were incorporated.^0  ^ A Bill for the construction of these 
works was presented to Parliament in 1913 but it failed in the 
Legislative Council. That Bill did not include the North Shore 
or Balmain rail connections and it left the railway entirely below 
ground in the low-level scheme adopted in 1909. There is no 
evidence that the Government was induced to introduce the 
legislation for any reasons other than political advantage and 
long-established need; at that point Bradfield's public influence 
was minor. The Government's decision to underground the trams, 
a highly undesirable if not unworkable scheme as Bradfield was to 
show in 1915, perhaps indicated the limits on Bradfield's internal 
influence.
8. Spearritt, "Bradfield" p.2. Bradfield's salary was £1,000 p.a. 
from 1st July 1912, to 1920 when it was raised by increment to 
£1,200 p.a. His official title did not change until his retirement. 
(Information supplied by Ms Yandell.)
9. See J.J.C. Bradfield, "Report on Proposed Electric Railways for the City of Sydney" (N.S.W. Parliamentary Papers, 1915-16, 
vol. 6), Plate 65 and elsewhere. Hereafter cited as: Bradfield, 
"Report". (As quoted below this was also issued separately by the 
Government Printer in 1916; some copies in that issue included an 
important foreword by the Director General of Works.) The 
following sentences are based on this source, pp. 42 ff.
10. Ibid., p. 59 and Plate 68.
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So far Bradfield and Johnson had modified the Improvement of 
Sydney Commission’s scheme by increments, accepting the original 
structural framework. The only significant initiative was made by 
Johnson in December 1912 when he proposed that the tramlines from 
the Broadway be run underground below Pitt Street to Circular Quay 
and that those from the Eastern Suburbs (Oxford Street) be run
( 1 1 )under Oxford Street, Hyde Park and Elizabeth Street to the Quay.
This was basically an internal scheme and its rationale was 
apparently not made public except for Bradfield's later analysis 
(see below). It was not included in the 1913 Bill.
By late 1913 the Bradfield Bridge had been accepted by the 
Public Works Committee and an underground rail scheme had been 
endorsed by the Departments of Railways and Public Works and by the 
Government. The proposals entailed a scale of innercity construc­
tion (and disruption) that had never been attempted before and so 
in January 1914 the Government decided to send Bradfield to Europe 
and North America to investigate changing construction methods, 
materials technology, railway management, and "the conditions
adopted in various countries to prevent excessive claims for damage
( 1 2 )to property by blasting during the progress of the works". J He 
left by sea on the 21st March and returned on the 19th September, 
1914. The War delayed the delivery of papers and photographs he 
had collected until November that year and the German information 
did not arrive at all.
Whether on Bradfield's initiative alone or using investigations
carried out in Railways and/or Public Works while he was away, as
seems more likely, in December 1914 Bradfield announced major
modifications to the railway scheme. Instead of the comparatively
low-level underground railway, a higher-level underground route
(following the old alignment) was adopted, with open air stations
at Central and Circular Quay, underground stations at the other
four locations, and above ground lines from Redfern to Goulburn
Street and at Circular Quay. This scheme included much improved
rail crossings and the same underground tram routes as proposed by
Johnson although Bradfield added two tram lines on the Bridge.
Running conditions and the general quality of service were improved
by Bradfield's amendments which however had been basically foreseen
by all main proponents of a city railway up to the Improvement
Commission (with regard to the Central Station end) and by that
( 13 )Commission (regarding the Quay). ; The 1914 Bradfield scheme was 
important because it was the first to propose several important 
features of the lines that were actually built. Further, up to
11. Ibid., Plate 66.
12. Ibid., p. 1.
13. An invaluable source is E. Irvin, Sydney As It Might Have 
Been, op. cit. . especially Ch. XI. Cf ibid... pp. 33-6.
this point the progress of the design of and advocacy for the 
train system reflected the competitiveness which existed between 
Bradfield and the Railways Department. The organisational frame­
work which allowed such open interplay with its associated benefits 
(including greater, not less, pressure for effective Governmental 
action) was of obvious importance for contemporary policy-making.
Bradfield "presented" his "Report on the Proposed Electric 
Railways for the City of Sydney" in February 1915, as a report on 
overseas construction methods and railway operational standards as 
well as a comprehensive analysis of the underground rail scheme 
and associated works. (A chapter was included on the Bridge but 
this dealt entirely with procedures for the calling of contracts.) 
Bradfield went further in developing even his scheme of December 
1914 and he provided details of railway working, costing and design 
which had been absent from previous analyses. While the Report was 
a very competent engineer’s statement and contained a more detailed 
analysis of current population and transit trends than did the 
Improvement Commission's,^^^ it was not a comprehensive planning 
document and could not be taken to establish Bradfield as anything 
but a technical expert —  it lacked the societal and symbolic 
understanding of the Commission's Report, although admittedly 
Bradfield was dealing with basically the same works. The Report 
was not published until 1916, well after the City and Suburban 
Electric Railways Act, 1915, had passed through all legislative 
stages and in fact Bradfield was hardly mentioned in Parliament 
during the passage of the Bill. The scheme was regarded more as 
that of the Improvement Commission, especially because by that time 
Sir Thomas Hughes, Sir Allen Taylor and J.D. Fitzgerald were on the 
Government benches in the legislative Council. A s ‘in 1913 
Bradfield had not been a prime mover in persuading the Government 
(and this time the Legislative Council) to take major action.
The 1915 "Plan" scheme followed the same line and level as 
that of 1914 but it was basically a two-track instead of three- 
track loop. (For various reasons Bradfield estimated that the two- 
track system would have a capacity 50 per cent greater than the 
three-track system at 54 per cent less c o s t . ^ ^ O  Bradfield made 
provision for the future relocation of Sydney Terminal (Central 
Station) below Hyde Park, underground but on top of the St James 
Station, as well as a terminal at North Sydney. He also provided 
two tracks between Central and Wynyard to meet future capacity
14. The basis of projection was however far more arbitrary and 
less careful. See Bradfield, ibid., p. 87.
15. Ibid., pp. 62-66.
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needs and to form the basis of a quadruplification of the under­
ground system if required. In purely technical terms the Bradfield 
loop was superior to the previous schemes although it is not known 
why he had waited until then to develop it; the influence of other 
parties can be imputed (perhaps overseas influence although this is 
by no means certain). It might be mentioned that the much-maligned 
Hay loop of 1912 was double-track and above ground as far as 
Goulburn Street, although underground at Circular Quay.
Bradfield also proposed substantial new suburban rail works 
including a double-track loop to the Eastern Suburbs and a double­
track loop to Petersham via Balmain (including a high-level bridge 
only 250 feet or 16 per cent shorter than the Harbour Bridge).
New lines to Mosman/Manly/Narrabeen/Pittwater, Ryde (from the new 
Western Suburbs line via two bridges), Watson's Bay, and La Perouse
f  1  r  \
were expected to be required "at a later date". ' These works 
were not regarded as "urgent" and received no priority in 
Bradfield*s Report.
An essential condition of the underground railway was that
operations would be based on electric traction. Bradfield
recommended that the "inner zone suburban" lines should be
electrified immediately (a total of 200 track miles or 64 route
miles), followed by the "outer zone suburban" (200 track miles or
(17)95 route miles) when warranted by the development of traffic.' 
Bradfield was far too optimistic in the Report as to the extension 
of the electric system elsewhere in the State and the voltage that 
would be practicable.
The 1915 "Plan" included the undergrounding of the same tram .
routes as were approved in 1914. Bradfield explained that the
removal of the trams from the street surface was justified on the
basis of facilitating vehicular and pedestrian traffic "rather than
as a means of satisfactorily relieving the dense passenger traffic",
because he said that only trains could be justified on a cost basis(1 8)for the latter purpose.' 1 He offered no analysis of significance 
for the development of tram routes unlike the Improvement 
Commission. (A new tram route connecting the Haberfield Tramway 
and Summer Hill Station was included in Bradfield's costing but was 
not mentioned elsewhere. This represented an expenditure of 10,000 
pounds.) He suggested however that expenditure on trams and tram 
tracks be reduced so that by 1920, when Bradfield expected trams to 
have lost 37 per cent of their total patronage, the tram systems
16. Ibid., pp. 75 ff and Plate 74.
17. See ibid., pp. 66 ff.
18. Ibid., p. 75
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would not be overcapitalised, ’’From the year 1920 onwards, the 
tramway position should steadily improve, as the traffic must again 
grow in the City proper, though not at the present rate of increase, 
but the traffic on the outlying tramways, which will be feeders to 
the electric railways, will increase at a more rapid rate than at 
p r e s e n t . ( T h ere was an implicit assumption, though no explicit 
discussion, of the impact of works on housing.) Needless to say 
Bradfield’s forecasts of patronage were well astray.
Bradfield's Report was accompanied by a Preface written by the 
Director General of Public Works^^ in which in the ambiguous 
manner of the time it was stated that "The work recommended in this 
Report... has been approved". The cost of the "approved" works 
amounted to 20 million pounds sterling (exclusive of land costs), 
which can be compared with the estimated cost of the Harbour Bridge 
and railway from Wynyard to Waverton at less than 3 million pounds. 
The "approved" order of construction was given as:
(i) the electrification of the inner zone suburban railways 
to Parramatta, Hornsby, Sutherland and Bankstown;
(ii) the City Underground and the Eastern, Western and Northern Suburbs lines;
(iii) two long span cantilever bridges of 1,600 feet and 1,350 feet centre spans respectively;
(iv) the electrification of the outer zone suburban railways;and
(v) the construction of the underground tramways (this accounting for less than 2 million pounds).
The Preface also stated that the City and Suburban Electric 
Railways Act 1915 had already authorised a programme of 10 million 
pounds, excluding the bridge and the North Shore railways. The 
Preface and the Act illustrated the willingness of the Holman Labor 
Government (soon to become the Holman/Wade National Government^21^) 
to take effective action. The source of finance for the Act was an 
agreement between the Government and Norton Griffiths & Company of 
England by which the Company received a guaranteed 5 per cent on 
construction costs.
In terms of being a staged programme of works which had been 
analysed and found to be justified, Bradfield’s Report was more a 
"plan" than was the Improvement Commission's. His was not however 
as comprehensive nor as politically attractive and indeed in many 
respects Bradfield's achievements would not have been possible 
without the earlier Royal Commission and its contribution to the 
planning consensus. Bradfield had placed little emphasis on
19. Ibid.. p. 103.
20. See n. 9 above.
21. See Hawker, op. cit.t pp. 204-5.
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societal impact or political acceptability and obviously did not 
himself have to publicly work for the acceptance of his plans. 
Bradfield's work in short was a product of the underlying 
consensus.
The implementation (as distinct from Government acceptance) 
of Bradfield's plans did not proceed smoothly. The Harbour Bridge 
Bill was rejected in the Legislative Council in April 1916 because 
of anxiety for war finances. The financial agreement with Norton 
Griffiths was cancelled in March 1917 and the Railway Commissioners 
continued the work. However in June the Government decided to 
discontinue construction and property which had been resumed for 
the Eastern Suburbs Railway was returned to its original owners by 
a Recission Act. As for the Bridge, Governments didn't lose sight 
of the basic need, as Premier Storey told one deputation from the 
expanding North Shore in 1 9 2 0 . ^ A Bill was presented in 1921 
but had not been dealt with by the Council when Parliament was 
dissolved. The subsequent Fuller Coalition Government succeeded in 
having the bill passed in September 1922 and it was assented to in 
November. The design of the Bridge had not been finalised when 
tenders were called in 1923, although while Bradfield had been sent 
overseas in 1922 to further investigate cantilever types, he "had 
come to the conclusion that there were no insuperable difficulties 
to the erection of an arch type bridge... (which) would cost 
350,000 pounds less than a cantilever". ^ (The Bridge Act was in 
fact framed in terms of a cantilever bridge and was only amended 
after its introduction. The selection of the arch bridge rested 
entirely on the construction ability of Dorman Long and the design 
ability of their consultant, Ralph Freeman.) Bradfield had 
repeatedly revised the design details of various components in his 
plans, notably the Bridge (roadworks and capacity) and the 
Circular Quay S t a t i o n . O n e  reason for this was no doubt that 
Bradfield wanted to keep the issues alive and in public view.
In 1921 the Government decided that the Eastern and Western
Suburbs rail links proposed by Bradfield earlier were too complex
and costly and the Railways Department (which had been responsible
(2 5)for railway planning from January 1917, Bradfield and his
22. Irvin, on. cit., p. 112.
23. See for example Bradfield, "Sydney Harbour Bridge" U932), 
op. cit., p. 2.
24. Cf Irvin, pp. 133-6 and elsewhere. Bradfield made many 
incidental changes in his popular articles (a list of which is 
given in P. Spearritt, "Selected Writings of Sydney Planning 
Advocates, 1900-1947: A Preliminary Bibliography" (A.P.S.A. 
Monograph No. 13, 1973), PP« 4-6).
25« The divided control between Railways and Public Works nad 
been a legacy of nineteenth century confusion over the best way to
branch having been transferred at that time) was asked to prepare
( n r  \amended plans in preparation for the resumption of works. ' In 
1921 the amended plans were completed. The Western Suburbs line 
was originally to have been linked with the main loop at the 
northern end of Wynyard Station and progress across a high level 
Bridge to Balmain. The amended line ran from the southern end of 
Town Hall Station to near Central and then west parallel to 
Parramatta Road to Homebush or Flemington. The Eastern Suburbs 
line was to run under the Domain and connect with the main loop at 
both Circular Quay and St James. This was replaced by a more 
simple line from between St James and Museum Stations and then 
under Hyde Park and Oxford Street to Bondi Junction. Most 
importantly, both the Western and Eastern Suburbs lines would 
connect easily with a new ’’inner loop” on the underground system 
which would run from between St James and Circular Quay Stations 
to Town Hall Station via stations at O’Connell Street and Pitt 
Street (between King and Market Streets).^ T h i s  loop would have 
filled in the middle ground in the CBD not served by the main loop 
and as well would have offered considerable operational advantages. 
The ’’inner loop” had not even been mentioned before by Bradfield or
the Improvement Commission, and it was not widely publicised at 
the time of its design, unlike the earlier ’’plans”. (The 1921 
scheme also contained changed ’’details”, such as the alignment of 
St James Station: these were refinements of the 1915 works.)
The Harbour Bridge scheme proceeded quickly once the 1922 
Bill had passed. Tenders were called world-wide in 1923 on plans 
and specifications prepared by Bradfield (these v/ere sufficiently
achieve efficiency, reduce corruption and yet retain political 
control. Incredibly until 1912 the Engineer-in-Chief of Railways 
(and by implication other branch heads) had a legal and official 
status equal and in some respects superior to that of the 
Commissioner for Railways. ’’Extremes of mismanagement” resulted.
I. M. Laszlo, "Railway Policies and Development in Northern N.S.W." 
(Ph.D Thesis, University of New England, 1957); R.L. Wettenhall, 
"Early Railway Management Legislation in N.S.W.", Tasmanian 
University Law Review. July I960; and other sources as quoted in
J. B. Sheehan, ”A Consideration of the Legal Origin and Structure 
of the Bureaucratic Hierarchy of a Statutory Corporation as 
Represented in N.S.W. by the Former Commissioner for Railways” 
(unpublished essay, Department of Town and Country Planning, 
University of Sydney, 1976).
26. This paragraph is based largely on H. Silverton, "Sydney’s 
New Underground Railway”, Australian Transport. November-December 
1972. Mr Silverton and Mr J. Forsyth have also assisted through 
discussion, their knowledge of departmental records being most 
helpful.
27. The lines are shown in simple form in James Fraser, "The Railway System, Past, Present, and Projected of the City of Sydney 
and its Suburbs”, p. 10, in The Electrification of Sydney and 
Suburban Railways (Sydney: Institution of Engineers, Australia,
1927). Mr Fraser was Chief Railway Commissioner from 1917 to 1929 and his paper was one of a series given before the Institution in 
1926 on electrification.
general to provide for different design and workshop practice).
The tender of the English company Dorman Long & Go. was formally 
accepted in March 1924 for a two-hinged arch bridge, the contract 
price being about $8,436,000 and the period of construction six 
years. (The estimate of total cost was $15 million.) Work 
commenced on 28th July 1923, the two halves of the arch were 
joined in August 1930 and the lower chord and approaches were 
completed two years later, the Bridge being opened on 19th March 
1932. The extended period of construction was a major factor in 
pushing the cost of the Bridge (at 30th June 1933) to $20,114,340 
($12,500,000 for construction and the rest for resumptions and 
interest during construction). 1 The 1922 Act had provided that 
the Railway and Tramway Commissioners would meet two-thirds of the
final cost, with the remainder coming from a levy of -g-d. in the £
of unimproved capital value in the City of Sydney and the 
municipalities and shires of Manly, Mosman, Lane Cove, North Sydney 
Willoughby, Kuring-gai, Warringah and part of Hornsby. (This 
provision was unique in Sydney's twentieth century history at 
least.^9)) prom 1932 however the arrangement was varied so that 
a toll was charged for rail-borne passengers as for road traffic, 
thus making user charges the principal source of finance, while 
the council levy was reduced to l/3d. in 1933 and was cancelled at
the end of 1939. By 1938-39 the levy had yielded $1,503,200
compared with $3,098,000 in road tolls and $1,864,800 in rail 
contributions. (The toll rates favoured rail passengers quite 
substantially.) In the same period loan capital charges totalled 
$5,930,600 (91 per cent of total expenditure). (in 1931-32 there 
was apparently a scheme to sell the lease of the Bridge for ten 
years to raise finance! Nothing apparently came of this.)
The construction of the underground rail system recommenced 
in 1922, excluding the western side of the main loop. The eastern 
section from Central to St James was opened in late 1926. The 
western side was authorised and started in late 1925 and finished 
in time for a concurrent opening with the Bridge in 1932. (At 
that stage suburban electrification had just been completed, the 
Illawarra line having been the first finished, in 1926. The total 
cost of conversion of existing suburban track was a very 
substantial $22,288,000 which compared with Bradfield's 1915
28. N.S.W. Year Book, 1932/33, p. 585. Other statistics in this 
and the following paragraph have been taken from the Year Book. 
There is a superficial evaluation of economic aspects in B. Lennon, 
"The Development of the N.S.W. Government City and Suburban 
Transportation System, 1914-39" (unpublished B.Ec (Hons) thesis, 
Department of Economic History, University of Sydney, 1970),
pp. 104 ff.
29. See N.S.W. Year Book, 1932/33, p. 585.
30. B. Irving, "Lang in the N.S.W. State Archives", in H. Radi 
and P. Spearritt (eds), Jack Lang (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger. 1977)
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estimate of $7,500,000, Electric rolling stock cost an extra 
$12,502,200, Electrification cost much more than the Bridge. 
However the loop was not completed at that time — work continued on 
Circular Quay Station until 1935 hut then ceased until the late 
1940s. Circular Quay Station and the loop proper were opened in 
1956. The same thing happened to the "inner loop": substantial 
portions of its tunnels had been constructed from Wynyard and 
especially St James Stations by the early 1930s but the loop has 
not been completed. (Part of it near the Public Library of N.S.W. 
served as General Macarthur's Headquarters during the Second World 
War.)
The War and particularly the Depression intervened at crucial 
stages. The Depression was more significant because it emphasised 
the economic weaknesses of the railway-based strategy. The number 
of trips on metropolitan railways fell from a peak of 140,158,000 
in 1928/29 to 119,016,000 in 1930/31, followed by steady recovery 
to 161,061,000 in 1935/36.^^ This was probably not as serious as 
the longer-term failure of patronage to meet official expectations. 
Prior to 1914 the bulk of growth in patronage (and capital 
invested) occurred on the tramways which at the time of Bradfield's 
1915 Report accounted for about 70 per cent of passenger journeys 
(20 per cent were carried by trains and 10 per cent by ferries). 
Bradfield expected the tram/train ratio to be reversed by the 
programme because electric railways were faster, cheaper and more 
attractive. As Fraser, the Chief Commissioner, put it in 1 9 2 6 , ^ ^  
electric traction would reduce the capital needs of rolling stock, 
locomotion and ancillary services while it would reduce the average 
train trip from 35 minutes to 25 minutes. Taking everything into 
account it was predicted that by 1930/31 railway patronage would 
total 185,256,000 trips (compare with actual figure above) of which 
111,000,000 would be to or from the new city stations. The latter 
traffic would produce a revenue of $1,600,000 (on 1926 fare levels), 
about 32 per cent greater than capital charges on the Bridge and 
underground and more than enough to cover working expenses. Fraser 
went further in saying that
In the year 1930-31 the time saving to the suburban 
travelling public, as a result of acceleration of 
services, will amount to no less than 20,000,000 hours, 
or a time value of no less than ($2,000,000) per annum, 
assessing each hour at the low value of (200).
Capitalized, this saving equals nearly four-fifths of
31. Spearritt, "Urban History", p. 188 is incorrect on this 
point.
32. Lennon, op. cit., Table 10, p. 81.
33. Fraser, op. cit., pp. 11 ff. Also G. Reynolds, "The 
Development of the City and Suburban Railway in the 1920s" 
(unpublished undergraduate essay, Department of Economic History, 
University of Sydney, 1969), pp. 3 f. Cf Bradfield, "Report",
pp 5 ff.
the total cost of all the works, and there must be added to this the appreciation of land and property 
values, probably many times in excess of the above 
figures.(34)
Fraser was the only speaker in the 1926 "Electrification" series 
to deal with economic questions (Bradfield was entirely concerned 
with construction progress). However by 1929 the Treasurer,
Mr Stevens (Premier from 1932), found the railway situation to be 
"becoming very embarrassing".
A basic cause of the railways’ unexpectedly slow gains was 
severe competition from road-based private transport. In 1921/22 
there was one motor vehicle for every 55 persons in Australia: by 
1929/30 the ratio was one in 11 persons and falling rapidly.
In these circumstances the Railways changed their strategy to 
consolidation rather than expansion and they succeeded in this 
until the late 1950s with the help of their new works. The 
authorities and governments took their chances with the new 
technology in 1922 and later. In 1926 for example Fraser wrote 
that for the purpose of estimating 1930/31 patronage, the period 
1914-25 would not be a good base because of the Y/ar and the fact 
that "in the later years of the period... there has been loss of 
business to the Railways by competition of other transport 
services". He continued, "The actual increase in passengers 
carried from 1914 to 1925... (was at) rather less than a compound 
ratio of 4% per annum. In view, however, of the fact that from 
1907 to 1914 the total increase in passenger movement was (at)... 
over 11% compound ratio per annum, an estimate of the probable 
increase during the next six years at a rate of 9% per annum 
compounded should not be regarded as unduly optimistic". This
was a simple case of lying with statistics. Bradfield had received 
the D.Sc (Hons) from Sydney University in 1924 for a thesis on 
"his" City and Suburban Electric Railways and the Sydney Harbour 
Bridge and he did not challenge the direct economic basis for the 
works, either then or thereafter.
It was noted in the previous chapter that it was most unlikely 
in 1909 that the Herculean task of reorienting Sydney’s extensive 
tram system to form a feeder network would ever be undertaken.
This particular aspect weighed heavily against Bradfield and his 
colleagues because the two rail modes continued to compete rather
34. Fraser, ibid., p. 23.
35. Reynolds, op. cit., p. 19.
36. Gf. G. Forster, Industrial Development in Australia 1920- 
1930 (Canberra: A.N.U.P., 19&4), pp. 29 f.
37. Fraser, op. cit., p. 22.
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than complement. In fact from the First World War buses
challenged trams as the most efficient, economical and flexible
feeder and medium distance mode of public transport but the
various governments regarded trams as an investment asset to be
protected rather than a service. The conflict between the
privately owned buses and the Government trams was resolved from
1929 by the taxation of the former on the basis of "unreasonable
competition" with the trams. Finally in December 1932 the
Government acquired its first buses, to be run on a very limited
basis, after a delay which was fairly typical of Sydney's twentieth
century experience. As an aside, the period from the Improvement
Commission's Report to 1914 saw an extremely rapid expansion of
Sydney's tram system, which was electrified and profitable, on a(39)fairly uniform geographical basis. " J The principles laid down in 
the Commission's Report were disregarded largely because of 
necessity; an Eastern Suburbs Railway bill had been narrowly 
defeated in the Legislative Council in 1879 and Governments were 
consistently unwilling to invest in major rail works. In fact the 
first line designed for suburban use rather than as part of an 
inter-regional trunk system was the St Leonards to Hornsby railway, 
completed in 1890. This contrasted strongly with the Government's 
eagerness of 1913 and 1915.
The construction of the Harbour Bridge and the city under­
ground and the electrification of the suburban railways were 
mammoth undertakings which required excellence in design and 
construction and a commitment to urban investment that could never 
be matched in later Sydney, at least to the present.(40) ^ series 
of very important questions are suggested by the decade of 
construction which started in 1922 and the Government commitments . 
of 1913 and 1915. What had happened in Parliament and society 
that permitted the initiatives, at those t i m e s ? H o w  strong was
38. See Lennon, op. cit., chapter 2/3; Spearritt, "Urban 
History", pp. 195-200; also chapter 5 below.
39* B. Lennon, "The Growth and Development of the Sydney and 
Suburban Tramway System, 1860 to 1914" (unpublished undergraduate 
essay, Department of Economic History, University of Sydney, 1969), 
pp. 13 ff.
40. The total cost to 1932 of the Bridge, underground railway 
(excluding the Circular Quay section) and electrification was about 
$55 million which was 22.4 per cent of actual loan expenditure in 
N.S.W. from 1922/23 to 1931/32. A comparable proportion of actual 
loan expenditure from 1968/69 to 1977/78 (estimate) is $839 million. 
(This comparison is intended for illustration only.) Statistics 
calculated from Year Books and Treasurer's Loan Speech 1976 and 
1977. The present construction cost would oe mucn Higher than #839n.
41. Economic conditions were generally in favour of urban 
construction, for which see Sinclair, loc. cit.; and
C.B. Schedvin, Australia and the Great Depression (Sydney: S.U.P., 
1970), especially pp. 68 ff. The political background to this
the push from planning lobbies? and how strong the pull from 
potential beneficiaries? Why were the rail planners able to 
design their works at an ambitious level of technical standard 
especially after the initial impact of the motor car and bus had 
been felt? And how important had Bradfield been in the design of 
the major works and the persuasion of governments? Complete 
answers to such questions cannot be given on present knowledge — 
the questions have not been seriously asked before^1  ^ — but at 
least a partial assessment can be advanced.
The first major point is that the programmes and policies 
which Bradfield espoused had common acceptance and were in 
particular consistent with the organisational thrust of the 
largest and most expert bureaucracy, the Government Railways. 
Railway design was an art at that time and there were many men 
inside and outside the Department who had received the best of 
training and who were characteristically dedicated. The construc­
tion of an adequate rail system was their primary goal. While 
Bradfield was officially Chief Engineer from 1912 this did not 
mean that he was solely responsible for rail plans, and it would 
seem that his personal working style placed a great load on his 
colleagues in any case.^^ As has been indicated in the preceding 
analysis at two points at least it appeared that major alterations 
to Bradfield's plans were made in circumstances which suggest a 
very strong organisational input, the most important being the 
changes of 1921. Bradfield's public reticence on those changes is 
suggestive. This aspect cannot be definitively settled at this 
stage but it can be concluded that Bradfield's rail planning was 
heavily dependent on the Railways/Public Works organisation. The 
1915 "Plan" was not really Bradfield's plan at all —  it had been, 
a co-operative effort as Bradfield admitted in his Report.
The other sections of the "rail lobby" were extremely 
influential also. There were retail interests in the CBD and 
speculators in the southern and northern suburbs, as well as the
fundamental change has not been adequately explored generally. 
Country prejudices and rural priorities remained important.
42. Spearritt concentrated on Bradfield's publicity campaign 
and did not so much deal with actual planning or the relationship 
between Bradfield and his "world" —  especially work environment, 
action groups, politicians and the like.
43. Personal communications v/ith Mr W.K. King who joined 
Railways in 1929 and is well acquainted with the background to 
this statement.
better-housing movement^^ (for some reason the general "planning 
movement went into decline in the twenties"^although the 
planning consensus apparently did not). There is evidence, quoted 
by Spearritt, that the "pull" of potential beneficiaries was very 
strong particularly in the case of the Harbour Bridge, the East 
Hills extension (and all lines from the first World War on), and 
Circular Quay Station. ^ 6) rphese interests supported Bradfield 
for their own purposes. Electrification had a tremendous effect 
on operations generally as did other major programmes.
In the case of the Bridge, it would definitely appear that
Bradfield’s role was largely confined to three major elements:
defining general design parameters; advising on design tenders;
and overviewing construction. This was basically his role as
draftsman/engineer in 1900. Construction supervision was in the
hands of Dorman Long and Company and design in the hands of Ralph
freeman. The latter was highly indignant that Bradfield allowed
his name to be "connected" to the design and freeman had
substantial support within his own British and the Sydney
Institution of Engineers.(47) (Bradfield in fact retired on special
(4-8)leave in mid-1931v  ^ and retained his title as Chief Engineer in 
an advisory capacity only. He remained engineer-for-contract until 
the final reports on construction in 1933.)
Bradfield's fame rested on the articles he wrote for various 
sections of the press and popular articles written about him. 
from the mid-1910s he built on his existing public standing through 
a series of articles which were intended to consolidate public 
opinion by emphasising not so much the inherent quality of the 
works but rather their potential impact on urban development and . 
life styles, from the early 1920s the articles largely lost their 
political purpose and.became more descriptive and laudatory.
Through the public campaigns (which were extraordinarily active 
for a public servant) Bradfield’s name became firmly associated 
with the works. It was only in the heat of trying to arouse public 
support that Bradfield embellished his central "plan" with the less 
justifiable elements attributed to him by local advocates such as 
the Warringah peninsular railway. After his retirement Bradfield 
engaged widely in local publicity through a slide show he took from
44. Of Spearritt, "Urban History", chapter 3 especially pp. 47 ff
45. Spearritt, "Selected Writings", op. cit.t p. iii.
46. See Spearritt, "Urban History", various places but especially 
chapter 9, pp. 185-7, 190, 192-3; also pp. 50 ff. This is a 
subject which requires further critical analysis.
47. See Institution of Engineers (Great Britain), Minutes, 1935 
(reference supplied by Ms Yandell).
48. Information provided by Ms Yandell.
hall to hall with the help of an assistant. His extrovert drive 
was a very important characteristic: winning promotion and status 
comparatively late in life (his mid-40s) and then going without 
promotion for the last twenty years of his career, with other 
personal factors, must have had their effect. The respect which
Bradfield earned within the Railways Department was specific to 
his specialist skills and should not be overestimated.
Bradfield was unquestionably an important part of a crucial 
period of Sydney's history. In his time Sydney was given a series 
of invaluable assets, not necessarily because they could be 
justified on hard economic or even operational grounds but because 
a set of ideas gained common acceptance through a long process of 
"advocacy" and organisational commitment. Perhaps the pragmatists 
outnumbered the visionaries but the Bridge alone was an investment 
which was to prove to be of inestimable value to later■generations. 
Those generations, with their political polarisation, fundamentally 
different priorities and political uncertainties probably could not 
have afforded the social as well as economic costs ("the great 
sacrifice") of such a mammoth structure. (This is quite apart 
from the concomitant railway projects.) Thus the importance of 
the period did not lie in any one man. When Bradfield was 
praised, it was society praising itself.
49. Ms Yandell (as cited above) has suggested in personal 
communications that these were possibly very significant factors. 
Mr W.K. King has agreed in discussion with the present author.
Chapter Four
Road Planning and Traffic Management
The Committee consider it desirable in the first 
place to invite serious consideration of the complete 
lack of effective machinery to ensure the carrying-out 
of any co-ordinated scheme of traffic or transport 
improvement in the city or throughout the State. ...
It is not suggested that (the various specialised authorities) are not performing efficient service in 
their respective spheres, but there is a lack of 
harmony and co-ordination and in some instances at 
least an aloofness.... Their efforts, the information 
they possess, and the result of their actions should 
be entirely subservient to general State requirements.
Traffic Advisory Committee, Report (1928).
The construction of the Harbour Bridge and most of the city 
underground railway marked the end of the golden age of rail 
investment in Sydney. In the 1920s the road lobby emerged as the 
most energetic and politically important component in metropolitan 
planning, both with respect to road construction and route improve­
ment and also traffic control and co-ordinated transport system 
development. While the rail lobby was not dead, as will be seen 
later, it had lost its technological monopoly and was quickly 
forced into second place. This chapter will examine the formation 
and pre-1939 planning of the Main Roads Board and its successor, 
the Department of Main Roads, as well as the overall urban road 
transport movement.
Until Carruthers* reform of local government administration in
1906, main roads were administered by a Commissioner for Roads
within the Department of Public Works (from 1862) and by
( 1)municipalities and local trusts. ' At 1862 there were 820 miles of 
main roads which had been proclaimed under an Act of 1857, the 
costs of construction, maintenance and administration of which were 
met from Consolidated Revenue. Prom 1862 Public Works also control' 
led 2,627 miles of other roads. The Shires Act of 1905 left the 
City of Sydney, existing municipalities and the Western division of 
the State under the Department but the Local Government Extension 
Act of 1906 brought existing municipalities into the revised local 
government system and gave them primary responsibility over their 
main roads. (The City of Sydney remained separate until 1948 while 
main roads in the western region were controlled by Public Works 
until after the Machinery of Government Review of 1975.) Thus 
from 1906 central control of main roads was largely abolished 
although the same legislation specified minimum subsidies to 
councils which were apparently used more for local than main roads.
From that year problems of divided control, financial
differences between areas and lack of planning led to calls for
unified administration, especially from the 1910s when the volume
of traffic, lack of regulation of standards and vehicle design
( 2)shortcomings caused excessive dust and community disturbance. '
1. The main historical sources are: H.H. Newell, "Road 
Engineering and its Development in Australia 1788-1938" (Reprinted 
by D.M.R. from The Journal of the Institution of Engineers, 
Australia, February and March 1938); F.A. Larcombe, A History of 
local (Government in N.S.W. Vols 1 and 2 (Sydney: S.U.P., 1973 and 
1976); and especially Department of Main Roads, The Roadmakers:
A History of Main Roads in N.S.W. (Sydney: D.M.R”  1976). AlsoI. J. Thomas, "Some Aspects of the History of the Roads of N.S.W.",
J. R.A.H.S., March 1967.
The best source is The Roadmakers, Chs. 1.5 ana II.1•2 .
One aspect of the problem, the control of the use of vehicles, was 
partly ameliorated by the passing of the Motor Traffic Act of 1909 
which was enforced by the Traffic Branch of the Police Department; 
but the concomitant problem of road standards increased with time.
The first attempt to introduce consolidating steps was made in
1912 when the Holman Government tried to set up a Main Roads Board
of four members under Ministerial authority. It was intended that
councils would retain construction authority but that State grants
( 3)would be conditional. The Bill was withdrawn because of local 
government opposition but much the same effect was achieved 
administratively through the allocation of subsidies on a needs 
basis by the Department of Local Government. The motoring 
interests, specifically at that time the Royal Automobile Club of 
Australia, still sought central representative administration.
Another legislative attempt was made in 1918, this one adding 
motor vehicle taxes to the Main Roads vote and differentiating 
between Sydney and the country. Country interests defeated that 
attempt and a subsequent proposal in 1919. The National Roads 
Association (N.R.M.A. from 1923) was set up in the following year 
and their statement of policy centred on the need for the estab­
lishment of a Board. The Storey Government agreed and introduced 
the Metropolitan Main Roads Bill of 1920, incorporating a Board 
headed by the Minister for Local Government, a Metropolitan Main 
Roads Fund, a levy on councils (first suggested in the previous 
year) and a betterment tax on land fronting a main road. That Bill 
lapsed after its First Reading, partly because it was regarded as 
too representative and unwieldy and would spend its whole time 
talking rather than working.^'
The Coalition Nationalist Government was having difficulties 
in achieving a majority in 1923 and Premier Fuller adopted a 
"suddenly conciliatory" attitude to country interests, specifically 
the Progressive Party (Country Party from 1925) led by Lt.-Col. 
Bruxner. Bruxner asked for "a Main Roads Bill which would satisfy 
country members and money to make it effective. He got (all he 
asked for), and gave control of the House back to Fuller.
3. See ibid.t pp. 76-77. From this point on, Don Aitkin, The
Colonel: A political biography of Sir Michael Bruxner (Canberra:
A.N.U.P., 1969) is essential background. The following discussion 
of the early planning of the M.R.B. and D.M.R. is largely based on 
those two sources, as well as H.M. Sherrard, "Sydney Metropolitan 
Main Roads Planning 1925-1962", Australian Planning Institute 
Journal, July 1964.
4. Minister's speech notes (unused), as quoted in The Roadmakers. 
p. 79.
5. Aitkin, op. cit.. p. 76, see further pp. 81 ff.
Apparently Fuller's willingness to take action was due to the
passing of the Commonwealth Main Roads Act in 1923 which required
the States to make matching grants (see Chapter Six below). This
( 6 )implied the formal allocation of motor taxation' ' to roads but 
Fuller intended to retain a third of taxation revenue for 
Consolidated Revenue. However in November he was denied supply 
and by the time that the revised Bill had been prepared and 
Bruxner's requirements met the entire taxation proceeds were to go 
to roads. The Main Roads Bill was introduced in August 1924 and 
retained the principles of city/country dichotomy and subsidisation 
of the country by the city which had been incorporated in previous 
Labor and Nationalist attempts.
The debate over the 1924 Bill showed clearly that metropolitan 
roads were regarded as the most needy of attention but that the 
country held the strings. As the Minister for Local Government 
said,
If both the metropolitan and country main roads are 
dealt with from the one fund the country districts may 
very rightly fear that, in view of the proximity of the 
metropolitan roads to the seat of government, in view of 
their infinitely worse condition, and in view of the 
great pressure which the metropolitan area can bring to bear, there would be grave danger of the metropolitan 
area receiving the lion's share of the expenditure of whatever funds were provided for the Main Roads Board to 
expend, and the country districts not receiving due and 
adequate attention.(7)
Separate accounting arrangements were made in the form of a 
County of Cumberland Main Roads Fund, a Country Main Roads Fund and 
a Developmental Roads Fund. A Federal Aid Roads Fund was estab­
lished in 1927/28. The overall effect was as stated, a subsidisa­
tion of the country by the city, as is shown in Section 3 of 
Chapter Six.
The 1924 Act set up a Main Roads Board of three full-time 
members, the President being the former Under Secretary for Local 
Government, the others being engineers, one from the Department of 
Public Works and the other from the Country Roads Board in 
Victoria. (The Shires Association had requested a Victorian 
appointment.) The Act provided that "councils should continue to 
build and maintain the roads, and that the board would only finance 
the works and have some say in what works were to be done.... An 
important feature, in view of subsequent developments, was that, 
where necessary, the proposed board was to be empowered to buy and
6. That is, on a substantially extended base. A Motor Vehicles (Taxation) Act was passed concurrently with the Main Roads Act, 
providing for taxes to be calculated on the weight of the vehicle and the class of tyres used.
7 Quoted in The Roadmakers, p. 81.
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hire tools and equipment to carry out work should this prove (8^necessary”. The Board was dependant on the Public Service Board)
for staffing until 1929 while in the same year the Board was made
wholly responsible for servicing its loans because the Government
withdrew Consolidated Revenue contributions and repealed its
previous liability for at least one-half of the repayment of 
(9)loans. 7
The Board depended on council submissions on necessary works 
but largely because of a shortage of engineers the councils fell 
well behind and the Board found itself accumulating a large cash 
reserve. Premier Lang noticed this and had the Finance (Taxation 
Management) Act passed in December 1926 —  this was denounced as 
the "main roads grab”. (The Lang Government was soon defeated
and that Act was repealed a year later. Lang also transferred the 
Board to the Minister for Labour and Industry between October 1926 
and October 1927.) In the end the Board assumed the main respon­
sibility for main roads: whereas in the first fifteen months the 
Board paid five times in grants what it spent on its own roads, by 
1929-30 it spent four times what it paid in grants. "In the three 
years from its foundation the M.R.B. had become the principal road-
letamorphosis that had not been intended by
The M.R.B. also had to contend with a fairly desperate attempt 
by the Department of Public Works to regain its role as the sole 
central road construction authority. This was resolved in 1927 by 
a compromise whereby the Department assumed complete control in the 
Western Division. As noted already this parallelled earlier local 
government arrangements. (Lang had intended that the Roads Branch 
of the P.W.D. would be transferred to the Board.)
Thus by 1930 the Main Roads Board had been established as the
main design and construction authority for major roads in New
South Wales. The Board retained its close links with local
(1 2)councils, 7 particularly from 1928 when under the current 
Minister for Local Government, Lt.-Gol. Bruxner, a hierarchical 
classification of roads was introduced to assist in the division 
of work. Country Main Roads were divided into State Highways,
Trunk Roads and Ordinary Main Roads. In the County of Cumberland 
there were Highways and Ordinary Main Roads as well as lessor
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 88.
10. For details see ibid., p. 87; cf Aitkin, op. cit., pp. 110 f.
11. Aitkin, ibid., p. 110.
12. See Section 1 of Chapter Six below.
development had been authorised by Lang
Secondary Roads which qualified for assistance on a discretionary 
basis. ' A great many transitional changes were made in the 
Board's first five years which were confirmed when the Stevens 
Government created the office of Commissioner for Main Roads in 
1 9 3 2 . ^ Attention can now be directed to policy and planning.
The Main Roads Board held its first meeting in March 1925 and 
decided to circularise councils to "stocktake" the existing main 
roads and then set an allowance per mile for maintenance, "leaving 
questions of construction or reconstruction to be dealt with 
separately on individual special proposals, until we have time to 
consider construction on a systematic basis". y In the country 
Bruxner imposed his own ideas of decentralised administration and 
country ascendancy on the Board:
Bruxner directed that divisional offices of the Board be 
set up, each in the charge of a resident engineer, who 
was to have authority to deal with local municipal and 
shire councils, to authorise the expenditure of M.R.B. 
funds in his area, and to supervise all work financed by the M.R.B.(16)
In the end the internal structure became highly decentralised, to 
the extent that decentralisation became more important than central 
control.
In the metropolitan area though central planning became a 
paramount necessity. Resources were limited and demand was great. 
There was already an established pattern of Highways and other main 
roads, and although the Board had received requests for the 
proclamation of 78 new main roads in the County by mid-1926, it 
was decided that a pragmatic programme of strategic improvements 
was more desirable. Every Highway had either a "missing link" or . 
"missing end". Some of the major routes had been reconstructed in 
segments while others had been reconstructed only to the suburban 
border. The first Annual Report of the Board (1926) had a map of 
the missing ends and links and expressed a strategy based on 
eliminating these in conjunction with the provision of circumfer-(17)ential roads to connect the radial routes. y In both construction 
and maintenance the need for planning was recognised. At an early
13. Cf The Roadmakers, p. 107.
14. This change is dealt with in the next chapter. Basically the Department of Main Roads was based on a corporation sole rather 
than corporation aggregate. The significance of this is also 
touched on in the Conclusion.
15. President's Minute at Eirst Meeting on 24th March 1925, in "From the Minute Book", Main Roads. June 1975, p. 101.
16. Aitkin, op. cit., pp. 113-4.
17. See The Roadmakers. Ch. II.2 and map opp. p. 103.
stage the Board assumed practical control of major lengths of 
Parramatta Road, Liverpool Road (Hume Highway), Windsor Road and 
Woodville Road. It was found economical to adopt quite high 
construction standards and was forced to widen and realign roads 
through the realignment (that is specific development control) 
powers of the Local Government Act rather than by quicker methods. 
Greatest emphasis was placed on arterial routes rather than inter­
suburban or local trunk routes.
From 1925/26 to 1929/30 the Board spent $8,569,000 in the 
County of Cumberland, of which 11 per cent came from the 
Commonwealth. Of the Board's funds, 74 per cent was spent on 
construction; about 55 per cent of construction went on the five 
Highways (1926/27 - 1929/30) while almost all the Federal Aid Roads 
Agreement money was similarly allocated. Even before the 
Depression commenced the Board decided to restrict loan finance in 
the interest of soundness and in any case this would have been 
necessary. Otherwise the Board (Department of Main Roads from 
1932) was substantially protected from severe financial stringency 
by the stability of its main funding sources, namely council con­
tributions, motor taxation and Commonwealth grants. Total income 
increased in all years except 1931/33, when it fell by 5 per cent. 
Generally from 1930/31 to 1934/35 income rose by 10 per cent, and 
in the next four years (before the War) by 16 per cent. In the 
nine years to 1938/39 construction accounted for 54 per cent of 
County of Cumberland expenditure and maintenance for 45 per cent. 
Within the period priorities fluctuated widely, from virtual 
equality in 1931/32, 1933/34, 1935/36 and 1936/37, to construction 
being twice maintenance (1930/31, 1937/38 and 1938/39) and 
maintenance being almost double construction (1932/33)«^^
The D.M.R. continued in the 1930s in much the same manner as 
in the '20s. Its record has been traced in other p l a c e s ^ a n d  
was quite impressive, as the Minister for Transport, Lt.-Col.
(later Sir Michael) Bruxner stressed to a deputation from the 
N.R.M.A. in 1938.^^ That deputation sought the appointment of a 
special co-ordinative body to investigate various plans for the 
improvement of access to the city centre. The N.R.M.A. President 
(ex-Prime Minister of Australia), the Hon. J.C. Watson, finished 
with an expression of confidence in the Department.
18. Data calculated from M.R.B. and D.M.R. Annual Reports. Fora more detailed (but narrow economic) analysis see Lennon, op. cit. Gh. 4/1*
19. Lennon, ibid.. and The Roadmakers, chs. II.5 and III.1.
20. See Appendix 1 throughout. The record of the deputation has been included in the appendices because of its importance and also to reduce the treatment needed in this chapter.
Watson had consistently been one of Bruxner's most persistent 
(p i )critics' ' and it is possible that the comments of the deputation 
stimulated the Minister (who was nearing the end of a total 11 
years in the portfolio) and the Department (which had been improv­
ing metropolitan roads to a 13-year-old elemental’plan1) to consider 
a more comprehensive approach. In any case,
Just about the time of the outbreak of the Second World 
War (1939), the Department of Main Roads was ready to 
commence its re-appraisal of future metropolitan main 
road needs. Although there was no statutory town 
planning in New South Wales at the time, it was decided 
that, nevertheless, road planning should be conducted in 
accordance with comprehensive town planning principles, 
and have a logical foundation.(22)
This was more important as an organisational commitment rather than 
an actual policy process because the planning study was cut short 
by the Second World War. It was resumed some four years later and 
had significant postwar results, as will be seen in Chapter Seven, 
but it is equally important to note that the concern for planning 
had earlier roots. Main roads construction was balanced by a 
concern for traffic (or road) management, not only in a limited 
technical sense but including transport system co-ordination and 
public transport management.
The Police were responsible for traffic control and the Chief 
Secretary was their Minister. In late 1927 Chief Secretary 
Bruntnell set up a Traffic Advisory Committee of three principal 
members, the chairman being J.C. Watson and the Secretary and 
Executive Member Sydney Aubrey Maddocks, the Secretary of the 
Police Department. Obviously Bruxner might have regarded this 
Committee as an afront from his colleague but in any case the 
Committee was given three months to report on the causes and 
possible remedies for "the present unsatisfactory position in 
regard to traffic”, including "The desirableness or otherwise of 
creating a central authority for transport to be designated 'The 
Transport Board'"
The Committee's Report of 2nd April 1928, was definitely the 
product of personal preconceptions but it was nonetheless very 
significant. The central problem was stated thus:
It is impossible to study the question (of traffic 
congestion) comprehensively without realising that 
traffic is but a smaller phase (sic) of the larger
21. See Aitkin, ibid., pp. 114-5.
22. Sherrard, op. cit., p. 12.
23. Report of the Traffic Advisory Committee (Sydney: Government 
Printer, 1928), p. 57
problem of transport, and that traffic congestion is 
largely the result of an ill-considered transport 
system.(24)
To remedy this it was recommended that a Ministerial portfolio 
should be created called Transport, Traffic and Highways, and that 
transport administration should be centralised under that Minister 
and his Under Secretary. The Main Roads Board, the Railways and 
the Sydney Harbour Trust would come under the Minister (the Board 
and Trust would have to be transferred from Local Government and 
the Treasurer). The Government had already decided to separate 
trams from Railways so therefore a "Metropolitan Transport Board" 
could be created to run Government trams and buses and thus 
maximise their respective potential. (The Under Secretary of the 
Ministry would be chairman of the Board.) A State Transport 
Committee or Commission would be established "To make a comprehen­
sive survey of the transport needs of the State as a whole 
(excluding perhaps Metropolitan agencies...) and the correlation of 
the various transport agencies". Registration and licensing would 
be controlled by the Ministry which would also be the principal 
agency for the allocation of resources. The Ministry would also 
regulate private buses, commercial vehicles, taxis and so on; and 
have central responsibility for traffic control, including policy 
with regard to the relevant Police activities. The Minister would 
be assisted by a permanent Traffic Advisory Committee, ad hoc 
technical committees, a Transport and Traffic Research, Statistics 
and Public Safety Bureau, and an annual Transport and Traffic 
Congress•
This was a radical and somewhat unrealistic hotchpotch but it 
found some support in Bertram Stevens, then Assistant Treasurer, 
who saw financial benefits in co-ordination of services and who 
sponsored Maddocksv ' to the eventual heights of head of the 
"Metropolitan Transport Board" as Commissioner for Road Transport 
and Tramways. (Stevens was Premier after Lang’s defeat in 1932.)
In fact Bruntnell died and Bruxner took over traffic, first as 
acting Chief Secretary and then as Minister for an enlarged Local 
Government portfolio, now including the licensing of private buses 
which had seen a farcical exercise of Ministerial discretion.
Part of the reforms of 1930-32 were founded on the organisational 
proposals of 1928.
The Committee’s Report did not resolve many of the practical
24. Ibid., p. 6. Regarding the following account see furtherpp. 7-12.
25. Aitkin, op. cit.. pp. 118-9.
26. Ibid., p. 117.
problems in traffic control but some of its principal recommenda-
(27)tions were as follows:
(i) retention of tram routes with trials of buses to 
relieve peak loadings;
(ii) completion of city underground (but doubt its capacity 
to reduce street congestion);
(iii) parking facilities at public transport nodes should be 
encouraged;
(iv) parking restrictions are necessary but should receive 
further careful consideration;
(v) more traffic police should be employed while electric 
control signal systems should be fully investigated;
(vi) white lines should be placed across streets at dangerous places to ’’encourage pedestrians to cross by definite 
routes";
(vii) overhead pedestrian bridge to be built at Railway 
Square, together with suitable "by-pass” roads (also for other 
locations);
(viii) an experiment should be made on one major Highway with 
Stop signs on all intersections to give arterial flov/s the right- 
of-way in accordance with some overseas practice.
Numerous specific location improvements were suggested including 
several proposed by Dr Bradfield.
The Committee's Report was primarily directed to organisation­
al effects on planning rather than planning itself, and the key 
question of the respective roles of trams, buses and to a lessor 
extent automobiles was evaded because it had become "a matter of 
Government policy". 1 Nonetheless at the time the Government was 
grappling with a Transport Bill which would replace the nominal 
licensing power of the Chief Secretary (and then Bruxner) with an ' 
effective means of control over private bus operations. Bruxner 
was fully committed to restoring the viability of the trams
because of their trunk route capacity and permanent capital (29)debtv 7 and from 1929 he and Lang in turn penalised and restricted 
private bus hauliers. This was the most controversial urban issue 
of the time^^ and led to the commissioning of Madaocks on the 
17th April 1929 to visit Europe and America to inquire into 
transport generally, particularly into
"1. The methods adopted to co-ordinate motor omnibus and other forms of transport.
27. Cf T.A.C. Report, op. cit., pp. 12 ff.
28. Ibid., p. 14.
29. Aitkin, op. cit., pp. 180 ff.
30. There is an excellent section on the tram/bus controversy in Spearritt, "Urban History", op. cit., pp. 195-200.
2. Conditions under which such forms of transport are 
allowed to operate upon the public streets,
3. The latest methods of traffic administration and 
control,
4. How far experience in other places justifies any 
alteration in the policy laid down in the Transport 
Bill now before Parliament..."(31)
Maddocks* Report on Transport and Traffic Control Abroad 
(October 1929) was very influential among Bruxner's circles and 
still stands as a technical document of historical significance, 
for example it was perhaps the first Australian study to evaluate 
and commend the "superhighways” being developed in the United 
States of America, and Maddocks praised trolley bus systems.
Again however the main theme was organisational, that the problems 
caused by motor traffic required a co-ordinated approach to road 
construction and management (traffic control), and to public 
transport modes. The Transport Bill proposed that trusts would be 
established in Sydney and Newcastle to run Government tram services 
and license private bus services. (It was also intended that they 
would run Government bus services but the first of these was not 
started until the Government acquired its first buses in December 
1932.) The Road Transport and Traffic Fund was also to be set up 
and the office of Commissioner of Road Transport created.
The Transport Bill was duly passed in 1930 in amended form and 
Maddocks was established as the principal Government advisor in 
traffic (if not more generally), in the position of Commissioner 
for Road Transport. He had said in his 1929 report that buses 
should be used to ease peak tram congestion and that the buses 
should bear their proportion of tram capital charges. This was not 
the solution because a semi-ideological controversy developed 
around unified ownership and control. A special Transport 
Advisory Committee released a report on the question in 1932 
(which led to a spirited attack on Bruxner by one Fred H.
Kennedyv ) which recommended that a public utility company be 
set up to purchase and run the Government tramways and private 
buses at "fair present-day valuations”. This need not be discuss­
ed further here.
In short, the fifteen years preceeding the Second V/orld War 
saw two significant road planning developments. Firstly a
31* S.A. Maddocks, Report on Transport and Traffic Control 
Abroad (Sydney: Government Printer, 1930), p. 5l
32. See the most interesting documents by Kennedy:
Metropolitan Transport Co-ordination and its Supplement (Sydney: 
published by author, n.d. but probably 1935).
central main roads organisation was established and commenced a 
programme of improvement and eventually modem planning, the 
latter well ahead of other urban authorities. Secondly a great 
deal of attention was focussed on traffic problems with explicit 
attention to traffic as being indicative of more fundamental 
organisational and planning weaknesses. In the end the two 
streams were not united except through the establishment of a 
Ministry of Transport in 1932, and even then the reform was limited 
by existing corporate domains. Nonetheless in the period a 
quality of road planning and awareness of road transport problems 
existed which was in some respects higher than in the thirty 
years from 194-5-1975 which might be called the Automobile Age of 
Sydney.
Chapter Five
Administrative Experimentation
I am prepared to support a complete scheme 
of transport co-ordination, but I will not 
support any proposal that vests the full control 
of the management, the staffing and general 
administrative direction of the operations of 
the State*s public utilities in the political 
head. In this bill the meanest contract, the 
smallest transaction, the most detailed activity 
of these great public assets, the public utilities 
of the State, can be subjected not only to the 
scrutiny but the decision of the Minister, and that 
is... an entirely new departure in the administration 
of these great public assets. I am not prepared to 
support any scheme that will place all these 
activities and every section of them under the 
domination of the political head of the Government.
B.S.B. Stevens, in Debate on State Transport
(Co-ordination) Bill, 1931 .
The late 1920s and early 1930s saw an exchange of 
vituperative words and organisational reform in transport between 
the Lang Labor Government and then Opposition, and the Stevens/ 
Bruxner coalition Government. Very substantial issues were 
involved, from the point of view of State politics and political 
economy, the transport sector, and personal philosophy. At the 
end the defeat of Lang enabled Stevens to establish his own ideas 
on what was to prove to be virtually a permanent basis. This 
Chapter will briefly examine the conflict and the concepts which 
formed the foundation of the New South Wales transport administra­
tion from 1932.
The immediate dimensions of the technological challenge facing 
the Government public transport systems from the 1920s have already 
been seen. Motor buses and trucks challenged the traditional 
preserve of rail passenger and freight operations and threatened 
the security of an enormous State capital investment and roughly 
half the State Government workforce. Lang was loud in his determ­
ination to protect the railways and tramways and was attacked for 
his ’‘Sovietism”; but more fundamentally he was seen as undermining 
the efficiency of management by "interferring” with the transport 
executives and by making explicitly political appointments. As 
Lang and his colleagues repeatedly pointed out, Stevens was far
from blameless on the latter count and agreed with the former but
( 1 )this ex-Under Secretary of the Treasury' ' championed the cause of
managerial independence from Ministerial actions. This was a
period of tremendous importance in the development of the New
South Wales political system but the principles and policies which( 2 )were debated have been neglected by subsequent writers. 1 2*7
The treatment here will be basically chronological and as far 
as possible the disputants* own words will be quoted as to their 
philosophies.
It has been seen that a great deal of controversy preceded the 
setting up of the Main Roads Board and that there were also issues 
of administration regarding tram and bus operations. If anything 
Railway administration was even more politicised, although Parkes*
1. See Aitkin, The Colonel, on. cit., p. 103, Ch. 6 and elsewhere 
and J. McCarthy, ’’After Lang, 1932-35", in H. Radi and P. Spearritt 
(eds), Jack Lang (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, and Labour History. 
1977), and references cited there.
2. Lang's second Government in general and the transport bills inparticular are a major gap in Radi and Spearritt (eds), ibid., and
other Lang histories. Aitkin, ibid.. dealt with the issues in
passing. Lang’s own The Turbulent Years (Sydney: Alpha, 1970),
has some background but his ideas were spelt out more fully in
Parliament as discussed below.
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action on political logrolling in 1888 had stabilised that aspect. 
Parkes had established a Board of three Commissioners who had full 
delegated power for administration, while approval for financial 
and construction policy remained with Parliament. The Department 
of Railways was by far the largest State enterprise and the focus 
of development policy, and it was found after the death of Chief 
Commissioner Eddy in 1897 that agreement was too difficult to 
achieve on the Board. After a Royal Commission in 1905 authority 
was concentrated in the Chief Commissioner. Ten years later it 
was thought necessary to reduce that "autocracy” and major 
changes resulted on various principles in 1917 (twice), 1924 and 
then 1931 when the Chief Commissioner was restored as sole 
authority. (A Minister for Railways was appointed in 1916.) Other 
major changes followed which will be discussed shortly. The Great 
Strike of 1917 also had recurring internal and external repercus­
sions. In this area then the issues of efficient administration 
and autonomy had long been important and New South Wales’ 
politicians were used to thinking of Railways as an area for 
capricious debate and experimentation. In addition the advent of 
the common use of motor vehicles and the concomitant work of the 
Main Roads Board aroused the political theorists to consider the 
parallel development of roads and railways, tram and bus routes, 
and road-based public transport and suburban railways.
Maddocks was sent overseas in 1929 to advise Stevens and 
Bruxner on the terms of the Transport Bill which they had 
apparently had Maddocks draft, because of the hostile reaction ^ )  
when it had been introduced in that year. (They had opposed a 
Lang Transport Bill previously.) Maddocks favoured local control 
over State-wide control. The Bill was passed in 1930 and provided 
for a Commissioner for Road Transport, who would be chairman of 
the Sydney and Newcastle trusts for trams and buses, and who was 
also the State registration and regulation authority.^ The 
^relevant officers of the Police and Chief Secretary’s Departments 
were transferred to him. Trams were to be run by sin operating 
board which was autonomous in staff matters but under the trusts 
regarding policy and finance. Various advisory committees were 
provided for. Lang's former Chief Secretary, Lazzarini, condemned 
the separation of train and tram administration in his Eirst 
Reading speech and said that previous Nationalist Governments had 
licenced private bus operators to run in competition with trams 
while requests from the Railway Commissioners since 1918 and beyond
3. Railway Centenary History, op. cit.. p. 212, see pp. 210 ff 
generally.
4. But see Aitkin, op. cit.. pp. 120-1.
5. See Bruxner's First Readin/ Debates, Session 1929-30, 2nd S<r^sp e e ^h N.S.W. Parliamentary120, P P .-Z T 7 3  fr .—
to run their own buses had been repeatedly refused.
8 J(6)
In his Second Reading speech Bruxner justified the separation 
of trams and trains because the former needed co-ordination with 
local conditions, but he did not recognise other co-ordinative 
needs relating to trains. Lang condemned the Bill on four grounds. 
First, he saw a fundamental and inequitable innovation in the taxa­
tion of bus proprietors on gross turnover rather than income (that 
is profit). Second, he objected that the cost of administration of 
Maddocks' bureau would be taken from traffic revenue till then 
available to the M.R.B., and third that the bureau and traffic 
police would have "autocratic" and "Prussian" power over the 
licensing of road users. Finally and most importantly from the 
present perspective, he said that the new body would be independent 
of Parliamentary control and elections and that "Day by day the 
Government is handing over the functions of Parliament more and 
more to boards and officials". ' The new Commissioner and trusts 
would have control over tramway construction and management, of 
which Lang said:
There is before the House another bill to transfer the Railway Construction Branch from the Railway 
Commissioners to the Public Works Department, because, 
it is stated... Parliament and not the Commissioners should decide where and when railways should be built.... 
If it is wrong to entrust Mr Cleary, the Chief Railway 
Commissioner, with railway construction, how is it right 
to entrust Mr Maddocks with tramway construction?... The 
public interest should be the chief point considered in 
the conduct of the tramways, and if Parliament loses all 
authority over this public utility, then I am sure the 
public will not be served as they should be."(8)
Apart from Lang's specific objections, which were certainly 
substantial in several respects and some of which were to be 
developed later, the Transport Bill approached a cross-party 
consensus although there were several laissez-faire Government 
members (including Sir Thomas Henley who was mentioned in Chapter 
Two) who were totally opposed to any trading in the name of the 
Government. The private bus operators were naturally opposed to 
the Bill but there was certainly wide agreement that some action 
was needed in one direction (free enterprise) or another 
("co-ordination").
In November 1930 Lang succeeded the Bavin/Buttenshaw 
Government and in 1931 passed a State Transport (Co-ordination)
Act which he regarded as an immediate post-electoral but otherwise
6. Ibid., pp. 2977 ff.
7. Ibid., p. 3216. His speech is at pp. 3214-3220.
8. Ibid.t p. 3218. (Aitkin, op. cit., p. 192, explains the 
withdrawal of the proposal regarding the Public Works Department.)
interim step and which retained the arrangements of the Transport 
Act, A State Transport (Co-ordination) Board of four Commissioners 
was set up to regulate road and air transport with particular 
regard to Government rail services, and to improve and co-ordinate 
corporate performance. This was the first of three truly 
controversial reforms. The special object of the Act was to 
redress (in Lang's words) "the spectacle during the past few years 
of an extravagant and unprecedented expenditure on road construction 
mainly parallelling the railways, and depriving them of the 
passenger and goods traffic, for the conveyance of which they were 
primarily constructed.... If there was one thing more than another 
which we pointed out when putting our policy before the country it 
was that the Government would take control of transport. There was 
no mistake about it. The statement was made from every platform. 
Everyone understood that it meant that in order to solve the 
State's difficulties in connection with transport we would make a
(q)Government monopoly of the whole of the transport system."' *
Lang also indicated that developmental or cross-country roads 
would be considered rather than extensions of the rail system.
Lang did not really relate these intentions to the structure 
and powers of the new Board, and obviously had a limited notion of 
monopoly. The Act provided for the licensing of all journeys of 
ten miles or more on specific routes which were in competition 
with the railways, together with a ton/mile charge. Only services 
run for reward were subject to the regulation and they were 
penalised rather than banned for competing with the Government.
Lang did not change the provisions of the Transport Act of 1930 
and so the regulatory powers over buses of the bodies established 
under that Act remained in force. Of the technical provisions 
only the ten mile limit attracted substantial criticism and 
Stevens and Bruxner raised the limit to 50 miles when they regained 
office in 1932 but they kept the Co-ordination Tax. (Lang 
regarded this partly as an "obsolescence" tax and compensation for 
an investment already made as well as a charge against road costs.)
Two particular aspects of the Bill enraged the Opposition. 
Firstly the Bill gave the responsible Minister full powers of 
control and direction over not only the State Transport 
(Co-ordination) Board but also over all the other authorities and 
committees in transport. In the Parliamentary debates over the 
transport Bills of this time the most frequently cited source was 
a Commonwealth Transport Committee which was set up by the Bruce- 
Page Government in January 1929 and which reported in May of that 
year. The report was apparently not printed'"*^ but Lang quoted
9. N.S.W.P.D.. Session 1930-31, 2nd Ser., Vol. 127, pp. 3415 f.
10. See Votes and Proceedings of House of Representative^
(Commonwealth),1929, p. 111V Of w.A. Sinclair, "Capital Formation"
two of its recommendations (as did Opposition speakers) as 
follows: (a) that "all transport activities be grouped under one
Ministerial head, who will be responsible for the whole transport 
ation policy", together with (b) "the establishment of a co­
ordinating authority which would be responsible for carrying out(11)the transport policy approved by the Government",'
The State Transport (Co-ordination) Bill met the second item 
but only as an interim measure. The Bill also provided that:
As soon after appointment as practicable the 
Commissioners will be required to present to the Minister 
a draft bill setting out the legislation necessary to 
give effect to their proposals for the general 
regulation and co-ordination of traffic, and incorporat­
ing the management of the railways, Main Roads Board, 
Commissioner of Roads Transport (sic), the management 
board and transport trusts under one corporate body in 
a Ministry of Transport... When the bill that these 
gentlemen draw up is passed, it is the intention of the 
Government to appoint a Minister for Transport".(12)
(This Minister would combine Transport with an existing portfolio 
and Lang intended to take the post himself as an interim step.)
Lang and other Labor members repeated the overall theme of 
Ministerial control in other words and with different emphases, but 
the details (such as whether the Ministry idea parallelled British 
practice) will not be treated here.
Ministerial control was a distasteful proposition for 
Stevens and Bruxner because (in the former's words) it would 
"open the door very wide to log-rolling, intriguing and corruption(1 3)in the administration of these great undertakings". ' However 
Stevens took a public servant's stance, wanting a full-time 
Minister and "a small permanent staff gathered from the service": *
Greater co-ordination and regulation of railways, roads 
and other forms of transport is, I admit, highly 
desirable. Single ministerial control should be an 
advantage. Prom my experience of railway ministerial 
work I am convinced that this could be brought about by 
the appointment of a competent and skilled administrator, 
who would in relation to transport matters function for 
the Minister of Transport as every Under Secretary does 
for the Minister of his department. In my view there is 
not any need for the creation of any new board or 
department, or for an army of assistants. The necessary 
organisation could be built up from existing services, 
and this form of centralization should result rather in 
a reduction than an increase in the number of officers 
required. The nucleus of such an organisation already
in G. Porster (ed.), Australian Economic Development in the 
Twentieth Century (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970), p^  21.
11. N.S.W.P.D., vol. 127, p. 3420, also Stevens at p. 3443.
12. Ibid., p. 3421.
13. Ibid.« p. 3443
exists at the Treasury. When I took office as Minister 
for Railways a small section of two or three officers 
who were detached from other branches was set up to handle 
the submission of railway matters. This work is now 
being efficiently done.(H)
Bruxner was typically forthright:
That is Sovietism, lock, stock and barrel. It takes 
away those powers that this State has placed in the hands 
of those bodies over the years. If they were to be handed 
over to the control of Parliament there might be some 
excuse, but it is not. This is handing it over to the 
control of the Minister, whom Parliament cannot get at.
He can do as he likes.(l5)
In Bruxner*s view as with other Opposition members the role of the 
Minister and Government was to set down "general policy" without 
interferring with the expert and nonpolitical administration of the 
statutory undertakings. "General policy" ranged from overall 
labour and operating conditions, financial policy, broad priorities 
and the like. Bruxner feared a loss of "effectiveness" because of 
political control:
During the time I was Minister for Local Government no 
member of this House dogged my steps more than the Minister for Agriculture did in order to get the Main 
Roads Board to build a concrete road from Sydney to 
Mudgee running parallel with the railway all the way.
Under this bill the hon. member will be able to go to 
whatever colleague of his takes control of transport and get the concrete road all the way to Mudgee whether the 
Main Roads Board likes it or not. That is a principle 
we do not want to introduce into the administration of 
the Main Roads Board, which has been successful because 
Ministers have had no more to do with it than to provide the money and to lay down the general policy. This 
Government is departing from that, because it is going to take control.!16)
Among others the member for South Coast, Mr Bate, supported
Bruxner and Stevens by saying that "What I want to see done to the
bill more than anything else is to eliminate all suspicion of
( 17 )ministerial control". ' It is seen elsewhere in this thesis that 
Bruxner did not think that formal Ministerial powers were needed 
to ensure that the Minister's wishes would be implemented, and Lang 
in fact accused Bruxner of his own "interference" with the M.R.B. 
programme in Bruxner's electorate, and Bruxner was certainly a 
most active Minister. It should be noted that Stevens' statement 
quoted above accepted one notion of "single Ministerial control".
The other major area of controversy was that of personality. 
Most importantly in 1929 William James Cleary had been appointed
14. Ibid., p. 3445
15. Ibid., p. 3572
16. Ibid., p. 3573
17 Ibid., vol. 128, p. 4873
as the Railways Chief Commissioner to replace James Fraser.
Cleary was a brewer and a very respected businessman who had many 
qualities but who was perhaps too conscientious in fighting the 
financial problems of the Railways through hi manpower
Transport (Co-ordination) Bill was being discussed it was known 
that Cleary was being partly superceded by the Board, and 
Opposition spokesmen complained of the uncertainty which the 
existing executives were faced with. While the most contentious 
decisions were to come after the Bill was passed, two issues were 
especially objectionable to Stevens et al. Employees had to be 
members of an approved union, and members of what were then known 
as the "loyalist unions" were to be discriminated against in favour 
of the Australian Railways Union. Secondly, Railways staff to be 
transferred to the new Board had to apply to the Board rather than 
to their superiors as in the case of the other transport( 1 O')organisations.v * These two aspects were to be dwarfed by later 
complaints. A further threat to Cleary was seen in the Board's 
charter to draft a consolidating bill, but Bruxner disregarded this 
by saying that Lang's ulterior motives would be satisfied by the 
1931 Act and that the Labor Government would go no further with 
efficiency-oriented legislation.
Bruxner was quite incorrect because in early 1932 Lang introd­
uced the Ministry of Transport Bill. The Premier said that while 
the "deplorable conditions" which the transport authorities had 
drifted into were partially caused by motor competition, there 
were other factors. The principal of these was "the lack of co­
ordination in the control and administration of our railways, 
tramways, and main roads, both from an operation, maintenance, and 
construction point of view. Instead of being efficiently co­
ordinated, it is found that these arms of transport are controlled 
by three separate bodies; huge and expensive organisations have 
been built up for administrative purposes, and not infrequently 
they are in active competition, both in construction and operating 
p o l i c i e s . L a n g  claimed that the State Transport (Co-ordination) 
Bill had prompted the Queensland Government to take parallel action 
and had attracted a great deal of interest elsewhere in Australia 
and in Canada, South Africa and the United States of America. He 
also quoted the Commonwealth Auditor-General on the costs of rail­
road competition. However, he thought that there was needless 
overlapping and duplication in the transport enterprises and that
18. See Aitkin, op. cit., pp. 190-2.
19. For both aspects see Stevens, N ,S .W ,P,D.. vol. 127, p. 3443.
20. Ibid., p. 3572.
economies (because of Government decisions). When the State
21. N.S.W.P.D., Session 1930-32, 2nd Ser., vol. 132, p. 8418.
a reorganisation was required "to complete the Government's policy(22)and effect complete co-ordination" .v y The Board set up under the 
1931 Act had reported on the "co-ordinating of the activities of 
(the transport agencies) under one corporate body", and Lang 
accepted their ideas. Therefore he set up a Ministry of Transport 
consisting of a Minister and an integrated Department of Transport, 
without changing the basic regulatory powers.
Lang pointed out that there were eighteen commissioners and
members of boards as well as numerous senior executives in the four
State transport areas. In 1931 the term of office of one member of
the M.R.B. and the two Assistant Railways commissioners had expired
and not been renewed but administrative duplication and expense(23)were of serious concern.v It was "the intention of the Government 
to centralise control and thus ensure a more economic administration 
without in any way reducing the efficiency of (the) great public 
utilities" .(^ 4)
The new Department was set up on a "common service" basis, so 
that for example there would only be one construction and one 
personnel bureaucracy. There were a Chief Commissioner and seven 
"head of branch" Commissioners, while the Commissioner of Police 
was an ex-officio member as well. The seven branches were in 
short:
(i) railway and tramway transportation (traffic operations);
(ii) highway and roads transportation (registration, 
licensing and regulation of aircraft and road vehicles, and traffic matters);
(iii) power and mechanical (locomotives, rollingstock, workshops etc.);
(iv) way and works (all construction and maintenance, etc.);
(v) commercial (freight and passenger traffic);
(vi) finance (accounting, audit, statistics and stores); and
(vii) staff.
When asked who the Commissioners would be responsible to, Lang said 
the Chief Commissioner and thence the Minister. He emphasised that 
in the case of dissent the Minister would have the final decision. 
The Chief Commissioner was to be appointed for seven years but the 
others were to be permanent officers of the Department.
22. Ibid.
23. Cf ibid., p. 8419.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid
Simultaneously of course the specialised statutory authorities 
(such as the Main Roads Board) were abolished.
O
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Stevens in reply repeated his earlier idea:
What is wanted is expert direction of each of the separate transport activities, and a small co-ordinating 
authority, not with supreme management powers, but with 
powers to ensure that all aspects of policy shall be considered.(26;
After an interjection in which it was suggested that Cabinet 
Government gave all Ministers a share in the control of their 
organisations, Stevens added:
I have yet to learn that the function of a Cabinet 
Minister per se is to deal with the details of the 
administration of the department. As a matter of fact 
the hon. member*s suggestion rather proves my contention. 
The principle of taking a huge enterprise and allowing a 
controlling board to handle every detail of management 
is unsound. There should be staff control of detail, 
leaving to,the co-ordinating authority the question of policy..•.(27)
As examples of the subjects which should be free of political 
influence Stevens mentioned staff control, discipline, ’'management" 
and the "technical and economic control" of corporate affairs.
He also said,
If you give the management of the separate activities 
duties in which they are specialists, you are more likely to secure efficient management than if you group all 
those activities in one department and place it under 
the supreme control of one man who owes allegiance only 
to a Minister of the Grown. If we would set up a really 
co-ordinating body, we should not rest merely at the 
establishment of a purely official board. In that co­ordinating body there should be found a place for inter­ests other than those of purely Government activities.(28)
Bruxner's Second Reading speech was vituperative and condemned the
Bill and Government policy generally without proposing any
( 29 )substantial argument relevant to the present discussion, 7 except 
that he lauded road services as the technology of the present and 
future and described the rail operators' (and by implication his 
own) reaction to the new competition as "lay(ing) down and 
squeal(ing) and howl(ing) to heaven".
In the debate on the Ministry of Transport Bill the personal 
ity aspect of the series of organisational experiments began to
26. Ibid., p. 8429.
27. Ibid., also pp. 8429-31.
28. Ibid., p. 8430.
29. See ibid., pp. 8439 ff.
30 Ibid., p. 8440 (also Aitkin, op. cit.. p. 178)
emerge as a most important factor. The Chief Railways Commissioner 
Mr Cleary, had been usurped by the 1931 reform, both by Lang and by 
the new Board which was headed by Mr E.C. Goode and which included 
Mr Fraser who had been recalled from retirement. The Opposition 
claimed at some length that the Railways (and other) organisations 
had been interferred with in a wide range of matters, and Lang 
agreed. As he said, MI will admit that since the Transport Co­
ordination Act was passed we have been in control and not the( 31)Railway Commissioners”•v 7 However he said that when he had first
gone into Parliament he had researched the Railways for six months
and concluded “that the Government and the people were being 
(32)fooled",w  7 and that inefficiencies had not received adequate
attention since. Stevens instanced Lang's refusal to allow the
Federal wage award reduction of 20 per cent to apply to the
Railways as a major consequence of the interference and dissipation( 33)of the Chief Commissioners powers. 7
Stevens also pointed out that the Ministry of Transport Bill 
was intended to allow the repudiation of the contracts of certain 
statutory office-holders, notably Cleary, Maddocks and the two 
members of the Main Roads Board. Members of the Tramways Manage­
ment Board and officers of the Co-ordination Board and Commissioner 
of Road Transport were given statutory protection of rights, but 
the other statutory office-holders were merely eligible for 
appointment to the new Department. In fact Cleary and Maddocks 
had their positions abolished and were not re-employed until 
Stevens passed the next major piece of legislation. Because these 
officers had benefitted from their affiliations with Stevens^^ 
and Bruxner, the Opposition expected that they would not be 
appointed and although Lang did not repeat earlier perjoratives 
about Maddocks (the "ex-policeman”), the Government did not see 
that Cleary had any special ability or experience.^ ^ 7
However Goode himself was not a particularly sound choice as 
the new Chief Commissioner. Labor pointed out that he had had
31. Ibid., p. 8421.
32. Ibid., p. 8423.
33. Ibid., pp. 8430 f.
34. Later Lang quoted a letter of reference from Stevens to the Commonwealth Minister for Trade and Customs in favour of Maddocks. 
Stevens wrote there that "I was largely responsible for his 
appointment as Transport Commissioner, and at my suggestion we sent 
him to tour the world to get the latest information." N.S.W.P.D., 
2nd Session of 1932, 2nd Ser., vol. 134, p. 868.
35. N.S.W.P.D., vol. 132, p. 8438. It was claimed that in Cleary' 
2 years the Railways deficit (which was some $9 million p.a., 
compared with the cost of the Harbour Bridge at about S20 million), was almost equal to the total deficit of the previous 19 years. Cleary and the 1972 experiment with P.H. Shirley (Chapter Eight belowj were both financial disasters, in different circumstances oi course.
about forty years of experience in the Railways without blemish 
on his record, that is until convicted of accepting a bribe and 
being demoted from Chief Traffic Engineer. That did not stop 
Lang, but after he had appointed a Royal Commission to examine the 
charges against Goode, he was probably not pleased to find that 
Goode had to resign in late June 1932. At the time of the Bill 
though the Government was entitled by the circumstances of Cleary's 
administration's action to say that Goode had been "sandbagged". 
Again, the debates on personalities had not yet reached their full 
intensity.
Lang was dismissed by Governor Game in May 1932 and Stevens 
was confirmed as Premier at the subsequent June general election. 
The new Government proceeded quickly to restore the corporate 
identity of the previous specialised transport organisations and 
abolish the unitary Department of Transport. This was achieved by 
means of the Transport (Division of Functions) Act which was 
assented to on the 19th November, 1932. That Act again was 
reputedly drafted by Maddocks. Prior to that a proclamation trans­
ferred the administration of the Main Roads Act back to the former 
President of the M.R.B. and in early August 1932 Maddocks was 
appointed Acting Commissioner for Tramways and Road Transport.
The Stevens/Bruxner Act created a Ministry of Transport
consisting of a Minister and three statutory authorities, namely
the Department of Main Roads, the Department of Railways, and the
Department of Road Transport and Tramways, each under a
Commissioner. In his Second Reading speech Bruxner pointed out
specifically that the provisions of Ministerial control had been 
( 37)removed' 7 and therefore the principle of independent expert 
administration had been restored. The name "Department" was mis­
leading in that the three organisations were statutory entities 
with a varying degree of the characteristic freedom (this is 
examined in the next chapter), while "Ministry" was misleading to 
the extent that the level of structural integration achieved was 
very low. The sole provision of this type was Clause 19 which 
gave the power of final decision to the Minister where there was a 
dispute between the Commissioners.
There was a good deal of personal obloquy in the debate which 
will not be dealt with and otherwise the issues were consistent 
with the previous occasions. Bruxner said that the Bill would 
only deal with administrative organisation and that it did not 
really effect Government transport policy generally. He expressed
36. Ibid., p. 8434.
37. See N.S.W.P.D., 2nd Session of 1932. 2nd Ser.. vol. 134. 
pp. 797 fT.
the general principle of the reorganisation thus:
The best that one can hope to gain is to provide, as 
far as possible, machinery whereby those placed in charge 
of these services shall have the fullest freedom in the 
actual details of their administrations and control of 
staff, and that the representative of Parliament —  
namely, the Minister —  shall only exercise his influence 
in matters of broad Government policy; and in doing this 
it is very necessary that the Government itself should 
accept full responsibility for any actions on the part 
of the administrators that may be necessary to put this 
policy into effect, and that it should not make use of 
those officers to shoulder the responsibility which is 
essentially the Government's. After the passage of this 
measure, the several commissioners to be appointed will 
be as free as it is possible to make them from political 
control in the actual administration of the departments.(38)
He said that in the Department of Transport the Commissioners were 
so placed as to concentrate on a particular sphere of transport 
policy rather than regard the system as a whole. Therefore, he 
said, separate businesses should be separately controlled and that 
there was a need for "co-operation" rather than "co-ordination". J
Lang regretted that he had been somewhat out-manoeuvred by 
Stevens, Bruxner and their intimates:
The Government only wants to remove the board appointed 
by its predecessors so that it may find positions for its own political supporters. I do not say that in any 
spirit of cavil, because with the principle of political appointments to chief administrative positions the 
Labour party is in complete and absolute accord.
In the past the trouble has been that Labour 
Governments have not acted to the extent they should have 
acted upon this principle, while our opponents have never failed to use it. In the future the Labour party, as far 
as I am concerned, will never be remiss in this direction. 
In fact, it is my personal opinion, for what it is worth, 
that within a very few years we shall find that the 
first legislative act of every incoming Government will be to dismiss from office all the political appointees of 
its predecessors, and to appoint in their stead followers 
of the party in power. That system, at least, is 
justifiable, because it ensures to the Government 
sympathetic administration, and prevents public officers 
and public departments being subjected to the treatment 
that the principal officers of the Transport Department have received from this Government.v40)
While he had little to complain about in the circumstances, Lang 
had identified the principal theme of the successive reorganisations. 
Whatever the merits of the two opposite philosophies, they had not 
been adequately tried because of the personal politiking involved, 
nor had they been adequately appraised. Personal issues
38. Ibid., p. 802.
39. Ibid., p. 806.
40. Ibid., p. 866
predominated. Lang claimed administrative and co-ordinative 
advantages for his system^41  ^ while Bruxner claimed that it had 
produced excessive delays and inefficiency, but the only real 
issues were those of personal and Party preference. Later Bruxner 
was to admit that Maddocks' idea of local control via the trust 
system had been unsuccessful^2  ^ but other issues of functional 
specialisation, political control and organisational dynamics were 
not resolved.
The Transport (Division of Functions) Act represented a 
triumph of the peculiar brand of conservatism applying at the time 
in New South Wales. In continuation of the earlier concern for 
political interference with expenditure, resulting largely from 
gross excesses rather than a proper evaluation of the Westminster 
system, Bruxner and especially Stevens chose organisational 
independence and a nominal reliance on "co-operation" (rather than 
co-ordination), and this system basically still obtains in the 
1970s. Some conservatives, such as Professor P.A. Bland, thought 
a greater degree of separation of ’’politics” and ’’administration" 
should be achieved (together with the protection of popular 
interests through an appeals tribunal ), but this was one 
opinion which subsequent experience has demonstrated was substan­
tially incorrect. The consequences of unfettered organisational 
independence will be seen in the following chapters and the obvious 
conclusion to be drawn is that statutory independence is incon­
sistent with the New South Wales system of government. It is 
unlikely that the 1932 Department of Transport would have been 
efficient over time, especially from the point of view of political 
control over transport modes as is argued in the Conclusion, but 
again there was no particular justification for the Stevens 
solution. The design of the transport administration was based on 
Party, personality politics.
41. Ibid., pp. 869 f.
42. See Aitkin, op. cit., p. 179.
43. P.A. Bland, An Administrative Approach to Australian 
Transport Problems (Sydney: N.S.W. Centre of the Institute of 
Transport, 1935)•
PART TWO
THE POSTWAR EXPERIENCE
Chapter Six
The Administrative Framework
The political institutions of the 
country may be classed among the accidents 
of history... for even when it would seem 
that the design of institutions was a 
calculated and deliberate activity... the 
appropriateness of the design for regulating 
the phenomenon of large urban centres was 
neither considered nor achieved by 
inadvertance.
G.H. France and C.A. Hughes,
"The Role of Government" (1972).
Transport administration takes place in a wider environment of 
societal and political influences, institutional constraints, 
complex inter-governmental relations and so on. Such factors 
affect the quality of transport decision-making through uncertainty, 
fragmentation in related areas of administration, State budgetary 
and related political priorities, and so on. As has been said, the 
urban governmental system is extremely complex and attention cannot 
be confined to the transport sub-system if transport is to be 
properly understood.
This chapter will briefly analyse three important aspects of 
Sydney’s political environment. First, the general structure and 
texture of governmental relations will be examined, including the 
role of local authorities and Commonwealth-State interaction.
Second, the successive central metropolitan planning agencies will 
be discussed. Third, the budgetary and financial system of N.S.W. 
will be related to decision-making in transport, partly in 
continuation of the typology of structural co-ordinative influences 
developed in the Introduction. (The third aspect is complementary 
to Chapter Nine which deals with explicit co-ordinative mechanisms.) 
The treatment will be as brief and interpretative as possible. A 
fair range of secondary sources is available for most topics 
(although in some cases the conventional interpretations will here 
be challenged). The three subjects have been selected for special 
treatment: other topics (such as specific societal constraints and
the like) are dealt with elsewhere.
1. The Structure of Government
All three tiers of government in Australia have responsibilit­
ies in Sydney's transport. The Commonwealth is a fundamental 
influence on airport policy and on aviation-based commerce and 
tourism. It has also accepted a role in financing main and local 
roads and recently to a minor extent rail works. The State 
Government controls, funds or regulates public transport, private 
vehicles, main roads, maritime facilities, and has a dual licensing 
role with the Commonwealth in intra-State aviation, local 
government bodies are involved in local and some main roads, 
parking, some traffic facilities, and the regulation of trucks on 
local roads (and private buses in the country).
The above is not a complete catalogue but the dispersal of 
responsibility can be seen. Authority is even more dispersed and 
confused because "co-operative" federalism extends to relationships 
betv/een all levels of government. Arrangements have emerged 
between State and local government over parking and local roads,
between Commonwealth and State on a wide range of Constitutionally
exclusive matters, and so on. Rose’s description of an "intricate
and confusing network of institutions" which lacks a single
dominant concentration of power as "a maze without a mace" is most 
( -])apt.v 7 It is not necessary to define or trace the evolution of 
the intricacies but at this point only sketch the features of 
intergovernmental relations which impinge most closely on the
( 2 )specific areas of responsibility discussed in following chapters. 1 2*5
The main area of urban transport responsibility for the 
Commonwealth under the Australian Constitution is airport policy. 
The Commonwealth (through its Department of Transport) is solely 
responsible for the provision of airports for domestic and inter­
national use, the State's formal role being confined to the 
provision of ground access and joint licensing of intra-State 
traffic on the grounds of community value. Although the State has 
been excluded from considering questions of airport economics or 
environmental impact in regulating its share of air traffic, the 
Commonwealth has taken a co-operative stance. Growth pressures 
have been tremendous in airport policy but the preference of the 
Commonwealth, the increased utilisation of tne Kingsford Smith 
Airport together with the diversion of minor traffic to Bankstown, 
has been unacceptable to the Wran Government in particular but also 
to the previous Governments because of effects on port development 
and the environment. Long delays, political chess and uncertainty 
have characterised decision-making. Power will continue to be 
shared because of the political aspects but also because of the
great investment that will be needed on both sides, whatever
('*>)airport development strategy is adopted.
1. Richard Rose, "The United Kingdom as an intellectual puzzle", 
in D. Jaensch (ed.), The Politics of "New federalism" (Adelaide: 
A.P.S.A., 1977), p. 22 and generally. This Special Issue of 
Politics contains very useful background.
2. There is a wide range of literature on federalism which will 
not be referred to here. Some especially relevant works are:
R.L. Mathews and W.R.C. Jay, Federal Finance (Melbourne: Nelson, 
1972); R.L. Mathews (ed.), Making Federalism Work (Canberra: 
A.N.U., 1976); Report of R.C.A.G.A., Appendix 2. G; R.N. Spann, 
Public Administration in Australia, op. cit., chs. 7-9; and
K7 Wiltshire (ed.), Administrative Federalism (St. Lucia: Q.U.P., 
1977). Also Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Roads in Australia 1973 
and Roads in Australia 1973; and Commonwealth of Australia Budget 
Paper No. 7, Payments to or for the States and Local Government 
Authorities, 1975-76 and 197b-77.
5. More comment will be made on the characteristics of airport 
decision-making in Chapter Nine. This author prepared a detailed 
case study on this subject in Painter, Gibbons and Brezzp,Sydney Strategic Study (Report for Commonwealth Bureau of
Roads, 1975), the conclusions of which will be discussed in 
Chapter Nine below.
The Commonwealth has assumed de facto responsibilities in 
urban and non-urban transport works, originally (from 1923/4) 
because of the developmental impact of roads (and to a minor 
extent railways), but more recently because it has been accepted 
that a more reasonable basis should be established between the tax 
base and urban responsibility —  the Commonwealth having the money 
and the States the problems. The roads grants have been made on 
various bases as will be seen in Section 3 of this chapter, but 
generally they have been a key element in the funding of the 
Department of Main Roads.
Federal funding of railways dates from a scheme initiated in 
1920 by which the cost of inter-State rail standardisation would be 
shared between the Commonwealth and States in the ratio 20:80.^' 
Very little indeed was actually done then; payments recommenced in 
the late 1950s with the construction of the standard-gauge link 
between Albury and Melbourne. Other ad hoc agreements followed on 
other specific links. In 1974 however the V/hitlam Government 
undertook to pay two-thirds of the cost of approved urban public 
transport projects (including research and planning). The details 
of arrangements have changed over the last few years but it seems 
at present that the Fraser Government has accepted and will 
continue the Urban Public Transport Improvement Programme (UPTIP). 
The respective levels of road and rail funding are examined later 
in this chapter. (in 1974 the Commonwealth offered to take over 
the N.S.W. railway system. That offer was of course rejected.)
Such Commonwealth "optional" responsibilities are funded by 
grants made under Section 96 of the Australian Constitution, which 
enables the Commonwealth an almost unlimited ability to attach 
conditions. Thus programmes have to be submitted in advance for 
main and local roads, rail works, planning and research, minor 
traffic and related works, and so on. This arrangement is normally 
a significant, and at times a critical, constraint on State 
allocative policies. The most obvious example was the federal 
Labor Government's strenuous objections to the D.M.R.'s inner 
urban freeway plan in 1974. That case was not totally exceptional. 
State administrators find that their programmes and policies are 
consistently conditioned by expectations of Commonwealth standards, 
and in fact in 1977/78 the Commonwealth Minister for Transport 
withheld approval for the Victorian road submission because he felt 
that State funds were not being properly allocated. ^  That
4. This is simplified. See Commonwealth of Australia Budget 
Paper Do. 7, Payments to or for the States and Local Government 
Authorities 1975-76, p. 205. ~
See The Hon. P.J. Nixon, M.P., Opening Address to 1977 
Australian Road Transport Federation (Townsville, 26 September, 1977), p. 5. The Commonwealth has sought greater State allocations
precedent has now been firmly established. (6)
It might be noted that the Commonwealth pays for two-thirds
of the cost of the Urban Transport Study Group which is a fairly
autonomous arm of the Ministry of Transport and Highways, and for
research and planning in the P.T.C. and especially the D.M.R. and
Traffic Accident Research Unit. The Whitlam Government wanted to
directly participate in urban planning decisions and insisted on
representation on a top-level inter-departmental committee. The
Transport Development Committee was set up by the N.S.W. Government(7)for this purpose but has met infrequently and is ineffective.
The Commonwealth has provided a direct input into two major 
sub-regional planning issues, namely the development of Parramatta 
as an alternative metropolitan centre to the CBD; and the 
residential development of the Manly-Warringah sub-region. The 
Whitlam Government offered to build and operate a rail system for 
the encouragement of corridor development around Parramatta, and 
paid for an expensive consultant study of demographic factors.
The Fraser Government did not maintain this policy and in any case 
severe doubt was cast on the desirability of the rail-based 
solution, in the State sphere at least. Secondly, the Whitlam 
Government discouraged the extension of sewerage and water 
facilities in the Warringah peninsula because of the infrastructural 
costs that would be imposed on transport and other authorities. ;
to local council roads and the Victorian Government had reduced 
their commitment. Mr Nixon went on, "I v/ant to say that while I 
have only withheld approval for the Victorian road programs 
submitted to me, I will be examining very carefully future programs 
submitted from other States in order to ensure the Commonwealth’s 
commitment to assist local government through supporting the local 
roads categories is adequately met”. Needless to say the States do 
not have comparable ability.
6. Commonwealth funding has in particular broken State allocative 
discretion over urban/rural spending, partly through specified 
grants, partly through the National Highways grants (which are 
exclusive of urban areas), and partly through the refusal to fund 
rural railways. There have been several State complaints at 
meetings of the Australian Transport Advisory Council that 
Commonwealth practices are causing or perpetuating misallocations 
of resources.
7. Interview with K.J. Trott of 21st December 1976 (Appendix 6),
p . 6 .
8. See for example, T. Uren, ’Urban Development", in J. McLaren 
(ed.), Towards a New Australia (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1972),
pp. 139-13C. Mr Uren, who became the Minister for Urban and 
Regional Development in the Whitlam Government, in that place 
specifically attacked the D.M.R. and the Warringah Expressway.
It can be seen that the Commonwealth's exclusive airport 
authority and de facto authority derived from Section 96 grants 
have given the national tier of government an influential but 
basically restrictive role in urban policy. That de facto pov/er 
was largely gained by the Whitlam Government but its control 
aspects have been retained by the subsequent Fraser Government.
In general, the airport power has only been of substantial 
importance since the late 1960s while the other urban powers date 
from the mid-1970s.
The New South Wales Government has primary responsibility for
the quality of government in Sydney, both in the sense that its
agencies provide a wide range of services and also because the
State Government aids and supervises the various local government
bodies. The structure and operations of the two levels of
government are generally well known and cursory attention only will(9)be given to select aspects here. y
In most respects the Constitution and related conventions of 
New South Wales follow the Westminster model regarding the formal 
roles of Governor, Government and Cabinet and Opposition, and 
Public Service. Virtually every institution has co-ordinative 
functions, and taken with the range of inter-departmental, judicial 
and specialist co-ordinating bodies, a high degree of formal 
integration is intended. However in practice even many of the 
co-ordinative bodies like Treasury have limited jurisdiction or 
limiting conventions, and it is often argued that even direct 
Ministerial connections to organisations such as apply in the 
Public Service do not ensure adequate communication, responsiveness 
and advice. Parliaments themselves have major shortcomings. ^  ^
9. There is a wide range of sources. A basic description is 
L.J. Rose, The Framework of Government in N.S.W. (Sydney: 
Government Printer, 1972)", throughout. The best single source is 
still Spann, op. cit., throughout; but see also Mayer and Nelson, 
op. cit.; and K. Wiltshire, An Introduction to Australian Public 
Administration (Melbourne: Cassell, 1975), Part A. Parliament 
itself is analysed, with greatest attention to historical aspects, 
by G.N. Hawker, The Parliament of N.S.W. 1856-1965 (Sydney: 
Government Printer, 1971).
10. Every one of the recent major inquiries into various govern­
mental systems was critical of normal Departmental arrangements, 
and many saw statutory authorities as being also deficient in 
control aspects but superior in financial, managerial, personnel 
and like arrangements. All favoured the modernisation of the 
Departmental form and Public Service practices. See Royal 
Commission on Government Organisation (Glassco, Canada 1962), 
especially Vol. 5, p. 56; The Civil Service (Fulton, U.K., 1968); 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Public Service of South 
Australia (Corbett, 1975), pp. 11*2 ff; and R.C.A.G.A. Report^ 
op. cit., pp. 82 ff. There are many other references on this 
point — see especially the articles by R.L. Wettenhall, L. Peres 
and others in the special issue ’’Government Departmerr Statutory Authority*1, Public Administration ^Sydney), 2?f4),
A special feature of the N.S.W. system though is the 
predominance of statutory authorities. These typically have non­
elective chairmen (instead of Ministers) at their head and are able 
to internalise a far greater proportion of operational and 
interpretative decision-making than can Departments. While they 
are formally under the control of a Minister, tney normally have 
to consult him or her on a restricted range of matters only and 
have extensive discretionary powers under the relevant Acts. They 
are also relatively independent as a rule in financial, personnel 
and related matters.
As a consequence of these and similar factors, strong lines of
specialisation rather than integration become evident in the
political system. Administration is organised on specialised
client or functional bases as are Ministerial arrangements. (The
effectiveness of co-ordinative bodies is discussed in Section 2 and
especially Chapter 9 below.) Ministries have been established for
Local Government, Planning and Environment, and Decentralisation
and Development, all of which are functionally interdependent, as
well as Public Works, Transport and Highv/ays, Housing, and so 
( 1 2)on/ ' The task-orientation of these arrangements does not help
the determination of policies in policy areas (such as cities)(13)which cut across departmental lines. ' Partly as a consequence, 
in 1975, in the course of the Machinery of Government Review a 
system of five standing committees was introduced into the N.S.W. 
Cabinet structure. The composition of these has changed^ ^  but at 
late 1977 it was as follows:
December 1968. N.S.W. has been poorly served by analysts in this 
area, see Spann, op. cit., p. 498.
11. See S. Encel, Cabinet Government in Australia (Melbourne: 
M.U.P., 1962); also "Cabinet and the Bureaucracy", in J. Wilkes 
(ed.), Who Runs Australia? (Sydney: A.I.P.S. and Angus and 
Robertson, 1972). A most important reference on N.S.W. is
K. Turner, House of Review? (Sydney Studies in Politics No. 8,
1969) .
12. The historical development of N.S.W. Ministries is traced in 
various places in Hawker, op. cit.; and C.A. Hughes and
B.D. Graham, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1890- 
1964 (Canberra! A.N.U., 1968).
13. M. Painter, Introduction, in Painter, Gibbons and Brezzo, 
op..cit., pp. 3 ff. An excellent overview of Sydney’s government 
is France and Hughes, "The Role of Government", in Parker and Troy, 
op. cit.
14. Compare the following with B. Moore, "Machinery of 
Government Changes in N.S.W.", Public Administration (Sydney), 
34(2), June 1973, pn. 117-8, 1277
1 POLICIES AND PRIORITIES COMMITTEE (Senior)
Premier (Chairman)
Deputy Premier & Minister for Public Works and Ports 
Treasurer
Minister for Transport & Highways 
Attorney General
Minister for Industrial Relations, Mines and Energy
Minister for Planning & Environment (and Vice President 
of Executive Council)
2. INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE
Deputy Premier & Minister for Public Works and Ports 
(Chairman)
Minister for Transport & Highways
Minister for Industrial Relations, Mines and Energy
3. DEVELOPMENT CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE
Deputy Premier & Minister for Public Works and Ports 
(Chairman)
Minister for Planning & Environment
Minister for Decentralisation & Development and Primary 
Industries
Minister for Local Government
Minister for Lands
Minister for Justice and Housing
Minister for Conservation & Water Resources
Minister for Services and Minister Assisting the Premier
4. JUSTICE & CONSUMER AFPAIRS COMMITTEE
Attorney General (Chairman)
Minister for Consumer Affairs and Co-operative Societies 
Minister for Justice and Housing
Minister for Services and Minister Assisting the Premier
5. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE
Minister for Education (Chairman)
Minister for Health
Minister for Sport, Recreation & Tourism 
Minister for Youth & Community Services
Minister for Services and Minister Assisting the Premier 
(The Treasurer is also an ex-officio member of Committees 2 and 5«
These Standing Committees do not have terms of reference and 
only deal with matters referred to them by Cabinet. Special 
purpose Sub-Committees (such as that on Land Valuation) do have 
terms of reference.
Most if not all major Government initiatives and policy 
decisions are referred to Cabinet for approval and this provides a 
reasonable opportunity for affected Ministers to make an input to 
the final decision, but in terms of adequate information and 
organisational participation, Cabinet is not nearly as good a forum 
as the Standing Committees. Apart from such formal decisions 
however many decisions are made by the Minister or Premier without 
consulting other Ministers (or officers) while many decisions also 
do not need Ministerial approval. As well many programmes become 
entrenched and persist without question; in particular the pricing 
policies of many statutory authorities would be opposed by State 
Governments of either hue if it was realised how anachronistic and 
even inefficient they had become.
The organisation of Cabinet committees into such a structure 
is of considerable value when major issues affecting the Government 
as a whole arise but otherwise it is a "good indication of the lack 
of political concern for comprehensive metropolitan policies at the 
State level".^ 1 ^  As will be noted later co-ordinative responsibil­
ities have been more effectively exercised in the last few years, 
largely as a consequence of the politicisation of several major 
urban issues, but at the State level there is no real integration 
in urban affairs.
Fairly detailed analyses follow of decision-making in a number 
of transport and related areas in which many of the characteristics 
of government at the State level are discussed. While each 
organisation and each administration is different in New South 
V/ales owing to historical factors, many of the conclusions from the 
specific studies apply more generally.
Local government is the third, and in most respects the 
inferior, level of government. It is inferior in that it exists 
basically at the pleasure of and is the "creature" of the State; 
it is typified by parochial and reactive (rather than positive) 
approaches to policy; and it has very limited powers and 
responsibilities. Because the main tax base of local councils and 
shires is the rateable value of their districts, spatial inequalit­
ies tend to be accentuated. As well, although a major theoretical 
virtue is the directness of accountability, this fact also 
militates against the quality of decision-making on issues of more 
than local significance and can affect the degree of co-operation 
that even State agencies can expect. Again such factors are well
/ a
documentedv and the following treatment is selective.
15. Painter, in Painter, Gibbons and Brezzo, op. cit., p. 3.
16. Some important sources are: R. Atkins, "Local Government", in Spann op. cit., ch. 11; M. Bowman, Local Government in the
There are about 40 local councils in the Sydney region 
(slightly more for instance in the Sydney Water Board’s area), 
which basically have individual, unco-ordinated responsibilities.
A measure of integration is achieved through seven main 
mechanisms; the activities of the successive central land use 
authorities discussed later; judicial review; minimal supervision 
(basically administrative auditing) of the Department of Local 
Government; limited co-operative arrangements (the electricity 
County Councils as well as some waste handling facilities); 
several limited-purpose committees; and relations with central 
operational authorities such as the D.M.R. and Water Board. A 
final co-ordinating influence is the effect of Commonwealth and 
State Grants Commissions (and at times other Commonwealth agencies) 
which basically allocate funds according to relative merit. The 
five County Councils are now virtually the only surviving 
manifestations of the movement for a Greater Sydney; the Water 
Board until 1972 consisted of elected local government represent­
atives but now has very limited non-elected representation, while 
the Cumberland County Council (1945-63) was entirely a creature of 
local government (reversing the usual dominance of the State).
Local government’s main urban transport responsibility is the
construction and maintenance of local roads. These represent( i 7 )almost 90 per cent of Sydney’s road systerrr ' and cost local 
councils about 30 per cent of their total annual expenditure (about 
20 per cent of the Sydney City Council’s expenditure).^ P a r t  of 
this effort is funded by the Commonwealth and part by the State. 
Since 1969 the Commonwealth has nominated funds separately for 
urban arterial and urban ”sub-arterial” (later ’’local”) roads in 
its road funding and as well councils receive (or received) 
substantial assistance from the Grants Commission from 1973, Area
Australian States (Canberra: A.G.P.S. for Department of E.H. & C.D., 
1976); Prance and Hughes, in Parker and Troy, loc. cit.; Joint 
Study into Local Government Finances: Australia and Hew Zealand 
(Canberra: Report of the Joint Steering Committee, 1976);
M. Neutze, ’Local, regional and metropolitan government”, in
R. Mathews (ed.), Intergovernmental Relations in Australia (Sydney; 
Angus and RobertsorTJ 1974) ; and M. Painter, ”A Comparative 
Analysis of the Decision-Making Processes in Six local Government 
Councils in Sydney” (unpublished Ph.D thesis, A.N.U., 1973)*
17. This figure is based on D.M.R. classifications; see
S. A.T.S., Vol. 1, Table 3.1.
18. Atkins, op. cit., p. 240 and elsewhere; Official Year Book 
of N .S.W ., 1974, ch. 9, especially Table 252.
Improvement Scheme and R.E.D. scheme. The other main sources of
revenue for roads are rates which are set basically at council
discretion except to the extent that constraints on overall annual
increases apply, and loans which are determined by the State
Treasury and Loan Council in the first instance and then by the
Department of Local Government. Individual councils thus have(19)little discretion in the size of their loan programmes. J '
As a general rule, roads expenditure is a greater proportion 
of total council expenditure for municipalities and shires which 
have experienced rapid population growth in the last twenty years 
and which still have mainly rural or semi-rural infrastructure, 
compared with the more established councils which are able to spend 
relatively more on community facilities. In council areas such as 
Blacktown, Penrith, Fairfield and Liverpool rapid urban development 
was superimposed on relatively weak financial and infrastructural 
bases, and relations with State instrumentalities became crucial. 
The Housing Commission and 3.P.A. for example placed great 
pressures on Blacktown Municipal Council which until 1969 -had 
qualified for Commonwealth road assistance as a rural area.
Hov/ever no special State assistance was given to the Council for 
the upgrading of through and local roads which carried greatly 
increased traffic, and as a consequence the quality of the roads 
deteriorated to critical levels. In 1974/75 the Grants Commission 
gave Blacktown more than any other municipal body in Australia, 
except Brisbane, and all of that allocation of $984,000 was applied 
to roads (as well as $300,000 in the previous year for Area 
Improvement —  none in 1974/75 —  and $94,000 in 1974/75 under 
R.E.D.). State policy was attacked in Federal Parliament and by 
local resident action groups, especially the Mt Druitt Action 
Committee and the Australian Transport Study Group.
Against this background, and it might be remembered that such 
council areas are "transport disadvantaged" with respect to public 
transport as well as roads, the policies of the Department of Main 
Roads are extremely important. The D.M.R. is "responsible" for 
roads which carry heavy traffic, are of particular design, or have 
special developmental or tourist impact. Being responsible in many 
cases means paying for construction and/or maintenance, and the 
Main Roads Act leaves the question of classification almost 
entirely in the hands of the Commissioner for Main Roads. Two 
principal effects arise. Firstly, country councils generally have 
greater control and discretion than their metropolitan
19. See R.P. Gibbons, "Blacktown Council: A Case Study of Local 
Road Planning", in Painter, Gibbons and Brezzo, op, cit., ch. 9.
2 0 . Cf ibid., pp. 127-131.
i r  ov • % .
counterparts;^ and secondly, the latter are disadvantaged 
vis-a-vis the control of the D.M.R. over classification (an 
important factor in adapting to changing urban conditions).
While the first factor is important on a State-wide scale, the 
second is more directly relevant to the urban situation. Blacktown 
for example depends for access to the main rail and road corridors 
on several quasi-trunk roads, some of which are classified as Main 
Roads, some as Secondary Roads and some as local. Secondary Road 
is a special category which applies only to the County of 
Cumberland; it refers to roads which carry "substantial" volumes 
of through traffic and relieve Main Roads. The D.M.R. pays only 
half the cost of construction and maintenance and more significant­
ly has the discretion of declaring a road as a Secondary Road.
Apart from gaps in the classification system which perhaps have 
been produced by time, Blacktown Council has argued over the years 
since 1969 that several of its roads should receive the assistance 
of reclassification. Such arguments have been unsuccessful, at 
least partly because of D.M.R. priorities and funding policies.
As the Department stated in its pamphlet Guide to Main Roads 
Administration (1970):
For some years the Commissioner has usually withheld 
support of /“reclassification requests_7 because the 
amount of work required at present to bring existing 
Main Roads to the standard required to meet rapidly 
expanding traffic is usually so great that available 
Main Roads funds need to be concentrated on this task...
This was a major factor in the Council’s inability to cope with the
pressures placed on it by planning decisions and metropolitan
development, and also helped to elicit the special ad hoc(22)Commonwealth support from the Whitlam Government. State and
Commonwealth policy has adjusted to this to some extent but the 
basic difficulties in fringe co-ordination remain.
The second major role for local councils is the provision and 
control of parking facilities, generally on the basis of formal 
co-ordination with affected authorities through Parking Advisory 
Committees set up under Section 270D of the Local Government Act. 
The first of these was established in the City of Sydney in the 
mid-1950s and since then some ten more have been set up, especially 
in commercial areas with parking and access problems. Represent­
atives include the Departments of Local Government and Police, the 
P.T.C., the local authority and the Planning and Environment 
Commission. Some of these committees are inactive but otherwise
21. One source for this is "Main Roads and Local Government", 
Main Roads, December 1976, p. 36.
22. Cf. the Hon. P. Nixon, loc. cit.; and interview with the 
Hon. P.F. Cox of 29th November 19/6 (Appendix 5), PP* 7-8.
they in effect shift local decision-making away from the council 
towards the functional authorities because the decisions of the 
Committees are binding, subject to appeal to the Minister for Local 
Government. The Council of the City of Sydney has been especially 
active in planning in the last ten years or so and parking has 
been a focus of its policy, in respect of which it has come into 
conflict with the views of State authorities over the use of 
parking supply to control traffic to the C B D . w o u p £  seem 
that the Council was parochial in its attitude and did not have the 
ability to prevail. That is not to underestimate the operational 
importance of councils’ role more generally, especially v/ith regard 
to parking spaces and meters.
Councils’ control of parking is the most positive element in 
their role in traffic control generally, the administrative 
complexity of which is mentioned elsewhere. Councils have the 
ability to restrict the mass (size) of vehicles using local streets 
and have circumscribed powers in other policy areas, such as street 
closures. Traditionally councils have shared control with Police, 
the Department of Motor Transport, the D.M.R., land use planning 
bodies and so on (even down to the Maritime Services Board and 
various servicing authorities). Until 1976 co-ordination was 
tenuous and fragile, and often lacking. The Traffic Advisory 
Committee had been set up in 1964 v/ith much the same membership as 
CUMTAC, with a preponderance of State organisations but with 
co-opted local council representation as required on specific 
subjects. In late 1974 as part of the Machinery of Government 
Review a ’’Committee of Enquiry into Roads and Traffic Administration 
and Related Matters” was set up with the Under Secretary of the 
Ministry of Transport (as it was called until January 1975) as 
chairman. This produced a report of reputedly high quality which 
inter alia regarded the administration of traffic as excessively 
fragmented, with co-ordination being dependant on individual good­
will. The formation of a statutory ’’Traffic Authority” was 
recommended and subsequently endorsed by the then Government, 
leading to implementation about two years later.
The Traffic Authority can be regarded as an innovative 
development in administration and is assessed as such in Chapter 
Nine below. At this point it can be said that while the Authority 
has overall control over road management (as distinct from 
construction), it has delegated a great deal of responsibility to 
local councils for the planning of minor traffic facilities on
23. Por a brief account see Prance and Hughes, op. cit., pp. 53-4. 
Cf Urban Systems Corporation Action Plan No, 4: Car Parking 
Stations on the Western Perimeter of the CBD (Council of trie Citv 
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councils have attracted frequent criticism of their conservatismtardiness in planning.
roads other than Main and Secondary Roads. It retains the right 
to erect facilities on council roads (through the D.M.R.) but has 
decided that this will only be exercised in exceptional circum­
stances. Generally councils have set up joint "Traffic Committees" 
to involve Police and D.M.R. officers as well as the local M.L.A.
In a few cases councils have defied the Traffic Authority but 
consequently the Authority’s powers have been confirmed and it 
functions as a co-operative body of great potential.
It can be seen that councils have a rather residual role in 
transport planning in Sydney and this can be regarded as a v/eak 
link in the State administration. Generally however the State 
Government's operational agencies are the primary actors in the 
policy field although the roles of the Commonwealth and local 
tiers are important and at times critical, especially in the 
former's case.
2. Central Metropolitan Planning
The nexus between the quality of urban living and integrated 
urban planning and administration had been v/idely accepted from the 
early 1900s as was seen in Chapter Two. The domination of 
metropolitan administration by separate functional organisations, 
usually with statutory incorporation as well, was frequently 
criticised and the creation of a Greater Sydney Council remained 
Labor policy through to after the Second World W a r . ^ ^  
Reconstruction conditions in the 1940s and William McKell's 
Government's policy led to the creation in 1945 of the Cumberland 
County Council (C.C.C.), the first of three quite different and 
generally unsuccessful postwar experiments in integrated urban 
planning. These are important background to the chapters on 
institutional planning which follow.
In 1945 McKell and J.J. Cahill introduced the Local Government 
(Town and Country Planning) Bill which provided for the establish­
ment of a Town and Country Planning Advisory Committee to assist 
the Department of Local Government in preparing a broad plan to 
serve as framework for detailed local council land use plans.
Mr Stan Haviland had become Assistant Under Secretary of the 
Department of Local Government and Housing in 1941 and he was known 
as a man of strong ideas on metropolitan government, and while the
24. See J.D.B. Miller, "Greater Sydney 1892-1955”, Public 
Administration (Sydney), 23(2) and 23(3), 1954; Spearritt, "Urban 
History", op.~cit., ch. 10; and P. Harrison, "Planning the 
Metropolis —  A Case Study", in Parker and Troy, ol . cit., ch. 4. 
Harrison's chapter and Painter, Gibbons and Brezzo, op. cit., ch. 2 
are important sources for the main historical details which follow.
bill provided for local government representation on the Committee 
it made the "third tier" inferior to the State Government.^' ^  The 
Minister for Local (Government was to be fully in control of both 
the Committee and councils when they subsequently submitted their 
plans. (At the time there were 67 councils in Sydney; in 1948 
the number was reduced, through compromise of stronger Government 
proposals, to 39.)
The Bill was strongly opposed in Parliament and by the local 
Government Association which wanted the planning scheme to be drawn 
up by its members. The Government gave way on this<point and set 
up a County Council to consist of ten members, one from the Sydney 
City Council and nine elected by constituencies of the other 
councils (on much the same basis as the Water Board’s membership). 
The C.C.C. was to be funded by councils by means of a special rate. 
However the Government did not give way either on overall 
Ministerial control or on the Planning Advisory Committee. The 
C.C.C. was not subject to the direction of the Minister, a fact 
which later proved to be an invaluable weapon for the Council, but 
it had to submit its scheme within three years to the Minister and 
the scheme had no inherent statutory status that v/ould allow the 
C.C.C. to dissent from his wishes. Second, the local council 
schemes were to be submitted not to the Council but to the Advisory 
Committee or Department of Local Government (in practice these were 
very close), which advised the Minister. If a local scheme was 
inconsistent with the Council’s guidelines but the Minister accept­
ed the former, the Council’s plan v/ould have been superceded. The 
Committee and the Department were understaffed and overwhelmed by 
detail and "took no part in bringing about co-ordination... nor 
were they in any position to secure Government sponsorship of 
planning". (^)
The planning system was therefore drawn up on very poor lines
if one accepts that it was the Government’s desire to make the 
(2 7 )C.C.C. work. ' further the Council was given no practical powers 
such as to acquire land, and it was specifically excluded from 
intervening in urban works programmes. There was in fact a very
25. The Committee consisted of three professional representatives 
(architect, engineer and surveyor), an officer of the Department of 
Local Government, an alderman nominated by the Local Government 
Association, and two Ministerial nominees.
26. R.D.L. Fraser, "Planning and Government in the Metropolis", 
Public Administration (Sydney), 31(2), 1972, p. 135.
27. There is no doubt that Mr McKell and Mr Cahill supported the 
C.C.C. strongly but nonetheless they handicapped the Council.
They no doubt did not intend to relinquish Ministerial control and 
adopted fairly traditional Ministerial support systems even though 
there v/as an inherent contradiction.
limited degree of co-operation from most established authorities, 
with the exception of the M.W.S. & D.3. (even that body was an 
uneasy partner at times), and there was occasionally open 
c o n f l i c t . T h e  statutory authorities were jealous of their 
individual sovereignty. Several councils withheld their share of 
the C.G.C. levy after the initial three-year period had finished 
because the C.C.C. had by then alienated sections of the local 
government community.  ^ ^
The Council presented its Planning Scheme Report in July 1948. 
This was a comprehensive survey of the present circumstances of the 
County and a prescription for future planning. The Council had 
employed a substantial team of planners and geographers and also 
relied on the population and land use statistics which trie B.M.R. 
had collected in preparing its Main Roads Development Plan.^"^
The Report's prescription generated a great deal of controversy as 
did its modus operandi later.
The basic strategy of the Report was to restrict the outward 
sprawl of the metropolis to the existing urban area and select 
"new towns" (Campbelltown for example), and preserve urban amenity, 
by setting up a "green belt" on the urban fringe and designating 
large tracts as open space. The transport systems then planned by 
the respective authorities were almost entirely adopted and the
( 3 1 )Water Board's systems were of primary consideration. J The CBD 
was designated as County Centre and sixteen district centres were 
also identified.
The Planning Scheme Report was adopted by the Government with­
out change but only after a delay of three years which caused 
fundamental problems and which was a major constraint on the
(•52)effectiveness of the C.C.C.'s planning. ' The Scheme was unique 
in Sydney's history in that it was given legislative substance 
through being incorporated as a Schedule to the local Government 
Act in 1951. At the same time the Council was made the
28. See Harrison, op. cit., especially pp. 69 ff.
29. Ibid., p. 66; Fraser, op. cit., p. 131.
30. See Chapter Seven below. The planning outputs of the three 
successive land use authorities are discussed briefly in that and 
following chapters.
31. Cf R.P. Gibbons, "Finance and Planning: the Sydney Water 
Board and the 1959 Green Belt Releases", A.J.P.A., 35(2), June 1976, 
pp. 149 ff. For more detail see Harrison, ibid., pp. 67 ff. Also 
R. Bunker, Town and Country or City and Region (Melbourne: M.U.P., 
1971), ch. 10. L. Sanaercock, Cities for Sale, op. cit., ch. 8, is 
a useful summary of other sources.
32. Painter, Gibbons and Brezzo, op. cit., p. 24.
"responsible authority" for certain aspects, including the 
acquisition of land, the control of the Green Belt, and the 
reservation of land for County Roads and open space. (It should be 
noted that the Government and constituent councils paid half each 
of the cost of such land.)
The main philosophical opposition to the Plan somewhat
paradoxically came from the local councils whose rating capacity
(or potential) was affected by limitations on growth and the open
space commitment (which was in any case to be substantially
reduced). The best demographic projections were also to prove to
be far too low, and the Plan to therefore be "inflexible", and
opposition from the land development lobby was in 1959 very
important in having the Green Belt abandoned. Some councils, and
especially the Minister to 1959, Mr Cahill, and the C.C.C.’s two
(35)aldermanic chairmen, gave strong s u p p o r t a n d  the Council had the 
benefit of an excellent (ex-D.M.R.) Chief County Planner who was the 
driving force behind the adoption of developer contributions for 
various services for example. It was in fact in connection with 
the 1959 Green Belt releases and the Council's fight for developer 
contributions that the C.C.C. showed that being free of direct 
Ministerial control was invaluable in enabling it to overcome short 
term (but fierce) political pressure in achieving the implementa­
tion of necessary planning powers; the operating authorities, 
principally the Water Board, were chary of fighting their own 
battles.
Two aspects of the modus operandi were important. firstly the 
Council was flooded with enquiries about the routes of the 
extensive system of proposed roads (see the next chapter), most of- 
which could not be definitely answered because the Department had 
recommended the roads without detailed surveys being undertaken. 
This was a necessary evil and could not be avoided at that time 
without neglecting the road needs of the metropolis, although the 
Chief County Planner later wrote that the problem would have been 
easier to resolve if the D.M.R. had been given "a taste of front-
/  ^2 A \
line experience".  ^ ' Secondly local councils were unco-operative
in preparing their detailed planning schemes. The Areas Act of
1948 required all councils to prepare schemes but it also conferred
discretionary powers which the councils would have lost, so that by
1963 only three schemes had been prescribed. The City of Sydney
scheme was not nromulgated until 1971 because of an extended cycle 
( 3 5)of compromise.' '
33. Praser, op. clt., p. 131. 
Ibid., p. 133.34.
35. Harrison, op. cit., pp. 72-3.
It can be noted, on the question of whether local government
was a satisfactory basis for central planning, that the Chief
County Planner and one of his staff planners have disagreed
subsequently whether the Council was capable of achieving a
"synoptic” viewpoint. Rod Fraser has argued that the Council had
been well-served by the local government system in electing able
m e n , ^ D  ^ but Peter Harrison believes that the Council's staff
generally persuaded the Council to overcome a parochial 
('57')perspective. ' It is impossible to settle this here because while 
the Council definitely took a synoptic view and held to it through 
their political battles, at risk to their individual electoral 
prospects, the role of Rod Fraser cannot be underestimated.
However there was a great difference between the planning of the 
C.C.C. and the State Planning Authority in that the former's was 
much more pragmatic and related goals to means far more success­
fully, and this difference was to a large extent achieved because 
of the nature of the C.C.C.'s management. (There were also 
possibly critical differences in staff resources.)
In 1951 the Town and Country Planning Advisory Committee,
which had earlier decided that it v/as unnecessary to give the C.C.C.
statutory powers of inter-corporate co-ordination,^0' decided that
a comprehensive method of "co-ordinated planning" was required and
later recommended to the Minister for local Government that a
( "59)State Planning Authority should be set up.v ' This was accepted 
by the Government which announced in March 1962 that the 3.P.A. 
would be set up to "plan and co-ordinate the development of the 
use of land and provision of essential services". Over a year-and- 
half passed before the C.C.C. gave way to the Authority and the 
Council continued to operate with that threat over its head. In 
its final Annual Report it said that its task had been to "enforce 
new legislation which infringed upon the vested powers and 
responsibilities of existing statutory bodies and adversely 
affected the financial interests of many citizens", and that its 
basic dilemma was how to be effective and popular at the same 
time g  40)
The State Planning Authority Act differed very little from the 
C.C.C. legislation in terms of planning role and powers, although 
the S.P.A. v/as given a larger legal status in implementation. Ho 
extra co-ordinative power was given. It had to "submit to the
36. Fraser, op, cit., p. 131.
37. Op. cit., p. 73.
38. Ibid.
Ibid., p. 77.
Quoted in ibid., p. 79.
39.
40.
Minister proposals for the development and use of land, including 
development and use in conjunction with the provision of utility 
services and public transport facilities*’ (Clause 3 ot S._r .A. Act) , 
but it was under the control of the Minister, unlike the C.C.C., 
and thus the only overall co-ordinative power came not from "the 
Minister" but from Cabinet. Ministerial (cum organisational) 
specialisation was preserved.
In effect, the S.P.A. legislation proved that most importantly 
the C.C.C. had been a thorn which the statutory authorities and 
Minister wanted to rid themselves of. The new S.P.A. was a
(41)creature of the State and of the other statutory organisations.
The Authority in fact was originally proposed to consist only of a 
chairman and deputy chairman, one of whom was to be a professional 
planner, and four part-time members from the Ministry of 
T r a n s p o r t , t h e  D.M.R., the Department of Local Government, and 
a public utility authority respectively. To these six v/ere added 
five local government representatives after the Bill had been 
introduced and a twelfth member nominated by the professional 
Institutes (Architects, Engineers, Surveyors and Planners). Co­
ordination was therefore seen in terms of participation and shared 
control within the State governmental system, although local 
government power via the Legislative Council at least partially 
defeated the initial intention. In 1972 four new members were 
added (commerce representative, Treasury, Director of Decentralisa­
tion and Development, and Lands). This was done to widen 
representation and thereby ostensibly improve co-ordination. At 
about the same time the Under- Secretary of the Ministry of 
Transport for some reason was replaced by the Commissioner for 
Railv/ays.
In the ten years of its existence, the State Planning 
Authority fulfilled its apparent role of "internalising" planning 
and making it subservient to corporate goals, but this was found to 
be eventually undesirable. The Authority was a large group of 
part-time officials and suffered all the disadvantages of 
compromise, artificial consensus and delays which poorly designed 
committee structures can be subject to. In 1973 a Government 
Parties’ backbench committee was set up imder Mr R.O. Healey,
41. It is possible that the S.P.A. was seriously intended to take 
a positive approach to inter-corporate planning and if so it was a 
case of very poor organisational design. However given tne 
C.C.C.’s experience and the nature of corporate specialisation, it 
is far more likely that the S.P.A. was an attempt to control 
planning.
42. As will be noted in Chapter Nine, at this time the Ministry 
was merely a "letter box" and the appointment of the under 
Secretary is somewhat difficult to understand. It was no doubt a 
result oi* the then Minister for Transport’s personal nreferences.
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to investigate various complaints, including (in the
Minister’s words) that ’’planning in this State was being carried
out by public servants who are not answerable to Parliament”. As
a member of the Committee said in debate, the part-time members
had to rely excessively on their employees —  Healey himself went
much further and said that the pattern of representation was
undesirable. ”My Committee could see no reason why such persons as
the Commissioner for Main Roads, an officer of the Treasury, and
(4 ■5)others, should be members of a planning authority...” ' Even
Ministerial control and responsibility had been lost in practice.
There is no doubt that this prognosis was ’’correct’’ according 
to the political philosophy of planning which then prevailed. The 
S.P.A. had published a revised planning scheme in 1968, the Sydney 
Region Outline Plan, which most importantly replaced the compact­
ness of the C.C.C.’s strategy with linear sprawl along major 
transport corridors.(44) rp^ e plan’s language was technocratic and 
euphuistic and abstract goals abounded —  without any meaningful 
discussion of how goals would be achieved, how particular problems 
could be overcome, how existing infrastructural and social 
facilities could be best utilised, or how co-ordination would be 
achieved. Moreover in practice the operational authorities were 
unquestionably tricked by the technocrats. In the early and mid- 
70s problems emerged which revealed the delusions of the 3.R.O.P. 
but which were not resolved. For example the extensive land 
release programme which the S.P.A. said would overcome land short­
ages and reduce prices, in fact assisted speculators, increased 
prices and in the end found the Water Board for one to be over­
committed to release areas which had not developed because the 
S.P.A.’s expectations (and abilities) had been grossly 
unrealistic.^ T h i s  happened even though the Water Board had been 
represented on the S.P.A. throughout its history. Development did 
not go where it was meant to go, nor could it be controlled, and 
considerable incompatabilities between land use and transport 
planning resources emerged. As has been indicated above the 
composition of the C.C.G. had enabled it to both aim high but be 
reasonably realistic; the S.P.A. had aimed somewhat lower but been 
unrealistic.
It must be said that the Authority recognised the clumsiness 
and co-ordinative weaknesses of its structure and the State
43. Painter, Gibbons and Brezzo, op. cit., pp. 19, 23.
44. See Harrison, op. cit., pp. 86 ff; S.P.A., Sydney Region 
Outline Plan 1970-2000 A.D. (Sydney, 1968).
43. Gf Gibbons, ’’Finance and Planning”, on. cit. , p. 198 for 
brief detail. This statement is otherwise based on the writer’s practical experience.
Planning Authority (Amendment) Act of 1972 besides expanding 
membership also (on the advice of the Public Service Board) 
provided for the delegation of authority to specially-constituted 
committees as well as to S.F.A. sub-committees. In June 1972 a 
purely advisory Transportation Planning Committee^0  ^ was set up 
under the chairmanship of the Commissioner for Railways, Mr Neal 
McCusker, and it included the S.P.A.'s Chairman (Mr Ashton) and 
Associate Chairman, Commissioner for Main Roads, Under Secretary of 
the Treasury, City Council nominee and Under Secretary of the 
Ministry of Transport. (In fact Mr McCusker retired before the 
Committee's first meeting about a year later and Mr Ashton took 
over.) In the end this Committee was judged to be an usurpation 
of the transport administration's responsibilities and duplication 
of URTAC. The committee system was cumbersome and did not save the 
S.P.A.
The Planning and Environment Commission (P.E.C.) was created 
by an Act passed in April 1974 (effective from November). It was 
given the same basic responsibilities and powers as the S.P.A. 
with the exception that Clause 2, Section 20 called for it to 
produce a report within a year on "organisational, administrative 
or other changes and adjustments which, in its judgement, are 
necessary in the public interest for the purposes of improving, 
restructuring, integrating or co-ordinating the planning of the use 
of land..." It v/as apparently intended that this would be an 
impartial review because the infrastructural authorities were 
excluded from the formal structure of the Commission; in fact two 
of the three full-time members were brought in from outside 
established planning circles. The initial Chairman was an overseas 
academic geographer, the other two were the Government Architect 
(not previously on the S.P.A.) and the Associate Chairman of the 
S.P.A. (The former Chairman was excluded via an appointment as 
Special Advisor to the Minister for Planning and Environment.) It 
was recognised that txhe goals and intentions of planning had been 
lost and the Government decided to give greater planning powers to 
local government to improve the efficiency of detailed planning 
processes. (Two part-time members were appointed to the 
Commission, one representing the Local Government Association and 
the other community interests.)
The P.E.C. produced two booklets in November 1974 and June 
1975, entitled "Towards a New Planning System for N.S.W." and
i  c.
46. Other committees were: Executive, Management, Statutory 
Planning, and State Regional and Project Planning. The committee 
structure was a good attempt to make the most of the existing 
framework.
"Proposals for a New Environmental Planning System for N.S.W." 
(Green Book and Blue Book respectively). The Green Book was 
intended to raise issues and arouse community response, while the 
Blue Book was intended to be somewhat more definite although it 
v/as stated in its Introduction that legislative changes would only 
be drafted after the reception to the modified proposals was 
assessed.
The Green Book proposed that the P.E.G. should withdraw from 
local land use planning as far as possible, but that an inter­
mediate tier of Sub-Regional Groups of councils (and outside the 
metropolitan area there could also be regional planning councils) 
should be created to implement guidelines established centrally.
It was clear otherwise that no co-ordinative breakthroughs v/ere 
proposed: while an "Advisory Committee" would assist the P.E.C.,
functional organisations would hopefully ensure "that their actions 
(would) conform to the State Government’s planning and environ­
mental policies and guidelines" (p. 17).
The State bureaucracies apparently reacted reasonablv (47)strongly' ' to the idea of an intermediate State/local tier of 
the sort proposed: as the Blue Book put it, "There was general 
opposition to the introduction of another level of bureaucracy or 
government" (p. 11). Regional development councils were proposed 
for extra-metropolitan areas in conjunction with the decentralisa­
tion of P.E.C. offices and the formation of an Advisory Co­
ordinating Committee and Environmental Planning Advisory Committee 
for each region. In Sydney councils v/ould be "encouraged" to form 
sub-regional groups to advise the P.E.C. (possibly on a compulsory, 
statutory basis) and perform functions delegated by the constituent 
councils. More significantly, it was stated that greater inter­
corporate planning v/as advocated in many responses to the 1974 
booklet, possibly via the P.E.C., Treasury or Cabinet. The Blue 
Book avoided the real issues involved and said that "A willingness 
to share power and co-operate will be essential", and that "It is 
expected that the State Government will adopt environmental 
planning policies and objectives which will bind all government 
agencies, as well as councils and regional bodies" (p. 26). It was 
stated that legislative changes would be made to "bind all 
government bodies to planning and environment controls and policies 
in their development and works programmes. Moreover, provision 
will be made allowing them to particip?ite in plan formulation and 
environmental protection" (p. 29).
47. P. Harrison, "Regions and Parishes or How the Green Book 
Turned Blue", paper given to Conference on the Proposals for an 
Environmental Planning System for N.S.W. , University of Sydney, 
August 1979.
The latter proposal is extremely significant in theory but it 
is more valid as a statement of intent rather than of purpose or 
practice. There is sufficient power in Cabinet now to achieve most 
of the co-ordination that is sought. In any case in its three 
years the F.E.C. has proven to be apparently ineffectual —  no 
progress has been made towards the passing of a new "policy style" 
planning Act, no effective action has been taken to implement new 
planning procedures or r é g i o n a l i s a t i o n , and the S.R.O.P. has 
not been replaced (although a review of S.R.O.P. is well advanced). 
As often happens a change in Government and leadership (a new 
Chief Commissioner was appointed, again from outside the existing 
planning establishment, in 1977) has possibly restored centralist 
philosophies.
The P.E.C. has not significantly affected formal mechanisms 
of co-ordination. An Advisory Co-ordinating Committee has provided 
the traditional access for authorities such as the Sydney Water 
Board. (The Under Secretary of the Ministry of Transport and 
Highways replaced the Commissioner for Main Roads in late 1977.)
The committee structure in transport planning has not been changed 
and URTAC has kept developing as the main transport/land use 
co-ordinative forum.
A central theme runs through the three experiments with 
metropolitan planning bodies in Sydney, that the State Government 
has never really tackled the dilemma inherent in the planning 
function. If strategic planning is to be achieved then compelling 
co-ordinative mechanisms and loss of corporate autonomy have to be 
effected; otherv/ise the planning function is in reality merely 
partial land use management. (49) q #q #q # was able to divorce its
policy-making from the State political base to a considerable 
extent, enabling a start to be made on the integration of policy 
but reducing the possibility for compulsory or co-operative co­
ordination. The S.P.A. was a reversion to autonomy (including the 
autonomy of the Authority’s ov/n technocratic policy processes) and 
at best achieved little. So far the P.E.C. has avoided having to 
face the dilemma because of the need to build support, especially
48. In fact the P.E.C.'s poor administrative record among other 
things led Professor Wilenski to conclude that land use planning 
should be decentralised while overall planning and co-ordination 
should be done in quite different places. See Review of N.S.W. 
Government Administration (P. Wilenski), Directions for Change 
(Sydney: N.S.W. Government Printer, 197777 PP• 74-9 and Parts A 
and B generally. (Also see Conclusion below.)
49. Fraser saw the principal defect of planning in the C.C.C. 
■period as the failure of the Government to take a proper 3 ead
top. cit., pp. 135, 137). Planning is too close to local political 
processes for politicians to allow effective independent involve­
ment although the environmental movement and similar factors might 
force a change.
in Cabinet (where go far support has been lacking) if a frontal 
assault is to succeed. However this would not be the correct 
direction for reform as will be argued in the Conclusion. The 
direct impact of the central planning bodies on transport planning 
will be mentioned in later chapters.
3. Finance and Budgeting
The budgeting system of a governmental network is important 
from a number of viewpoints. Line-item budgets have different 
effects to performance budgets and the fact that New South Wales 
has the former type has significant implications for Government 
control of organisations,! performance and programmes and so on.^°^ 
Equally important, the financial system is not designed to 
facilitate co-ordination in that it has evolved in steps and is not 
homogeneous. Some organisations are tightly constrained by 
Ministerial and Treasury supervision while others are all but 
completely independent (especially in an historical if not current 
perspective). All have different sources of revenue and different 
liabilities. Some are subject to external constraints while others 
are virtually able to determine pricing and budgeting strategies 
internally.
The features, strengths and weaknesses of the State budgetary
system are generally very v/ell documented and no attempt needs to
( 51 )be made here to outline them. Rather the appropriate oackground
will be given in the course of sketching the history of financial 
control of the transport organisations (Department of Main Roads, 
Public Transport Commission, Department of Motor Transport,
Traffic Authority, and Ministry of Transport and Highways) . ^ ^
Only one of these organisations is a normal Department, the
50. Major references are Knight and Wiltshire, or. cit., 
especially Ghs. 2, 5 and 6; P. Wilenski, "Budgeting: Political 
Processes and Accounting Imperatives", in Jaensch, op. cit., pp. 
196-205; (Wilenski) Directions for Change, op. cit., chapter 2; 
and A. Wildavsky, Budgeting: a comparative theory of budgetary 
processes (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), Chs. 11-12 and elsewhere.
51. See (Wilenski) Directions for Change, ibid., various places 
but especially Ch. 2; Manual of Governmental Accounting in N.S.W. 
(Sydney: Government Printer, 19 67), Ch. 2 and elsewhere ; Spann,
op. cit., Ch. 17; W.J. Campbell. Australian State Public finance 
( Sydney: Lav/ Book Company, 1954;; W.R.C. Jay and R.L. Matnews 
(eds), Government Accounting in Australia (Melbourne: Cheshire, 
1968); and RoseJ.,op. cit., pp. 91 ff.
52. Statistics given in the following are from Annual Reports, 
Reports of the Auditor-General, and Year Books, 
were compiled for the main parameters, which will 
rather than treated at length. D.M.R.
Payments) to 1972 are given in The 
Appendices. The assistance of Mr J. McDonnell,
Mr P. Slater in the compilation of oublie transport public sources is gratefully acknowledged.
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Ministry, and all the rest are individually unique.
The Department of Main Roads is an unorthodox statutory 
authority in many respects. It operates under the Main Roads Act, 
1924, as amended, which gives the Commissioner for Main Roads wide 
discretionary powers over internal financial, administrative and 
operational matters, but which defines broad spending priorities 
between metropolitan and "country" (including non-metropolitan 
urban) areas. The Commonwealth also contributes a very large part 
of the Department’s revenue, again with specified priorities 
between a range of area- and road-type categories. Thus the D.M.R. 
is an unusual mixture of delegation of decision-making and 
statutory restrictions over spending.
As has already been seen the original Main Roads Board was the 
product of urban-country antagonism and pork-barrel politics on the 
part of country representatives. In order to gain legislative 
approval to the replacement of fragmented local council administra­
tion by a central expert organisation, the Government set up 
separate accounting arrangements in the form of a County of 
Cumberland Main Roads Fund, a Country Main Roads Fund, and a 
Developmental Roads Fund. By guaranteeing the revenue sources for 
the two former Funds in set proportions, the Government guaranteed 
that money would not be diverted to the metropolis.
The early financial history of the Main Roads Board was very 
unsettled, but from 1925 to 1953 the County of Cumberland Fund was 
allocated on average about one-third of total receipts; thereafter 
the proportion was fairly steady at 26-28 per cent (including 
Commonwealth funds which were allocated directly from 1932). As an 
example of the imbalance, until December 1950 the County of 
Cumberland Fund received half the motor vehicle taxes collected in 
the County, while the Country Fund received the other half and the 
taxes collected outside the County (the respective proportions were 
therefore 23i% to 761-%). From 1951 to the present the Country Fund 
has received 80% of tax proceeds. The Country Fund receives 80% 
of Road Maintenance charges and 50% of motor vehicle tax levies. 
Loans and borrov/ings are distributed on a discretionary basis, year 
by year.
The first Commonwealth legislation for road assistance was 
passed in 1923 and applied to main, trunk and arterial roads; this 
provided for <i for contributions but did not divide the funds 
between the various road types in advance. A Federal Aid Roads 
Fund was created in 1927/28 into which all Commonwealth contribu­
tions were paid, to be allocated to councils for approved works 
later. From 1931 the need for the States to make pro rata payments
(and the need to seek approval of projects were dropped and the 
Commonwealth legislated that its contributions would be paid 
straight into the County of Cumberland and Country Main Roads Funds 
in the same ratio as State motor vehicle taxation receipts, 
legislative requirements were varied fairly frequently thereafter, 
with regard to State contributions, petrol tax allocations, 
strategic roads and so on. The 1954 Commonwealth Aid Roads Act 
provided that at least 40 per cent of funds made available had to 
be spent on rural roads other than highways, main roads and trunk 
roads; this was repeated in 1959 and 1964 .  The rest of contribu­
tions were allocated directly to the Funds. From 1969 a needs 
element was introduced into the distribution of Commonwealth assist­
ance and specific allocations were made for urban arterial and sub- 
arterial roads, rural arterial roads, rural roads other than 
arterial roads, and planning and research. It was decided to re­
establish the Commonwealth Aid Roads Fund in 1969 and although 
names have changed since then the basic principle for the alloca­
tion of Commonwealth grants has remained the same.
It can be seen from the foregoing that there has been a great 
deal of inflexibility in the funding arrangements of the D.M.R. 
because of the establishment of specific-purpose Funds. These 
Funds are mutually exclusive and inhibit the transfer of available 
capital between changing priorities and needs. At various times 
the D.M.R. was unable to match the share of funds that councils 
were able to provide as their share of the cost of works on Trunk 
and Ordinary Main Roads, so that one council was able to tell the 
Department in the early 1 9 5 0 ’ s that "generally speaking, Councils’ 
ordinary roads are in a far better condition than the main roads”. 
(See the D.M.R.’s Annual Report of 1 9 5 6 / 5 7  for further details.)
At times, the Department claimed that a disproportionate amount of 
funds was going into urban areas, at other times that it had been 
unable to allocate enough to urban freeways.
However within the overall constraints the Commissioner has 
fairly wide discretion. The Main Roads Act contains numerous 
provisions for the Commissioner to decide on funds for maintenance, 
renewals, research and development, and classification. As will be 
seen the Commissioner for Railways could not initiate or authorise 
construction works, at least in practice without specific 
legislative apnroval, and all funds were and still are subject to 
specific annual Parliamentary appropriation. The Commissioner for 
Main Roads on the other hand until 1975 did not even inform the 
Government of the details of its annual and advance programmes, 
even in respect of urban freeways. The Minister for Transport from 
1965 to 1975,  Mr M.A. Morris, has said t h e  following o f  t h e  D.M.R.:
f
1 0
Their estimates were never seen by a Minister or by 
Parliament or aporoved. (Mr Fife) changed that. Their 
road policies often, by luck, coincided with the 
Government's road policies, they never had to explain or 
justify them.(53)
Since 1975 the D.M.R. has submitted an annual programme of works 
for approval to the Minister for Transport and Highways but there 
is no real statutory compulsion for it to do so and so far the 
appraisal has been hurried and superficial, as generally happens 
with sizeable computer-produced organisational works programmes.
A related matter is that the D.M.R. has always had to submit 
a works list to the Treasury in connection v/ith annual loan 
allocations.(54) However one of the major advantages of the D.M.R. 
is that its Funds basically consist of current revenue and 
Commonwealth grants, and the D.M.R. policy has been to avoid using 
loan funds whenever possible except on revenue-producing roads such 
as toll works. In the period from 1950/51 to 1976/77 loan revenue 
as a proportion of total revenue only exceeded 10 per cent once and 
in the period as a v/hole accounted for only 5.6 per cent. (It 
only became a significant source of funds in 1963/64-.) In the same 
period Commonwealth funding under the Commonwealth Aid Roads Act 
and succeeding legislation (National Roads Act 1974, Roads Grants 
Act 1974, and Transport (Planning and Research) Act 1974) was 
reasonably constant and averaged 38.1 per cent. Motor vehicle 
taxation and fees fell in trend and averaged 37.1 per cent of total 
revenue. From January 1972 councils in the County of Cumberland 
became exempt from a special Main Roads levy; Section 11 revenue 
(as it is called) has fallen to negligible levels but averaged 3.8 
per cent for the period. Road maintenance charges have been levied 
on heavy vehicle operators since 1958 and have contributed on 
average about 13 per cent of annual receipts in that time. In the 
27 years the D.M.R. only borrov/ed $144 million (compared with the 
P.T.C. total loan allocation of $921 m i l l i o n ) . j ^ e  important 
point to note is that a relatively small proportion of the D.M.R. 
programme had to be submitted through the Treasury for approval and 
Loan Council action.
53. Interview v/ith the Hon. M. Morris of 1st September, 1976 
(Appendix 2), p. 5. See also interview v/ith the Hon. P.F. Cox and 
Mr K.J. Trott of 19th November, 1976 (Appendix 4), p. 1.
54. An interesting aspect of loan borrowings is that the 
Department administers the Sydney Harbour Bridge Account which was 
established in 1932. The cost of the Cahill and Warringah 
Expressways was met from this Fund which was a vital consideration 
at the time of construction.
55. The D.M.R. inherited liabilities of about $1,400,000 when it 
v/as set up (see The Roadmakers, p. 86 for brief detail). The 
public transport systems (railways and tramways) had been financed 
entirely by borrowing, at a net cost of $235,970,000 at 1927/28.
Tiie Treasury operates several "trust funds .^or the D.M.R. irto 
which annual surpluses are paid; these can be drawn on (as & bank 
account) to meet contingencies and special expenses. In the five 
years to 1976/77 the surpluses were 19 i ,000 ( 19 '• /  t - ) >
$7,267,000, $3,609,000, $566,000 (deficit), and $2,426,000 (1976/ 
77). Such reserves are often regarded as a sign of organisational 
opulence. (Further evidence of the financial record of the D.M.R. 
is given in the following.)
The financial system which the Public Transport Commission 
works under is quite different to that of the D.M.R. V/hen the 
Commission released its Looking Ahead in 1974, it regarded the 
introduction of consolidating legislation, including greater 
financial independence for itself, as essential to its managerial 
responsibilities. However no action has been taken and tne 
Commission still operates under the same legislation as the former 
Departments of Railways and Government Transport.
Up until 30th June 1928 the Railv/ays paid all receipts into 
Consolidated Revenue and all funds for administrative, operational 
and capital expenditure had to be appropriated annually by 
Parliament. From 1928/29 a separate Government Railways and 
Tramways Fund was established (simply Railways from.1930) for a 
similar purpose. This gave a marginally greater degree of autonomy 
to the Commissioner for Railways but still retained the same basic 
controls over policy, particularly pricing (fares and freight rates) 
and construction. A Royal Commission on Railway administration in 
1924 had recommended that the Department should have the ability to 
raise and spend its own capital and control revenue and expenditure, 
but after an unsuccessful attempt to introduce legislation in the . 
same year no further action was taken.
The Government Railways Fund operates in the same manner as 
Consolidated Revenue, that is all receipts are paid into it and all 
expenditure from it must be appropriated for nominated purposes by 
Parliament. There is some discretion for the P.T.C. but not nearly 
to the same extent as the D.M.R. or M.W.S. & D.B. and like bodies. 
The various Trust General Funds for bus and formerly tram operat­
ions (Metropolitan Transport, and Newcastle and District Trust 
General Funds) work in the same way. The Funds are like banking 
accounts in that payments and receipts only are recorded by the 
Treasury, the operational details being kept by the P.T.C. and its 
predecessor Departments. Contributions towards interest, sinking
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fund and other charges on the services’ capital debt are nominally 
met from the funds but because annual deficits have traditionally 
been the rule, the Treasury makes up the Funds to record an actual 
annual balance. Any profits are credited to a Government Railways 
Reserve Fund and can not be used as a trust account (as the D.M.R. 
does) for carry-over but could only be applied to losses or 
reduction of rates and fares. (A parallel General Reserve applies 
to bus operations but does not exist in practice because there is 
an accumulated deficiency.)
The 1928 Act also provided for the creation of a Government 
Railways Renewal Fund to cover depreciation but this was not 
activated until June I960 when the capital debt liability was 
reduced by $146,490,183 to account for accrued obsolescence. This 
made a difference of only $7 million per annum to debt charges. "  J 
An additional Special Reserve was made available to the Commissioner 
who could determine the annual funds to be set aside, but this 
could only be used for works of specified types which were not 
chargeable to working expenses and which had been approved by 
Parliament. In 1976/77 $9 million v/as thus reserved, representing 
for example about 10 per cent of the cost of maintenance of track 
and structures in that year.
Capital expenditure is undertaken by the P.T.C. from various 
types of loan revenue, principally from allocations from the 
State's share of the Commonwealth borrowing effort. The 
Commissioner has never had the power to authorise the construction 
of railways (or tramways in the case of Government Transport) and 
has only had the ability to raise loans (in small amount at that) 
since early 1974. The Government Railways and associated Acts 
stipulate that the Government, •through the Minister, may seek to 
have the P.T.C. carry out survey and design work for the construc­
tion of any rail line or extension thereof where the cost is 
estimated to exceed $40,000, the cost of such survey work to be met 
by Parliament. In the case of trams, the works had to be 
specifically approved by Parliament but the control of research did 
not apply. It can be seen that the Commissioner for Railways had 
very little power indeed with regard to the extension of the rail 
system, although it must also be said that he was given wide 
discretion in contract matters and in the upgrading of existing 
services (including quadruplication, repairs and alterations).
The Railways had always been a powerful policy instrument for
97. See interview with Mr N. McCusker of 13th September 1976 
(Appendix 3), pp. 3, 9-10. As will be seen there, from 1936 a 
Treasury official was seconded to Railways (as special Assistant
Secretary), partly to cement the hold which Treasury had always had over the Department.
rural and urban development and politicians were only willing to 
delegate power for efficient administration, not the really 
politically potent issues, and even then the budgetary process 
offered great scope for control of administration. In one very 
minor case, the Commissioner for Railways was compensated for 
uneconomical country developmental services at the nominal rate of 
$1,600,000 p.a. to 1952/53, $2,000,000 p.a. to 1961/62 and again 
$1,600,000 thereafter. More generally the role of public transport 
has changed in the 1970s and Governments have been willing to make 
a positive contribution in the form of greater loan allocations and 
more recently grants for track upgrading following the Granville 
disaster of January 1977.^"'^ As well more scope has been given for 
improvements in bus services in the form of leverage leasing 
arrangements for the current programme of 200 (and later 550) 
Mercedes-Benz buses. This arrangement evades Loan Council restric­
tions because it is not strictly borrowing.
In the period from 1950/51 to 1976/77, the record of the 
Railways in terms of resources for investment is quite different to 
that of the D.M.R. On one measure, the loan allocation for all the 
various public transport services reflected the fall in priorities 
of State governments. To generalise, after the War the Labor 
Government invested quite heavily in Railways especially until 
1952/53 (see Chapter Sight below) when allocations fell from $47 
million in 1951/52 and $41 million in 1952/53, to $28 million in 
1953/54, then relative stability to $21 million in 1960/61 and a 
further general fall until the last year of Labor Government in 
1964/65» (Using 1950/51 ns a base, the funds expressed as an index 
fell to 80 in 1956/57, 60 in 1960/61 and 54 in 1964/65.) As a 
percentage of the total State loan funds, public transport’s share- 
reached a peak of 42 per cent in 1950/51, fell from 37 to 23 per 
cent between 1952/53 and 1953/54, and bottomed at about 11 per cent 
in 1963/64 and 1964/65. In the last five years the Railways 
Renewal Fund gave an extra $22 million, or 24 per cent of the 
public transport loan allocation for those years, plus of course 
the capital debt remission.
It should be noted that total revenue or annual surpluses are 
not realistic measures of the Government public transport sector’s 
ability to fund new works, for the several reasons stated above.
Although the loan allocation fell during the Labor years, the 
low point came in the first year of the Askin Government. In that
58. In addition N.S.W. has received about $68 million (excluding 
research and planning) since 1974 as grants on a 2:1 oasis under 
the Commonwealth’s Urban Public Transport Assistance Program. See 
Payments to or for the otates and Local. Government Authorities,1 9 7 6 - 7 7 . p . / ¿
year (1965/66) the index of loan allocation reached a trough of 45 
while the allocation was only 8.7 per cent of total State loan 
funds. In the following years the allocation rose very slowly, to 
index number 77 in 1969/70 and 1970/71, 112 in 1972/75 and 171 in 
1974/75. The proportion was 10 per cent in 1971/72 and 15 per cent 
in 1974/75. Thereafter changing political pressures raised the 
index to 259 in 1975/76 (16 per cent of the loan allocation). The 
incoming Labor Government raised the index to 351 (410 including 
Renewal Fund) and the proportion to 20 per cent in 1976/77. The 
1951/52 index figure was only passed in 1974/75, the 1950/51 prop­
ortion has never since been achieved. (State contributions to 
operating losses have however been very heavy since the P.T.C. was 
set up in 1972.)
By contrast the total revenue of the D.M.R. rose consistently 
in the whole period, from 100 in 1950/51, to 318 in 1959/60, 580 in 
1965/66, 785 in 1969/70, 1903 in 1975/76 and 2124 in 1976/77. An 
index for construction funds is not available. It might be noted 
that receipts for the County of Cumberland Main Roads Fund rose to 
index number 1089 in 1967/68, fell to 642 in 1969/70, and rose to 
993 in 1973/74 and 1276 in 1976/77.
The Department of Motor Transport is basically a revenue­
collecting body for motor vehicle and road haulage taxes, and a 
regulatory authority for private buses and intra-State aviation. 
Hence the Department has not had a positive urban role to be 
effected by revenue-raising apart from the installation of traffic 
control systems (now the responsibility of the Traffic Autnority 
and D.M.R.). It has had a basically reactive role in "allowing” 
private bus operators to service outlying metropolitan areas and 
Wollongong, and in the past it and its predecessor, the Department 
of Road Transport and Tramways, regulated the interplay of 
Government trams and buses versus private buses. In short while 
the D.M.T. has had intrinsically significant functions, these were 
not comparable to the planning (and non-planning) of the P.T.C. and 
D.M.R.
Having said that, the D.M.T. collects a range of taxes, fines 
and charges, basically all of which (except administrative costs) 
is passed on to the D.M.R., the Traffic Authority and other bodies. 
The Road Transport and Traffic Fund was established in 1930 and 
again is a banking account for revenue which is divided by statute 
between various purposes. (Motor vehicle registration fees are 
retained by the D.M.T. as are G.I.O. commissions on insurance 
premium collections. The motor vehicle weight tax and levy are 
allocated fully to roadworks, that is to the D.M.R. and the Traffic 
Autnority.) It is not particularly meaningful to trace the record
of receipts because of this distribution of funds but the comments 
which follow on the Traffic Authority apply generally and it can be 
concluded that the Department has been reasonably well-off in terms 
of funds.
In tne last five years all of the foregoing except perhaps 
the F.T.C. have been disadvantaged to varying degrees by the 
declining real value of motor vehicle taxes, changing priorities 
and in the D.M.R.*s case by the reversal of Commonwealth funding 
policies after the defeat of the Whitlam Government. These very 
recent trends will be discussed later in the evaluation of the 
URTAC Report of 1976 but they are otherwise of marginal historical 
interest from the point of view of this thesis.
The last operational organisation is the Traffic Authority 
(referred to in Section 1 of this chapter), which is basically a 
statutory co-ordinative committee which has a full-time Director 
and secretariat, part-time Chairman and members, and an arrangement 
for operations and construction with the D.K.R.
When the T.A. was set up in 1976 a special trust fund was 
opened in the Treasury's Special Deposits Account called the 
Traffic Facilities Fund. This Fund and associated arrangements for 
Ministerial control and co-ordination are unique in this State.
In general most of the revenue for the Fund comes from sources 
which are named in the Traffic Authority Act but in amounts which 
are to be determined by the Minister for Transport and Highways 
(and in some cases the Treasurer). This is unlike the restrictive 
conditions of the D.M.R. Funds. Moreover although Parliamentary 
appropriation is not required for construction, Clause 24(2) 
states that "No payment shall be made from the Fund without the 
approval of the Minister". The Minister can also revoke approval. 
Clause 25 provides that "The Authority shall, as directed by the 
Minister, and at least once in each year, submit to the Minister 
proposals in relation to expenditure from the Fund, together with 
a statement of the amounts necessary to be paid into the Fund to 
implement the proposals".
The Traffic Facilities Fund has streamlined the administration 
of traffic since the time when traffic control resided in several 
Departments and authorities. The Fund has been in heavy deficit 
since it was set up because of the need to reimburse Police for 
their attributable costs. Police traffic responsibilities are 
becoming increasingly regarded as part of Police duties proper and 
the reimbursement is unlikely to continue, at least in the 
traditional form. One other problem that has emerged is tnat
giving the D.M.R. construction responsibilities and nearly all 
traffic planning resources has allowed that Department to have a
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disproportionate influence in what is meant to be an inter- 
organisational Authority. Again the future may bring reform 
through tne reallocation of traffic resources back to the T.A. or 
through the reform of the D.M.R. itself to make it more 
representative.
Since 1976 and the publication of the URTAC Report the 
general area of traffic management has become the central thrust 
of metropolitan road administration, as will be seen later. Sydney 
has always had a progressive traffic administration and as a 
generalisation resources have been sufficient to meet changing 
priorities without undue difficulty. It has not been possible to 
draw up an index of financial performance to test this for the 
long-term however.
Finally, the Ministry of Transport and Highways is a (small) 
Government Department, that is, it is funded by annual vote from 
Consolidated Revenue. It passes some of its revenue on to the 
Traffic Facilities Fund and to the operating authorities for 
concessions of various types for veterans, pensioners and so on; 
in other words, it is the agent for subsidies from Consolidated 
Revenue. The Urban Transport Study Group forms part of the 
Ministry vote, although the Group is three-quarters paid for under 
the Commonwealth Transport (Planning and Research) Act. (The 
Ministry is responsible for the co-ordination of the N.S.W. effort 
under that Act.) Otherv/ise the Ministry's role is non-operational 
and co-ordinating and v/ill be examined in Chapter Nine.
It has been seen that the five organisations presently in the 
transport administration (and the same can be said of their 
predecessors) have different sources of finance, different types 
of financial control and degrees of independence, and different 
"allocative" histories. These factors have significant 
implications for co-ordinating organisational performance.
The D.M.R.'s revenue sources have generally been beyond its 
control in terms of magnitude but they have been highly stable and 
predictable, both because of the statutory division of State 
revenue and because of Commonwealth term commitments. Generally 
the Department's financial system has denied the Government 
discretion over annual and even longer-term priorities to a great 
extent, and although corporate discretion was also compromised the 
Department adapted by setting up country arrangements which 
exploited the constraints. (See Chapters Five and Seven.)  
Resources were limited but certainly no more than for other N.S.V;. 
authorities. Thus the D.M.R.'s situation can be characterised as 
certain, independent and quite solvent.
The Government public transport services on the other hand 
relied heavily on user charges (which are unstable and have 
substantial market constraints), and loan funds. In both respects 
certainty and independence were greatly lacking. In addition their 
administrations had substantial capital debts which severely 
limited the extent to which loan funds (that is, investment funds) 
could be utilised. In summary, the situation was characterised by 
uncertainty, complete lack of discretion, and resource scarcity. 
(All that need be said of private public transport services is that 
they have never been effectively co-ordinated with Government road 
and rail investment and services.)
In the case of traffic control, resources were always limited 
but the overall standard of achievement suggests that major needs 
could be met without undue difficulty, especially recently.
However the location of investment expenditure (such as traffic 
control lights) was subject to close political pressure and 
corporate discretion was moderate. The Ministry of Transport and 
Highways had no real financial resources and its role was limited 
as will be seen. Its resources were institutional, especially with 
regard to access to its Minister, although it had no complementary 
statutory standing.
In Chapter One a typology was outlined which identified a 
number of structural factors which might encourage and enable 
organisations to act independently of political, mutual and other 
co-ordinative forces. This typology has been reflected in this 
chapter through the discussion of the financial and related 
institutional features of the Hew South Wales transport administra­
tion. It is possible to develop a behavioural typology based on 
financial factors, and in fact Wildavsky has done this to show now
resource availability ("wealth”) and certainty can affect budgetary ( 5 9)processes. ' His analysis is not directly relevant to the cases
discussed here and will not oe repeated but it can be seen from the 
preceding discussion that financial parameters are fundamental to 
organisational and system performance, especially with regard to 
new planning commitments. The importance of such parameters in 
practice will be seen in the following chapters.
59. Wildavsky, op. cit., especially pp. 260 ff. He uses terms 
such as wealth, predictability of income sources, political 
"capacity” (basically meaning stability) administrative capacity, 
growth rate and partisanship to analyse the circumstances under 
which his four main types or> budgetary behaviour will develop. 
These types are: incremental, repetitive, supplemental and 
revenue. See especially his Hi. . 15.1.
Chapter Seven
Main Roads and Traffic Post-1945
... in my nine years and eight months as Minister for 
Transport, one of the continual festering sores was 
that the D.M.R. was a law unto itself. It could he 
at times co-operative, when it didn’t want to be it 
had the let-out of saying, well we're under another 
Minister, you’ll have to see him. Then because the 
D.M.R. was an attachment to an important Ministry of 
local Government..., it meant that the D.M.R. virtually 
made all of the decisions and that the Minister was the 
cipher. Every now and then the Minister was invited to 
take a ride in the helicopter or to go and open a 
bridge or to go and open a four-lane highway, the band 
would be out, the Minister would be suitably duchessed 
and then he went back to his desk to do the other more 
onerous tasks and the D.M.R. went happily on its way.
Interview with the Hon. Milton Morris, M.L.A.
(Appendix Two).
... in my view there was a great weakness on the 
Government's side.... engineers being what they are 
and trained to it I suppose, their main measure of 
success in life is what they build and how much money 
they spend in building it and it’s very difficult to 
change them.... Some of the planning for the main 
road development of Sydney was in my view' quite out of 
this world and quite unnecessary.
Interview with Mr K. McCusker, C.3.E.
(Appendix Three).
The dominant feature of post-1945 transport planning in 
Sydney was the uncontrolled spread of usage of the automobile.
The private ownership of the increasingly dominant transport 
technology had enormous effects on every aspect of urban adminis­
tration but it was generally not matched by the development of 
adequate transport construction and management philosophies. That 
is not to say that there were no significant achievements; but 
even more than in the prewar period the governmental system was 
not capable of making positive, effective adjustments to basic 
change. There was a turning point in the early and mid-1970s 
primarily because of cumulative "external" societal pressures.
This chapter will briefly examine the planning, construction and 
management of Sydney's network of major roads with particular 
attention to the effects of organisational factors.
After the War the Department of Main Roads continued to
establish itself as the foremost planning organisation in Sydney.
The land use/transport study which it had commenced in 1939 was
resumed in 1943 and was well-advanced by the formation of the
Cumberland County Council. (The Assistant Chief Engineer was
appointed as the C.C.C.'s first Chief County Planner, while the
Assistant Commissioner became a member of the Town and Country
Planning Advisory Committee referred to in the preceeding chapter.)
The land use and population surveys were published in 1946 as Part
A of the "Main Road Development Plan for Sydney Metropolitan and
County of Cumberland" and this became the basis of the C.C.C.'s
own investigations. At the time the D.M.R.'s established expertise
was an invaluable asset and it was almost totally successful in
having the C.C.C. adopt what was nominally Part B of the M.R.D.P.
(which has never been published), namely a system of proposed
major urban roads. The M.R.D.P. became the core of the County
Planning Scheme but it was not publicly analysed or justified by(1 )the D.M.R. or the C.C.C. ' It was however the starting point of a 
continuous line of development of the D.M.R.'s urban planning 
philosophy.
The essential objective was explained in the C.C.C.'s Planning 
Scheme Report as the "cardinal planning precept of traffic 
separation", that is the provision of specialised roads for 
different types of traffic flows (for example to keep through
1. Sherrard, op. cit., p. 13, erroneously implied that the 
analytical Part B had been published and that the need for 
freeways had been indicated in the published section of the Main 
Roads Development Plan.
traffic off residential streets) and the concomitant establishment 
of environmental precincts.^ The road hierarchy was to consist 
of seven types, namely National, Regional, Intra-Regional, Scenic 
and Tourist, Special Access (ports and airports), District (or 
transit) and Neighbourhood (residential access). The latter two 
were purely local.
The actual roads which were recommended were ostensibly 
derived by an elemental planning methodology which used the exist­
ing patterns of travel (as indicated in overview by an origin- 
destination study conducted by the Joint Committee on Traffic and 
Parking in 1947) as the basis for essentially supplementary new 
roads. The strategy was the total replacement of the existing 
radial road pattern, plus extra provision for inter-district move­
ment by the construction of ring-roads. The plan called for new 
roads rather than the disruption of ribbon development along exist­
ing routes. The 8 National and Regional Roads, which were to have
(3)limited access from lower-category roads, ' were generally 
aligned for convenience and least expense (possibly more than 
urban design), as indicated below;
(i) Northern Expressway (national) to Newcastle and
Brisbane, through Drummoyne, Lane Cove Valley;
(ii) Western Expressway (national) to Parramatta running to the north of Parramatta Road on the line of minimum disturbance 
to existing development and then south to Penrith;
(iii) North Western Expressway (national) branching from 
Western Expressway to Singleton;
(iv) South Western Expressway (national) leaving the 
Northern and Western Expressways at Broadway, "south through lines 
of weak development in Alexandria" and then via Wolli Creek Valley 
to the Hume Highway;
(v) Southern Expressway (national) south through Rockdale 
Peninsula "bordered by open space" and Taren Point crossing of 
Georges River;
(vi) Warringah Expressway (regional) to Manly and 
Warringah, drawing off Mosman transit traffic, with Middle Harbour 
bridge;
(vii) South Eastern Regional Road connecting south-eastern 
suburbs and industrial area to the city centre. The development of Dowling Street was being investigated as an alternative 
(because of minimal commercial disturbance);
(viii) Eastern Regional Road from city by-passing Bondi 
Junction.
Moreover while the Expressway system was later extensively 
criticised because of its effects on traffic concentration in the
2. C.C.C., Planning Scheme Report, op, cit., pp. 154, 162 and 
elsewhere.
3. That is they were "expressways", the main characteristics of
which are access control, grade-separated intersections.and , ,relatively high design speed. Freeways are a more sophisticate^ 
fnrm within the same genre.
Central Business District, at that stage it was intended to effect 
such a concentration rather than by-pass the CBD. As the Planning 
Scheme Report said, "Recognising that an expressway system cannot 
collect or distribute traffic at one single point in a City 
Centre, a distributor road system is proposed around the Centre, 
providing expressway conditions to the immediate vicinity of city 
destinations". Beyond this the roads were presented without 
specific justification.
The D.M.R. expressed a flexible attitude towards the new 
roads, saying that they should be constructed only if immediately 
needed and ceased if expectations were not met.^' The Department 
stated later in the 1950s that
"When the future development of the system was planned, it was not intended that the construction of the freeways 
in the plan should necessarily be first undertaken, and, 
in the Department's view, that is still the position.
The construction of freeways... should be undertaken only 
at the stage when further traffic relief cannot be obtained by other and less costly means."(5)
However three main points need to be made in this context.
Firstly, the Department's traditional protagonist and principal 
client group, the N.R.M.A., had argued since the early 1940s at 
least that while the primary postwar task was "the removal of 
bottlenecks from main routes", in the future local circumstances 
could require a more ambitious approach (that is, freeways) along 
the lines of overseas precedent and "decisions should not be made 
that would block the path".^^ Secondly, the Department basically 
accepted this as its 1944/45 Annual Report showed, again with 
reference to the segregation of through traffic:
From the studies made of traffic flow in pre-war years, it is apparent that the present Main Roads system of the 
County of Cumberland calls for substantial alteration 
and improvement both as regards the lay-out and the 
type of roads required. Estimates of future traffic 
movement indicate the need for the development of a 
complete system of radial and circumferential road 
routes, with special provision for the distribution of 
traffic in the city area and, as regards certain of the 
more important arterial routes, provision for the 
segregation of fast-moving motor traffic from slow- 
moving vehicular and pedestrian traffic.(7)
And finally, the Department became increasingly committed to its 
expressway plan. It obtained the basic legal ability through a 
1945 amendment allowing the proclamation of "motorways", which
4. See Main Road Development Plan, Part A (1946), p. 13.
5. D.M.R. Annual Report. 1956/57, p. 18.
6. See "Post-War Road Works", Open Road. 22(4), 20th April, 1944,
p . 1.
7 D.M.R. Annual Report. 1944/45, p. 10.
contravened the traditional right of unlimited access by 
residents and others to main roads. The motorway concept was 
consistent with the initial M.R.D.P. Expressways but the 
Department became increasingly committed to not only expressways 
but the higher form, freeways, which represented the epitome of 
overseas road technology. This happened at the same time that 
the road strategy of the C.C.C.’s Planning Scheme was being 
questioned, even by the C.G.G. and the Minister for Transport.
This divergence highlighted co-ordinative weaknesses.
The first Chief County Planner of the C.C.C. had been an 
ex-D.M.R. officer and this was an important aspect of that 
Department’s institutional resources. However Mr Luker was 
succeeded by Mr Rod Fraser, who has been discussed already. Fraser 
returned from an overseas study tour in 1957 and concluded that 
while the D.M.R.’s planning had been technically satisfactory, it 
was unlikely that sufficient funds would ever be found for the 
expressway system, while it was doubtful that it could be justified 
anyway. He said that freeways were not a ’’permanent" solution to 
traffic problems as demand was highly responsive to supply and 
overseas freeways were already congested and inefficient for that 
reason; while it seemed possible that "surface highways kept free 
of roadside commercial development and with cross streets control­
led and reduced to a practical minimum would serve traffic needs 
effectively".v ; As well the overseas planning profession was 
predominantly looking to public transport rather than freeways on 
the basis of economy, efficiency and better service to a wider 
range of citizens. Fraser concluded,
"I spent a good deal of my time studying the subject of 
arterial road planning .... and I am now more strongly - 
of the opinion that a review of the County Roads in the 
Scheme is an urgent necessity". CU)
The Cumberland County Council followed this with its 
Economics of Urban Expansion in 1958 in which it said:
As the number and use of private cars increases, 
congestion and parking difficulties become more acute. 
Remedies in the form of expressways, parking stations 
and other improvements in highway construction and 
control are expensive and (according to overseas 
experience) merely intensify traffic and parking 
problems by encouraging even greater use of private 
transport...
In the United States and Canada, the view is 
gaining support that public transport offers the only 
solution to traffic problems which threaten to choke
8. R.D.L. Fraser, Report by the Chief County Planner on a Tour of 
Europe and the United States in 1957 (Sydney: C .C .C .. June 1958).
p. 10.
9. Ibid.. p. 47 (emphasis added).
and paralyse metropolitan centres... (10)
« n  j
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(it must also be said however that its Annual Reports continued 
to lament the lack of progress with the 1948 County Roads.)
Following this, the Minister for Transport, the Hon. G-eorge
Enticknap, M.L.A., visited North America and Europe in mia-1959
with the object of “ensuring that the Government would be fully
informed of broad policy and practices in other parts of the world,
having regard to the vast sums that are being spent in this State
( 11)on the various forms of transport...”. Enticknap had succeeded
the Hon. E. Wetherell (who had died in office) in March 1956,
apparently on the condition that the heavy workload would be 
( 1 p )eased.'1 ' Premier Cahill agreed and the D.M.R. was transferred 
back (as before 1930) to the Minister for Local Government 
(Mr Renshaw) who then took the additional title of Minister for 
Highways. Enticknap and his successors were thereafter disadvant­
aged, as will be seen. He was particularly concerned after his 
trip that overseas freeways had proven to be failures v/ithout 
complementary development of rapid public transport systems, and 
that the congestion and accidents on (and costs of) American 
freeways denied their basic purpose. Enticknap made this point at 
length and in the same v/ords that the D.M.R.'s critics used more 
than ten years later. '
Such criticisms, v/hich had some community support, did not 
discourage the D.M.R. at all. It was now free of the formal land 
use influence of the Cumberland County Council and even of the 
Minister for Highways who had more onerous duties than the D.M.R., 
as the quote from the Hon. M.A. Morris at the start of this 
chapter indicated. The Department was able to proceed on a cycle - 
of intensified design, preparedness (through financial reform) and 
construction.
Firstly, in the mid-1950s the Department decided that the 
major freeways should not terminate at the edge of the 
metropolitan area (as originally intended) but should extend as 
inter-urban roads as done in the U.S.A., England and Europe.
Thus the length of freeways within the County of Cumberland was 
increased from the 1947 figure of 87 to 147 miles. Secondly,
10. C.C.C., Economics of Urban Expansion (Sydney: C.C.C., 1958), 
pp. 12-13.
11. A.G. Enticknap, A Report by (the author) on his visit to North 
America and Europe. May to September 1959 (Sydney: roneo, 1959),
p. 1.
12. See interview with the Hon. M.A. Morris (Appendix 2), pp. 2-3. 
This account has been confirmed by other sources, although tne 
possibility of other factors cannot be precluded.
13. Enticknap, op, cit., pp. 7-8.
funds for new construction were limited but in 1956/57 the
Department called for tenders for the construction of the
Gladesville Bridge on the route of the North Western Freeway.
Tenders were to be on the basis of finance being provided by the
( 1 A Stenderer with repayment over not less than ten years. ' The 
design eventually was amended to consist of the largest single 
span concrete arch bridge in the world, completed in late 1964. 
This was a continuation of the strategy of "filling gaps" in the 
existing main roads, using bridges of very high design standards - 
other bridges designed and committed at about that time included 
the Taren Point Bridge and the Tarban Greek, Fig Tree and 
Silverwater bridges. These had very considerable value, including 
a popular symbolic effect which must have had a positive impact 
(possibly intended) on political opinion. To give some illustra­
tion of the intrinsic importance which was given to bridges 
because of past low standards and the existence of two major (and 
one other substantial) rivers, in its 1960-61 Annual Report the 
D.M.R. included a map which showed the actual or proposed sites 
of 29 "of the more important bridges in the Metropolitan area".
Of these, 6 were existing; 13 were existing bridges which were 
intended to have greater width; and 10 were yet to be built.
The Department was not however successful in terms of the
construction of freeways in the 1950s, partly because of the
failure of road funds to match cost increases at a time of rapid
i 1 s')traffic growth and thus road wear. ' The first stage of the 
Cahill Expressway was finished by the Department of Railways and 
Sydney City Council in 1958, this being the Circular Quay overhead 
road referred to in Chapter Eight. Between 1959 and 1962 the 
Council extended the road to Woolloomooloo, this representing the 
total freeway construction of the 1950s, apart from bridges.
(Half the cost of that Expressway came from Harbour Bridge funds.) 
Until the Hon. P.D. Hills became Minister for Local Government and 
Highways in 1959, no real progress was made. Then however, 
partly under his impetus, two major changes occurred, namely an 
extension of the Department’s financial base, and a start on the 
final design and construction of a number of major expressways but 
to higher design standards (American freeway standards in fact).
In 1959 the D.M.R.’s Design and Urban Planning Engineer,
Mr M.V. Douglas (the officer largely responsible for the 
M.R.D.P* ), went overseas to compare Sydney's planned express­
ways with those of America. Subsequently, as the D.M.R. Annual
14. See D.M.R. Annual Report, 1956/57, p. 10.
15« See ibid., p. 1 1, also nearly every other A .R . of the period. 
16. See Sherrard, op. cit., p. 13.
Report for 1959/60 noted,
The Department has continued with the preparation of 
outline designs for proposed new roads so that the 
boundaries of the land required for road purposes may 
be fixed. On freeway design, base maps for 110 miles 
of freeway have been completed. During the year a 
large proportion of the outline designs has been 
reviewed to incorporate, where necessary, improved 
standards of design now being adopted in similar work 
overseas and investigated by the Department's Design 
and Urban Planning Engineer during his visit abroad in 
1959.(17)
This was only part of the story of the development. The 
bridge design work had been largely internal but now the require­
ments of the freeway standards led the Department to start a long 
relationship with American engineering consultants, De Leuw,
Gather and Company. The same Annual Report advised that during 
that year the "Government (had) decided in principle to proceed... 
with lengths of the Warringah Expressway (portion from Sydney 
Harbour Bridge to Ernest Street, North Sydney) and the V/estern 
Distributor (portion from near city markets area to Ultimo)". 
Neither the Department nor the City Council had sufficient staff 
to undertake the survey and design work while the local consult­
ants did not have appropriate experience. It was claimed that for 
these reasons De Leuw, Cather had been called in.
De Leuw, Cather's role was much wider than that. They were
to prepare designs and investigations of virtually all of the
(1 q Yinner M.R.D.P. expressways,v ; namely:
(i) Western Distributor between Harbour Bridge and city 
markets;
(ii) Eastern Distributor from the Cahill Expressway to 
Moore Park;
(iii) the Southern Expressway from Glebe to Alexandria;
(iv) the Western Expressway from Ultimo to Annandale;
(v) the interchange in Ultimo of the Southern, North V/estern and Western Expressways; and
(vi) the Warringah Expressway to Cammeray.
They were also to prepare designs for vehicular overpasses at 
Anzac Parade and Allison Road, Kensington, and at Wakehurst 
Parkway and V/arringah Road, French's Forest; and as well to 
advise on the design of the outer-metropolitan Expressways. The 
concurrence of the Sydney City Council had been obtained where 
needed. In terms of specific commitments, tenders were called for 
the first stage of the Warringah Expressway in late 1964, the
17. D.M.R. Annual Report. 1959/60, p. 111.
18. Ibid., p. 12. Cf D.M.R. Annual Report. 1961/62, po. 15 ff.
expressway to Newcastle in 1963; and in September 1963 Mr Hills 
announced that the North Y/estern Expressway from Druitt Street, 
City, across Darling Harbour to Pyrmont, Glebe and then by 
tunnel (apparently Mr Hills' own contribution) to Annandale would 
be started by the D.M.R. Some principal bridge and related 
sections of the North Western and Southern Expressways (and so on) 
were well in hand. (More will be said about the magnitude of these 
commitments later.) Prima facie, the D.M.R. had answered the 
criticisms of the Cumberland County Council and Mr Enticknap and 
others with attack rather than defence.
De Leuw, Cather's first formal report consisted of an origin
and destination (travel pattern) survey in 1 9 6 0 ; ^ ^  the second was
an assignment study, essentially of the gravity type,^20  ^ including
a general location study (no details given), capacity analyses,
preliminary geometric designs and the establishment of
elementary road design criteria, for the Western and Eastern
Distributors, Ultimo Interchange and portions of the Western and(2 1 )Warringah Expressways only.v ' These roads were to "comprise the 
initial stage of a more extensive expressway system". The general 
method of assignment was the projection of traffic flows to 1980 
(using an expected metropolitan population of 2,900,000) and then 
allocation between designed routes on the basis of relative travel 
times on the expressway and non-expressway routes —  a very simple 
analysis if compared to overseas studies of the Chicago Area 
Transportation Study type. The inner portions of the original 
Main Roads Development Plan were tested for the projected I960 and 
1980 traffic flows: it was adequate for the former but found to 
accommodate only 45 per cent of the 1980 load if operated as part 
of the overall 1948 scheme.^22  ^ As well, "Too many routes would 
converge in the Ultimo area, and additional expressways would be 
needed to bypass traffic around the City of Sydney". De Leuw, 
Cather therefore removed the connection of the North Western 
Expressway into the Ultimo Interchange and rather extravagantly 
added a north-south expressway and a new harbour crossing, an east- 
west expressway, and a new expressway link between the North 
Western and Western Expressways near Haberfield. They deleted a 
number of access turns at interchanges between freeways. The 
initial stage system then consisted of 10.7 miles of expressway,
19. De Leuw, Cather & Co, Sydney Area Origin and Destination 
Survey (December 1960).
20. See R.P. Gibbons, "Transportation Planning in Sydney, Post
1945: Politics, the Environment, and Sociospatial Dynamics"
(Colloquium paper, Department of Government and Public Administra­
tion, University of Sydney, April 1975), for brief discussion.
21. De Leuw, Cather & Co, Geometric Design Study Sydney Area 
Expressways Sydney. Australia (San Francisco. August 1961).
22. Ibid.. p. vii; cf pp. 13-17.
costing an estimated $154,126,000 (being $68,726,000 for right of 
way and $85,400,000 for construction). These were the only costs 
considered, but the consultants said the following of benefits:
The economic justification for the large capital 
outlay required for the expressway program is clearly 
provided through our analyses. Estimated savings in 
time and operating costs amount to some ($222,000,000) 
during the first 20-year period. These direct benefits 
will continue for many years in the future. Less 
tangible, social and economic benefits will be 
experienced from the expressway development. Through 
traffic on the existing street system will be diverted, 
traffic accidents will be reduced, public transit 
operation will be benefited, and, finally, growth of 
new and existing centres will result in the enhancement 
of property values throughout the metropolitan area.(23)
A third report was presented in typescript to the D.M.R. on 
July 20th, 1962, being a report by Captain Charles M. Noble of 
De Leuw, Cather on the remainder of the Main Roads Development 
Plan, with special reference to future loads on inner city streets 
and to an additional Harbour crossing at Greenwich. It was not a 
critical appraisal:
The original concept twenty years ago was a system of 
surface arterials that would serve each segment of the 
Sydney Metropolitan area. As time passed and highway 
development in other parts of the world progressed, the 
planners in the Department concluded that the backbone 
system of the metropolitan highway network must be of 
the full expressway or freeway type of facility capable of carrying with safety and dispatch five times as much 
traffic as an ordinary street. This was a wise 
decision.
Because the automotive vehicle promotes an expanding 
economy and creates wealth, it is in the national 
interest that additional funds in substantial amount 
be allotted the Department of Main Roads for highway 
construction. Inasmuch as the urban areas contain the great majority of the population of the country a 
large portion of available funds should be allotted to 
r critically needed highway improvement
Noble made several suggestions (in prose akin to the above), an
interesting one being that the D.M.R. had designed too many
interchanges on the routes being considered. Noble stated that
the reason why overseas expressways became congested was that
their designers had fallen into the trap of aiming at high(2 5)benefit-cost ratios and easy access to the roads. ' He also
wanted the planning of the second bridge to proceed so that the
( 2 6 )right of way could be preserved. ‘ ' Noble made no suggestions
23. Ibid., pp. ix-x.
24. C.M. Noble, "Report on Review of Expressway Plans Sydney 
Metropolitan Area" (typescript, De Leuw, Gather & Go, 1962; held 
in D.M.R. Library) pp. 2-3.
25. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
And
26. Ibid.. pp. 16-17.
as to the location of the proposed freeways and largely confined 
his report to technical design matters.
De Leuw, Gather presented a study completing the preliminary
geometric design of the freeway system in May 1965. This report
recommended the addition of the following roads to the Main Roads
Development Plan: an east-west and Eastern Belt Expressway; an
additional north-south expressway and new harbour crossing; the
elimination of the eastern section of the Eastern Expressway and
the extension of Oxford Street in lieu thereof; and an
additional highway along Port Jackson. They also suggested
(27)extensive modifications to the surface road system,v J There are
signs in this report that De Leuw, Cather considered some of the
original freeways undesirable in terms of environmental
disturbance. The new Eastern Belt Expressway, for instance, "will
serve most of the eastern and southeastern suburbs. It will
collect and distribute traffic from streets radiating from the
city and relieve congestion on the major streets intercepted.
Located on the periphery of the heavily developed industrial,
recreational, educational and residential areas, the Eastern Belt
Expressway avoids the extensive property damage which would be(98)required on other alternative locations considered".
In this report the consultants also gave the first indication 
of the type of analysis that they had used when making their 
critical traffic assignments. The analyses were based almost 
entirely on the United States Bureau of Public Roads* Highway 
Capacity Manual 1950 and similar rule books; result:
As input data for the computer, the existing arterial 
street network was coded by assigning numbers to each 
intersection within the study area and assigning cost 
and distance values for each link between intersections. 
Similarly, the proposed surface roads and expressways 
for each alternative system tested were coded for the 
computer. The most economical arterial route and the 
most economical expressway route between each zone 
centroid were determined by the computer. The origin- 
destination data were then assigned to the selected 
street and expressway networks...(29)
Obviously this analysis must produce a very limited notion of 
"economical". However the main weakness was that too few compet­
ing alternatives were tested: there was no discussion of 
different modes, different purposes of travel, or different 
individual cost and demand functions. (it is a self-fulfilling 
expectation that freeways are needed if travellers are forced to 
use the freeways when built.) This type of assignment study 
effectively assumed the need for freeways because freev/ays were
136
27. De Leuw, Gather & Go, Recommended Expressway System Inner
Metropolitan Area Sydney, Australia (May 1'$fc5) > pp. 1 , 2 5 ff.
28. Ibid., p. 26.
29. Ibid., p. 45-
"fastest” and the arguments of the C.G.C. and Enticknap were 
completely ignored. This was characteristic of the D.M.R.*s 
independence.
The construction of the Cahill Expressway and the first stage 
of the Warringah Expressway belied the basic financial abilities 
of the D.M.R. because of the Harbour Bridge funding and, to the 
extent that the M.R.D.P. had been officially adopted earlier, the 
abilities of the overall urban planning system. The Department 
was of course constantly conscious of this and frequently 
published prognoses in its Annual Reports of the effects of 
inflation on the real value of its revenue. We come now to the 
second major development while Mr Hills was Deputy Premier and 
Minister for Local Government and Highv/ays, namely the evaluation 
and extension of the D.M.R.*s financial base.
In 1961 the National Association of Australian State Road 
Authorities published a survey of road investment needs for the 
1960s, consisting of sub-surveys by the D.M.R. and N.S.W. local 
councils and their counterparts in other States. The survey showet 
that "to carry out a reasonable and needed programme of Main Roads 
works during the next ten years would require a revenue about 60 
per cent greater than that in sight from present sources at 
current tax levels". (Expenditure needs were estimated at
$1,030 million and revenue at $400 million.) The Commonwealth had 
just decided to divert grants to rural roads other than Main Roads 
while the Department pointed out in its 1958-59 Annual Report 
that "The discontinuance of a relation between grants and petrol 
tax receipts is contrary to the most logical method of financing 
of Australia’s principal roads, i.e. by road users and property 
owners, and disregards the highly successful example of the 
United States".
Then in late I960 Mr Hills convened a meeting of road user 
organisations and local government bodies to discuss the D.M.R. *s 
ten-year programme and its financing. "The programme was accepted 
by those present as being satisfactory. The conference then 
addressed itself to the problem of raising the additional funds 
required to carry out the p r o g r a m m e . ' Fuel taxes were 
favoured and the meeting agreed that the Commonwealth should 
return more money from this source. However it was thought that 
an extra $310 million could be raised over normal revenue in the 
decade (excluding fuel tax). This comprised: State Government
30. D.M.R. Annual Report. 1960/61, p. 18.
31. Pp. 16 ff. See The Roadmakers, various places, on such 
extremely important aspects of overall Commonwealth policy which cannot be discussed here.
32. D.M.R. Annual Report, 1960/61, p. 18.
grants (3100 million or 32 per cent); increase in drivers' 
licences of 200 per cent ($60 million or 19 per cent); finance 
from private investment sources, local and overseas ($40 million, 
13 per cent of total); loans ($40 million also); increase of 
one-quarter in motor vehicle taxes ($50 million or 16 per cent); 
and revenue from private operators in competition with the 
Railways under the State Transport (Co-ordination) Act ($20 
million, 6 per cent). Regarding the third item, the Government 
had promised in its election campaign in 1959 that private 
investors would be allowed to tender for the Sydney-Newcastle 
Expressway and this was done, but in the end the Government 
allocated special loan monies for this work. (It will be recalled 
that a similar arrangement was proposed for the Gladesville Bridge 
but expectations had not been met then either.)
Near the end of 1962 Mr Hills announced a reduced (but 
committed) version of the earlier programme, this one covering the 
six years to 1968. The programme provided for an expenditure of 
$200 million on Country Main Roads (including part of the Sydney- 
Newcastle Expressway), $55 million on metropolitan Main Roads and 
a separate $53 million on metropolitan expressways. The latter 
allocation comprised the following:
(i) Warringah Expressway to Cammeray;
(ii) Tarban Creek and Taren Point Bridges;
(iii) North Western Expressway to Glebe;
(iv) Road tunnels under William and Oxford Streets at 
Taylor Square; and
(v) By-pass roads around Parramatta, Sutherland and 
Penrith.(33)
This was still regarded as insufficient by the D.M.R. A second, 
more extensive, N.A.A.S.R.A. survey was published in 1963 for the 
ten years from 1964 which showed that $1,090 million ’’should" be 
spent on Main Roads of all types in N.S.W. (other than expressways 
$650 million on local roads, and $730 million on expressways in 
and between Sydney, Newcastle and Wollongong. (^)
Significant steps were however taken by Mr Hills to improve
the D.M.R.'s financial abilities. The Sydney Harbour Bridge(35)(Further Works) and Main Roads (Amendment) Act of 1960v '
provided that the cost of conversion of the tram tracks to road 
lanes on the Bridge, the first stage (and half the cost of the 
second) of the Cahill Expressway, and the land needed for the
33. D.M.R. Annual Report. 1962/63, pp. 14, 16.
34. Ibid., p. 14.
See The Roadmakers, p. 242 for other relevant legislation.35.
first stage of the Warringah Expressway, would all come from the 
Harbour Bridge Account. It also enabled the payment of the cost 
of design and investigation of the Inner City Expressways from the 
County of Cumberland Main Roads Bund, and also the cost of 
"planning the construction of and designing any such road which the 
Commissioner for Main Roads has determined shall be an Inner City 
Expressway" (Section 12 (1) (C) of the Main Roads Act, emphasis 
added). (The Commissioner obtained statutory control of Main Roads 
within the City of Sydney in 1963.) The authority to use Bridge 
revenue for the acquisition of properties for the next stages of 
the Warringah Expressway was given by legislative amendment in 
1962. Then in December 1962 motor vehicle taxation rates were 
increased by one-third (rather than the one-quarter discussed in 
I960) to yield an expected increase of $6 million a year. At the 
same time vehicle ownership was increasing rapidly and with it 
motor taxation receipts.
The most important step was taken in 1963 when the 
Commissioner for Main Roads was empowered to raise public loans 
under the new Part VII A of the Main Roads Act. This was 
apparently done because of the work load in the metropolitan area. 
Until then all loan funds had come from allocations from the 
State’s General Loan Account. The degree of additional 
discretion was small at best because the volume of borrowings 
still had to be approved by the Loan Council, but more importantly 
the change placed the burden of debt servicing on the Department. 
(Although it would have also enabled the D.M.R. to offset costs 
against toll revenue, especially on the profitable Sydney- 
Newcastle Expressway, in fact that road was funded from special 
State loan allocations.) Of the total cost of the first section - 
of the Warringah Expressway (completed in mid-1968) of £25,656,000, 
the Harbour Bridge Account met 63 per cent, State loans only 1 per 
cent, and Departmental borrowings 36 per cent.^^
This detailed account illustrates the degree of the Labor 
Government’s commitment to urban freeways. To generalise, the 
rest of the 1960s followed the pattern set down in the early years 
of the decade. The Department of Main Roads proceeded v/ith the 
design of its inner freeway system broadly along the lines 
recommended by De Leuw, Cather, with a major revision of the 
M.R.D.P. in 1967, and was able to obtain the Liberal Government’s 
concurrence in principle to additional works. The pragmatic 
approach of the 1950s (quoted above) was lost.^'^ For example in
36. See ibid., pp. 242-3.
37. It is doubtful that the Liberal Government kept in touch with 
the D.M.R.’s planning, as seen by Mr Morris’ comments (Appendix 2)
1971 the Liberal Minister for Local Government and Highways, the 
Hon. P.H. Morton, M.L.A. sought and obtained a substantial 
increase in motor vehicle taxation. J He said in debate that in 
the following 3 years (in the term of the current Commonwealth Aid 
Roads Act), $193,000,000 would be spent in the County of 
Cumberland, while expressways would account for $147,000,000 
($49 million a year). This consisted of $9 million on the 
Eastern Distributor and Eastern Expressway, $32 million on the 
Western Distributor and V/estern Expressway, $13 million for the 
South Western Expressway, $26 million for the Southern Expressway 
and $67 million for the Sydney-Newcastle Expressway. was 
still seen to be well below warranted investment.
While the development of the M.R.D.P. had been largely 
continuous in the mid- and late-1960s there had been significant 
initiatives. Firstly in 1965 the County of Cumberland Passenger 
Transport Advisory Committee had been set up to co-ordinate 
metropolitan passenger transport policy. This had been in part a 
half-hearted election ploy which lacked power and proved to be 
all but totally ineffective, as will be seen in Chapter Nine.
(The latter comment applies to the former split of Ministerial 
responsibility between the Ministers for Transport and Highways. 
These factors highlight the significance of the subsequent 
vehemence of the then Chairman of CUMTAC, Mr McCusker, and then 
Minister for Transport, Mr Morris.^"'') Nonetheless when the 
Sydney Region Outline Plan was released in 1968, the lack of a 
strategic transport plan was appreciated^^ and from as early as 
1966 CUMTAC took the establishment of the Sydney Area Transporta­
tion Study (SATS) upon itself.
The SATS investigation was essentially a straight-line 
extension of the De Leuw, Cather methodology, being based on the 
same types of data collection and processing and using standard 
American computer-package methodology. In fact the SATS analysis 
was entirely false. It contained a reasonable amount of wider 
analysis (environment, societal considerations, public transport
and those of Mr McCusker (Appendix 3, pp. 5-6) . Other interviev/s have supported this view. The theoretical discussion in the 
Introduction regarding internalisation of values and organisational independence has direct relevance.
38. See the excerpts from Parliamentary Debates in P.H. Morton, 
"Funding Finance for Main Roads Works'.Main Roads, 37(4), June 
1972, pp. 102-105.
39. Ibid., p. 105.
40. Interview with Mr N. McCusker (Appendix 3), pp. 5-6; interview with the Hon. M. Morris (Appendix 2), pp. 1-2.
41. State Planning Authority, Sydney Region Outline Plan (Sydney, 1968), p. 36 and elsewhere.
and so on) and ostensibly "produced” a best combination of new 
roads, public transport and related policy initiatives. However 
the recommended road programme was all but totally tne current 
Main Roads Development Plan, that is the D.M.R. submission.
(This is especially so if the phasing of the recommended 
expenditure is considered.) To a great extent this was a 
consequence of constraints imposed by past planning, the relatively 
superior financial position of the D.M.R. vis-a-vis the P.T.C., 
and the influence of the Department. Of the expenditure recommend­
ed to take place between 1974 and 1990, that is $2,833 million, 46 
per cent was devoted to urban highways (30 per cent to the 340 
miles of new freeways and expressways). Virtually identical 
proportions applied in respect of total recommended expenditure 
to the year 2000.^^
The SATS road programme was a far more extensive and intensive 
system of expressways than had been suggested in the 1940s or 
1950s but importantly it was very similar to the M.R.D.P. as 
revised internally by the D.M.R. and was fully consistent with the 
grid highway system espoused in the Sydney Region Outline Plan. 
However by the early 1970s the Department had begun to encounter 
substantial social opposition to the disruptive effects of road 
construction, starting in Paddington and extending to the 
established working class inner western suburbs. While the 
impressive technical presentation of SATS was intended to 
legitimise the M.R.D.P., in fact it helped to concentrate attention 
on the extent of the threat which that internal Plan posed for 
residential districts of all types. The immediate point of 
conflict was Ultimo and Glebe, where the Australian Labor Ministers 
for Transport and for Urban and Regional Development were able to - 
use the pre-approval clauses of the Commonwealth road grants 
legislation to help halt the demolition of certain condemmed (and 
not immediately intended for construction)terraces. However the 
implications of the M.R.D.P. were felt in many quarters, in the 
Lane Cove Valley, Woolloomooloo, Royal National Park, Paddington 
and so on, and which contributed substantially to discrediting 
SATS and to a reapnraisal of the overall direction of road (and
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public transport) planning in 1975-76. '
CUMTAC had been replaced by URTAC in 1973 and while this was
42. See SATS, Vol. 3, Passenger Transport Systems, pp. 1-36 ff.
43. The importance of the social reaction to the D.M.R.'s 
planning is not underestimated but it cannot be traced here. See 
Gibbons in Painter, Gibbons and Erezzo, op. cit.. pp. 48-9; also 
on various aspects A. Jakubowicz, "The City Game", in D. Edgar 
(ed), Social Change in Australia (Melbourne: Cheshire 1974;;
M.M. Camina, "Public Participation - An Australian Dimension"
The Planner, 61(6), 1975; and numerous other similar works. t
essentially a cosmetic change, URTAG began to develop so that by 
1975 it was able to break down institutional barriers to a 
significant extent and produce a realistic report on the short­
term planning situation. In 1975 the Transport and Highways 
portfolios were reunited under the Hon. Wal Fife, M.L.A., 
successor to the long-serving Mr Morris, and he reputedly recognis­
ed the weaknesses of the then Government's transport policy and 
sought two things from URTAC. First, he wanted advice on short­
term policy needs to clear up the confusion which had resulted 
from SATS. Secondly, the current conditions of resource scarcity 
had to be reconciled with many pressing needs in a way that would 
not prejudice future action and would maximise short-term benefits. 
URTAG was generally successful in these two objects and produced 
a Report in February 1976 which was immediately adopted by the 
Liberal Government (it was in fact an election year).
The URTAG Report shifted emphasis away from freeways and 
expressways, principally because they were regarded as excessively 
expensive, towards selective investment in new road works but more 
importantly towards policies designed to make better use of the 
existing investment in roads and public transport systems. The 
Report avoided mentioning the SATS/M.R.D.P. arterial road 
programme and instead proposed a 10-year programme of $27 million 
a year on 14 nominated major construction projects and $13 million 
a year on smaller works. It stated its long-term objectives as:
"(a) the development of cross-regional routes where it 
is unrealistic to expect major public transport 
facilities other than buses to be provided, even in the 
long term;
(b) the development of routes which redirect the growth 
of traffic av/ay from the Central Business District to 
major regional centres;
' v * ¡rial roads to by-pass the
The 14 major projects were still consistent with the D.M.R.'s 
current expectations (and were in fact the works nominated by the 
Department) but they were nonetheless in marked contrast to the 
SATS recommendations. To assist the essentially pragmatic 
approach, URTAG recommended the postponement or abandonment of 
some major works such as the Eastern Suburbs Railway past Bondi 
Junction, North Western Expressway past Darling Harbour, the 
Glenfield-East Hills rail connection and several quadruplication 
projects, and the Eastern Freeway beyond Darlinghurst.
An extremely significant feature of the URTAG Report was the
44. See Chapter Nine below for general background.
45. URTAC, Report (Sydney, 1976), p. 11.
emphasis it gave to traffic management as a complement to 
construction projects. Traffic planning will be examined shortly 
but it is essentia] to note that URTAC extended the role of 
traffic management past the traditional domain of road safety and 
intersection "control" and the like, to being an essential element 
in positive planning. URTAC's major recommendations and identif­
ication of measures of further potential in this area were "in 
principle" only because the Traffic Authority had not yet been set 
up and such policy issues were left to it, but increased funding 
was sought and a v/ide range of specific local improvements were 
listed in the Report's Appendix 2.
Since the 1976 URTAC Report the new Labor Government has 
substantially changed the context of main roads planning in 
Sydney. It had undertaken to review the D.M.R.*s expressways and 
on taking office it investigated the long- and medium-term needs 
of the metropolis, apparently with the aid of the Urban Transport 
Study Group (a continuation of the SATS effort under the direction 
of the Ministry of Transport and Highways and URTAC).
Consequently the abandonment of some sections of the M.R.D.P. and 
the modification of others were announced, subordinating 
expressways without ignoring their potential role. The Wran 
Government has so far completed the cycle of reassessment started 
by the C.C.C. and Enticknap in the late 1950s, although it is too 
early to judge whether a "balanced" investment programme will be 
achieved or whether external or political factors v/ill force a 
change in emphasis. In particular the enormous expenditure on 
public transport systems in recent years has not been matched by 
suitable policy initiatives, especially in the use of buses to 
serve specific geographical deficiencies, and expressway and public 
transport investment have not yet been reconciled fully.
It was seen in Chapter Four that in the inter-V/ar period a 
conscious effort had been made to investigate the potential for 
traffic management in the realisation that it was not sufficient 
to build roads, their use had to be managed and fitted into the 
total transport context. This effort was apparently not renewed 
to any significant extent after 1945, at least not publicly. The 
tram/bus controversy had lost its impetus. A reputedly high 
standard of expertise was maintained in the Department of Road 
Transport and Tramways and then the Department of Motor Transport, 
although responsibility was shared with the Police Department and 
local councils (particularly in the CBD). However attention was 
focussed on the reduction of the fatality rate in accidents and on 
local traffic measures such as the introduction of traffic lights. 
Unfortunately this area of urban policy has been extremely poorly 
documented but as already noted the traffic authorities appeared to
have performed well. Traffic signal investment was always in 
backlog but this was inevitable because of definitional arrange­
ments of "needs". SAT3 noted that at the end of 1971 there were 
569 intersections controlled by traffic signals and there were 263 
additional locations at which lights were "warranted".^ ^  However 
both in terms of technology and total effort the traffic signal 
programme had progressed well, although such a judgement must be 
tentative.
More fundamentally, the post-1945 period is best regarded as 
a long period of relative inertia between the initial awareness of 
traffic problems under the impact of the motor vehicle, and the 
new awareness after 1976 induced by resource scarcity and obvious 
need for reform. For most of the postv/ar period Governments left 
the private motorists to make free use of the road system, only 
intervening when congestion was excessive or to set general safety 
constraints. Even the most anachronistic road rules were not 
changed. There is no clear or simple explanation for that 
attitude. Both the N.R.M.A. and motorist groups and the traffic 
engineering profession sought reform. In 1963 the Department of 
Motor Transport introduced a complex system of television monitor­
ing and computer control to 110 traffic signals so as to ease 
congestion in the OBD. In June 1967 the same Department declared 
most of Parramatta Road as a "clearway" to eliminate kerbside 
parking in periods of heavy traffic and this concept was quickly 
applied to most other major roads. Co-ordinated signals were 
first tried on Parramatta Road, unsuccessfully at first, but the 
D.M.T. has developed its technology to a very high standard and 
successfully implemented it on several critical roads. (In 1971 
there were 13 such systems of three or more linked sites and that . 
programme was accelerated in later years. (47)) yios-t importantly, 
the 1976 URTAC Report recommended a revolution in road use through 
the extension of the priority road concept to all Main Roads and 
most of the important unclassified roads. This would replace the 
give-way-to-the-right rule almost totally. It might be remembered 
that the 1928 Report of the Traffic Advisory Committee suggested 
a move in the same direction (see Chapter Pour).
Traffic management has become a very active policy field with 
a common philosophy of making the most of existing roads while 
also at least partially placing the use of the private automobile 
(and trucks) in a wider social context. The Traffic Authority, 
which replaced an ineffectual Traffic Advisory Committee which had
46. SAT3, Vol. 1, Base Year Data Report, p. III-38.
47. See URTAC Report. Section E and Appendix A for a fairly 
comprehensive (though non-historical) discussion of traffic management.
been set up in 1964 (see below), has demonstrated the ability to 
deal positively with Sydney’s problems although it is constrained 
by membership and particularly by perceived political constraints 
from more ’’radical” measures (for example traffic restraint on a 
special spatial basis, such as in the C3D or Parramatta) and 
supporting investment which have been used successfully overseas. 
However the Traffic Authority has been the only agency to 
approach a firm policy on the development of a hierarchy of roads 
through its attitudes on road c l o s u r e s ^ a n d  this is important 
in historical terms.
In conclusion, main road planning and traffic management have 
had uneven records in the post-1945 period. The D.M.R. had great 
success in its own terms in the planning of an extensive system of 
high-standard roads, and in having that plan accepted officially 
by the G.C.C. and S.P.A. It was similarly successful in repell­
ing attacks on its plans in the late 1950s. However the 
Department was not able to obtain substantial commitments for its 
expressways and then freeways for a long time, especially consid­
ering that compared with public transport administration the money 
costs involved were not then unreasonable. It was also not able 
to positively affect the pattern of development of the metropolis 
for while the automobile had a tremendous impact, its use was 
unplanned and undirected. Nonetheless the Department’s planning 
successes were significant indicators of the relative magnitude 
of its institutional (that is, statutory, financial, political and 
societal) resources. Traffic management can be regarded to a 
large extent as the reverse of main roads planning — largely 
ignored while road planners were optimistic and dominant but 
favoured otherwise. This and the weaknesses of the D.M.R. 
planning from a system viewpoint and long periods of inertia and 
lack of practical achievement, were not characteristic of 
effective urban transport administration. The 1976 URTAC Report 
was a sign of the beginning of fundamental improvement and (as 
will be seen latei) URTAC could have sufficient momentum to sustain 
the change.
48. See Traffic Authority, Guidelines for Road Closures (Sydney: 
Traffic Authority, December 1977).
Chapter Eight
Public Transport
... the interdependencies in (British Rail) operations are such that any precipitate 
change forced by an outsider could very 
easily, in the hands of an uncooperative 
management, cause more real harm than 
apparent good. Railways are one industry, 
which must be given guidelines and constraints within which to solve their own problems.
Stewart Joy, The Train That Ran Away
( 1973) .
Controversy over various aspects of organisational performance 
has been a recurrent feature of the administration of public 
transport services in New South Wales. The Public Transport 
Commission was established in October 1972 with the tasks of
services and especially with the introduction of a modern managerial 
system into the massive bureaucracies controlling those services.
The P.T.C. is the third experiment in a series of major structural 
reforms, the previous ones occurring in the early 1930s and early 
1950s. The respective Governments acted on an assumption that the 
basic causes of problems of deficits, failure to adapt to changing 
conditions, high cost levels and the like were essentially 
administrative in origin. Each of these experiments failed, partly 
because of incorrect prescription and the inherent difficulty of 
the task but more importantly because the separate organisations 
were too separate and even different to want to or try to divert 
their momentum.
This chapter will examine the administrative and planning 
record of public transport since 1945 with particular emphasis on 
co-ordination and control and the explanation of the failure to 
maintain the effectiveness of train and bus services in a changing 
society. (Relatively little attention will be given to ferries 
because of their limited actual coverage.) A critical analysis
ort and Highways Commission and the
As has been seen already the Transport (Division of Functions) 
Act of 1932 established three statutory transport authorities, the" 
"Departments” of Railways, Road Transport and Tramways, and Main 
Roads, each of which was under a Commissioner. Before 1945 only 
one other major change took place, apart from special wartime 
measures. In 1943 the N.S.W. Transport Administration Act reversed 
Bruxner’s earlier decision and made the Commissioners for Main 
Roads and Road Transport and Tramways subject to the direction and 
control of the Minister for Transport. This provision was not 
extended to Railways until seven years later.
Both the metropolitan rail and tram systems had substantial 
problems, particularly the trams whose patronage started to fall
1 . There are no general secondary sources v/hich cover the topics 
discussed in this chapter. Detailed financial statistics were 
compiled from Annual Reports and the N.S.W. Year Book for various years and in most cases specific sources will not be cited, to 
simplify footnotes and also because such sources are very obvious.
re-organising and co-ordinating train and bus (and then ferry)
before and immediately after the War. Both had operational and 
financial problems and both were subject to criticisms of 
inadequate investment and suspicions of ineffective management.
The importance of such factors in contemporary and historical terms 
will be discussed in the following. First however it is essential 
to note a most significant development in 1947, the commitment of 
the Labor Government to the expansion of the role of the urban rail 
system.
As was said earlier, the rail lobby of Sydney had great
success in 1913, 1915 and the 1920s in obtaining funds for the
construction of the Harbour Bridge, city underground and suburban
electrification, and in fact succeeded to the point that railway
construction was the crux of the conventional wisdom of urban
planning even after the adverse technological developments of the
late 1910s and 1920s. The city underground was not completed in
the 1930s and this remained a work of high priority, one that was
in the forefront of deliberations in the Reconstruction preparations
of the early 1940s. However more importantly perhaps there was
still sufficient support for railways for the Government to commit
itself to the commencement of a number of significant rail works,
in addition to the Circular Quay Station and associated overhead
road, when the City and Suburban Electric Railways (Amendment) Act
of 1947 was passed. This provided for an Eastern Suburbs line to
Bondi Junction and Bondi broadly along the alignment of the 1915
route and later inner loop, being about 15 miles of single line at
a cost of $19 million excluding resumptions; and a Southern
Eastern Suburbs Railways to the Cricket Ground and Kingsford via
Oxford Street consisting of 12 miles of single track railway at a
cost of $13 million. (A line from this railway to the Airport was
apparently added. ') Further a Southern Suburbs line was included
to run from Redfern through the near-southern industrial suburbs to
just north of the Airport, with linkages to the established systems(3)at Redfern and Sydenham. ' Construction was commenced in 1947 on 
the extensive tunnelling works for the Eastern Suburbs and Southern 
Suburbs lines but ceased in 1952 partly because of the obviously 
excessive number and geographical concentration of routes and 
partly because of unfavourable economic conditions. The 1947 Act 
was a partial recognition of the structural limitations of the 
metropolitan rail system but it did not provide for the northern, 
western or southern areas which had inadequate services, if any.
2. Minutes of Transport and Highways Commission, 21st January 
1952, p. 146.
3. See Second Reading Speech by the Hon. M. O'Sullivan, N .S.W.
Parliamentary Debates, Session 1946-47, vol. 183, 19th March 1947,pp. 1678 ir.-----------
The combination of the usual problems of tram operations in 
the increasingly crowded metropolis and of poor financial results 
led the Government to import three public transport experts from 
London in 1948 to advise on the road passenger transport systems.
The three were G.F. Sinclair, C.B.E., A.F. Andrews and E.R. Ellen 
and they reported in April 1949 to the Premier, James McGirr (who 
had been the first Minister for Transport, from March to May 
1932).^^ They made extremely important recommendations in a number 
of areas of which three will be examined.v (Engineering and 
operational improvements were recommended but these need not be 
dealt with here.)
First, the Sinclair Report recommended the phasing out of tram 
services and their replacement by motor buses. They saw substantial 
operating and economic advantages as well as the greater ability of 
buses in the reduction of congestion and adjustment to changing 
patterns of development. The need for systematic replacement was 
overdue as the basic policy had been determined long before. They 
provided a programme of replacement which ended in 196(J approx­
imately; in fact the last tram ran in early 1961.
Secondly, the Report endorsed the 1947 rail extensions rather 
circumspectly by saying that those works would improve the 
standard of service and would allow road services to be run as 
feeders, not in competition. It was noted that ’’Should the railway 
extensions not be proceeded with, the highly desirable benefits of 
saving the city from traffic congestion and the benefits of high 
speed travel will be lost, bux even so the bus system which we are 
proposing will be an advantage to the community as a whole....
(The tram conversion has since been lamented by some but the 
conditions of the time were clearly in favour of the 
recommendations•)
Finally and most importantly, the three experts were charged
with advising on ”what long-term policy should be adopted to
ensure that the system (sic) is best adapted to meet public(7)transport requirements efficiently and economically". In doing
4. The Report was apparently prepared under the Premier and the 
Minister, Mr O'Sullivan.. Principal acknowledgements were to the 
Premier's Department and Treasury. See G.F. Sinclair, A.F. Andrews 
and E.R. Ellen, "Report on Road Passenger Transport Services in the 
Sydney Metropolitan and Newcastle Areas" (Sydney: N.S.W.
Government Printer, 1949), p. 50.-
5. See ibid., pp. 45-49 for summary.
6. Ibid., p. 37.
7 Ibid., p. 3.
so they went beyond road transport and recommended that 
considerations of co-ordination, efficient administration and 
planning required the establishment of stronger central co- 
ordinative agencies. They said that the Commissioner for Railways 
should be subject to the direction of the Minister, and more 
importantly sought the creation of a "New South V/ales Transport 
Commission” and the appointment of a ’’Director of Transport and 
Highways” as its full-time chairman. As the Report said, ”At this 
critical stage in the development of transport in N.S.W. all 
services should be controlled by a single authority, so that the 
pattern for the future can be woven to the most efficient and
r q \economical standard". ' These recommendations had undoubtedly 
been fully discussed at least with McGirr and O'Sullivan.
The rationale for the proposal was sound but the prescription
did not meet the Report's own standards. It was said that the
development of the various services "should be freed from the
competing claims of various Department (sic)”, and that road and
rail investment "should only be sanctioned when an overall traffic
plan is approved which will ensure that... each system is operating(9)in its own sphere". ' More specific benefits were expected, for 
example the elimination of the situation whereby rail fares were 
reduced on weekends whereas bus and tram fares were increased.
The Transport Commission as envisaged was to "be responsible 
for the control" of the Departments of Railways, Main Roads, and 
Road Transport and Tramways, and of the Maritime Services Board, 
and for the co-ordination (or regulation) of intra-State airways, 
private buses, ferries and the road freight industry. There would 
be a small secretariat for the Commission which would centralise 
the limited research resources which then existed, while the 
Commission would be the central transport voice, to be consulted 
by councils and other authorities rather than the individual 
Departments (which would otherwise remain in their present form). 
The functions of the Commission were stated as:
(a) to review and co-ordinate the development of transport 
services;
(b) to consider and make recommendations on all projects for 
capital and (similar) expenditure proposed by the three Departments 
and M.S.B.;
(c) to "consider and co-ordinate" the annual budgets of the 
authorities;
8. Ibid., p. 10, see pp. 9-11 and 45.
Ibid., p. 10, for this quote and next paragraph.9.
(d) to control employment conditions in the four 
authorities; and
(e) to licence and control buses and other motor vehicles.
It can be seen that the Commission was to have no real power.
The Sinclair group obviously had the support of Premier McGirr
and O’Sullivan for a Transport and Highways Bill was presented by
the latter early in 1950 and despite Opposition claims of socialism
was passed without delay. The Transport and Highways Commission
was established in May i950, consisting of eight members, one of
whom was Director and Chairman. The Director and departmental
heads were subject to the control of the Minister. The Chairman
was Reg Winsor who had risen through the Railway ranks to become
Assistant Commissioner in 1948 and Commissioner for Road Transport
and Tramways in the following year.^^ The other seven members
were: Commissioners for Railways, Main Roads, and Road Transport
and Tramways; President of the M.S.B.; and representatives of(1 1)employees, rural industry, and trade and commerce. J The powers 
of the Commission were basically as set out previously in the 
Sinclair Report except that the Commission could "control and 
direct" the heads of the transport departments. The cost of 
administration was to be shared by the Departments and M.S.B. but 
in practice the Secretary of the Ministry of Transport became 
Secretary and it was decided to use the Ministry as secretariat 
(without any of the related changes expected by the Sinclair group).
Two critical weaknesses negated the potential of the
Commission. The first was foreseeable, that leaving the
operational authorities separate and without adequate external
controls (apart from the fact that the Commission’s power was
co-operative and shared and very uncertain) enabled them to
internalise policy-making. The Minutes of the 22 meetings of the
Commission have been read and they fully support this 
( 1 2 )conclusion.v ' Secondly, in the words of a later Minister for
Transport, "There were also clashes of personality that doomed it(15)to failure before it got off the ground". ' The Hon. W.F. Sheahan 
became Minister for Transport in July 1950 and he used the 
opportunity of the Commissioner for Railways’ death in 1952 to 
abolish the Commission and virtually transfer Mr Winsor back there
10. See The Railways of N.S.W., op. cit., p. 218.
11. See for example N.S.W. Year Book, 1950-51, p. 93.
12. 0^_ cit. throughout. See also interview with Mr 
M. Morris (Appendix 2), p. 4.
13. The Hon. M. Morris, Second Reading Speech on Public Transport 
Commission Bill 1972, in N.S.W. Parliamentary Debates. Session 
1972-73, 3rd Series Vol. 100, p. 1174.
as Commissioner. Quite probably the personality question was the 
key —  the Commission could have continued to function as a "tea 
club" otherwise.
The only lasting effects of the Commission experiment were 
that the Government Railways Act was amended in 1952 to continue 
Ministerial control, and secondly that a Department of Motor 
Transport was created in 1952 under a Superintendent (and in 1954 
a Commissioner) to regulate the licensing of private vehicles and 
drivers, private buses, intra-State air services, and road traffic. 
As well the Department of Road Transport and Tramways was 
commensurately reduced in scope and renamed (misleadingly) the 
Department of Government Transport.
From 1952 the transport administration was co-ordinated 
through the Minister and even that degree of co-ordination (which 
was by interview accounts totally ineffective) was broken down in 
1956 by the removal of the D.M.R. to the administration of the 
Minister for Local Government. Treasury had a nominal role but 
only in loan administration, not in functional or policy co­
ordination. The Commissioner for Railways from 1956 to 1972,
Mr Neal McCusker, said in interview of the period before CUMTAC was 
set up in 1965,
... there was no arrangement for formal meetings between 
the Commissioners and very little contact was had. The 
co-ordination which I felt was so vital was just non­
existent, as simple as that.('4)
This statement has been confirmed in other discussions.
The individual authorities were faced with changing conditions 
and partly for that reason regarded their problems as internal. It 
has already been seen that the Department of Main Roads was in the 
process of developing, defending and further developing the Main 
Roads Development Plan. The Departments of Railways and Government 
Transport literally reversed this process by abandoning their 
planning. The reasons for this will now be examined.
In the case of trams and buses, patronage fell from 518 
million trips in 1947/48 to 324 million in 1956/57 and the 
accumulated deficit rose from $2,681,000 in June 1949 to 
$18,903,000 in June 1957. In July 1956 an across-the-board increase 
in fares of 50 per cent reduced the annual net deficit from 
$ 8 ,2 7 6 ,0 0 0  in 1953/56 to $ 2 ,3 3 7 ,0 0 0  in the following year but this 
was regarded as a palliative only. In the ten years before 1956 
the population served by the Department of Government Transport
14. Interview with Mr N. McCusker (Appendix 3), p. 1.
remained static because development in the metropolis was 
increasingly concentrated in the "outer1 suburbs.
The Railways’ situation was similar. From 1944/45 to 1956/57
revenue had covered expenses in each year, but in 9 of the 13 years
losses had been made because of heavy capital charges, and losses
had become the rule. (The total net deficit for that period was
$62,198,000 whereas the total surplus of revenue over operating
and administrative expenses was $139,838,000.) Even in these terms
there were significant contemporary doubts that adequate provision
had been made for depreciation. In the ten years before 1956/57
the freight tonnage hauled increased by 4 per cent, passenger trips
by 0.4 per cent, and debt charges by 60 per cent. More critically,
working expenses had increased by 143 per cent compared with a 113
per cent increase in earnings. At about this time the advantages
which the Railways had obtained from their earlier investment,
including the opening of Circular Quay Station and the completion
of the city underground loop in 1956, were negated by technological
and land use changes. Urban rail patronage peaked in 1954/55 and(15)then started to fall, with a brief recovery in 1963—65•
The Government responded to this situation with the appointment 
of American consultants Ebasco Services Incorporated in July 1956 
to conduct "A Study of Deuartment of Railways and Department of/ A g \
Government Transport". The Ebasco group consisted of six
consultants, two for railway matters (both former presidents of 
American railroad systems), two for Government Transport (former 
Vice Presidents of large American urban transport systems), one for 
financial problems (an experienced accountant), and a Supervisor 
(former President of an American urban transport system). The 
Ebasco team consulted extensively with the two Departments and made 
numerous recommendations through memoranda before submitting their 
Report on 1st October 1957. Again the numerous operational 
recommendations (including dieselisation, electrification from 
Hornsby to Gosford, equipment and goods yards improvements, 
centralised rail traffic control facilities, and continued 
conversion of tram routes to bus operations together with one-man 
crews) will not be analysed in detail. Instead attention will be 
concentrated on urban passenger planning.
The basic theme of the Ebasco Report was that economic 
rationality should be the main criterion of capital spending, that
15. See Base Year (1971) Data Report (Vol. 1, SATS), Figs 4.15 
and 4.16 for more important per caput figures. Rail patronage has 
been fairly stable in aggregate.
16. Ebasco Services Incorporated, A Study of Department of 
Railways and Department of Government Transport (Sydney: Government 
Printer, 1957); herealter cited as: Eoasco. Report.
is. that "money should be spent where greatest savings will result
( 1 7 )therefrom in operating costs”. " Suggestions were made for more
economical urban electric operations without significant changes to
levels of service. The main effect was however the diversion of
funds to profit sectors (freight) rather than quadruplification or
urban extensions. The consultants noted that the rail construction
programme which had "been worked on intermittently for some time”
would be expensive in terms of loan capital and that construction
costs, population distribution and "riding habits” had changed( 1 8)substantially. Three formal recommendations were made, that:
(i) the programme for the extension of suburban services 
should be carefully reappraised;
(ii) "If possible, any funds which may be required for its 
continuation not be appropriated to the detriment of the funds 
which are necessary for the modernization and improvement of the 
balance of the railway system"; and
(iii) a joint Railways/G-overnment Transport study should be 
set up "to determine which Department is in position to furnish 
adequate service with the least capital outlay and operating costs".
Obviously, bus services were preferred by Ebasco. However the 
Report made no recommendations regarding bus routes other than 
(iii) immediately above and a suggestion that better research and 
costing resources should be developed within the D.G.T.
The Report mentioned that the control arrangement between 
Commissioners and Minister had been examined, "particularly with 
respect to its effectiveness in securing the most efficient 
operation of the Department(s) and maintaining adequate controls 
over the spending of capital funds". ^ 9) Q^^ge in arrangements 
was considered necessary. The team said that they had given 
serious consideration to the creation of an Authority or Board but- 
had decided against these.
The Ebasco Report was largely adopted by the two Departments 
and served as part of the basis for their subsequent policies.
The two Commissioners, Mr Neal McCusker and Mr A.A. Shoebridge, 
issued comments on the Report in late December 1957 and late 
January 1958 respectively and had reservations but no real 
objections. McCusker had assumed office on 1st August 1956 and
had, he said, commenced a thorough review of Railway operations
17. Ebasco Services Incorporated, "Summary Report" (Sydney: 
typescript, 1957), p. 3.
18. Ebasco, Report, p. 19.
19. Ibid., p. 21, alsop. 31.
20. Their comments were issued in roneo form by the Minister for 
Transport, Mr A.G. Enticknap, on 31st January 1958.
with basically the same conclusions as Ebasco. He also said that 
Ebasco's comments on metropolitan policy were "in conformity with 
the views of the Department". He saw a need for co-ordination 
especially as there was evidence of service overlapping in Sydney 
and Newcastle, and had already ordered an examination of Newcastle 
services on the lines of the Ebasco recommendation (iii) above.
Apart from agreeing that the need for future suburban extensions 
should be very carefully appraised, McCusker said that a joint 
Departmental study of Sydney and Newcastle regions should have as 
objectives —
(a) "avoiding capital expenditure to the utmost extent 
possible consistent with an improved and adequate service sufficient 
to meet public requirements"; and
(b) advising on areas where public transport is necessary.
Mr McCusker was Commissioner for Railways from 1956 until his
compulsory retirement in 1972. The nature of his administration
has been researched at length by this writer and it is generally
true that the nature of the capital costs, labour cost structure,
operational problems and political climate of his times forced his
administration to "avoid capital expenditure" as stated above to an
almost extreme degree. Some aspects of this were seen in Chapter
Six, such as tight external financial scrutiny and a reliance on
expensive finance sources. The Department of Railways faced almost
inescapable contingencies in dieselisation, some electrification,
maintenance and mainline upgrading, and the like. Much of the
suburban fleet had passed its economic life, most of it dating from
1926/27, although McCusker's predecessor had invested in 120( 2 1)electric carriages' ' and McCusker brought in the first double-
( 22)deck cars in 1964. While it has not been possible to break 
Railways' capital expenditure down into sufficient detail to make - 
a definitive assessment, it is clear, as Mr McCusker said in 
interview, that the primary priority had to be revenue, and that 
meant freight.
It would not be true to say that Railways' urban role was 
completely negated after the cessation of the 1947 works: the 
obvious exception was the Eastern Suburbs Railway but the Southern 
Suburbs line was also favoured for some time in connection with the 
Airport as well as the inner southern industrial suburbs.
The Eastern Suburbs Railway was made into an electoral issue in 
the early 1960s by the Labor Government, and principally by the then 
Leader of the Opposition, R.W. Askin in his 1965 campaign speech, 
as a means of influencing the vote in the local State seats. In
21. Base Year (1971) Data Report (Vol. 1, SATS), p. IV-11. 
See also McCusker interview (Appendix 2), p. 2.22.
i 5f>
September 1961 the Minister for Transport, Mr J.M.A. McMahon, 
authorised a study of the transport needs of the eastern and 
southeastern suburbs by consultant De Leuw, Cather & Company of 
Chicago. The Report was released in May 1963 and recommended a 
combination of the 1947 lines.^2^  This was an extremely biassed 
consultant report, as has been confirmed by certain of its authors 
in discussion. The most viable alternative, the rapid bus system, 
was severely disadvantaged by the selection of future roadworks but 
the right political output was obtained. On coming to power the 
Askin Government (which had not received the electoral return v/hich 
it had expected) moved quickly to carry out its promise and the 
necessary legislation authorising the Bondi Junction/Kingsford line 
and cancelling the 1947 lines was passed (after much ad hoc 
political alteration to design) in 1967. The Opposition agreed 
with the measure. In this case the initial planning was 
artificially supported by unrealistic political expectations. In 
planning terms the output was disastrous as was confirmed by the 
next Labor Government and its Board of Review.^2 )^
The second major instance of post-Ebasco rail planning was the 
consideration of land access needs for Sydney Airport by CUMTAC and 
the Sydney Area Transportation Study. A detailed case study of 
this extremely complicated planning episode^2 -^  (referred to also 
in the following chapter) showed that for a time McGusker pushed 
strongly for the resurrection of the 1947 Southern Suburbs line but 
to the Airport and had the support of the Chairman of the State 
Planning Authority and nominal support of other members. Several 
factors, such as the possibility of Commonwealth funding if the 
Eastern Suburbs Railway was extended and encroachment by the N.S.W. 
Board of Fire Commissioners on the route of the Southern Suburbs 
line, defeated the proposal by 1972. It was however supported, in 
its 1947 form very strangely, in the report of the Sydney Area 
Transportation Study. There was no doubt that Commissioner 
McCusker saw the proposal as a valid extension of the role of the 
metropolitan railways.
A minor development which had short-term political but no 
other significance was the proposal by the then Minister for 
Transport, Mr M.A. Morris, in late 1974, to reintroduce trams into
23. De Leuw, Cather & Company, Report on Improved Transport for
the Eastern and Southeastern Suburbs of Sydney (Sydney: Government 
Winter, 1964). ------------------ ----
24. Board of Review of Eastern Suburbs Railway, Renort (Sydney: 
published by Board of Review, October 1976).
^5. R.P. Gibbons, "Case Study: Mascot Airport and Regional 
j-iansport Planning", in Painter, Giboons and Brezzo, op. cit. 
chapter 8. -------
the CBD of Sydney, This proposal was supoorted by a partial cost
( obenefit analysis which did not however compare alternatives, ' 
the main purpose of such analyses. It attracted brief attention 
but was quickly rejected. But for the fact that it was so 
obviously partial and transient the tram study would rank as the 
most biassed postwar planning evaluation (against very strong 
opposition).
The post-Ebasco experience of the Department of Government 
Transport must also rate as basically non-planning. The replace­
ment of trams was completed in 1961 but no regard was paid to the 
cost or route-planning advantages of buses, in that more double­
deck (two-man) buses were b o u g h t a n d  the buses were run on the 
same routes as the trams. Those routes had for the most part been 
determined before 1914 and the failure to adapt Government services 
to changing societal conditions was no less than a disaster.
However as early as 1960/61 at least the Commissioner for 
Government Transport was saying in his Annual Report that bus- 
priority if not bus-exclusive lanes would be needed to overcome 
congestion and chronic irregularity• It would not appear that
the Commissioner or his successors persisted with their argument; 
they were certainly not successful until other parties espoused 
their cause and introduced Priority Lanes. That was the planning 
of Government Transport — ■ no great financial limitations (one 
could argue that there were inducements), only entrenched 
operational conservatism.
In short, after the Ebasco Report the Departments of Railways 
and Government Transport proceeded along fairly independent and 
conservative paths. However in both cases economic and operational 
trends caused increasing concern as did the obvious failure to 
mutually adjust services along the lines of co-ordination and 
greater social relevance. Two significant developments occurred 
in the early 1970s, namely CUMTAC’s initiative in setting up the 
Sydney Area Transportation Study, and the political decision of 
1972 to again experiment with an integrated administrative 
structure for public transport.
26. Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board, Central Sydney 
Tramway —  feasibility study (Melbourne: M. & M.T.B., September 
1974). “
27. Although the buses were designed for one-man use and the 
Department was hindered by union action, there was no need to use 
double-deckers (there is a world-wide trend against them).
28. Commissioner for Government Transport, Annual Report 1960-61, 
p. 3.
The Sydney Area Transportation Study analysed a wide range of 
deficiencies in the existing train and bus systems, most of which 
related to inadequate investment in equipment and tne like and 
anachronistic route structures. While the main reason for SATS was 
probably the justification of the D.M.R.’s road planning and 
associated ” ’ n\cies, Mr McGusker in particular strongly
the area of public transport and although its railway recommenda­
tions were poorly considered and have been subsequently disregarded, 
the bus recommendations provided a strong case for investment and 
reappraisal of routes.
A number of short- and long-term factors influenced the Askin 
Government’s decision in 1972 to set up the Public Transport 
Commission. Among the most important of the latter was the 
financial position of the Department of Railways. In the ten years 
1962/63 to 1971/72 earnings increased by 46 per cent, expenses by 
65 per cent, and interest charges by 52 per cent. In the period 
the Railways made a net loss of $81,269,000 ($69,879,000 in the 
latter four years). It might be noted however that profitability 
(percentage of operating surplus to capital invested) was also 
extremely high by postwar standards except in the last two years. 
Labour cost was the main item of concern although it might also be 
noted that the McCusker philosophies had an excellent chance of 
containing such costs and of distributing scarce capital to best 
meet operational needs. In retrospect it is quite safe to say that 
if the annual financial result was the main criterion of 
organisational performance then the conservatism (and occasional 
warranted "risk” venture) of the McCusker tradition, the mainstream 
and traditional operational approach, was a fairly safe base for 
the future.
The second important long-term factor was the simple fact that 
much of the equipment and rollingstock of the Railways was due for 
replacement, and that such replacement offered scope for a new 
image of administration which could have political benefits. The 
then Minister for Transport, Mr Morris, had made two overseas 
trips^^ and was aware of the need to reconcile strident local
29. See McCusker interview (Appendix 2), pp. 6-7.
30. See M.A. Morris, ’’Overseas Report by the Minister for 
Transport” (Sydney: Minister for Transport through N.S.W. 
Government Printer, 1974, 76 pp) . For example: ’’After my inspec­
tion of these modern transport systems, I clearly recognised that 
our system in Sydney requires much upgrading. The signalling 
techniques on the railways need to be improved, our stations... 
also demand attention, and efficient interchange facilities must be 
provided if public transport patronage is to expand. 1 am sure 
that the next few years will see a major transformation in the 
public transport of New South Wales. An amount of $80.2 million
supported SATS' main achievements were in fact in
calls for reform with the superficial features of overseas systems
(such as the often misapplied term ’’rapid transit”). The
Government had a ’Government Parties Committee on Suburban Train
(3  i )Services” which presented a report in March 197?' to Mr Morris. 
The Committee had had extensive discussions with Mr McCusker and 
other officers, leading unionists and others, and largely confined 
their attention to operational improvements. They referred to 
"the crippling interest burden (on) the State railways”, regarded 
present urban subsidisation levels as comparable with overseas 
cities (rural subsidies were much greater), recommended that 
separate metropolitan passenger accounts should be kept, and noted 
that the Department was "aware of the desirability of many 
suggestions and recommendations in this report and would no doubt 
have adopted them if it had the money to do so”. The Eastern 
Suburbs Railway and two extra lines between Erskineville and Tempe 
were regarded as essential.
Superficially the Committee's Report was a triumph for
McCusker. However Mr McCusker was apparently too closely associat-
(32)ed with Railway traditionalism, and was himself too powerful,
for the Government to renew his term after he turned 65 years of
age on 20th October 1972. The Commissioner for Government
Transport was due to retire several years after as well and the
Under Secretary of the Ministry of Transport suggested to the
Minister that October 1972 would be a good time to consider
( 3 3 )implementing ideas which had been around for some time.
Mr Morris recognised the basic weaknesses of the former Transport 
and Highways Commission and instead initially favoured the creation 
of an urban and country dichotomy in administration by combining 
urban rail with Government Transport to form a Greater Sydney 
Transport Authority. The Treasury opposed this and so the issue 
was referred to a Cabinet sub-committee.^^ (The Treasury 
opposition was based on the fact that the separation of financial 
results would not reduce capital requirements for urban passenger
will be spent this year on modernisation and re-equipment 
representing an increase of 45 per cent on spending last year”
(p.8) .
31. "Report of the Government Parties Committee on Suburban Train 
Services” (Sydney: roneo, March 1972). This Report contained 
considerable analysis of historical changes in fares, standards of 
operation, etcetera.
32. Mr McCusker was undoubtedly an extremely able and influential 
man, who necessarily perhaps made enemies. See the comments of his 
Minister for about 7i years, Mr Milton Morris (Appendix 2, pp.
5-6).
33. Interview with K.J. Trott of 21st December 1976 (Appendix 5), 
p. 9.
34. Ibid. ; also Morris interview (Appendix 2), p. 6.
services but would cause pressure for more expenditure in the
country. As was said in Chapter Six, Treasury was a ma.jor
influence in Railway policy.) The final recommendation was for a
"Public Transport Corporation" — Mr Askin changed the title to
Commission — to consist of three full-time and two part-time
( 3 5 )members. J
The Commission Bill attracted a great deal of criticism from 
the Labor Opposition when it was debated in the Legislative 
Assembly in late September 1972.^^ The Opposition spokesman was 
Mr P.F. Cox who described the reform, which was based on the total 
amalgamation of the two public transport Departments in one 
statutory authority, as extreme and unnecessary. The appointment 
of Mr Philip Shirley as Chief Commissioner was attacked by the 
Opposition because Mr Shirley had been Deputy Chairman of the 
British Railways Board from 1962 to 1967, in which time extensive 
service cutbacks and closures had been effected. (Shirley was 
already 60 and therefore unable to complete his seven-year term. 
From 1967 he had been Deputy Chairman of Cunard.)^' ^ Although it 
was not really known at the time, the administrative record of 
Shirley’s Board was highly questionable as became evident when 
Stewart Joy's The Train That Ran Away was published in 1973.^°^ 
(That book would have given the Government the opportunity to 
properly evaluate the nature of the problem it was tackling. It 
has certainly given subsequent readers the sad knowledge that 
history repeats itself.)
The other full-time Commissioners were Dr Robert Nielsen, then 
Director of the Sydney Area Transportation Study and former 
executive of several American transport companies, and Mr Joshua 
Trimmer. Trimmer was then President of the State Superannuation 
Board and had formerly been Treasury representative in Railways 
under the 1956 arrangement discussed earlier and in fact special 
Assistant Secretary of the Department in charge of financial 
affairs. Like Shirley, Trimmer's qualification was that he was an
35* The evaluation of the P.T.C. which follows has been based on 
many formal and informal interviews and represents a fair and 
minimum level of criticism. Most such interviews cannot be 
specifically acknowledged.
36. See Second Reading speeches, N.S.W. Parliamentary Debates, 
Session 1972-73, 3rd Series, vol. 100, pp. 1173 ff.
37. The Government had not been able to recruit its first choice, 
a retired London administrator, and had trouble meeting its recruit 
ment deadline. Mr Shirley however seemed to be an excellent choice
38. S. Joy, The Train That Ran Away (London: Ian Allan, 1973)*
Dr Joy's prescriptions have been widely accepted in Australia and 
he has become an influential consultant and adviser. This author 
v/ould argue however that Joy is a better economist than general 
organisational analyst.
accountant with limited experience in transport administration; 
Neilsen was the only transport specialist.
The part-time Commissioners were a representative of the 
Labour Council of N.S.W. and the chairman of Rothmans. This basic 
pattern of representation has been maintained. Dr Neilsen resigned 
in December 1973 and was successively replaced by two operations- 
oriented officers of the Commission. Mr Trimmer was appointed 
Deputy Chief Commissioner in late December 1974.
The Commission was established with the same basic powers and 
responsibilities as the preceding Departments, with the exception 
that Clause 15 of its Act required it to make a report on the 
problems of public transport and the proposed remedies v/ithin two 
years of its inception. The Commission was plainly told that its 
primary responsibility was to curb the financial drain of transport 
deficits on State finances. Two of the three full-time 
Commissioners were apparently selected for this task on the basis 
of their financial experience and acted accordingly. It might be 
expected that this objective would conflict with the Commission’s 
planning tasks.
The formation of the Commission was quickly followed by the
limited amalgamation of the Departments of Railways and Government
Transport. The respective personnel structures and accounting
systems (as well as the various operational units) v/ere too
different to be amalgamated totally and in fact after over five
(39)years little progress has been made in some areas. ' The 
amalgamation was however the most critical aspect of the early 
P.T.C. experience because of the disruption that was caused and the 
derived effects on organisational performance.
From the very first the approach of the Commission alienated 
a great number of top and middle executives and others and broke 
down the traditional lines of accountability and management without 
prcviding an effective alternative. Dr Nielsen took charge of bus 
operations and marketing and established a close rapport with his 
employees. Otherv/ise the security of various management levels was 
disrupted and a considerable amount of hostility and bitterness
39. Some changes have been reversed, particularly (in 1977) the 
distribution of executive responsibility. Also engineering 
activities were combined under a Director of Engineering, to be 
separate from operations, as in the Department of Railways. These 
have since been integrated to improve efficiency. Train and bus 
operations were combined only to be separated and now bus 
operations and engineering are together (but separate from trains 
and ferries). Some experimentation was no doubt essential.
generated. The number of senior posts below Commission level
was increased on specialised branch and section lines and most of 
the new posts were filled from outside in a brusque and heavy- 
handed manner.^ ^  Managers with little or no public transport 
experience were given complementary and sometimes overlapping roles 
and at the same time Mr Shirley greatly increased delegations.
Mr McCusker and his Secretariat had co-ordinated affairs on a tight 
basis but the former arrangements were abandoned, often resulting 
in chaos. Several senior administrators resigned or retired early, 
especially because the "new order" was positively prejudiced 
against the traditional railwayman and also because its decision­
making style was haphazard and at times violently anti-historical 
in several respects.
These disorders had significant effects on overall performance 
At the policy level there was a lack of internal co-ordination and 
conflicting decisions often resulted. At the operations level, the 
complex manpower systems which were required to enable the train 
and bus systems to function efficiently were disrupted. The 
standard of service provided fell noticeably, not because of 
strikes or a long-term rundown of facilities, but as Freeman has 
said, the fundamental causes were incompetence, inefficiency and 
failures of communication.^^ There were also conflicts of policy 
and Nielsen finally resigned.
It is important to note, as was said at the beginning of this 
chapter, that one of the intentions of the 1972 reform was that a 
more modern management structure would be introduced. As the 
P.T.G. said in its Report under Section 15, Looking Ahead (1974):
. .. within the railway each branch was virtually a self- 
perpetuating identity. Thus there was no cross­
fertilisation of experience and in each there was a 
substantial tendency for a static approach to problems. 
The Departments tended to recruit at the lowest levels, 
and the staff had little exposure to outside management 
and techniques.(43)
40. Gf R.P. Gibbons, "The Public Transport Commission", in 
Painter, Gibbons and Brezzo, op. cit.; and Peter Freeman, "Why 
Sydney's Public Transport is Going Bust", The National Times, 
August 2-7, 1976, pp. 48-9.
41. See for example Morris interview (Appendix 2), pp. 3, 4-5.
42. Gf Freeman, op. cit., for more detail.
43. Public Transport Commission, Looking Ahead (November 1974), 
p. 2. The Report noted that the basic legislation had enshrined 
promotion by seniority and commented that "Governments in the past 
may have relaxed some of the constraints on the then Commissioners 
if they had understood the opportunities for improving the 
efficiency of the undertakings through better middle level 
management".
McCusker had in fact said in his comments on the Ebasco Report 
that a branch structure was essential. However, while Shirley set 
out his ideas in several publications as to the need for a ’highly 
geared, quick thinking, cost conscious and positive management” 
and justified reforms in some areas such as marketing and perhaps 
planning, he could not demonstrate that his style of management was 
more suitable than McCusker's in public transport operations.
In urban operations, the P.T.C. put emphasis on reducing 
labour costs and workforce, cutting back on some forms of 
maintenance and renewals expenditure, and raising fares. Falls in 
patronage were thereby accelerated apart from falls in levels of 
service. An attempt was made to replace archaic suburban train 
timetables in May 1975 but this failed disastrously because of 
internal failures of decision-making, not because reform was 
impossible. (The P.T.C. did not analyse its urban role in looking 
Ahead because the Sydney Area Transportation Study was still in 
progress.) The performance of the P.T.C. in the metropolitan bus 
and rail services was a major embarrassment to the Liberal 
Government.
In the rural areas, the Commission closed 361 stations in four
(4 5)years' and "heavy-handedly" tried to close uneconomic branch 
lines. Shirley was particularly enthusiastic about introducing a 
modern inter-capital container service and was the prime mover in 
the formation of Railways of Australia Container Express (RACE), 
using the (in many respects) unsuccessful British experience as a 
m o d e l . T h e  P.T.C. has been widely criticised for its container 
policies and has lost ground in the market place, mainly because it 
was and is severely disadvantaged in labour conditions and 
infrastructure costs vis-a-vis road hauliers.
One very important factor should have been taken into account ! 
when the P.T.C. was conceived. Even if the two former Departments 
had been efficient, their amalgamation would still have been all 
but beyond the ability of one management structure that was either 
oriented to the new or the old (strict hierarchical) ways. It has 
been found that the P.T.C. is simply too big for even its top 
executives to master the policy-making processes especially as they
44. See P.H. Shirley, "Management in Public Transport"
(Chartered Institute of Transport, W.A. Section, roneo, March 1973), 
and "Management in Transport" (Institute of Directors of Australia, 
roneo, April 1973), both in P.T.C. Library.
45. Freeman, op. cit., p. 48.
46. Joy, op, cit., pp. 135-137. Again the parallel in British 
and P.T.C. problems is astonishing.
are so fragmented. This has also affected political control. 
Co-ordination of services would not have required a complete 
administrative amalgamation hut it would seem that co-ordination 
definitely became a minor consideration^^ in an accountants' 
world.
All in all the Commission experiment was a short-term failure. 
Instead of reducing losses, it resulted in an operational loss in 
1972/73 (the first since 1855): compared with 1971/72 revenue from 
rents and passengers rose by 1.5 per cent (although patronage fell), 
earnings from goods and livestock fell by 7.8 per cent (tonnage 
fell), total earnings fell by 4.6 per cent, working expenses rose 
by 13.2 per cent, earnings per train mile fell by 3.7 per cent, 
and the profitability ratio (defined above) fell from 0.35 per cent 
to -5.33 per cent. Capital charges rose by only 3 per cent. The 
overall loss in 1972/73 was $80 million; the following year $126 
million; and in 1974/75 $167 million. For 1977/78 it is estimated 
to be about $400 million. There is no prospect of the loss falling 
off, although the level of urban subsidisation is not yet excessive 
by overseas standards. The operating loss in 1972/73 would have 
resulted even if the P.T.C. had not been set up but almost certain­
ly the rate of increase would have been contained by McCusker’s 
combination of accounting and operational skills.
There is no doubt that the Railway and Government Transport 
administrations had ossified by the time that the P.T.C. had taken 
over but it is also fairly obvious that there was no need for 
revolutionary managerial or philosophical changes. Ey Philip 
Shirley's resignation in December 1974 the base which constructive 
change could have started from had been destroyed and the P.T.C. 
had become an organisation that would need to be rebuilt before its 
external challenges could be met. This was essentially the 
diagnosis of Shirley’s successor, Mr A. Reiher, who has by all 
accounts been able to restore a certain degree of stability even if 
the P.T.C. does remain clumsy, closed and uncontrollable. Further 
structural reform v/ould have to be extremely carefully considered 
if it was not to worsen the P.T.C.'s problems.
The Granville disaster of January 1977 committed the newly 
elected V/ran Labor Government to a substantial programme of 
maintenance and improvement v/hich with carriage and bus replacement, 
container investment, new lines in the Eastern Suburbs and freight 
systems, and signalling investment, will give the P.T.C. a better 
operational base than Railways and Government Transport ever had.
47. Freeman, op. cit., p. 49.
Despite all the earlier promises, nothing had been done to appraise 
and rationalise rail, bus and ferry^8  ^ services until SATS and no 
action has been taken since then. In effect the public transport 
authorities (including the P.T.C.) abrogated their planning 
responsibilities and these have been taken up by the central land 
use and transport authorities such as URTAC. The P.T.C. has yet to 
prove that it can meet the expectations of its makers . ^
Several points stand out in the last thirty years of public 
transport administration in Sydney. Most importantly, while 
’’co-ordination1' was a frequent concern of Governments and others, 
almost no operational and even less policy co-ordination was 
achieved. The planning potential of buses was lost and in general 
rail planning was impracticable, partly because of its expense but 
perhaps also because there was no attempt before SATS to draw up 
the type of strategic plan which the Sinclair group sought. While 
various politicians in the 1960s and early 1970s lauded the 
structural spread of the existing rail system, the praise v/as 
basically Pharisaical because no real consideration was given to 
the positive use of rail versus buses and road investment or to the 
relatively minor works needed to complete the rail system. The 
only major structural suburban investment was the Eastern Suburbs 
Railway, the planning of which typified the lack of co-ordination 
and bias in postwar planning.
The willingness of several Governments to identify 
organisational specialisation with lack of co-ordination, and tneir 
reliance on superficial administrative co-ordination to achieve 
operational and planning co-ordination, indicated the lack of 
understanding of the nature of public transport and public 
administration alike. More will be said of this in the Conclusion. 
Decision-making and non-decision-making reflected the internalisa­
tion of organisational values to am extreme degree, as in the pre- 
1939 period. Even the consciousness of this did not produce 
effective solutions. Thus in this area co-ordinative influence has 
been negative and substantial.
48. Ferries were brought into the Commission’s domain in late 
1974 because of the withdrawal of the Port Jackson and Manly 
Steamship Co. Pty Ltd from the previous arrangement with the 
Sydney Harbour Transport Board. While ferries are an invaluable 
part of Sydney’s transport system, they are of minor significance 
compared with buses and trains and have not been treated here. In 
any case ferry policy has been very operational, the major policy 
decisions being very few and ad hoc and investment minimal in 
historical terms. See Sydney Area Transportation Study, Vol. 1 
Chapter IV, and Volume 3 Chapter V.
49. Several other public transport proposals, including an 
inner-city underground tram and high-speed rail link to 
Campbelltown, were discussed in CUMTAC/URTAC and v/ill be mentioned 
in Chapter Nine.
Chapter Nine
Co-ordinative Agencies
I was brought in as an honest broker at one 
stage, at the suggestion of the Minister by 
the way, to make both the D.M.R. and the P.T.C. 
aware of what each was doing to the other by 
their ad hoc decisions.
Interview with Mr K.J. Trott 
(Appendix Five).
Would you agree, Mr Minister, that policy 
co-ordination is necessary in transport above 
all else? In my thinking it is incredible that 
it hasn't been done before. There has been no 
policy co-ordination, of making sure that all 
Departments speak with one voice. I think there 
is only one person who can do that and in my 
experience in the Ministry, the Minister has had 
to be more closely involved in pulling the 
undertakings together at the highest policy level.
Mr K.J. Trott, in interview
with Mr Trott and the Hon. P.F. Cox,
M.L.A. (Appendix Five).
The broad co-ordinative needs of urban transport administra­
tion were established on both theoretical and empirical grounds 
in the Introduction, It was seen that co-ordination is not a 
simple concept because it involves considerations of formal 
political accountability versus practical administrative responsib­
ility, formal and informal influence and "power", obscure patterns 
of behaviour and so on. It was argued in the Introduction that 
in interdependent policy fields the nature of specialised organ­
isational behaviour would tend to break down co-ordinative ties, 
resulting in deficient policy outputs. Here co-ordination will be 
defined (as previously) in a manner which reflects the essentially 
unitary stream of accountability of Governments in a Westminster 
system. The records of the main co-ordinative institutions will 
be examined with special attention to their actual ability to 
enforce the two considerations of political accountability and 
functional interdependencies over the wishes of established 
specialised agencies.
Modes of Co-ordination
Co-ordination in such a political system as New South Wales*
essentially is the rationalisation of corporate behaviour in line
with centrally determined guidelines. Such co-ordination is
effected by three main modes, from above (superior political
authorities such as Cabinet and the courts), laterally (inter-
organisational adjustment), and from below by community(1 )pressure. ' "Central* can mean that an organisation conforms 
with an individual Minister*s wishes on a bilateral basis because 
the Minister and Cabinet, and also the judicial system (acting on 
legislation), and the Treasury and Public Service Board (with 
delegated authority), are central agencies.
For practical purposes the highest authority is Cabinet which 
is the primary co-ordinating institution. All major Government 
initiatives are referred to Cabinet and it is supposedly organised 
so that all Ministers and administrations affected by a decision 
can, among other things, raise appropriate issues for adjudication 
by their peers. A review function is performed by Parliament and 
where applicable by Caucus from the point of view of political 
acceptability. (In countries where parliamentary standing committees 
are more prevalent, they perform a more intensive scrutiny by such 
criteria as equity and efficiency.)
1 • Co-ordination by combined organisation, namely the Transport and Highways Commission and the Public Transport Commission, was 
dealt with in the preceding chapter.
Many decisions are taken by Ministers, especially decisions 
not or how to refer an issue to Cabinet. Similarly a larger 
range of issues in most if not all administrations is "decided" 
by the organisations in the filtering and influencing processes 
described by all analysts of bureaucracies. The respective roles 
of Ministers and bureaucrats are determined by a number of 
factors, including the quality of advisory services available to 
the Minister and the statutory and traditional rights of the 
organisations.
The central public service authorities (Treasury, Public 
Service Board and Auditor General) fall between the Premier and 
Cabinet, and the Ministers, on an important set of issues. 
Nominally such bodies are subject to superior political whim but 
in historical reality they are independent and individually 
powerful. It is particularly the case in their areas of speciality 
that such organisations affect the services provided to Ministers 
and the governmental system, and thus achieve a dominance, 
whereas there is a void outside the specialisations which 
imbalances the whole government network. Thus for example invest­
ment decisions are overly influenced by the narrow range of 
criteria which Treasury is concerned with, at the expense of other 
(often more important) values. Co-ordination is attempted by such 
authorities in a very limited sense.
Only a partial picture has been presented here; more detail 
is given in Chapter Six and the references cited there. The 
three main modes of co-ordination have various mechanisms, ranging 
from the highly formalised documentation of the courts and Cabinet 
through to the relative informality of the reticulistv ' networks . 
which operate in inter-corporate communication. 1 The three 
modes have not been equally developed in New South Wales in the 
past, although the transport administration is somewhat unique.
It has always received special attention on some issues from the 
legislature, and has received intense although uneven scrutiny 
from Treasury as seen already. It has been dominated by large 
statutory corporations and has generally not had the same
2. Reticulist essentially means manipulation of interpersonalnetworks and a professionalism and highly concentrated motivation 
are implied. See J.M. Power, "The Reticulist Function in 
Government: Manipulating Networks of Communication and Influence",
in Public Administration (Sydney), 32(1), March 1973; and the 
same author's "Organisational Technology and Public Planning", in 
Public Administration (Sydney), 30(1), March 1971.
3. J.M. Power has tended to overconcentrate on reticulists at the expense of other forms of informal co-ordination. In an 
established Public Service like that of N.S.W. reticulists are 
unquestionably important but not dominant. See below.
Ministerial resources applied to it as smaller, less complicated 
portfolios. Moreover while specialisation was the predominant 
rule of organisation, the potent functional interdependencies 
stimulated occasional attention in operational co-ordination. It 
has been seen that several experiments were attempted in 
transport administration and from the mid-1960s the outstanding 
interdepartmental committee in the State operated, later in its 
life being a model for other administrations. There have always 
been specialised lobby groups as well.
The main vehicles of co-ordination were in short: (i) the 
Minister(s) and his immediate support agency, the Ministry of 
Transport; (ii) lateral agencies such as the Transport and 
Highways Commission and the Public Transport Commission, the 
Traffic Authority and perhaps most importantly the main IDC,
CUMTAC then renamed URTAC; (iii) ancillary authorities such as 
Treasury and the land use agencies (discussed in Chapter Six); 
and (iv) popular political pressure. Item (iv) has been discuss­
ed in the preceding chapters and most attention here will be given 
to items (i) and (ii). The following discussion is highly 
empirical and because it covers almost untouched ground a fair 
degree of detail is required in some areas.
Ministerial Roles
The Traffic Advisory Committee foreshadowed substantial 
improvements in State transport administration when it recommended 
the creation of a Ministerial portfolio of Transport in 1928.^^ 
While the change was not as radical as the T.A.C. had originally 
hoped for, the appointment of the Minister for Transport in 1932 
helped to consolidate the organisational reforms of Lang and 
Bruxner as least as far as unified political accountability for 
land transport was concerned. Generally this made little 
difference to organisational independence, the co-ordination of 
services and the actual accountability (rather than delegation to 
statutory authorities) for policy and administration. It is not 
possible to trace the history of the portfolio in detail because 
of a lack of primary and secondary sources but some outline can 
be given, based largely on oral sources.
The pre-1945 period was dominated by Lt.-Col. (later Sir) 
Michael Bruxner who replaced the Labor Minister, McGirr, in May 
1932 and who resigned in May 1941. Previously Railways had come 
under the Minister for Public Works and the Main Roads Board under 
Local Government, except that the Board was part of Labour and 
Industry for a year from late 1926 and had been directly
4. See Chapter Pour above.
responsible to Premier Lang from September 1931 to March 1932. 
Transport was thereafter allocated to senior Ministers (Premier 
Cahill for a week in 1953) although it was not a popular 
portfolio because of the representational workload, union pressures 
and financial problems. As Bruxner's biographer, Professor 
Aitkin, has written, "Fifty years ago there was little competition 
for the post of Minister for Transport, and the attractiveness of(5)the post for the aspiring politician has declined each year". y 
That is not to say that dedicated Ministers have not been found 
but it is noteworthy that no Minister for Transport has gone to 
Premier or Leader of the Opposition in marked contrast for 
example to Ministers for Local Government. While there have been 
long-serving Ministers for Transport (Michael Bruxner, Maurice 
0*Sullivan for over nine years from 1941, and Milton Morris for 
almost ten years from 19 6 5), the average term has otherwise been 
very short. (Excluding Bruxner, 0*Sullivan and Morris it is 
slightly more than 14 years, and including those three almost 34 
years. Both averages exclude the present Minister, the Hon. P.F. 
Cox, M.L.A.)
When the portfolio was created in 1932 a Ministerial Office 
was also established (without statutory status under the Ministry 
of Transport and similar Acts) to assist the Minister. The 
Office was known as the Ministry of Transport until 1975 when it 
became the Ministry of Transport and Highways (MOTH). Its 
permanent head until August 1949 was Mr Leo Grose, replaced then 
as Secretary by Mr Eric Holt. On 1st January, I960, the position 
was upgraded to Under Secretary status. Mr Ken Trott replaced 
Mr Holt in June 1970. Obviously there has been a higher degree 
of continuity in the Ministers* closest advisers than in 
Ministers.^
From an early stage to recently a policy of noninterference 
with corporate policy was adopted by both Ministers and the 
Ministry. It is clear that Ministers were involved with only a 
limited range of transport issues, as political auditor rather 
than active participant and even then on a predominantly ad hoc 
basis. The main areas of interest were: labour relations, 
operational results, fares and freight rates, safety standards, 
and new rail lines and the like. Ministers were not concerned 
with consistent long-term or even short-term planning, with co­
ordination, or with the appraisal of transport services with a 
view to adequacy, expense, equity or relevance (and so on).
5. D. Aitkin, "The Decline of N.S.W. railways: a lesson in 
expediency", National Times. 31 January, 1977.
A general outline will be found in the interview,, of 29th November, 1976, with Mr Trotx (Appendix 5), pp. 1-3*
Information was limited. The Ministry of Transport was a "letter 
box” only, handling correspondence, deputations and other 
secretarial services without providing independent policy
(7)resources or developing and using informational facilities.
From a modern viewpoint this is perhaps a devastating judge­
ment, and it would no doubt have also seemed thus to the Traffic 
Advisory Committee, but it must be realised that that was the 
contemporary tradition of both the Public Service and the majority 
of politicians. Transport had been a highly politicised subject 
so long as it dominated the State*s developmental effort but it 
waned once the statutory authorities had progressed to a point 
where they had the principal responsibility for operations and 
administration, subject to key legislative controls over loan 
expenditure and financial policy. (The exception was the main 
roads authority because the M.R.B. (then D.M.R.) was set up in a 
peculiar climate of country and local government dominance, as 
seen in earlier chapters. The consequence was minimal rather than 
close control.) The Ministers certainly worked under great 
constraints but they had chosen their own role. The same 
traditions applied in other policy areas where statutory 
authorities dominated administration except that generally there
Ministerial resources even to the "non-
picture that has been presented here corresponds with Aitkin's
portrayal of Bruxner's conception of the Ministry as a small
subsidiary body only. It seems that while Bruxner might have been
able to achieve his own standards to a limited extent, in that he
saw the Minister as policy-maker and the statutory Commissioners( q )as administrators only,w  7 later Ministers did not.
A most significant episode in the history of the portfolio 
and Ministry began in 1975 with the restoration of the Department 
of Main Roads to the Transport family. This had a number of 
aspects. As already seen in Chapter Seven there had been no 
substantial reason for the original split while the effects on 
policy output were substantial indeed. The first of the Liberal 
Ministers for Transport, Mr Milton Morris, sought the restitution 
strenuously, at least at a later stage when the SATS/freeway
7. See interviews with Mr Trott of 29th November and 21st
December, 1976 (Appendices 5 and 6) for a comprehensive overview 
of the Ministry's roles.
8. See the important survey article by Roger Wettenhall, "Modes 
of Ministerialisation Part 1: Towards a Typology —  the 
Australian Experience", Public Administration (Britain), Spring 
1976. A similar criticism is one of the main themes of the Review 
of New South Wales Government Administration's Interim Report, 
cited previously.
which operated in transport. The
9. Aitkin, The Colonel, op. cit.. pp. 204 f.
controversy was raging, both in public^10  ^ and within his party.
It was not approved because Premier Askin did not want the change. 
Askin's successor, Tom Lewis, was more committed to efficient 
government and as a part of his Machinery of Government Review, 
in January 1975 he replaced Mr Morris with Mr Wal Fife and gave 
the latter both the D.M.R. and road construction in the Western 
Region of the State. Thus for the first time the Minister for 
Transport (and now Highways) had comprehensive "control" of 
transport in N.S.W. (but still excluding maritime matters).
That control was still very much constrained as Mr Fife 
discovered. The Ministry had never performed an analytical or 
review role in assistance to the Minister but as a result of 
Mr Fife's interest and Mr Trott's conception of his own role, and 
of Mr Trott's presentations to the Machinery of Government Review, 
in 1975 a Development Co-ordination Division was organised within 
the Ministry. The permanent head of the Ministry had always been a 
junior associate of the Commissioners in the administration and 
the only time that the Ministry had been built up at all (by the 
Hon. C.E. Martin in 1953), and that to a minor extent within the 
traditional organisational role, Premier Cahill had himself 
taken the portfolio to "bring it back into line"• He was argued 
out of that. As well when Mr Holt retired in 1970 there was 
apparently a move to downgrade the Under Secretary to Secretary(1 1)status but this was countered by Mr Morris and others. *
The new Development Co-ordination Division was the first step
in a break from the conceptual constraints. It was essentially an
internal regrouping but with an imported and highly-qualified
engineer at its head.^^ More recently (and well before Professor
Wilenski's recommendations to the same effect), a small Policy
Analysis Section was also set-up. This Section is apparently seen
as an aid in raising the quality of "normal" advice while adding
a critical new element of long-term appraisal. The present
Minister, the Hon. P.F. Cox, M.L.A., has taken the same (13)direction^ 7 as his Liberal predecessors in seeing the Ministry
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10. Mr Morris received a great deal of coverage for his campaign, while Sir Charles Cutler was overseas, in S.M.H., April 30, 1973; 
Daily Mirror. May 2, 1973; S.M.H., May 1, 1973, etcetera. The editorial in the last-named issue said in referring to the D.M.R.*s independent stance on freeways that "A takeover by Mr Morris could 
be one way to break down the bureaucratic isolation of the department that is causing this competition". See also interview 
with Mr Morris (Appendix 2), throughout.
11. See Mr Morris in N.S.W. Parliamentary Debates. 45th Parliament, 
2nd Session, 20th October 1976, p. 2080.
12. Again see interviews with Mr K.J. Trott (Appendices 5 and 6).
I am grateful to Mr Trott and Mr G.F. Messiter for other assistance in this area.
13* See interview with Mr Cox and Mr Trott of 19th November 1976 
( annpnHi y A^. n . 1 and elsewhere.
as an important central agency at his disposal, with a functional
importance at the centre of the whole, very complex, transport
system. It is understood that current developments (including
Wilenski's recommendations) are moving the Ministry in the
direction of positive appraisal and co-ordination of all types.
As the Deputy Chief Commissioner of the P.T.C. has said, ’’the
co-ordination of transport in the broader sense is a function very
specifically for the Ministry of Transport...”^ ^ ^ . This is
especially true when superior direction is required as in the case(15)of the allocation of costs of major projects. '
A minor point which should be mentioned is that from 1965 to 
1969 the Government leader in the Legislative Council, the Hon.
A.D. Bridges, was Advisory Minister for Transport, apparently 
because of his financial experience rather than because he was 
expected to share the Minister’s workload. This unique arrangement 
lapsed with Mr Bridge's death.
Co-operative Co-ordination: the IDC
The Ministry of Transport and Highways has resources and a 
role which place it in an intermediate high-level co-ordinative 
position. It is an agent of and adviser to the Minister but is 
also a separate organisation with its own specialisation in a 
system of three large statutory authorities and one major 
statutory committee (the Traffic Authority). These authorities 
intermingle at the second major level of co-ordination, the lateral 
or co-operative mode. In very approximate terms this type of co­
ordination could be called "partisan mutual adjustment".^ ^
Superior co-ordination occurs when one actor is in a position 
to issue enforceable instructions to other actors; in this case 
it is not the role of the inferior actors to audit each other.
In co-operative co-ordination a group of actors observe each 
other's actions and consider them in relation to their own 
intentions, because the actions are interdependent or because a 
measure of delegated responsibility is part of their tradition.
A prerequisite is that the actors must be willing and able to 
reach a common judgement and adjust their respective actions
14. Quoted in W.B. Paterson, "The Coordination of Policymaking in 
N.S.W. Public Transport in the 1970s" (unpublished dissertation, 
University of New England, n.d. but about 1977), p. 42.
15. See interviews with Mr K.J. Trott of 29th November, 1976 
(Appendix 5), p. 4, and 21st December, 1976 (Appendix 6), p. 4.
16. See Hawker, op. cit.. p. 353, n. 36; and Prance and Hughes in Parker and Troy, op. cit.. p. 53.
17. Lindblom's famous term, op. cit., pp. 25 ff.
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accordingly, For the present purposes it will suffice to say that 
there are seven other requisites for effective co-ordination (or 
a total of eight major areas of possible problems):
(i) a forum for adequate communication;
(ii) close relationship between planning discussions and 
operational responsibility and knowledge;
(iii) some control over resources and knowledge thereof;
(iv) authority to adjudicate;
(v) adequate coverage of relevant interdependencies;
(vi) minimal role ambiguity; and
(vii) adequate control of implementation and role definition, 
and support, from superior levels.
In New South Wales transport while the superior co-ordinative
role has always been underdeveloped, the co-operative mode had
(until the mid-1960s) been almost totally neglected in practice. ;
The individual Commissioners had distinct (and in some respects
poorly-designed)responsibilities which they internalised, without
outside consultation let alone consideration. In 1964 the Labour
Government created a Traffic Advisory Committee to deal basically
with the interfaces between councils and specialised authorities
in traffic. Responsibility in this narrow area had been very
dispersed and the formation of that advisory committee apparently(19)had little effect. ' More importantly in 1965 a passenger 
transport advisory committee was set up which after a long period 
of gestation proved to be a solid basis for co-operative co­
ordination in transport. The Traffic Authority will be briefly 
discussed after CUMTAC and URTAC.
The County of Cumberland Passenger Transport Advisory
Committee was set up on 11th March 1965, partially on the advice
of the Commissioner for Railways, Mr Neal McCusker.^ I n  a
joint press release of that date Premier Renshaw and Deputy
Premier Hills (not the Minister for Transport, Mr. J. McMahon)
referred rather incidentally to the creation of a permanent
consultative and advisory body to deal with "such matters as future
development, land use, staggering of hours and co-ordination of(21)existing and future services”. 1 Four of the five pages of the
18. See quote from interview with Mr McCusker (Appendix 3, p. 1) 
and related discussion in Chapter Eight (n. 14).
19. The membership and modus operandi of the Traffic Advisory Committee (the name was probably coincidental with that of the 
1928 Committee) and CUMTAC were very similar. The later T.A.C. 
will not be analysed because of these factors and its lessor role 
and reputation.
20. Interview with Mr McCusker (Appendix 2), p. 1. Note the haste with which the decision was made.
2 1 . press release of 11th March, 1965. This paragraph and the 
next one are drawn from that source.
announcement were taken up with details of a six-year “multi- 
million-pound programme” of transport improvement which had been 
drawn up by a special Cabinet sub-committee consisting of Mr Hills, 
Mr McMahon, the Minister Without Portfolio, the Commissioners for 
Railways and Main Roads, the Chairman of the S.P.A., and 
representatives of Treasury and other departments. The plan, 
which was said to be based on suitable origin-destination studies, 
"proposed the co-ordination of land development in the Metropolitan 
and other areas with all forms of transport whether private or 
public". This was not in fact achieved in the nominated programme 
which was dominated by railways (no costs given for the main items) 
as follows:
(i) electrification to Campbelltown;
(ii) construction of the Eastern Suburbs Railway (already 
promised by the Liberal Opposition);
(iii) an East Hills to Liverpool rail link (virtually East 
Hills - Glenfield as presently proposed);
(iv) improved carriages and rollingstock and ancilliary 
improvements (e.g. the replacement of the Como railway bridge within about three years); and
(v) "Augmented and new feeder bus services to cover the 
areas which could eventually be serviced by a Warringah Railway". 
(Provision could be made for this where necessary in the Warringah Expressway.) Bus transfer stations would be provided at select stations on the North Shore line.
These works were coupled with expressways costing $64 million 
over six years, namely the North Western to Rozelle and the 
Warringah to Cammeray; underpasses at Taylor Square; sections of 
the Western Expressway to by-pass Parramatta and Penrith and a new 
bridge over the Nepean; and an extension of the Southern 
Expressway from the Taren Point Bridge. (See Chapter Seven for 
further details of such works.) The appearance of inter-modal 
co-ordination was purely superficial.
1965 was an election year and the announcement of the 
programme was essentially an election ploy. Apart from the 
Eastern Suburbs Railway, which the incoming Askin Government 
would unquestionably have proceeded with anyway because of the 
extent of its commitment, the only lasting consequence was CUMTAC. 
This initially consisted of the Commissioner of Railways as 
Chairman (chosen because he was the most senior public servant), 
the Commissioners for Government Transport, Motor Transport and 
Main Roads, the Chairman of the S.P.A., and the Under Secretary 
of the Treasury. The first meeting was held on the 29th April, 
with subsequent meetings at monthly intervals. Representation 
was later extended at permanent head level to Police, the 
Ministry of Transport (September 1971), Maritime Services Board
(early 1973), and P.T.C. and P.E.C. when set up. In early 1973 
also the Minister for Transport asked the Premier to approve a new 
name for the Committee, the Urban Transport Advisory Committee, 
in keeping with the wider role it had logically had to take with 
regard to SATS.^^ New terms of reference were also codified:
1. To assist in the co-ordination of urban transport planning 
with land use planning in N.S.W. and provision of other services 
and utilities;
2. To identify and advise on ways and means of ensuring 
optimum and efficient use of existing and future transport modes, systems and corridors; and
3. To undertake any tasks allotted to it by the Government from time to time.
CUMTAC was established purely as an advisory group with no
fixed terms of reference, no statutory powers or definite task.
The danger with such a committee is that the individual members
regard it more as a forum for incidental discussion and for
announcing decisions and policies, rather than as a place for
mutual influence and active co-ordination. In fact available
evidence suggests that the former was definitely the case. Under
Mr McCusker*s leadership the discussion was heavily biased to
specific issues of routine or operations, with a narrow time and
policy orientation, while no attempt was made to raise issues that
would challenge the conventions of the individual members.
Mr McCusker had a policy of not raising questions that would not
(23)automatically obtain a consensusv "  and thus the Main Roads 
Development Plan as one example was never debated in Mr McCusker*s 
time, even in the course of setting up and conducting SATS. (It 
is highly unlikely that an advisory committee structure would be 
capable of resolving such potent issues with long-term wisdom 
anyway. They relate to superior co-ordinating modes, with 
advice.^4) )
That is not to say that CUMTAC had no achievements for it was 
at least able to establish a channel of communication which was of 
use especially later but also to the Chairman of the S.P.A. who 
frequently sought to have special matters investigated, such as a 
high-speed rail service to Campbelltown and one of his officer’s 
penchant for trams (later the inner-city tram system proposed by 
Mr Morris). present author was able to investigate in
22. See interview with Mr K.J. Trott of 21st December, 1976 
(Appendix 6), p. 5.
23. See interview with Mr McCusker (Appendix 3), pp. 4, 9.
24. See ibid., p. 4; interview with the Hon. M. Morris 
(Appendix 2), p. 2.
25. See Chapter Eight. The tram proposal stemmed from a 
campaign by tram enthusiast Mr Robert Caldwell. See J.R. Caldwell, 
"Transport in the Inner City Area of Sydney", A.P.1.J., 6(3),
July 1968, pp. 61 ff.
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depth one of the main issues which CUMTAC attempted to resolve, 
with the aid of a set of CUMTAC Minutes made available by the 
P.T.C. This was the question of improved land access to Kingsford 
Smith Airport which was an exceptionally difficult topic because 
of uncertainty about the Airport*s future role, the responsibility 
of the Commonwealth, and a very heavy regional traffic load (not 
related to the Airport) in conjunction with an inadequate regional 
road system which the best information then said was beyond 
significant structural solutions. Basically CUMTAC first wanted 
the construction of the old Southern Suburbs Railway (see Chapter 
Eight), then the extension of the Eastern Suburbs Railway. SATS 
for some reason finally recommended the former, indicating CUMTAC/ 
URTAC's lack of control over the SATS Report.
A number of significant points emerged from the case study 
(which finished at 1972), along the following lines:
(i) CUMTAC was not effective in producing a regional 
transport plan that had sufficient support from its members to be 
practicable, considering the unanimous agreement concerning the 
issue’s general urgency;
(ii) the evidence examined supports the view that the 
CUMTAC representatives respected each other*s sphere of 
responsibility. However CUMTAC was able to agree on various rail 
plans, as circumstances required, and the two road transport 
organisations* representatives nominally agreed, at least until the later stages, on the need for a rail loop in the region.
There was in fact surprisingly little critical discussion of the 
railway versus alternatives;
(iii) the difficulties in reserving a transport corridor for the region were significant from the planning viewpoint, especially as SATS regarded such reservation as essential (SATS 
Vol• VII. 7-8);
(iv) CUMTAC's rail plans changed frequently, in this case 
indicating strong outside political influence that militated 
against efficiency;
(v) CUMTAC's attempts to design both a railway and road 
network for the Airport were held up by the Commonwealth D.C.A., 
but to some extent this was excusable. However the Australian 
Department should have been able to give CUMTAC greater support 
which would have made a significant difference to the eventual 
outcome; and
(vi) the interaction of the Sydney transport authorities on 
CUMTAC produced an internal awareness of the importance of 
transport support systems in the planning of a second airport, and 
this aspect was recognised by the Australian airport authority and committees largely because of CUMTAC*s representations.
The Botany Port/Airport issue has been extremely complex and
the above conclusions relate solely to CUMTAC. In the end a road
(27)solution has been adopted by URTAC and the Governments'1 ' and it
26. Cf R.P. Gibbons, ’Mascot Airport and Regional Transport 
Planning”, in Painter,.Gibbons and Brezzo, op, cit., chapter 8.
27. See URTAC, Land Transport: Transport Administration
is somewhat unlikely that a rail link will be considered suitable 
for aviation passengers either at existing or new airport sites.
The Simblist enquiry on the Port development showed the weaknesses 
an inexpert approach but also identified major weaknesses in 
planning, the first of which was the lack of public knowledge and 
participation. Significant inter-corporate deficiencies were 
noted which it was thought could only be remedied by specialised 
Ministerial responsibility/28  ^ The Commonwealth Department of 
Transport showed its ignorance of the N.S.W. transport 
administration in a statement to the Simblist enquiry which was 
hotly contested by URTAC.^29)
On McCusker's retirement in 1972 the Chief Commissioner of the 
P.T.C., Mr Phillip Shirley, became Chairman but he relinquished 
this post in March 1975 to Mr K.J. Trott, the Under Secretary of 
the Ministry of Transport and Highways. This was mainly in 
recognition of the suitability of MOTH's position in the 
administration for the role and partly because of Mr Trott's 
personal contributions of the past. In any case from that point 
Mr Trott consciously followed a philosophy of confining URTAC's 
deliberations to strategic policy affairs rather than detailed 
co-ordination "on the ground",(^0) a complementary role to his 
other duties in MOTH. The distinction between superior and co­
operative co-ordination was thus clearly distinguished. Moreover 
a complete turnover of membership at about that time and the over­
all mood in State administration induced URTAC to define its own 
role more clearly than had been done in the past and in August 
1975 revised terms of reference were adopted by URTAC and confirmed 
by the Minister for Transport and Highways. These were to:
(a) Identify and advise the Minister on ways and means, within the urban areas of Sydney, Newcastle and Wollongong, of 
ensuring optimum and efficient use of existing and future 
transport modes, systems and corridors, taking into account 
public and private transport, and social and environmental considerations.
(b) Review regularly the broad objectives of the Government's transport policy including advice on the order of importance of the various measures planned to implement that policy.
Presentation to Botany Bay Sub-Region Communitv Advisory Committee (Sydney:UftTAC, June 1977). -------- *----------
28. Report of the Botany Bay Port and Environment Inquiry (Sydney: 
Inquiry edition, November 1977), Section 14, pp. 136 ff. The Government Printer also issued an edition.
29. Sydney Morning Herald. 1st November 1976. Cf URTAC Report. 
ojD_i_ci_t., Section H; also URTAC submission of 16th November 1976 
xothe Simblist Inquiry (available from Ministry of Transport and Highways).
30. Interview with Mr K.J. Trott of 29th November, 1976 (Appendix 
5;, p. 5. "On the ground" co-ordination has rightly been identifiedy Professor Wilenski as an important weakness, see Conclusion.
(c) Advise the Minister, when requested, on possible action 
which might be taken in the short term to alleviate specific 
problems in transportation.
(d) Assist in the co-ordination of urban transportation 
and regional land-use planning.
(e) Advise the Minister on priorities for major expenditure 
on transportation.
(f) Undertake any task allotted to it by the Government 
from time to time.
URTAG thus moved very marginally into the critical area of 
resource allocation and planned co-ordination. Item (b) is a 
fairly usual advisory role but on a grander scale.
Since 1975 URTAC has proved able to fulfil the essentials of
the co-operative mode to a reasonable degree. Some of the co-
ordinative issues that have arisen, such as the dispute over the
(31)distribution of the cost of the Bondi Junction by-pass road, 
were beyond its scope and had to be resolved at a higher level. 
However the production of the 1976 URTAG Report was a major step 
in the subjugation of corporate goals in strategic urban planning 
through the realistic recognition of system and long-term require­
ments. While that Report was a co-operative venture the dilemma 
of preserving mutual confidence and goodwill and also properly 
fulfilling the co-ordinating role has not been, nor probably ever 
will be, eliminated and would seem to remain as a major constraint 
on URTAC*s effectiveness. However the 1976 Report stated that 
planning for the long-term must really be well-directed short­
term planning in series, and if this approach is maintained through 
regular reappraisals of goals and programmes then URTAC has a 
good chance of retaining Government confidence and the new-found 
r e a l i s m . C o m m e n t s  on URTAC*s possible future role are 
presented in the Conclusion. It might be noted that the progress 
made by URTAC in a period of fairly critical need was helped by 
the long period of gestation under McCusker but a decade of rather 
fruitless discussion is hopefully not a prerequisite for 
effective IDCs.
A degree of disability regarding URTAC results from its lack 
of statutory standing. URTAC would for instance be a quite 
different (and no doubt more critical) forum if it had some 
statutory role in the allocation of transport improvement funds, 
a full-time chairman and a convention of majority rather than
31. Ibid., p. 4.
32. It is understood that URTAC is preparing a Second Report for release in mid-1978 and that this will confirm the approach taken in 1976. Certainly frequent, pragmatic reports would help URTAC 
to focus on real issues rather than long-term meaningless 
optimism.
consensus rule. It is at the other extreme at present, having no 
statutory existence, no powers of compulsory submission of policy 
proposals, no resource control and a reliance on consensus (and 
on favourable personal and external circumstances). It remains 
the most important IDG in transport but it is not perfect. Here 
one extremely important example of a statutory interdepartmental 
committee will be briefly analysed, namely the Traffic Authority 
of N.S.W.
It was shown earlier that an awareness of the complexity and 
co-ordinative requirements of traffic administration led a 
committee of the Machinery of Government Review (chaired by 
Mr Trott) to recommend the establishment of a Traffic Authority 
which would reduce the dangers of co-ordinative breakdown. The 
Authority was set up in mid-1976 as an IDC with part-time 
chairman (the Commissioner for Motor Transport) and membership, 
with the assistance of the Traffic Facilities Fund (see Chapter 
Six). The Minister for Transport and Highways has exemplary 
statutory controls over revenue and expenditure but without 
impairing the accountability of the Authority for the submission 
and performance of programmes. The members of the Authority are 
the Commissioners for Motor Transport, Main Roads, Planning and 
Environment, and Police, with representatives of the Local 
Government and Shires Associations and the Sydney City Council.
The P.T.C. and the Transport Workers Union are represented on an 
unofficial basis but their membership is to be regularised.
There is a full-time Director and secretariat (all provided by 
the D.M.T.) and four assisting committees (a Technical Sub­
committee and Principal Technical, Development Technical and 
Finance Committees)• All construction and most planning resources 
are located in the Department of Main Roads which is one of the 
disadvantages of the Authority.
The conception of the T.A. is not revolutionary but the 
financial arrangements virtually are, at least in N.S.W. Its 
statutory powers over road closures and traffic systems and the 
like give the Authority ample reinforcement without compromising 
its ability to delegate suitable responsibilities to councils.
No doubt the committee core has disadvantages compared with say a 
corporation aggregate with some full-time membership but nonethe­
less the Authority is a very interesting mixture of superior and 
lateral co-ordinative modes, which might have relevance to other 
areas of administration.
33. The Hon. P.F. Cox, in debate on Appropriation Bill, N.S.W. 
Parliamentary Debates. 45th Pari., 2nd Sess., 20 October 1976,
p. 2078.
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The advantage of the T.A. over URTAG is not that it is able 
to take advantage of different committee structures. The stakes 
of statutory decision-making are much higher than are those of 
the advisory type. Because the committee takes responsibility 
from the statutory authorities and departments, it opens up the 
decision area and makes the different interests face each other 
on a peer basis. For example the major loser when the T.A. was 
set up, the Police Traffic Branch, would have been encouraged by 
the split between policy-making, implementation (D.M.R.) and 
enforcement (Police) to take a more open attitude than if it had 
retained the exclusive role in its area of domination. (That same 
split introduced dangers of loss of co-ordination which in this 
case were not countered by the T.A.'s makers through countervailing 
statutory power or influence or a consolidation in Ministerial 
power. This is not inevitable however and would presumably not 
matter if the consequence of errant action is important to the 
Government.) Other parties would have also changed their roles. 
The effects of the changes cannot be evaluated yet but most 
indications are for more open, mutually-validated policy-making. 
Representation on the Authority is heavily biased towards operat­
ional bureaucracies and this might not be appropriate in a time of 
rapid societal change.
Other lateral co-ordinating mechanisms are in force in the 
transport administration, particularly special purpose ad hoc 
committees such as those operating on Botany Bay Port, the Major 
Airport Needs of Sydney (MANS) Study and coal transport. These 
are undoubtedly important, especially as a sign of changed 
administrative processes in the 1970s. However they will not be 
examined here because of their limited application and historical . 
significance, and lack of information.
The final major co-operative mode is inter-personal communica­
tion. The Under Secretary of the Ministry of Transport and 
Highways fits into Power's class of reticulists very well: he has 
a network of contacts built up from previous work posts, 
committee activities, inter-governmental relations and so on, and 
in fact is able to use select committees (notably URTAC) as a 
forum for close personal negotiation.^^) These contacts can be 
critical in assessing the need or direction for change, for 
developing information resources, and for persuasion. Officers 
at similar levels in other organisations tend to follow a similar 
pattern although it should be noted that reticulist resources are 
usually highly concentrated in most organisations. The Ministry
34. See interview with Mr K.J. Trott of 29th November, 1976 
(Appendix 5), p. 3.
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is in an exceptionally strategic location compared with operating 
authorities and reticulist activities are commensurately more 
important. Even then there are only two reticulists in the 
Ministry in the strict sense of the term (excluding the Minister's 
personal staff).
Co-ordination from Below
Client and pressure group activities can be very important in(35)influencing decision-making. ' Reference was made in earlier 
chapters to the road and rail lobbies, local councils, resident 
action groups and other interests which are affected by 
administrative action and which act as policy reviewers and co­
ordinators. The most obvious co-ordinative influences arise when 
lobbies are in conflict and argue the respective merits of policy 
outputs or when the lobby is based on a particular area and seeks 
to maximise the effectiveness of operations within that area.
Many councils fall into the latter category with regard to bus/ 
train operations, expenditure on roads versus public transport, 
and traffic management measures which affect the use of roads and 
local shops and the like. By far the most committed group is the 
National Roads and Motorists' Association which sees itself in 
large part as the D.M.R.'s publicity agent,w  ' although it has 
been less influential than essentially divisive forces such as 
land developers and motor manufacturers. (Special purpose 
advisory bodies of very limited relevance have been established 
such as the Taxi Advisory Council.)
Conclusion
The most important co-ordinating force in the transport 
administration is the Minister for Transport and Highways and his 
auxiliary, the Ministry. Historically the roles of both the 
individual and the organisation have been very limited, mainly 
because of a prevailing convention of delegated administration by 
expert statutory authorities. The Minister had always been 
important in a limited contingency sense in that he had the final 
option of legislative action and direct control (but not on all 
issues as has been seen). However the Minister did not have 
sufficient analytical resources to cover the full range of policy 
and programmes, and to some extent this is apparently still the
35. A good deal of attention is given to this subject in most of 
the papers in M.R. Palmer (ed), Policy in Transport in New Zealand 
(Wellington: N.Z. Institute of Public Administration, 1973).
36. Mr E. Huxtable (Public Affairs Executive) in interview with 
Mr E. Huxtable and Mr R. Cox, N.R.M.A., 17th August, 1976.
case although substantial remedial steps have been taken. Moreover 
divided Ministerial responsibility for the twenty or so years 
before 1975 prevented the achievement of a co-ordinated transport 
policy even in a limited sense, until the superficially adverse 
conditions of the first half of the 1970s forced the integration 
of the administration and a consciousness of urban reality.
If a sympathetic Minister is necessary for the effective
( • 3 7)functioning of the Ministry,' ' the reverse is also true. The 
lack of adequate advisory services has been a major cause of the 
inability of Ministers to effect adequate policies, and worse, of 
their not realising the extent of problems. There are strong 
Ministers and weak Ministers as Mr McCusker has said^8  ^ but in 
both cases the Ministry has been a base from which good or bad 
policy has been produced. It had been constrained by anachronistic 
traditions and conservative management again until the 1970s, but 
since 1975 MOTH has started to emerge as an effective advisory 
and support unit. It is realised internally that it has to move 
further in a modem direction before it will be able to meet all 
its tasks and as will be seen in the next chapter it is essential 
that it does so develop.
The co-operative or lateral mechanisms of co-ordination 
developed earlier than the presently defined roles of Minister and 
Ministry but CUMTAC was totally ineffective in resolving the 
fundamental issues of urban transport policy and in providing the 
Government with proper advice. Once more change has been substan­
tial since the mid-1970s when the chairmanship of URTAG passed 
into the hands of an organisation which was professionally 
concerned with co-ordination rather than railways. The nature of 
URTAC and the Traffic Authority limits the reliance that can be 
placed on their ability to coax out and resolve (or advise on) 
the real problems of the metropolis. However they have a valid 
role, especially the Traffic Authority which has a statutory 
constitution which could be the model for similar committees. The 
main element missing there is the power of referral of an internal 
dispute to superior levels where the dispute detracts from the 
Authority*s overall functioning.
Finally, it can be seriously doubted if the co-ordinative 
advances of the 1970s would have been achieved in full measure, 
if at all, if community pressure had not been as strong or
37. Interview with Mr K.J. Trott of 29th November, 1976 (Appendix 5), p. 4. Also comments of Mr Trott and the Hon. P.F. Cox, M.L.A., at p. 7.
38. Interview with Mr N. McCusker (Appendix 3), p. 6.
(in retrospect) as positive. Apparently bodies such as the 
Interim Commuter Council have been disappointing to their early 
proponents because of their inability to consider issues on a 
comprehensive basis, among other things. Yet there is a very 
strong case for developing appropriate client consultation 
mechanisms because of the special input that can be added, the 
greater ease of identifying the full effects of policy 
alternatives, and the enhanced chances of success of an eventual 
decision. Of course mechanisms capable of achieving these benefits 
have been absent for most of this century.
Conclusion
Directions for Reform
A key problem is that of devising 
systems that will harness the motivations 
of the various actors in the decision­
making processes towards achieving 
solutions that will best satisfy the 
multiple interests... and will 
discourage those motivations that 
militate against this objective.
Introduction to The Challenge of 
the Cities (A.I.U.S., 1976/.
This thesis started with a statement of the complexity of 
decision-making in transport and the need for careful, explicit 
attention to co-ordination. The outstanding theme of the 
subsequent analyses is that while that need was occasionally 
recognised, very little effort was made to achieve effective co­
ordination because specialisation was entrenched in the organisa­
tion of the governmental system. There was insufficient concern 
for overall system efficiency to enable a meaningful challenge to 
the vested interests of statutory authorities and even public 
service authorities. The need for a reconciliation of central and 
specialist (or managerial) requirements was and still is indisput­
able. An attempt will now be made to extract the principal 
lessons from twentieth century experience and make reasonable 
suggestions for the improvement of the N.S.W. transport 
administration.
The primary danger in passing special legislation giving a 
specific function to a statutory authority is that the authority 
interprets that function in isolation from wider considerations 
and over time adapts the whole organisation to a narrow set of 
values. Thus a bureaucracy becomes committed to a status quo and 
loses functional efficiency and flexibility over time as external 
circumstances change; while subsequent Governments find that they 
do not get adequate advice on alternatives to the internal 
conventional wisdom and that complex inter-corporate problems 
cannot be solved without extraordinary trouble (if at all). Thus 
the accountability of the Government and the Minister is 
compromised, the performance of the organisation becomes 
inadequate, and the administration as a whole and also the urban 
society suffer. Even when the symptoms become unacceptable to 
the Government it is constrained by statutory financial and 
corporate provisions and their wider ties, and the problem is so 
fundamental and in a sense abstract that effective prescription 
is not easy to achieve. As a further result either no action is 
taken or a mistake is made.
The Transport (Division of Functions) Act of 1932 established 
the transport administration as a system of specialised statutory 
authorities without even formal Ministerial control. Previously, 
at least for public transport, planning had been quite open and 
subject to political, public and inter-organisational scrutiny.
The Improvement of Sydney Commission of 1908-09 could be judged a 
little generously because it was a pioneering effort, but in any 
case it was an outstanding planning enquiry and made a significant 
contribution to a metropolis where wider social changes were 
encouraging a new consciousness of the effects of government
inaction and non-planning. The subsequent Bradfield and related 
plans must be seen in the light of a more developmental mood in 
Sydney because as the effects of the depression of the 1890s faded 
and as optimism predominated, the emphasis switched from compre­
hensive planning to technological planning.
While the intention of the 1928 Report of the Traffic 
Advisory Committee and of Bruxner, Stevens, Lang and Maddocks was 
to improve co-ordination by setting up a portfolio of Transport, 
the opposite effect was built into the transport administration.
The financial (and therefore allocative) system lacked integration, 
statutory independence was ensured by the extent of discretionary 
powers in the Acts, and no substantial co-ordinating mechanisms 
were provided. Bruxner saw himself as the central policy-maker 
but the lack of progress in systematic adjustment of the 
administration in his time belied his co-ordinating interests, 
while later Ministers were even more constrained by tradition, 
philosophy and statute. Bruxner had himself established the 
independence of his Commissioners. The Ministers lacked advisory 
support and in any case co-ordination was largely a "concept" 
which was not of great concern to politicians. As Professor Bland 
said in 1935,
Real co-ordination demands that the interest of the 
community should be the first consideration. Our legislation and administration makes the Government's 
interest a primary consideration, which may be 
determined, by very different criteria from that which 
the public would use.O)
This is a significant point which will be considered later.
The failure to achieve either operational co-ordination or a . 
balanced co-ordination at strategic levels is adequate proof of 
the fact that for most of Sydney's twentieth century experience, 
specialisation drawfed co-ordination. This has been seen in every 
one of the preceding chapters, in episodes ranging from the 
alternate dominance of the rail lobby and the road lobby, the lack 
of realism of most métropolitain land use planning, the separate­
ness of public transport modes, and the inability of the State 
system as a whole to appraise transport needs in relation to other 
urban goals and make realistic commitments to transport. The 
achievements of transport between the 1920s and the 1970s were 
minuscule compared with progress made in other areas and the 
growing demands on the metropolitan system generally.
Since the early 1970s there has been a trend towards closer 
integration in transport largely because of the increased
1. F.A. Bland, An Administrative Approach (op. cit.), p. 5. Quoted as written.
effectiveness of the Ministry of Transport and Highways and 
several key Ministers of Transport and Highways (notably Mr Fife 
and the Labor Government and its Mr Cox). Some of the results 
were the improved role of URTAG, the formation of the Traffic 
Authority and the new planning approach which emerged in 1976 and 
which has been slowly progressing since. Ministerial control has 
been strengthened on a day-to-day basis. The formation of the 
Public Transport Commission cannot yet be regarded as an advance 
in these terms because of its early failures but more will be said 
of this later.
The first major weakness identified in the foregoing analyses 
relates to the performance of the superior co-ordinating agencies 
and the actual limits on their spheres of responsibility. 
Ministerial accountability was obviously defined in practice on a 
restricted basis as were the roles of Cabinet and the Governments 
as a whole and the Treasury and Public Service Board. Obviously 
their co-ordinative roles were not as comprehensive as convention 
might imply, but the functional grounds were and still are 
important. What should be done to fill the gap between present 
roles and functional requirements, remove constraints and if 
necessary change convention but within predominating political 
limitations? Similarly, it has been seen that lateral co- 
ordinative agencies have inherent limitations but even then their 
potential has not been realised. What could be done to improve 
their roles, and also integrate community considerations more 
effectively in all appropriate levels of decision-making? Given 
that administrative performance has been deficient in particular 
areas, how can co-ordination be improved by organisational reform 
and vice versa?
These are important questions and will be examined briefly 
in turn, but first the most important subject of all will be 
tackled. Co-ordinative agencies and specialist organisations are 
components in a system —  is that overall system acceptable, and 
what should be done to get the basic relationships right before 
the components are improved? Should co-ordination between 
functions and administration be related by a consolidation of 
functions, or is the traditional concept of organisational 
specialisation a workable proposition at this stage of Sydney's 
history, considering present conditions and the probability of 
substantial societal change in the future?
There are two fundamental principles to be considered. The 
first is that central political control must be maintained, 
because of convention and the N.S.W. Constitution as well as for 
co-ordinative reasons. This does not necessarily mean that the
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Minister must personally take the major co-ordinative role or even 
exercise the options of power —  the system design should provide 
for delegation, auditing and built-in safeguards, all based on 
that initial control.
Second, it is important that task specialisation should be 
arranged so as to facilitate managerial effectiveness and 
efficiency but without splintering control to a degree which 
excessively hinders the achievement of co-ordination. Task 
specialisation in this context can apply to sub-organisational 
arrangements, for example within giant departments. While definite 
guidelines cannot be stated a priori for different policy areas, 
it is argued that a relatively high degree of specialisation is 
needed in urban transport. This is because of the impact of the 
main activities on the community, political processes and 
decision-making and because of the complexities associated with 
the investment programmes, employment and financial performance 
(etcetera) of each activity. Specialisation can promote manage­
ment performance through competition and aid accountability and 
community access. Very importantly it can promote the full 
analysis of policies, the identification of issues, the 
evaluation of alternatives, and the scrutiny of administrative 
effectiveness at a level where management can be related to 
performance. It can also assist a central arbiter to gain a 
thorough understanding of complex issues. As Benham and Peres 
submitted to the Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration:
The bureaucracy itself plays, and must play, a crucial part in the processes by which its own objectives are 
set.... Nor do the value criteria of efficiency and merit 
(and their surrogates) carry objectively self-evident 
meanings.... Both the objectives themselves and the 
criteria are operationalised against the influence of the 
values present within the particular policy context.
Thus departments and other mission agencies of government 
should come to compete with one another on the basis of 
quite legitimately derived, but differently derived, 
policy conceptions each of which places the highest value 
on the traditional virtues. We share the view that in 
general the stimulation of such policy competition facilitates political control. Where co-ordinating techniques squeeze out the possibility of competing 
conceptions, however, the problem of political control is aggravated though obscured by a veil of harmony.(2)
Specialisation is usually implemented (as seen in N.S.W.) 
along functional lines corresponding to public transport, main 
roads, local roads, traffic management, policing, regulation and 
urban planning aspects. Even in cases where it has been decided 
to have cross-modal authorities, especially in metropolitan areas, 
such as in most American States, internal structure is normally
2 R.C.A.G.A., op. cit.. Appendix 1.B
specialised on modal lines. The complementary need for co­
ordination mainly stems from functional interdependencies, for 
the pricing, investment, management, marketing and suchlike 
policies of each mode affect the other modes as well as the over­
all efficiency of the transport sector and in turn society. In 
general the dilemma of specialisation and co-ordination in 
transport is exceptional: few other policy fields are as complex 
in organisational terms.
The dilemma can be expressed in the words of the Royal 
Commission on Australian Government Administration: ”The 
fundamental task is to integrate the authority which comes from 
popular election with that which derives from professional 
knowledge and experience, while upholding the principle of 
ultimate political control.”
This leads to accountable management which is the central 
concept in modern public administration and which has enjoyed 
great popularity with the major recent public service enquiries.
It is based on three connected propositions: that the adminis­
tration of different responsibilities should reside at the most 
suitable level of the governmental system; that organisations 
should be given sufficient resources and freedom to perform their 
functions efficiently; and that each organisation should be 
accountable to its Minister and public service authorities on 
the basis of suitable criteria« In many respects accountable 
management differs little from specialisation except for its 
associated reforms in personnel and financial management. 
(Statutory authorities generally have the delegated powers already 
although accountability has typically been lacking.)
In the context of transport administration accountable
management rests on the distinction between operational and
( 4)strategic decisions, or administrative and policy' ' decisions in 
the traditional terminology. Main roads construction and the 
operation of public transport and traffic systems are relatively 
self-contained in administrative terms, are suitable to evaluation 
on the basis of pre-determined ”objective” criteria, and are 
dominated by repetitive decision processes. However strategic 
decisions concerning the placement of main roads, expenditure 
priorities, pricing, level of service and the like are 
controversial and cannot be separated from the mainstream of 
political accountability. Such areas are the direct concern of
3. Report of R.C.A.G.A., ibid., p. 43.
4. This distinction has lost its traditional respectability undei recent critical examination. These are however the words adopted 
by Self in Administrative Theories and Politics (op. cit.) and the 
concepts are the same.
the Minister and Government acting on advice against the background 
of societal constraints.
The principles which have been outlined can apply to a 
system of statutory authorities, traditional Departments, one or 
many Ministers, and so on. The combinations are numerous and it 
would be meaningless to propose a "perfect" combination. In fact 
the question of system efficiency as stated above results in three 
main alternatives, namely: (1) leaving the single Minister at 
the centre of a group of statutory authorities but with strength­
ened co-ordinating mechanisms; (2) converting the statutory 
authorities into Departments, with various Ministerial arrange­
ments; and (3) centralising all functions under one or two 
"giant" organisations.
There has been a good deal of controversy in the past about
the relative virtues of statutory authorities and the traditional
public service Department. The former usually have the
advantages of freedom from the restrictive centralised financial
and budgeting practices of Treasury and the personnel policy of
the Public Service Board, and of statutory functions and
representation on the board of management. In such cases it is
relatively easy to provide a management with sufficient powers and
abilities to perform their functions and to delegate repetitive
decision-making without necessarily impairing the legislature’s
(or Minister’s) powers in key areas. It cannot be claimed that
political control and policy auditing are easy to achieve but this
comment applies to any large organisation. The main disadvantages
relate to the difficulty of achieving financial, personnel and(5)policy co-ordination under traditional arrangements. ' The 
organisations are separate in financial and personnel matters and 
this reduces flexibility in both areas, while a conscious effort 
must be made by a Minister to observe policy decisions which 
relate to the approval of the organisation’s executive rather than 
the Minister. Also values are often highly internalised and 
managerial efficiency suffers over time. Most of these disadvant­
ages are consequences of bad application rather than inherent 
design defects. The Glassco Commission for example was not 
opposed outright to statutory authorities, like virtually all of 
the recent major public service enquiries in the U.K., Australia 
and Canada, and saw them (with improvements) "not as alternatives
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5. The most useful source is Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Public Service of South Australia (Chairman D.C. Corbett; 
Adelaide, Government Printer, 1975), pp. 112 ff. Other sources used were: (Glassco) Royal Commission on Government Organisation, 
Report (Canada: Government Printer, 1962), volume 5; and 
(J.S. Pulton) The Civil Service (London: H.M.S.O., 1968). The Reports of R.C.A.G.A. and Bland on the Victorian Public Service (1974-75) were far less useful although both placed a heavy emphasis on dangers of loss of co-ordination.
tc the departmental form but more properly as species of the same 
genus, or associated departments".^^
The main difference between the department and the authority 
ie that in the former the Minister is placed directly at the head 
of the organisation and is more closely concerned with internal 
submissions, officers and management than would otherwise be 
possible. This supposedly makes the organisation more open and 
responsive. However there are very substantial disadvantages in 
that the department is part of a public service system in which 
personnel and financial responsibilities are separate from 
administration, and in which the respective Ministers have basic 
responsibility for all matters, from the most controversial and 
political to the most technical and routine. These are the main 
reasons why the public service inquiries mentioned above have 
sought to combine the signal advantage of the department with the 
advantages of incorporation. They have shown that the dangers of 
loss of co-ordination are just as great with a Departmental system
Is direct Ministerial control essential? It is not required
ir. a large range of activities, including technical design,
ojerations, construction procedures, personnel administration and
sc cn. In the Swedish model such functions can be “hived off” and
subject to loose controls only. Transport administration abounds
ir. such matters. The specialist advisory services which are
associated with main roads and public transport planning are
ir.arguably best placed close to operational and administrative
functions, for reasons of experience, information and skills.
This suggests a more complete hiving-off so long as information
ar.d control links are maintained. There are also political and
functional advantages in leaving some “distance” between the
Minister and his administration, because of the controversial
nature of some decisions (i.e. some controversy can be hived off),
because of the inherent desirability of having specialist
( 7 )advisory services in a Ministry, J and because of the complexity 
irlierent in the functional and technological characteristics of 
tiar.sport.
lerhaps more importantly, the really potent control 
mechanisms, the financial and budgetary powers, could be more 
easily used with statutory authorities than with public service 
Departments. Other mechanisms, such as the obligation to seek
6. Ibid., vol. 5, p. 56.
7. Irincipally alternative sources of advice and different 
emphases regarding political and long-term implications. Cf 
R.A. Chapman, “The Role of Central or Departmental Policy and Planning Units: Recent Developments in Britain”, Public 
Adninistration (Australia), June 1975, especially pp. 151 f.
Ministerial approval to minutes to the Executive Council, can be 
effective but only on the small range of matters which the 
respective permanent head has to report on. In general the bulk 
of an organisation's activities are unseen by the political master 
and he has enormous problems with information, for example of not 
knowing the criteria of evaluation inherent in a submission 
(especially with regard to the selection of alternatives). Many 
of the powers of statutory authorities are discretionary and 
therefore outside the formal influence of the Minister, for 
purely technical not substantive reasons. Even where he has 
effective power to direct, he often cannot ensure that action is 
taken promptly and properly, even if only because he only has 
recourse to the final power of dismissal of an official, a power 
which in most cases is heavily checked and which is usually 
inappropriate.' J The only real power, quite apart from the 
question of relating goals to action in the form of a programme, 
is through the purse. Financial control can be absolute or can 
be used with tact and discretion; it can be easily recorded and 
applied; and most importantly it is effective.
It would undoubtedly be practicable to abolish statutory 
status of the transport bodies and place them under the direct 
control of the Minister. The Commissioners might even retain their 
titles and a substantial part of their present powers; it would 
even be possible to have multi-member management boards as in the 
Planning and Environment Commission. However under present 
institutional arrangements their personnel policies would be 
subject to the Public Service Board, their financial sources 
would be absorbed into Consolidated Revenue, their accounting and 
budgeting procedures would be replaced or revised, and they would 
be placed within the line-budget framework of the Treasury. These 
are all associated with problems of management efficiency, 
planning and political control, and even if the general arrange­
ments were improved the Departmental status would not vary 
substantially from that of statutory authorities. Improvement 
would not be a simple matter and would require considerable 
institutional and constitutional effort, which could hardly be 
justified except in the case of existing Departments.
Several additional points need to be briefly covered 
following on from the earlier questions. Specialisation can be 
achieved within an integrated organisation, say through the
8. To this writer's knowledge only one head of a statutory 
authority has been dismissed and that in fact was S.A. Maddocks because of a criminal conviction in 1936. See Aitkin, The Colonel (op. clt.), pp. 209-210.
conversion of all or most of the present statutory agencies into
one authority or Department. There are no grounds for thinking
that such integration would improve administrative efficiency, in
fact given present intra-organisational structures quite the(9)opposite would occur, ' while issues would tend to be complicate 
and possibly suppressed because of the difficulty and nature of 
internal processes. Adequate external discussion would be 
hindered. Further, "large departments are difficult to manage. 
There is also a risk that Ministers in charge of them may become 
so preoccupied with the work of their own departments that
Placing the responsibilities of four Departments on one Minister 
would severely detract from the effectiveness of that Minister 
unless the central Ministry was built up to a point which 
detracted from accountable management. The appointment of several 
Ministers to handle different sections of the administration would 
multiply problems of co-ordination, although the administration is 
complicated and important enough to warrant the appointment of an 
Assistant Minister.
Three conclusions emerge from the preceding discussion.
Firstly, specialisation is highly desirable in transport 
administration but it must be married with co-ordinative and control 
arrangements. Secondly, there are no substantial grounds for 
advocating the conversion of the existing statutory authorities 
into public service Departments for the benefits that are sometimes 
claimed for such a policy are illusory. Finally, present institut­
ional constraints must loom very large in the organisational 
architects calculations.
The last conclusion and the preceding analysis should not be 
taken to be arguments for just patching up the status quo by making 
improvements to existing co-ordinative mechanisms. Substantial 
administrative changes are needed, in fact in the case of the Public 
Transport Commission no significant progress will be made in any 
direction until a number of internal problems are resolved. None­
theless it is accepted here that the basic system of central and 
operational agencies which has developed in the New South Wales 
transport administration will not need revolutionary structural 
change. Organisational specialisation is on sensible lines and
9. See interview with the Hon. P.F. Cox of 29th November, 1976 
(Appendix 5), p. 6 and elsewhere.
10. P. Draper, The Creation of D.O.E. (London: H.M.S.O., 1977), 
p. 1. This writer would certainly argue against giant departments 
and extremely large organisations generally. For the structural horrors of the aborted British experiment see Draper, throughout; and a superficial account by A. Clark, "Ministerial Supervision and
the Size of the Department of the Environment", Public Administration (London), vol. 55, Summer 1 9 7 7. ------
are unable to share effectively in wider policy-making.
provides the basis for definitive reform while the lines of 
communication and control are clear and there are no complete 
lacunae. A specific prescription for each of the main components 
of the system will now be developed.
The Minister for Transport and Highways has adequate powers 
deriving from formal and other arrangements, with three exceptions. 
Firstly, he does not have the force of convention and statute to 
ensure that his wishes are carried out. Perhaps it would be all 
but unthinkable for a direction or request to be actually disobey­
ed but every Minister needs to be able to order management audits, 
find out what decisions are made internally, and specify or
approve (in a meaningful way) policies, priorities and (1 1 )programmes.' 7 Secondly and following on, the Minister must have 
adequate support services to assist with policy review and 
initiatives and programmes. As seen already the Ministry of 
Transport and Highways has been developing in this direction and 
must continue to do so. Finally, the Minister does not have the 
real power of the purse in the transport administration and reform 
in resource allocation is needed badly.
The inconsistency of the budgeting and financial system was 
examined in Chapter Six. At present the Minister and Treasury do 
not have uniform or adequate powers of review over the various 
authorities; in fact the disadvantages of the State system as a 
whole are seen in microcosm in transport. Reform is needed in many 
directions but especially in ways that will improve external 
understanding of corporate activities and plans and allow 
effective specification and enforcement of Government policy. 
Resource allocation has three main dimensions or tasks which need 
development, as Professor Wilenski has said. The tasks are:
(i) "to devise policy machinery to undertake the 
analysis of /^wide planning 7 issues so that decision-makers are aware oT the choices and 
consequences__7 involved";
(ii) "to develop information and budgeting systems so 
that policy choices can be translated into priorities in resource allocation (indeed it is only through resource allocation decisions that 
policy in the end will be made)"; and
(iii) "to co-ordinate the implementation and timing of 
these plans /""and priorities^/ on the ground. "(12)
11. See Glassco, loc. cit., for guidelines. Glassco included a 
condition of control over the appointment amd removal of top management. Considering the past experience in N.S.W. (Chapter 
Five) this has been deleted here but would have considerable merit 
on a special (say contract or rotation) basis.
12. P. Wilenski, "Urban Administration and Policy in N.S.W. 
(roneo, UNESCO Seminar on Urban Management Processes, Adelaide, 1977), pp. 3-4.
Wilenski has proposed a combination of a Priorities Review Unit, 
Capital Works Unit, comprehensive and integrated State annual 
Budget, and improved corporate and Ministerial research
{  A X )facilities, ' to do this on a State-wide basis. However 
transport should be regarded as a sub-system for such purposes 
because of its functional and political interdependencies, 
magnitude of expenditure (a total of almost $1,000,000,000 in 
1977/78), operational diversity and inherent complexity. This 
would not invalidate the Wilenski proposals at all but would rein­
force them.
It is not possible to say how much integration would be requir­
ed in the financial arrangements of the transport system because 
extensive consultation with affected interests would be required 
before a definite framework for accountable management could be 
worked out.^1^  However at the very least provision must exist for 
transfers of funds (and probably other resources) between 
operational areas and for special funds (such as the Victorian 
Ministry of Transports Transport Improvement Pund) for specific­
ally inter-corporate projects and Ministerial initiatives. These 
are the areas of greatest constraint at present. As well MOTH 
should be equipped to actively participate in the preparation of 
the various corporate programmes (in the sense of annual and 
advance lists of works) so as to assist in the interpretation and 
development of Government policy and the auditing of organisational 
activities. This would provide excellent sources of information 
as well as the most powerful (yet “accountable") control 
mechanism for the Minister. The question of fully integrated 
transport budgeting is involved and will be briefly examined 
shortly.
Professor Bland*s opinion was previously cited to indicate 
that there are limitations on the co-ordinative interests of many 
Ministers because as politicians they are not necessarily interest­
ed in a range of non-political (and sometimes apolitical) subjects. 
For example while some Ministers are interested in the efficiency 
of transport systems as a personal matter, many would not be and
this was the reason for Bland's idea of separating such subjects
( 1 S')from the politicians* domain.' ' This conclusion was a product of
13. See Review of N.S.W. Government Administration, Interim 
Report —  Directions for Change (Sydney: Government Printer, 1977), 
Chapters 1, 2 and 4.
14. See R.C.A.G.A. Report, op. cit., pp. 43-4.
15. Bland thought that a statutory appeals tribunal would be suitable protection of the popular interest in co-ordination.Against this it must be said that many issues will not be of interest to politicians because they are not of popular interest. 
This was not the whole of Bland's point and his basic argument has
Bland's era and personal experience with politics in administra­
tion^^ and it has no modem application. However when designing 
a system it is essential to provide adequate mechanisms (which are 
independent of temporary personality constraints as far as 
possible) to cover all important issues. Thus the Minister's 
personal stake in co-ordination should be complemented by an 
effective professional and possibly popular interest.
There are different types of co-ordination of course and 
different interests will be affected by say land use, timetable, 
and road management issues, and it is important to provide 
suitable inputs to allocative processes. Lateral co-ordinative 
agencies must continually consider major options and evaluate them 
from their professional viewpoint. Similarly popular participa­
tion could provide a special input, in balance rather than in 
opposition to the co-operative agencies, although it is far more 
difficult to achieve effective participation in Australian 
conditions than in countries where ethos and education are more 
favourable. Again it is not possible to foresee in detail what 
form the participation of URTAC for example would have but in his 
Interim Report Wilenski rightly separated budget preparation and 
project analysis so as to prevent the budget process from becoming 
too complicated. This would suggest that URTAC would continue to 
make recommendations on a regular basis rather than as a specific 
part of the budget cycle.
In general the role of the Minister for Transport and 
Highways and by implication the superior governmental system as a 
whole have developed in a positive and useful direction recently, 
and they will be reinforced in the same direction by the recommen­
dations of Professor Wilenski. In a way however there is an 
important question remaining about the respective roles of MOTH 
and URTAC. The former has a potentially vital role at the centre 
of the transport administration, not only as the servant of the 
Minister but as a (non-statutory) superior co-ordinative agency. 
URTAC also has a non-statutory but co-operative role, although it 
could become much more if a Government decided to follow (but 
hopefully improve on) the precedent of the Transport and Highways 
Commission of 1950-52. Wilenski has not explicitly considered that 
question although he has recognised the basic issue: "the Ministry 
and URTAC now form the basis for the establishment of a reasonable
much merit which the N.S.W. Government is examining consequent to the Report of the Law Reform Commission on Appeals in 
Administration (1973).
16. See Chapter Five above; and Spearritt, "Urban History" op. cit., pp. 227-8. »
co-ordination mechanism in this field if more fundamental
(17)problems of resource allocation can he overcome".
The first of these "fundamental problems" is that the State 
urban authorities are highly constrained by the terms of 
Commonwealth grants made under Section 96 of the Australian 
Constitution. The distribution of Commonwealth funds between 
urban local and urban arterial roads for example is determined 
outside the sphere of influence of the Department of Main Roads 
and the Minister for Transport and Highways. The broad allocative 
question of country and urban expenditure is similarly compromised, 
as well as by the arrangements for National Highways. The 
Commonwealth funds construction and maintenance expenditure on 
National Highways (which terminate at the urban boundaries) and the 
State has therefore lost discretion over urban/rural expenditure 
in this area as well as to a considerable extent over relative road 
and rail priorities. Commonwealth funding requirements in research 
and planning, and urban public transport improvement, mean that 
while the State has some discretion it must meet Commonwealth 
specifications which on occasions differ from State priorities and 
which therefore constrain State allocative decisions. The same can 
be said about port and airport works and National Commerce roads.
Secondly, there are significant institutional constraints on 
resource flexibility per se within the State system. Urban 
government is highly specialised generally between authorities 
which have different sources of revenue, different personnel 
structures, and special statutory restrictions. The various Acts 
specify functions on which funds may be expended and planning is 
basically confined to such functions. In some cases the major 
allocative decisions are set down by statute, for example revenue 
from road maintenance and various motorist charges is divided 
between the Department of Main Roads* Country and County of 
Cumberland Main Roads Funds, the Traffic Facilities Fund, Police 
expenses, and so on. Such provisions limit the Government’s 
flexibility and tend to pre-empt the Government’s options in the 
current rapidly changing climate of community needs and attitudes. 
In some respects a less than optimum distribution of finance and 
capital starving of important sectors of transport have resulted.
The third major source of problems underlies the second 
problem as just stated and the question of resource allocation 
generally. Each of the separate organisations has its own 
budgetary procedures and accounting mechanisms which make 
comparisons and central analysis very difficult. There are great
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17. Wilenski, "Urban Administration", op. cit., p. 17. Emphasis added•
difficulties in planning allocations from the centre in accordance 
with Government objectives. The budget process is one where the 
Government can specify particular limited wishes but cannot 
actually institute planned expenditure on an integrated basis.
This is a crucial limitation at times in urban policy where say 
Government policy may call for the advancing in priority of 
significant road projects to complement other transport works. An 
example of this was the Bondi Junction by-pass roadworks associated 
with the Eastern Suburbs Railway project (see above). In such 
circumstances an integrated set of financial arrangements for all 
modes is needed. This should incorporate suitable analytical 
measures (such as cost-benefit and social balance sheet 
approaches) to assist in determining priority and staging.
The Review of N.S.W. Government Administration has not intend­
ed at all that its strengthened central arrangements will supplant 
the role of MOTH and perhaps URTAG. "It is only by strengthening 
the capacity of central agencies to analyze and review policy and 
concurrently encouraging ministries and agencies to more critic­
ally evaluate and review their own programmes, that more coherent 
and 'co-ordinated' results will be achieved."' J In the context 
of the "fundamental problems" it is definitely intended, end 
rightly so, that the major State allocative decisions will be made 
at the core of accountable government, namely Cabinet and the 
Premier, acting on proper information and advice. At the 
transport system level it is similarly intended that allocative 
decision-making should be centred on the Minister and the 
Ministry's Development Co-ordination Division. In fact the bulk 
of the necessary policy analysis could not be moved from the 
administration to central agencies (such as a Capital Works Unit) 
because of the expertise and experience needed, the complexity, 
and the necessary nexus between the day-to-day processing of policy 
and representational matters and the review of detailed works 
programmes. (This does not apply to major projects.) Moreover as 
the allocative problems are tackled the Ministerial role will 
become considerably more important.
It is not necessary that a single transport budget covering 
all modes should be prepared, although this would be desirable if 
the effectiveness of supporting processes could be built up to a 
comparable level. However at the very least the requirements of 
the individual areas of operations should be understood and 
related to each other; and that decisions concerning relative 
merits can be made and implemented (including transfers of funds 
and other resources). These tasks unquestionably require 
specialist staff resources and a professional co-ordinative
18. Interim Report, op. cit., 4.61 (pp. 72 f).
orientation as well as proximity to the Minister and his authority. 
The Ministry of Transport and Highways is the logical place for 
these tasks and it has argued strongly for a more comprehensive 
and positive role for itself in submissions to the Wilenski Review, 
the Australian Transport Advisory Council and the former
( I Q )Commonwealth Bureau of Roads.v 7 The concepts and role are fully 
consistent with the thrust of the Interim Report of the Review of 
New South Wales Government Administration. Supporting legislative 
change would be highly desirable and has been foreshadowed by the 
permanent head of M0TH.^2(^
URTAC has a secondary role in this scheme of resource alloca­
tion. If it is accepted that MOTH should be the focus of the 
transport administration, and again it is interesting to note that 
this was the explicit intention of the 1928 Report of the Traffic 
Advisory Committee referred to previously, then URTAC would 
retain its co-operative status and the associated limitations.
URTAC would still involve the participation of MOTH and its 
present terms of reference are adequate for any reasonable expansion 
of role into say operational co-ordination and explicit considera­
tion of and recommendations on allocative patterns. (The 1976 
URTAC Report covered both areas to some extent and it is under­
stood that the Committee will maintain its involvement to a full 
extent.'1 7) There would be no need for URTAC to take a major 
part in resource allocation but it would be a valuable counter­
part to the Ministry*s analyses. While URTAC would not have 
direct control of resources the small extension of its role on 
allocative questions would improve the Committee's functioning and 
reduce the rule of consensus. It should not be allowed to take 
the leading role over the Ministry because this would detract from, 
accountability and generate undue competition, apart from the fact 
that the process of conflict resolution in URTAC is necessarily 
more complex and generally less satisfactory• u r t a c»s role
19- Ministry of Transport and Highways Submission to Review of 
N.S.W. Government Administration (photostat, available from 
Ministry), together with attachments.
20. Interview with Mr. K.J. Trott of 29th November, 1976 
(Appendix 5), p. 4.
21. The Interim Report of Professor Wilenski's Review said:
"...there is at least one area where some improvement in co-ordina­
tion 'on the ground* seems most desirable. This is in the trans­
port sector where some projects, e.g. Bondi Junction By-Pass and car-bus-rail interchanges at major commercial centres sometimes fall 
in the 'gap' between agency responsibilities. One solution to this problem could be to extend the powers of ... (URTAC) to one of project management (e.g. through ad hoc subcommittees with a project manager reporting to it) for these special cases" (4.62, p. 73, 
also 4.84e, p. 77). This is a major problem area which needs 
special task force-type attention. However so far URTAC has 
rejected the idea and this writer agrees because of URTAC's limited 
abilities. Such task forces would probably be better as a Minister­
ial responsibility, but regardless the need for some regularised action is urgent. „
22. M. Pai'n+er a^d B, Care_y, o u  ceci o c r c u h o  ratrfiSa/v Ge J->ci v/ < o u r c»v
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would be as at present, to complement the co-ordinative interests 
in the administration.
Finally, there is no obvious solution to the problem of 
obtaining an effective community input to transport planning.
URTAG has Illawarra and Hunter Advisory Committees which have 
value in stressing local concerns even though their representa­
tions, like those of the Interim Commuter Council and the Botany 
Bay Sub-Region Community Advisory Committee, are regarded as 
nuisances by many sections of the administration. Even though they 
may be regarded as selfish and incompetent by technocratic 
standards, their input is a politically and socially valid 
consideration. (Naturally there is a distinction between a 
politician being elected and making "responsible" decisions on 
behalf, and bowing to or rejecting community pressure.) A general 
decision would have to be made by the Government on some of the 
following points before the role of community groups could be 
properly defined:
(i) should they have compulsory access to budgetary, 
information and related processes?
(ii) should their roles be tightly defined and be of a 
"semi-superior" type (vis-a-vis corporate planning) on appropriate 
subjects? and
(iii) should they have access to Ministers and unhindered 
avenues of advice on disputes?\ 23)
There is probably little middle ground between giving community 
committees a firm status and leaving them as pressure groups, 
because of the relative resources of the bureaucracies. It can be 
argued on theoretical grounds that their input should be made more 
effective but this subject is one for Governments to take a 
preference on. There are not inconsiderable avenues of access in 
transport and related areas at present but those avenues should be 
further developed.
Finally, it has been seen that the structure and definition 
of functions of an organisation have important effects on the way 
it performs its own task and interacts with other organisations. 
There has been some controversy over each of the specific special­
ised areas of transport, particularly with regard to the abilities
Inter-Departmental Committees in Canberra" (roneo paper to APSA 
Conference, Armidale, 1977), passim. The authors' treatment of 
consensus and "self-protection11 (p. 5) and Ministerial involvement 
(p. 16) inter alia, is far too simple and inadequately founded on 
fact, at least as i'ar as N.S.W. practice is concerned.
23. The Review of N.S.W. Government Administration is understood 
to be developing model guidelines on these topics and others, in 
favour of a more powerful role for community groups.
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of organisations to perform their own tasks efficiently and 
economically, to inform and obey their superiors, and to adjust 
their operations and policies to meet changing requirements. These 
abilities cannot be taken for granted and will be appraised now 
regarding the Public Transport Commission and the Department of 
Main Roads. Comments have been made elsewhere on the Traffic 
Authority (Chapter Seven) and the Ministry of Transport and 
Highways (Chapter Nine and immediately above).
The Public Transport Commission was set up in 1972 in an 
attempt to rationalise the administration of government transport 
services in New South Wales and revitalise and co-ordinate two 
large statutory authorities.^4) However it is now clear that the 
Commission is unable to meet the long-term needs of the adminis­
tration, and that the problems which the P.T.C. faces are too 
complex for a single management structure which has to operate in 
a still fairly traditional and cumbersome organisation. There are 
weaknesses in adaptability, decision-making processes, efficiency, 
responsiveness to Ministerial requirements, ’‘openness" to scrutiny, 
information services, and so on. The Commission's task was 
extremely difficult and it has made some progress in meeting it, 
but it was (as is now evident) handicapped from the first and will 
not be able to perform satisfactorily until its basic organisation­
al problems are ameliorated. It will be suggested that this can be 
done by making relatively straightforward adjustments, using the 
concept of the Public Transport Commission as the basis for the 
further reform.
It is a valid generalisation that public transport administra­
tion is often seen by governments as being necessarily oriented to 
two main principles which derive from market conditions and 
operational characteristics. The first is that the organisation 
of transport administration should reflect the greatly different 
capital and marketing requirements of urban passenger services, and 
freight and country passenger services. The differences are so 
substantial that urban passenger services are often separated from 
other activities, not just within a single organisation but in a 
special organisation. The second principle is that the different 
modes are highly interdependent, at marketing as well as opera­
tional levels, within the main sectors. The requirements of these 
interdependencies are often seen as being more important than 
operating urban bus services separately from train and ferry 
services. Combining the two principles has led many governments
24. The following analysis is based on personal investigation and numerous informal and formal interviews. However while the advice qf others is gratefully acknowledged, all responsibility for 
interpretation and presentation is the author1s.
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to establish special métropolitain agencies (called say 
Metropolitan Transit Authorities) which are responsible for the 
integrated administration of public transport in cities, with 
parallel arrangements for freight and other services.
In the specific instance of New South Wales each of these 
respective sectors has acute problems which result in the 
substantial annual deficit. The problems were present prior to 
1972 but had been more or less masked by comparatively favourable 
economic conditions. Not only did the Public Transport Commission 
inherit unquestionably inadequate facilities but it also had to 
deal with administrative mechanisms which were organised for no 
more than day-to-day efficiency in operations. The administrative 
systems of the former Departments were not designed to collect or 
process the type of information which the new Commission required, 
nor to devise or implement policies which were alien to past 
management. The first Chief Commissioner instituted the new 
priorities of planning and flexible management in place of the 
operational orientation and in effect acted as a revolutionary 
modernising force: he changed the internal structure, brought in 
highly capable and progressive executives, and forcefully rejected 
old customs. There was an awareness that the Public Transport 
Commission's problems would require a type of management that was 
not then available, and that they would not even be satisfactorily 
defined and analysed let alone solved unless adequate organisation 
processes and resources were introduced.
However the reforms caused considerable fragmentation and 
inefficiency. The situation at present can be summarised under 
three heads: first, responsibility for the various aspects of the 
main problem sections is dispersed; second, there are conflicting 
chains of command and sources of influence around the sectors 
which detract from efficiency in decision-making; and third, the 
two foregoing organisational weaknesses have hindered the develop­
ment of positive management attitudes, information resources, 
analytical services and so on. Many of the outside recruits are 
of high quality, as are many former Departmental officers, but are 
not being fully utilised. In some cases analyses of major issues 
are delayed at various stages by the spread of authority and 
influence across the organisation, between different branches and 
even different Commissioners. There is also a great lack of 
"openness" in the organisation in that information sources are 
confused, the roles of senior officials are ambiguous, and it is 
very difficult for the Commissioners and the Minister to find out 
exactly what is happening and get adequate advice. In some cases 
reports are prepared which obscure and white-wash rather than 
explain and clarify; in many cases they are simply of very poor
quality
The internal achievements of the P.T.C. should not be 
underestimated, but its single most important characteristic is 
the inability of one management structure to handle a variety of 
such enormous problems as now afflict urban passenger, freight, 
and long-distance passenger services. These areas are not receiv­
ing concentrated attention; the officers who are responsible for 
them have to contend with internal competition and conflict; the 
Commissioners are able to excuse the Commissions weaknesses and 
hide its failures because of the lack of openness; and the extent 
and magnitude of the problems detract from the morale and effect­
iveness of staff.
Any move to improve the P.T.C. will necessarily have to be 
consistent with three main constraints. First, it must make the 
organisation more open to Government direction and investigation: 
many of the immediate past problems affecting the Minister for 
Transport and Highways have been caused by his inability, and even 
that of the Chief Commissioner, to obtain information and reports 
in good time, and to even find out what subjects need to be 
reported. (This is a problem which affects all administrations but 
the P.T.C. is an exceptionally difficult organisation in this 
regard.) Secondly, the reform must not repeat or accentuate the 
losses of morale and internal efficiency which followed the original 
reorganisation. It should make the most of existing departments 
and branches, after all the trouble and care that has gone into 
their present or projected status, and the most of personnel 
resources. Thirdly, the reform must do everything possible to 
achieve quick results but in such a manner that administrative and 
operational efficiency is not compromised, now or in the future.
A general direction for reform has been developed which is 
simple and certainly not novel (it generally follows overseas and 
interstate precedent as well as previous local suggestions). In 
short the operational core of the P.T.C. (the sections which deal 
with the management of physical facilities) would be left intact, 
except for workshops which would be hived off, but they would be 
given an appropriate management structure. A board (called say 
the Transport Operations and Management Authority or TOMA) would 
be constituted of representatives of various interests, both 
government and unions. The Chairman would be a full-time member 
who would be assisted by a Director while there would be 
representatives of the Treasury, MOTH and the Department of Public 
Works seconded on a half-time basis (so that involvement would be 
substantial). This Authority would be charged with efficient 
management and with the investigation of operational improvement: 
there would be no commitment to change for change’s sake. Although
this Authority would not differ from the bulk of the present 
P.T.C., there would be much greater openness and incentives 
because of the auxiliary changes mentioned below.
Secondly, policy-oriented functions would be removed from the 
constricting influence of operations by setting up separate 
representative authorities for Metropolitan Passenger policy, and 
Freight and Country Passenger policy. These would consist of 
existing planning, marketing and budgeting and relating sections 
and would be responsible for:
(i) market strategies;
(ii) appraising the appropriateness of existing services;
(iii) evaluating new policies, proposed new services and 
improvements to existing services;
(iv) reports on various aspects of rail, bus and ferry 
services (as appropriate) to the Public Transport Commission and 
the Minister; and
(v) the overall viability and utility of their services.
The two Authorities would have to "buy*' their facilities on 
contract to the operating authority and they would have to develop 
their own information and analytical services.
The Public Transport Commission would be left virtually 
unaltered as a co-ordinating body, consisting of a full-time 
Chairman, the three Chairmen of the new Authorities, and 
appropriate outside representatives. (An increase of one 
Commissioner only would be required on current numbers.) The P.T.C. 
would lose its administrative functions and would instead be respon­
sible to the Minister for the resolution of differences between 
the Authorities and for their general performance vis-à-vis capital 
works, labour relations, contracts, and so on. It is intended 
that the P.T.C. would still be responsible for all major decisions, 
with the Authorities being responsible more for efficient manage­
ment. The Joint Council of the P.T.C. would continue to work, 
providing effective involvement of unions at both Authority and 
Commission levels. The P.T.C. and the Minister would have 
statutory power to call on the Authorities for reports within 
specified time limits and the reports would by statute also be 
provided to the Minister at the same time.
The composition of the Authorities and the Commission is 
designed to maximise mutual understanding and communication as 
well as open them to constructive representation of interested 
parties, including Government Departments. Representation would 
broaden the perspective of both management and the interested 
parties, help generate new approaches and better policies, increase 
scrutiny and mutual understanding, and provide "automatic”
2 Of)
mechanisms of co-ordination. The hoards would he responsible for 
ensuring improvements in performance of their respective 
Authorities and would he encouraged to concentrate on their 
problems, which would be reduced to a manageable scale (at least 
in the case of the policy Authorities) by the reorganisation.
TOMA represents the biggest challenge but the general arrangement 
would give the Government and P.T.C. every assistance. The 
element of competition between the Authorities is deliberate and 
necessary, for competition -
(i) assists the setting of standards for planning time­
tables, economic efficiency, overall financial results, etc.;
(ii) stimulates higher levels of performance; and
(iii) facilitates the evaluation of alternative policies and 
helps in the identification and resolution of issues.
It would be essential to choose the correct criteria of performance 
for each Authority, especially in terms of improvement of both 
standards of service to the community and financial results, rather 
than say simple Return on Investment (ROI) approaches which have 
considerable disadvantages.
A significant benefit of this arrangement would be the clear 
allocation of the costs of public transport to the main operating 
sectors via annual reports and the representation. In the 
metropolitan area for example commuter groups and the public will 
know what their services cost the Government as will rural 
producers and interstate shippers in the case of freight services. 
The overall deficit will be less stunning and most importantly will 
be attributable to each management, so that they will be encouraged 
to make a real effort to overcome their problems. Considering the 
present state of the Commission it is unlikely that action to 
decrease the annual burden on the State significantly could be 
taken for some time, but this proposal would reduce the delay and 
assist in the derivation of appropriate policies and programmes.
The principal problem with the D.M.R. is similar in a way in 
that its structure has produced excessive policy inertia which 
prevents the organisation from satisfactorily adjusting to changed 
conditions.
When the office of Commissioner was created in 1932, main 
roads was regarded as a purely technical and administratively self- 
contained area of government, and it was thought that one manager 
would be best able to control it. Since then, however, the 
Department of Main Roads has seen its domain become politicised 
and more interdependent with other State agencies; while 
commissions such as the Royal Commission on Australian Government
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Administration, have very emphatically decided that a major 
justification for continuing the form of statutory authority 
rather than adopting the normal departmental form is the 
opportunity for mixing different specialisations and backgrounds 
on the board of management of the former. An important question 
which should therefore be considered is whether the corporation 
sole is still the most suitable form of management for the 
Department of Main Roads.
The Commissioner for Main Roads has invariably been appointed 
from within the Department and the Commissioner's job has become 
the ultimate step in the line of succession within the internal 
promotional structure. This has reinforced the internalisation of 
values and policy-making which resulted from statutory independ­
ence, narrow overall task orientation, and independent personnel 
management status. In bodies such as the Water Board, State 
Electricity Commission, Rural Bank and State Planning Authority/ 
Planning and Environment Commission, there has been a high level 
of outside appointment at executive level, as happens in the 
mainstream of the Public Service. Thus while these statutory 
authorities have been faced with the same dangers of technical 
narrowness of vision that the Department of Main Roads has in the 
past succumbed to, the wider experience and background of the 
senior executive has helped to maintain a measure of balance in 
organisational values. These bodies have had the further assist­
ance of a composite board of management, whereas the Department of 
Main Roads is faced with the internalisation of values at every 
level.
Lately the Department has been most reluctant to assist the 
various Governments to change the direction of main roads planning. 
Responsiveness to Government policy is not a concept which is 
easily achieved within large organisations. Even if the chief 
executive was willing to assist his Minister as fully as possible, 
he might have difficulty in obtaining information and results from 
the lower levels of management. Management is of course basically 
a filtering process: the filtering can take place at the second, 
third or tenth-last link in the chain of command, so that if a 
specific set of values is inculcated in an organisation over time 
and an incoming Government challenges those values, it does not 
necessarily matter if the top link is adaptable if the lower ones 
are not. The chief manager may be faced with the same problems 
as the Minister, of not knowing what decisions have been made 
without his knowledge, of not being aware of the values inherent 
in the evaluation criteria in analysis of alternatives (not to 
mention the very selection of some alternatives and not others), 
of not himself having the knowledge to answer criticisms of a 
proposal that has been passed to him and approved with the best
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intentions on his part. The processes of filtering and the 
problems of management in large organisations are very well 
recognised and the logical and general empirical grounds for the 
preceding comments can hardly be questioned.
It would seem that a board of management would be better able 
to help an organisation adapt to changing conditions than a 
corporation sole, because the chief executive (the present 
corporation sole) can retain the bulk of his managerial role but 
with help (and checks and balances) which are desirable by 
external criteria. Especially if a fresh start is made, a 
Government can put the most appropriate talents on a board as well 
as utilise the existing resources of the organisation, to achieve 
a good balance of expertise, experience and managerial ability.
Two of the main benefits that would result if the reorganisation 
was properly handled would be:
(a) the sharing of responsibility and thus the relief from 
the corporation sole of the burden of personal decision on 
difficult matters;
(b) broader judgments due to the varying experiences of each 
of the members and less likelihood of incorrect decisions due to 
the inbuilt checks and balances.
As well, each full-time executive can be given areas of 
policy with which he can become thoroughly familiar, and can over­
view the processes of information-gathering and evaluation down 
the management line. This does not apply so much to part-time 
members except that they would be appointed on the basis of 
special knowledge and could specialise to some extent on that 
basis. It is important to note that a common argument in favour 
of the corporation sole, that a Government will get quicker and 
more effective action if it appoints one suitable manager, has no 
long-term value. It is quite incorrect to base organisational 
design on temporary individual qualities as the policy record of 
the D.M.R. has demonstrated.
It is envisaged that the new board of the D.M.R. would 
consist of three full-time members representing the road construc­
tion, road management, and societal impact areas. Additional part 
time members could be appointed on the basis of expertise in 
financial or related management and workforce representation.
There is one further dimension to this problem. The D.M.R. 
is very competent within its traditional discipline but it has 
not developed adequate manpower resources in economic, social or 
environmental areas. The Review of N.S.W. Government Administra­
tion has identified this. The obvious solution is to expand 
analytical services but the senior management reform is essential 
on this count as well.
Finally, a number of miscellaneous problems have been 
identified which relate to rigidities in the D.M.R.'s internal 
budgeting system and ability to adjust programmes to meet inter­
corporate and Government priorities. The solution is simple and 
obvious, namely the creation of a single main roads fund with 
separate flexible sub-accounts for specific purposes.
In conclusion, a number of suggestions have been made in this 
chapter which have had an indicative rather than definitive 
intention. While the historical record of the New South Wales 
transport administration is replete with signs of co-ordinative 
weakness, its structure is fundamentally sound enough to provide 
the basis for final improvement to its components. As a system 
all that is needed is the strengthening of the major linkages 
together with corporate reforms which would restore accountable 
management and improve the external orientation of the various 
authorities. These would redress the balance of distribution of 
system resources in favour of co-ordination and improve the overall 
functioning of the administration, particularly with regard to 
modern (and changing) societal demands.
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DEPUTATION TO LIEUT.-COLONEL THE HON. M.F. BRUXNER, M.L.A., 
DEPUTY PREMIER AND MINISTER FOR TRANSPORT, FROM MEMBERS OF 
THE NATIONAL ROADS AND MOTORISTS’ ASSOCIATION, IN REGARD TO 
TRAFFIC OUTLETS TO AND FROM THE CITY. 9TH SEPTEMBER, 1938.
Present: Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. M.F. BRUXNER, M.L.A.,
The Hon. J.C. WATSON, President of the N.R.M.A. 
Messrs. A.M. GRAHAM 
H.I. JOHNSON 
A. MITCHELL H.L. PRIMROSE, M.L.A.
Alderman James McMAHON
Mr H.H. NEWELL, Commissioner for Main Roads
Mr WATSON stated that the Council, during the last few months, 
had been considering the question of arterial roads from the 
standpoint of having a uniform plan investigated and adopted. The 
Council felt that it was essential that something should be done 
to evolve some coherent plan, and if it were not possible to carry 
out such a plan in the course of the next year or so, it might, nevertheless, be achieved by extending the work over a number of 
years.
He did not propose to suggest any particular method of 
handling the matter, except to say that his Association would like 
to see a body created to go into the various aspects of the 
question —  the standpoint of the municipal authorities, of the 
road users, of the Government and the Departments working under 
Government control — and to evolve a plan in which all could 
co-ordinate.
Mr. Watson mentioned that ten years ago he had been Chairman 
of a Committee appointed by the Government of the day to go into 
the question of arterial communications with the City. A whole 
series of propositions had been set before the Committee for 
tunnels, by-pass roads, etc., but in the short time at the disposal 
of the Committee it could not go into the suggestions in detail. 
However, the Committee had recommended the Government to arrange 
for the ’’expert” study of the proposals. That report had been made 
ten years ago, and nothing had been done....
The MINISTER: ’’Nothing?”
Mr WATSON said that as far as the Main Roads Department was concerned he had nothing but praise. But the Main Roads Department 
could not be expected to deal with problems in the consideration 
of which a whole host of other authorities in the metropolitan area 
were also entitled to be heard, and who would be expected to find 
at least some proportion of the cost of bringing about the improved 
position.
The Association would like to see some authority set up to go 
into the various schemes suggested. There were, for instance, the 
schemes suggested by the City Council, and anything the City 
Council might do should be in consonance with a general scheme.
The need for something to be done was, he thought, apparent 
to all. Motorists generally paid a very large sum by way of 
taxation for roads, and they had been repaid in many directions.
He did not think that the motorists would object to a nroportion 
of the £2*i million received from them by the State Government 
being diverted to pay for propositions which would facilitate 
improvement in the means of access to and from the City.
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His association, therefore, asked that the Minister would 
persuade his colleagues to set up some body of men who would 
agree upon a general plan of arterial or by-pass roads to improve 
the movement of traffic within the Metropolitan Area.
Mr McMAHON drew the Minister’s attention to the narrowness 
of the Botany and Newtown Roads. The City Council had done what 
it could to widen the Newtown Road as far as Camperdown. He 
considered that the Pyrmont Bridge Road exit was one that required 
dealing with immediately, in order better to serve the people of 
the Northern Suburbs.
Mr GRAHAM said the Association was hopeful that the 
Government v/ould adopt the suggestion for the appointment of a 
body, —  and get on with the work as speedily as possible.
The MINISTER said that he had been surprised to receive the 
Association's statement. He did not think it either correct or 
fair to say that Sydney lagged behind other cities in its attempt 
the improve its arterial communications.
It was true that the City Council had inaugurated a ten-year 
plan for the betterment of roads within the metropolitan area; 
and this was largely due to the fact that he had suggested to the 
Premier that the City Council should be relieved of the tax it was 
paying towards main roads, so that it could utilise that money on 
major works in and around the City itself. Every time the 
Department had conferred with the City Council, emphasis had been 
placed on the Council’s lack of funds.
It was wrong to say that there had been no plan for 
facilitating means of access to and from the City. No Government 
Department published its doings, or plans, or expenditure, or any­
thing connected with it more than did the Main Roads Department.
In 1926 it published its first Report, and in that Report it very 
definitely showed how aware it was of the need for planning City 
routes. Since 1929 the Department had published a Journal in 
which the road development of the State was fully discussed, so 
much so that not only in Australia but in every country of the 
world it was a recognised text book. A great deal of information 
as to the Department's activities could be gleaned from a study 
of the Reports and Journals.
The Association was asking that someone should plan ahead 
for the future. In the first Annual Report the Department had 
published a map of the then existing roads in the County of 
Cumberland, and the missing links: and in that same publication 
the Department had laid down what it considered should be the 
policy for the construction of radial and circumferential roads 
in the County of Cumberland. Not one of the then existing roads 
was surfaced to carry modern traffic. (Showed a map of the 
existing roads in 1925, and a map illustrating how the Department 
had fulfilled its plan of linking the road system throughout the 
City by circumferential roads.)
One of the first things the Department had had to do was to 
bring all the roads in the County of Cumberland, as v/ell as all 
over the State, to a state of efficiency capable of carrying 
present-day traffic. Since that date a sum of approximately 
£6,000,000 had been spent in the County of Cumberland. The 
Department did not merely conceive the idea of circumferential 
roads, but roads were reconstructed and widened, and that had 
meant the resumption and purchase of land. For example the 
Princes Highway in the vicinity of Cook's River had been widened 
from 28 ft. to 80 ft., —  with a double set of tram tracks. (The 
Minister showed a map illustrating the work that had been done in 
this direction.) (The Minister also mentioned that he had 
discussed the question with the Minister for Transport in England, 
who had been astonished to know that New South Wales nad "ring" 
roads and by-pass roads.)
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There had, therefore, been some degree of planning, and no 
"ordinary spasmodic" alterations. If the Department had worked 
spasmodically, it had been due to lack of funds: for instance 
there was a time when it had been denied the use of funds, but 
this had not been the case in the last six years.
The Minister showed a map indicating the long range plans 
that had already been investigated and determined upon by the 
Government, or else were under examination. The most complete 
was the re-routing of the northern side to give an express 
route: that route involved a tremendous amount of work and could
only be done gradually. Both it and the express road to the West 
had been examined by engineers of the Department of Main Roads, 
in close touch with the City Council and with every Council in 
the area indicated.
The Association had said that expert engineers should be 
consulted, but he did not know where better engineers, so far as 
road works were concerned, could be found than in the Department 
of Main Roads. From his observations abroad he was of the opinion 
that our road engineering compared favourably with any in the 
world. And that was the opinion expressed by Sir Rees Jeffreys, 
who said he had come to Australia to teach, but went away having 
been taught a lot« Mr Newell and some of the junior men had been 
abroad, and every endeavour was made to keep the men up to date.
It might be asked why the Department had not published its 
plans. But had that been done there was the possibility of land 
speculating, and the cost of resumptions might be more than the 
cost of making the road. That aspect of the matter had been 
discussed in the Journals.
If the Department had had the money, it could have gone 
ahead more quickly. It had spent £6,000,000 already, and had 
borrowed £3,000,000 early in its life, which had necessitated 
repayment. But a stage had been reached where almost all that 
debt was paid off. He thought, however, that the deputation would 
agree that, instead of spending the money on bottlenecks that hold 
up the traffic at peak hours, it would be preferable to use that 
money on widening the roads outside of the bottlenecks, for 
traffic could be more readily controlled in the narrower places.
He considered that work "outside" was necessary in a country as 
large as ours, otherwise the motorists would not have scope, 
whether for pleasure or business.
Just as the Department had planned for the City, so had it 
for the country. Most of the work had been done in conjunction 
with Councils. An enormous development had taken place in the 
construction of bridges: 825 had been built during the lifetime 
of the Department, making, in a running line, something like 
14 miles. Besides co-operating with Councils, it was necessary 
for the Department to consult the Maritime Services Board, and the 
Railways and Tramways, in order to ensure that plans and works 
were co-ordinated.
The Minister thought that if a body were set up today to 
replan and co-ordinate the various activities and then to "come 
down and see that the work is carried out", this would mean calling 
a halt to any work in progress. He had seen one or two such 
committees set up outside his Departments, and work had been held 
up awaiting the new plan. The Main Roads Department had a plan, 
and if funds were forthcoming it could get on faster with its plan. 
For instance the Department had in hand the plans and alignments 
for the widening of Oxford Street. The Department had started off 
planning and had continued investigating and planning.
Mr NEWELL, on being questioned by the Minister as to the 
value of the plans in the Main Roads Department, said that the 
actual value would be nothing under £200,000.
The MINISTER, continuing, said that not a road was built in 
the State that did not form part of a definite plan. In 1928 the 
roads outside the County of Cumberland were planned, and tne Act
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amended so as to put these roads into a definite classification. 
The mileage of the highway had been increased by about 1,500 miles 
The Association had said that any development outside the City 
should coincide with the activities of the City Council. That had 
been done, and to such an extent that the Great Western Road, 
which starts in the City of Sydney, goes right out to Broken Hill, 
and "meets our friends in South Australia'!. Queensland, Victoria 
and South Australia co-operate with New South Wales, so that the 
New South Wales roads meet, at the border, the important roads of 
the other States. Actually speaking, this State could claim to 
have started an Australian-wide system of highways. The achieve­
ment in the last twelve years had been extraordinary; the roads 
were equal in surface to any he had seen while abroad: they were 
perhaps, not so wide, nor, for that matter, were they as wide as 
they ultimately were meant to be. However, the State had been 
saved thousands of pounds by the Department realising while land 
was cheap, for instance along the Parramatta Road, simply through 
the foresight of those in charge of the work.
The geographical position of Sydney made the task of access 
difficult. But nobody could say that the "traffic flows just like 
a stream" in either New York or London.
However, the Minister stated that he was prepared to submit 
the Association's proposal to his colleagues. If it meant 
hastening the work or adding to its efficiency he would not get 
in anybody's way so long as three or four years were not taken 
over the job. He felt that the Department had all the necessary 
machinery, and if the cash were available, it could do more.
"The bones were there: they only needed the flesh putting on 
them." He assured the deputation that the City Council would get 
all the assistance the Department could give them, and that the 
Department's engineers would consult with those of the Council.
Mr WATSON, in thanking the Minister for having received the deputation, said he was sorry if an impression had been created 
that his Association was criticising, even involuntarily, the 
work of the Main Roads Department. He could appreciate the 
arguments put forward by the Minister. But perhaps he had not 
made it clear that the Association only wished to see an authority 
set up to advise in favour of some coherent plan to deal with the 
immediate approaches to the City. In making the suggestion he 
had felt, as a Member of the Council of the N.R.M.A., that he was 
not competent to suggest a way of dealing with the difficulties.
He had been inundated with schemes and plans of every description, 
many of which had seemed to him to be quite good, but he could not 
pretend to examine these as closely as might professional men. 
Therefore the Association had felt that if some authority — which 
would not take the place of the Main Roads Board, but would 
supplement its work and the work of the City Council —  could be 
set up, it would allow of a concerted programme being arranged.
He thanked the Minister for the good work that had been 
carried out by the Main Roads Department, and he himself thought 
that the work could be entrusted to the Department. But he felt 
that the situation demanded that speed should be exercised for 
remedying some of the bottlenecks, and if he could help in that 
direction he would be very much pleased.
The following interview with the Hon. Milton Morris, M.L.A., 
former Minister of Transport, was held on Wednesday, 1st Septembe 1976. Not to be cited or quoted without permission.
R. Gibbons.
GIBBONS: I have managed to research a fair amount of the policyareas such as freeways, public transport, financial problems, 
things like that, but it's the actual operations of the inter­
departmental committees that have been difficult to research.
I have not been able to get any information from say the D.M.R. 
and the Public Transport Commission but the people in the 
Ministry themselves, such as Mr Trott...
MORRIS: He's very helpful, isn't he.
GIBBONS: He asked me to give you his regards.
MORRIS: Yes, I'm glad you saw him because he's very helpful and 
a dedicated officer. Sometimes in the statutory bodies they get 
very nervous or suspicious and probably with some justification.
I take people on their face value and I've never been let down in my life.
GIBBONS: Well I've certainly had a great deal of trouble with 
the statutory authorities even though I'm not trying to smear 
their names or anything. The first thing is CUMTAC. What was 
the general intention of CUMTAC: it didn't have any statutory 
powers...
MORRIS: Originally it was called CUMTAC, County of Cumberland
Transport Advisory Committee, you know the composition of the 
Commissioners and so on. It was set up before I became Minister, 
it was set up by the former Labor Government in the early '60s.
It was to plan, to coordinate transport and traffic flow within 
the County of Cumberland. I thought it was fairly successful.
It was presided over in those days by the then Commissioner for 
Railways. It had no teeth, it was purely coordinating and 
advisory to the Minister. We subsequently changed the name to 
URTAC and URTAC did much the same role. I, at one stage, thought 
it ought to have some outside representatives on it, let's say the 
retail traders in Sydney or the Sydney Chamber of Commerce for 
example. I was advised most strongly against this. There wasn't 
a big clamour from outsiders to participate so I just let it lie there.
GIBBONS: No one really knew that it was going, did they?
MORRIS: Not many, it received greater mention in the last couple 
of years as a result of the Report that it commissioned and which 
was tabled here late last year —  the URTAC Report. Then I think 
people started to ask about URTAC. And of course now we have the 
statutory Traffic Authority which has the teeth under the chair­
manship of the Commissioner for Motor Transport, and whilst it hasn't superseded entirely URTAC, it will take most of its role,I believe.
GIBEONS: It was intended to work through the power of the
Minister: to the extent that an issue came up which involved
several Departments, it was not intended to resolve the conflict within itself, was it?
MORRIS: Often it did but the Minister was the final arbitrator,
he used to get the Minutes and recommendations from the Committee 
and in those days the Department of Main Roads was with another 
Minister and this sometimes made it difficult. Since January 
'75 the D.M.R. has been part of Transport and so it snould be 
and it ought never have been separated from Transport.
GIBBONS: That's something I was going to ask you, wnat problems
it gave you as the Minister, because Mr Trott indicated that it was perhaps the major problem.
MORRIS: Yes, and in my nine years and eight months as Minister
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for Transport, one of the continual festering sores was that the 
D.M.R. was a law unto itself. It could be at times cooperative, 
when it didn't want to be it had the let-out of saying, well 
we’re under another Minister, you'll have to see him. Then 
because the D.M.R. was an attachment to an important Ministry 
of Local Government, and in earlier days under Mr Morton it was 
Local Government, Planning, Valuer-General, the State Electricity 
Commission, State Coal Mines, and D.M.R., it meant that the D.M.R. 
virtually made all of the decisions and that the Minister was the 
cipher . Every now and then the Minister was invited to
take a ride in the helicopter or to go and open a bridge or go 
and open a four-lane highway, the band would be out, the Minister 
would be suitably duchessed and then he went back to his desk to 
do the other more onerous tasks and the D.M.R. went happily on 
its way.
GIBBONS: Was there any intent to try to bring the D.M.R. more 
into the fold by setting-up the interdepartmental committee?
MORRIS: Yes, and I think we did to some extent, but what I found 
was, as the road-builder, the D.M.R. built the roads, their 
engineers in their opinion, they were good engineers but they had no 
peer , they knew all about road building. Immediately a road 
went down there would be a fatal accident and everybody would be 
clamouring to the Minister for Transport, what are you going to 
do about it? So whilst we had no say in how the roads were built, 
why they were built, what the surface was, I got the kicks. My 
job was to make the traffic flow and to cut back the road toll, 
and I remember the shining example was Pennant Hills Road where 
there was accident after accident, where we needed some comers 
shaved, an old building removed and the D.M.R. would say, well 
we haven't got the money, we'll consider it in a programme in the 
future. Had I been Minister for Main Roads I would have directed 
them to do that work because there were serious political and 
other problems in this area. The road safety aspect of my port­
folio, which I sought to make fairly supreme, it was dealing with human lives, was the one that was often inhibited as we had no 
say in the road works.
GIBBONS: Would it have helped if CUMTAC had had some statutory 
authority, or maybe not?
MORRIS: Yes, I think it would have,provided the CUMTAC members 
by statute were all responsible to the Minister. But the Minister 
for Transport in those days had no authority to give a direction 
to the D.M.R. Despite CUMTAC, despite URTAC, in the final analysis 
their Minister was someone else, and they could always convince the 
other Minister, for good reasons, that he oughtn't to act other than 
as they recommended.
GIBBONS: I'll ask you I think a hypothetical question, I assume
you did try to get it in but the Country Party stopped you.
MORRIS: No, not the Country Party because for seven years it was 
under a Liberal Minister, Mr Morton. I spoke to Sir Robert Askin 
time after time and he always felt, well he was not a boat-rocker, 
he always felt well everything is going along nicely . Mr Morton 
did not want to give it up, Sir Charles Cutler did not want to give 
it up, it was a glamour department in those days. In the last year 
or two it lost some of its glamour because the Government would not 
put up the registration fees and there was a shortage of money, so 
some of the glamour was tarnished. And then Ministers were more 
happy to get rid of it. It should never have been away from 
Transport, Labour took it away, Mr Cahill took it away, was it in 
the late '50s?
GIBEONS: I think it was about 1955 or '56.
MORRIS: Yes in the '50s, because he had a Minister, Mr Entic'knap, 
who didn't want to be Minister for Transport, and George Enticknap 
said well I am not going to kill myself: they wanted a rural
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Minister in Transport because the unions were killing the city 
Ministers. Ehticknap said I want to get rid of part of the portfolio 
and Pat Hills said, well I’ll take the and that's how it
was parted, just for that reason. It didn't come back until '75, 
some twenty years later.
GIBBONS: And the Machinery of Government review.
MORRIS: Yes.
GIBBONS: The URTAC Report was a different sort of exercise, it was 
a really coordinating sort of study, it had to look at the resources 
that were available and distribute them among the separate 
authorities.
MORRIS: Yes, well the URTAC Report was a good one, they all got 
together and worked on it as a coordinated body under one Minister 
and that’s the sort of function I think that URTAC ought to be 
performing, rather than piecemeal looking at whether there ought to 
be a pedestrian crossing in George Street West or a new set of 
traffic lights at the comer of King and Pitt Streets or something.
GIBBONS: Was there a problem in getting Commissioners to debate 
issues that were in other people's domains?
MORRIS: What we had to do was time-wasting. Every time a problem 
came up that was in another domain, I had to arrange a meeting with 
their Minister, with them present, with our people present, we 
inevitably set up an interdepartmental committee to report back to 
the two Ministers, or sometimes three. The amount of time that was 
wasted to go through the motions in getting the decision that I 
could have made six months earlier appalled me at times, and very often we were dealing with human lives in the road safety field.
GIBBONS: I think at this time we could come to the Cabinet
committees and governmental committees. From reading the 
Parliamentary Debates, I know that a Cabinet committee, or the 
transport committee of your Parties,reviewed the concept of the 
Public Transport Commission and what could be done there.
MORRIS: We did.
GIBBONS: V/hat sort of role did those committees have?
MORRIS: The Cabinet committees? The Cabinet committees v/ere very
good. We had a number of them. I often thought it was a good idea 
to have Ministers looking deeply into a problem before it went to 
Cabinet, where it was an important issue, and for some years we had 
a Road Safety Committee in Cabinet of three Ministers and we used 
to meet once a month. We had the Commissioner of Police, if you get 
Ministers together you get all the Heads coming along, and this was 
good too, and we made a lot of progress. With the setting-up of the 
P.T.C., I think five Ministers looked at that, from memory I think 
it was five, and the purpose of setting up the P.T.C. was of course 
for one of coordination. I think perhaps some of the personnel who 
were first appointed, whilst they did a wonderful job, they lacked 
a little bit in dealing with the press and in public relations.
The longer a Government is in, the more vulnerable it is to scanning 
by the press and of course this year the press had a field day on public transport because we didn't seem to be getting our message 
over at all.
GIBEONS : That was a problem with the Commission itself?
MORRIS: I felt that the Commission itself was not good on public
relations. It did a good job, the goods trains, the freight trains 
are now quite magnificent. If you go back three or four years to 
the hotchpotch of composition of trains, the little four-wheel 
bogies, two of them would be in a train and it would mean the speed 
of tne train was 20 miles an hour all the way to Brisbane because
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three or four trucks couldn't exceed that speed. They were 
scraoped, we went into a big investment programme, with terminals, 
container trucks and so on, and Mr Shirley made magnificent progress 
there.
GIBBOUS: With containerisation.'
MORRIS: On the goods side generally. Whilst he sometimes said that
passengers are our business not an interruption to our work, that 
was his phrase, sometimes people wondered. Of course we did place 
orders for passenger carriages, sometimes there were delays at 
Treasury in getting them through, playing with the timing to spill 
it over to the next financial year, but from early this year six 
double-decker carriages a month are coming onto the system, or nine 
new trains a year, and this will just transform passenger carrying 
in this State.
GIBBONS: looking back historically Governments in New South Wales 
have seemed to regard transport as an area where they have had 
great administrative problems. In 1950 the Transport and Highways 
Commission was set up, which didn't work...
MORRIS: It should have.
GIBBONS: It didn't.
MORRIS: No, personalities were the problem there.
GIBBONS: But there was also another problem there, that the
Departments weren't amalgamated. There was an overlording body set 
up with a funny sort of power, it was not the same power that the 
P.T.G. had. Everything was brought under one hierarchy.
MORRIS: That's true.
GIBBONS: Was this a lesson that was learned in the '50s?
MORRIS: Yes, I didn't want to set up another Transport and 
Highways Commission because as you say there was a little body 
suoerimposed over the others and it didn't work. You get 
jealousies and the taller the poppies the greater the jealousies 
sometimes.
GIBBONS: Did you have any problems in amalgamating the Departments?
MORRIS: I didn't because two Commissioners had retired and we'd 
have had to appoint two new Commissioners and I rather felt that 
buses, trains and ferries ought to be integrated. But I think if 
the present Government persists with the Commission concept in a 
little time it will coordinate. I think the new Chief Commissioner, 
Mr Reiher, is doing a wonderful job and will continue to do so.
GIBBONS: That's the general impression people get. It's now a
matter of personalities, isn't it, because they got themselves in 
a tangle.
MORRIS: Yes. People down the line do get worried when you 
amalgamate an accounts branch — we had two accounts branches, two 
legal branches, two advertising brancnes, two real estate branches —  
when you amalgamate them all, well someone has to take second place, 
someone takes first place and you get all sorts of jealousies.
This was where the original Public Transport Commission did not 
always give these amalgamations the time that was needed and not 
always the compassion extended to individuals. Sometimes you've 
got to give a chap half an hour to sit down and talk to him and 
tell him why you're doing something and to give him an assurance 
that his future is alright. Now if you just put a notice on the 
board that as from Monday this is going to happen, people are 
terrified.
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GIBBONS: Were there problems in that direction? I am thinking 
of Peter freeman’s article in the National Times.
MORRIS: Yes, there were some problems because it was not always 
sold to officers in the Service —  not the top officers but down 
the line a bit. -A number of people were brought in from outside,
I wasn’t opoosed to some coming in from outside but not too many. 
Whether too many were brought in I am still not sure.
GIBBONS: Mr Shirley had ideas on management that were, you could 
say, completely foreign to the old Departments.
MORRIS: Yes.
GIBBONS: Were they brought in too quickly — they were basically 
good?
MORRIS: The ideas were excellent, some were brought in too
quickly and had an effect on morale fora while. I think that is 
probably over now. Mr Shirley was v/ise enough,you know*to say to 
me after I'd passed from Transport, I’ve had three years, I’ve 
done a lot of things that had to be done, many of them unpopular, 
a lot of people think that I’m a so-and-so, do you think now I 
ought to get out? and I said I think that would be a good idea.
And that is why he got out two years before he should have. To 
that extent I gave him full marks. It let a new man come in who 
couldn't be blamed for anything that had happened but who could 
build on the fact that many things had been done that had to be 
done. Someone had to do them and become a stink-pot because of it.
GIBBONS: Gould you tell me something about the role of the 
Minister and the Departments under him. I admit that I'm mainly 
thinking about the Department of Main Roads which has had a 
continuity of policy. When a Department has that sort of continuity 
is it hard to challenge it, hard to review it critically even 
without challenging it?
MORRIS: Yes it is hard because the D.M.R., when they came under 
the Transport umbrella, didn't want any Ministerial control or 
direction, but my friend Mr Fife in his quiet way, quickly showed 
them who was running Transport. They succumbed to that. Their 
estimates were never seen by a Minister or by Parliament or 
approved. He changed that. Their road policies often,by luck,coincided 
with the Government's road policies, they never had to explain or 
justify them. That is why I think some of their policies on 
ripping the guts out of an inner-city area to build super-duper 
roads were quite contrary to my thinking but they'd been able to 
sell them to other Ministers in the few minutes a week that they 
spent with them.
GIBBONS: Isn't it an advantage in that circumstance to have a
Country Party Minister in charge of main roads, in this case 
concerning highways?
MORRIS: I don't think so. I think that what you need is perhaps 
the best Minister you can get in charge, I don't think it matters 
if he's Country Party or Liberal. As I say my own views were more 
on the conservation side, I would never rip up Paddington or 
Wooloomooloo, or some of these places, to put cars through there.
I was much more on the Sydney City Council's side, close more 
roads and make them available to people.
GIEBONS: Mr McCusker's personal role —  would you say that he was 
an ideal man to get people together and talk?
MORRIS: No, no, because he was a one-man band and he had around
him Deople v/ho were completely subject to him. Now, he was a very 
able man, I say that and he v/ould have told you too if you had 
asked him. He'd built up really a little dictatorship in Railways
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and early in the piece he didn’t like any interference from the 
Minister or the Ministry.
GIBBONS: The formation of the Public Transport Commission —  what 
was the Treasury's opinion of this, did you have trouble with 
Treasury?
MORRIS: No, no trouble with Treasury. At one stage I wanted to
set up a Greater Sydney Transport Authority, like the Greater 
London, to run the electric trains, buses and ferries and then have 
a New South Wales Rail if you like. Now tney opposed that strongly 
because the N.S.W. Rail might have showed a profit from goods if 
we’d cut back a few of the highly unprofitable country trains.
They didn’t want to, they wanted to lump everything in together 
otherwise they felt there would be a clamour for reduced freight 
charges, or there might have been a clamour for reduced fares in 
the Sydney area if the losses there weren’t showing up as —  the 
big losers were the country passenger trains (sic;. They opposed 
that strenuously, I never went on with it because we wouldn’thave 
got Cabinet approval for that.
GIBBONS: And did the Railways want to maintain their autonomy, 
would they have if they could?
MORRIS: Mr McCusker would have liked to but he was a realist and 
he was prepared to trim the sails. He would have liked to have 
stayed on a bit longer but we couldn’t renew his term after 65.
GIBBONS: The role of the actual Ministry itself —  I am not too
sure about this particular area at all. It is my impression that 
the Ministry was a very quiet body which served the Minister rather 
than the organisations as a coordinative body itself.
MORRIS: Yes, most of the statutory bodies would have abolished the 
Ministry; the Ministry was terribly important as a buffer between 
them and the Minister. I would have liked to have expanded the 
Ministry to be more like the British Ministry of Transport. I 
would have liked to have had perhaps one or two engineers attached 
to the Ministry who could go out and give me perhaps another 
opinion on some of the Railv/ay matters, or have been able to 
consult with a naval engineer and say, look give me your views on 
these ferries that we’re thinking of ordering. The Public 
Transport Commission has recommended them and so what do you think? 
I think the Ministry ought to have a few more feathers to fly with* 
I built it up and it’s much stronger now than it was when I took 
over. It was just regarded as a little secretariat in those days. 
But we built it up and it will get stronger in the future and serve 
a much more useful role. The Under-Secretary is now Chairman of 
URTAC .
GIBBONS: And is now playing a very important role himself.
MORRIS: That’s true.
Appendix p
The following interview with Mr N. McCusker, C.B.E., was held 
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R. Gibbons.
GIBBONS: Regarding CUMTAC (the County of Cumberland Passenger 
Transport Advisory Committee), could I start by asking you what 
arrangements were in force between the heads of the various 
Departments before CUMTAC was set up.
McCUSKER: There was an ad hoc arrangement which in my view left a
lot to be desired. As a result of a discussion I had with the then 
Premier, Mr Renshaw, and the then Minister for Local Government,
Mr Hills, and following the suggestion I made to them, CUMTAC was 
set up within two days. I felt that there was need for a trans­
portation view' to be expressed prior to planning arrangements being 
finalised. I held the view, and I still hold it, that transnorta- 
tion is the key to good planning, there is need to move people and 
goods, and if transportation considerations are looked at in the 
first instance it is possible to induce the kind of planning that 
is best overall.
GIBBONS: Was that opinion tempered by your experience with the 
Cumberland County Council?
McCUSKER: To some extent yes, I v/as for a short time a member of
the Cumberland County Council. It was also conditioned, I suppose, 
by the experience I had as a railway man and subsequently as 
Commissioner for Railways; it seemed to me that the planners were 
going ahead willynilly and not paying any attention, or very little 
attention, to the transportation requirements. It's virtually 
impossible to provide proper and adequate transportation after 
development, it's costly and never completely satisfactory-. As a 
result of that discussion CUMTAC was set up with myself as Chairman 
and comprising the Chairman of the State Planning Authority, the 
Commissioner for Main Roads, a representative of the Police 
Department (in fact it should have been the Commissioner of Police), 
and the Commissioner for Motor Transport and the Commissioner for 
Government Transport. Mr King was the Secretary at my behest. 
Subsequently we added to the Committee the Under Secretary of the 
Treasury, the President of the Maritime Services Board, and towards 
the latter end, more or less as an observer, we invited along the 
Under Secretary of the Ministry of Transport.
GIBBONS: Before CUMTAC was set up, I take it that the Commissioners 
met privately more than in an official capacity.
McCUSKER: Yes, there was no arrangement for formal meetings between 
the Commissioners and very little contact was had. The coordination 
which I felt was so vital was just non-existent, as simple as that.
GIBBONS: Regarding coordination, were there particular things that
worried you, that couldn't be done?
McCUSKER: This was, you will recall, a time of an upsurge in
development in the metropolitan area. Tne Cumberland County Council 
had indicated after a survey that they were planning for a popula­
tion of five million people in Sydney by the year 2000. It seemed 
to me that unless something was done, transport v/as going to be hard 
put to it to cope. I think I was influenced, partly anyhow, by the 
problem that confronted us at that stage with the peak-hour traffic 
movements. We were carrying between four and five hundred thousand 
commuters daily by rail, in the morning, and evening peaks, and the 
cost of providing those services was very high. The"capital eouip- 
ment that v/e had to provide those services was in use for less than 
twenty hours a week and the expenses were running away with the 
situation. To have accentuated that situation by peering m re and 
more people into the Central Business District in my opinion would 
have created an impossible situation. The desire on my part v/as to 
spread the load so that we could be using our existing equipment to 
serve a much greater number of people going in different directions.
3/2.
GIBBONS: You said "existing equipment” — I take it you also had 
some investment in mind. (Mr King has indicated that the Railways 
were in many respects greatly hampered by the relationship with 
the Treasury.)
McGUSKER: Yes. V/e had at that stage some 1,300-odd electric 
suburban passenger cars, we were running 128 or so eight-car sets 
in the morning peak and 132 in the afternoon peak, and in between 
times the service was being provided, or over-provided, by about 
52 four-car sets. There was quite an imbalance so far as revenue 
production was concerned. V/e did have the need to revamp the fleet 
because some of the cars were extremely old and the maintenance 
costs were very high and at best they were giving a poor service.
V/e had the added problem of not wanting to run more trains during 
peak hours because the capacity of the tracks and the signalling 
was such that it was virtually impossible to get any more in during 
the peaks. That led me to conceive the idea of double-decked trains. 
It took quite some little time to move from the conceptual stage to 
an acceptable design. V/e had quite a lot of problems, some thought 
they were insurmountable but in fact they weren't, v/e got over them. 
They were double-decked trailer cars at that stage. In the event 
we found that by replacing single-decks with double-decks we had 
an 82 per cent increased carrying capacity, which based on all the 
information that was available would have enabled the Railways 
Department to carry all the passengers up to the year 2000, with 
an increased population of up to 5 million. This seemed to me to 
be the proper way to do it. Money was tight. Additional to that 
of course was the economic viewpoint; we were buying the double­
decked carriages for 24 per cent more than we were paying for the 
single-decks and we were getting that substantially increased 
capacity. Apart from that there was no need to spend countless 
millions on altered signalling or duplication of tracks, or the 
colossal proposition to lengthen the trains from eight cars to ten 
cars. That would have meant altering all of the signalling and 
lengthening all the stations in the metropolitan area, so the costs 
were inordinately high.
GIBBONS: In other words you were reasonably happy with the funds
you were getting for investment?
McGUSKER: There were two points of view one had to look at. We
had a very high interest debit from the Treasury and every 
additional dollar we were granted by the Treasury had to be financed 
out of revenue. At the same time we were expected to run the 
railways as a business proposition and to minimise the deficits.
It was certainly not my desire to get huge capital investment which 
couldn't be substantiated by an economic appraisal. You have to 
remember that up to that time no depreciation had ever been 
provided for railway equipment from 1855, when the railways were 
started, and the capital account became cumulative. There was a 
small writing-off each year of redemption of debt but that v/as 
infinitesimal. This was a millstone round our necks, one that I 
didn't want to increase if I could avoid it. At the same time there 
was need for the upgrading of the service in many ways. We v/ere not 
only dealing with the passenger side of it, which took about 68 per 
cent of our effort in train-miles and returned about 30 per cent of 
our revenue; the converse was the case in respect to freight move­
ment. That was where the profits v/ere and not unnaturally that was 
where I v/as anxious to make the investment to make sure that v/e 
kept on a reasonably even financial keel. At that stage we were 
also at the cross-roads with our locomotive fleet, diesel traction 
had just become accepted in this country and I v/as anxious to spend 
as much money as I could, having regard to all requirements, on the 
introduction of diesel locomotives. This reduced manpower require­
ments and enabled us to provide a much more efficient service to 
the clients we had.
When one looked at the capital requirements of the 
Department, one looked at a wide area of ooerations. By and large 
I laid it down, having in mind that at this time we were getting
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our capital money from loan funds at about 4.3 or 4.4 per cent, 
that I didn't want to have any propositions put to me from the senior 
officers of the Department unless they could show an eight per cent 
saving overall. This was trying to retrieve the situation tnat had 
gone on for a hundred years or more.
But regarding the Treasury, to answer your question 
specifically, we always asked for more money than we got, we always 
could have spent more money than we got, ours was not to question" 
the wisdom of the Government in the allocation of loan funds. All v/e 
could do was point out to the Minister the urgency of these things 
and hope that our representations were fairly dealt with.
GIBBONS: Do you feel that perhaps the Railways were disadvantaged to 
the extent that they had a substantially different relationship with 
the Treasury vis-à-vis the D.M.R., which had a secure source of 
income and which didn't rely on the same mechanisms for obtaining 
funds? (Mr King gave me the example of coal trucks in the early 
1970s.)
McOUSKER: Yes, I felt v/e were disadvantaged because v/e were 
providing a community service, a social service if you like, without 
any subsidy of any sort. The D.M.R. were in receipt of substantial 
grant money that didn't have to be serviced by interest payments and 
they were able to go ahead. Others were in the same situation. The 
Government Departments, as distinct from the commissions (the 
Electricity Commission, the Water Board and the Railways), had no 
need to pay interest on the loans they received. We were regarded as a trading organisation and were distinct from the other two in that 
neither of them were expected to provide these loss-leader services 
that the Railways did. Unfortunately this was a consequence of 
railway development from its inception. I felt that v/e were at a 
great disadvantage because we were doing two things, we were carrying an inordinate amount of depreciated equipment for which no provision 
had been made over a hundred years to replace, and to that extent we 
could say that the charges for railway services were understated; 
and then we were providing these community services. We had a twin handicap if one can put it that way. There v/e re times when v/e felt 
we could have got more money, there were also times (I must be fair 
about this), when Mr Oliver became Under Secretary of the Treasury, 
when we got a better deal. I'd had him over on my staff on loan for 
three or four years and he had an appreciation of the internal 
operations and requirements of Railways. I brought him over to set 
up a budget bureau, to report to me as distinct from anything else, 
on the economic appraisal of the various propositions that were put - 
forward.
GIBBONS: I'm very interested in that, I've heard a little bit aboutit from Mr King. That was in 1957, was it?
McOUSKER: No, in 1956 I set it up, I became Commissioner on the
1st of August 1956, and one of the first things I did, in the first 
three weeks, was to set up the budget bureau. Mr. Oliver wasn't 
there initially but I set it up from v/ithin and then realised that 
I needed somebody who had a wider financial appreciation than was 
available to me, and he at that time was Budget Inspector for Railways. I arranged with Sir John Goodsell (he wasn't Sir Jonn 
then), the Chairman of the Public Service Board, to second Jonn 
Oliver to me for three or four years. I would have still had him 
only I felt v/hen the Treasury became denuded of people that the need 
of the State was probably better served by him going back to become 
Under Secretary of the Treasury than staying in Railways. Judging 
by subsequent events I'm not sure if I did the right thing or not.
GIBBONS: This was a regular pattern of'exchange? or did it become
that ?
McCusker: I\o, it didn't become that, I set it up to give me the 
information that I needed, I set out my requirements to the budget
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bureau and the three or four people in there produced the relevant 
statistical information for me monthly; additionally they reviewed 
any proposition for capital expenditure and they were responsible for 
the drawing up of the estimates each year. They gave me a second 
view, I had one from the Departmental side and I had one from these 
specialists. After Mr Oliver went back I didn't have anybody in 
Railways who was quite able to take over from him and I got Mr 
Trimmer for a while. He stayed with us for tv/o or three years and 
then we had our own people trained who were competent to carry on.
I found that very small section didn't cost me much but it was of 
immense benefit to me. I asked them all kinds of questions and the} 
were free from the daily routine to look at these things.
GIBBONS: I might come back to the Treasury" later. You were Chairman 
of CUMTAG for most of its history. GUMTAG was set up with a purely 
advisory role. To me this implies disadvantages and advantages in a 
situation where you have a number of Departments responsible to 
different Ministers. Did the operations of the Committee bear out 
the original concept of it being purely advisory, or would it have 
been an advantage for it to have had statutory power?
McGUSKER: I think the weakness of it was the absence of statutory 
power. As it was, GUMTAG reported to the Minister of Transport and 
a copy of the reports and Minutes went to the Minister for Local 
Government v/ho was also Minister for Highways. I think it would be 
fair to say (and I say this with great humility) that the achieve­
ments of GUMTAG were not inconsiderable but they were only made 
possible by the persuasive power of the Chairman.
GIBBONS: There is a tremendous range of potential problems that I
can see, for instance where you had a submission which was concerned 
with a particular planning issue and you had tv/o or three different 
Departments involved, were their decisions made separately and then 
they came and announced their decisions?
McGUSKER: No, after we got going I encouraged them to bring along
their problems before they reached the decision-making stage, we 
canvassed them and thrashed them out, sought more information, got 
people to work to get this and that, then finally there was invariably 
a consensus. Their recommendations then in the main— there were 
exceptions of course —  v/ere the kind of recommendations that a 
statutory body might have made anyhow. It was difficult at times to 
bring one or two of them into line because men in that position, with 
their autonomy, didn't want to be told by me or anybody else what to 
do. We were able to persuade them by various means to comply writh . 
what we believed to be the right thing, and I believe that without 
this, things wouldn't be as satisfactory as they are now —  if one 
can say they're satisfactory, I'm not sure about that.
I'll give you an example, the Woolloomooloo development was 
a case in point. The proposition there was to put some 30,000 people 
in that little basin, and it was quite obvious when we discussed it 
that you couldn't get them in or out, there was no physical means of 
doing it. The roads had limited capability and the Eastern Suburbs 
Railway had some capability but not that kind of capability. It was 
estimated I think that some 18,000 would come from the Northern, 
Western or Southern suburbs and the balance would come locally or 
from the Eastern suburbs. This would have meant a transfer of some 
18,000 people, mainly at Town Hall Station, in the peaks and that was 
virtually impossible. Outside GUMTAG, but as Chairman of GUMTAG,
I saw the Lord Mayor and members of the City Council and I think they 
had almost made up their minds that it was going ahead when I pointed 
this out to them. The fact that for good or ill they had a major 
development of their own, I found some fertile ground in which to 
spread my viev/s and as a consequence it didn't happen. That was one 
case I believe where had GUMTAG not been operative and I as Chairman 
had not been privy to a lot of things I would not have been privy to 
as Commissioner for Railways, quite conceivably the Woolloomooloo 
development would have taken place and after it had been finished 
there would have been hue and cry because we couldn't get the people 
in or out.
GIBBONS: On Woolloomooloo, in the Minutes of GUMTAG there seemed to
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be a substantial amount of conflict between CUMTAC members on one 
hand, S.P.A., City Council and especially developers on the other 
hand. The developers saw the land there as suitable for development, 
it was your res pons ibil ity to provide transport v'orks, therefore 
they do their part and the rest of it was your worry. hid you find 
that attitude?
McCUSKER: That was definitely the attitude of the developers there
and the City Council had I believe supported them to some degree 
until I saw the Lord Mayor and the aldermen. There was a change of 
face then. The planning authority was quite conscious of the problem 
when it was explained to them that transport was virtually impossible* 
This was one example of where CUMTAC did prevent what could have been 
in my view a disaster.
GIBBONS: Mr Morris told me, in referring partly to CUMTAC and partly 
to his Ministerial experience as Minister for Transport and therefore 
Minister for Railways, if I may quote him, "in my nine years and 
eight months as Minister for Transport, one of the continual 
festering sores was that the D.M.R. was a law unto itself". He 
continued that there hadn't been a mechanism which could draw the 
D.M.R. into planning, that there was total reliance on Ministerial 
mechanisms which in his view' weren't working because the Minister for 
Local Government was overburdened with other responsibilities. He 
indicated that he thought his job as Minister for Transport, with 
his responsibility for Railways and Government Transport generally, 
was quite severely disadvantaged. Would you agree?
McCUSKER: Oh yes, I would. The road transport planning of Sydney
was based on a scheme that had been drawn up by the Department of 
Main Roads sometime in the late '40s or early '50s. Somewhat later 
the scheme for the development of the Eastern Suburbs Railway was 
drawn up. They both became schemes on paper, I believe without any 
complete analysis of the costs or requirements or the service they 
provided the people. Subsequently we were able to trim down very 
severely the Eastern Suburbs Railway proposals but no such trimming- 
down took place in the D.M.R. proposals. In that area in my view 
there was a great weakness on the Government's side. We did our 
best in CUMTAC to persuade the Main Roads to do this and to do 
that, but engineers being what they are and trained to it I suppose, 
their main measure of success in life is what they build and how 
much money they spend in building it and it's very difficult to 
change them. I had the same kind of attitude in the engineers from 
my own Department so I knew something about it. Some of the 
planning for the main road development of Sydney was in my view 
quite out of this world and quite unnecessary. I took the view 
and I still hold it that the city is for people and you must 
consider the requirements of people first. The more roads you build, 
and I'm not against some road construction, I realise that the motor 
car is here to stay and is part of our life and society; but it 
can't be allowed to dominate and if there are no restraints placed 
on it you finish up with a city of roads and nothing else. For 
that reason whether we like it or we don't, public transport must 
play a dominant role in the movement of people; public transport, 
particularly railways which operate over their own right-of-way, 
which take the people into the city and then take the rolling stock 
out of the city and reverse the process in the afternoon, that's 
the proper way to do it. The more facilities you provide for roads 
the more cars you get on them. This was borne out very much when we : 
converted the two tram tracks over the Sydney Harbour Bridge to roads. 
1 was responsible for that and I make no apologies for it because 
with the concept of the double-decker trains, there was plenty of 
capacity on the two existing tracks to cater for rail services and 
there didn't seem to be any point in holding the other two tracks 
v/ith a dog-in-the-manger attitude, it was better for them to be 
converted to road. Then the Cahill Expressway came into being. I 
think I'm right in saying that within twelve months of those conver­
sions, the motor car traffic over the Bridge in the morning peak 
increased to some from memory 10,500 an hour and it was claimed that 
was the optimum, you couldn't get any more cars on. That proved the 
point that I believed to be right, that the more roads you provide 
the more cars you get on them and you're no better off in the
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finish —  in fact you’re only aggravating the situation. I think 
there's only one way to control the cars and that's by monetary 
means of imoosing parking fees that are sufficient to deter the 
people from wanting to bring their cars. I don't think there's any 
point in trying any other way, I don't think it would work.
GIBBONS: ^he way CUMTAC v/as set up, it really couldn't do much about
the D.M.R., could it?
McCUSKER: No, it couldn't, we could only try to persuade them and 
this was one of the unfortunate things. V;e could make recommendation 
which we did, to the Minister, but it seemed to break down at that 
stage. There was not any machinery to allow the 
matter to be pursued beyond the Minister. We couldn't do more 
than that. I think probably, and this is my own view-, you had one 
Minister with a strong personality, dominant, and the other one not 
so strong, and the dominant personality carried the day without 
looking at the pros and cons of the problem that was there. I'm sure 
this was the situation.
GIBBONS: Yes, that's one of the problems of that sort of system. I 
take it that this was one of the problems with the Sydney Area 
Transportation Study as well. It's remarkable how you can do so 
much investigation and come up with the D.M.R.'s plan as the end 
result — I take it that it wras a "given" from the very first?
McCUSKER: No, the Sydney Area Transportation Study stemmed
from a lot of discussion within CUMTAC. We needed a survey, if one 
can put it that way, of the transportation needs (road, rail, bus 
and whatever) and of future planning, and we decided that the proper 
thing to do was to set up S.A.T.S. The first requirement was to get 
an individual who was competent to set up the Study, who knew the 
methods and who could build up the computer models and the rest for 
the project we wanted. I was given the task of finding the man and 
I made enquiries throughout the world and was reliably informed by 
two or three sources that about 20 people in the world had this 
capability. One of them was Bob Nielsen who was in Perth at the 
time. He was a New South Welshman originally and we engaged him.
It was a wise decision. The arrangement was that he would work under 
CUMTAC and he would gather the basic information and set u p models 
and make his projections; then it was for CUMTAC to interpret that 
with him and draw conclusions. This was where the Sydney Area 
Transportation Study broke down. At the time of my retirement, in 
October 1972, the Study had then been under way for the best part of 
two years and the data gathering had been completed, the assessment 
v/as reaching the stage where it needed the practical members of 
CUMTAC to get alongside Nielsen and draw conclusions from it. I 
gather after my retirement this fell into discard and it v/as left to 
Nielsen to draw his own conclusions. Therein in my view lay the 
disaster of the Sydney Area Transportation Study. I've seen a 
number of transportation studies done, one by Sir Henry Bland in 
Victoria, and the information gathered in both studies(sic) in my view 
v/as extremely good and extremely useful. But the conclusions drawn 
bore no relationship to the information that was gathered. This is 
an unfortunate situation. So I think it fair to say that after I 
left, the influence of Main Roads became a dominant factor, it 
wasn't while I v/as there.
GIBBONS: Seeing that a substantial amount of road planning had been 
done, it would have been difficult to disregard a lot of that, as is 
now being done. Would it have been almost impossible to start 
afresh?
McCUSKER: True, they had a lot of planning done but I don't think
it v/as beyond redemption at that stage, if the proper approach had 
been made. They had for example a huge road development, the 
Southern Dustributor I think they called it, and they were going to 
knock down I don't know how many buildings out in the nedfern area.
It seemed to me quite unnecessary and I'm sure we would/ 't have 
proceeded with that. There was some need for the Western Distributor 
to relieve the traffic passing from the North and the West parts out 
of the city proper to relieve Parramatta Road. We did contemplate
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having what we called transport "corridors", in developing areas 
and in some developed areas where we could achieve it, where we'd 
have provision for rail, road, P.K.G., water, gas and electricity, 
in the one self-contained corridor. It seems to me that's the way 
to ooerate. We wanted to develop a series of (for want of a better 
name) "ring roads" to keep traffic out of the city and I think this 
would have been possible. We were contemplating a railway by-Dass 
from the Northern Line to the Southern Line and ultimately to the 
Illawarra; railways provide facilities for both passengers and 
freight and on the information we had at that time the movement of 
freight between Port Kembla and Newcastle and vice versa was likely 
to increase very substantially. We didn't want to bring it in and" 
out of the city but to by-pass it. Passengers I believe will 
ultimately grow substantially between those two cities because they 
are major industrial cities, heavy industry anyway. We also looked 
at the possibility of this line also serving for the movement of 
commuters in the Western area which was developing rapidly. I mignt 
add, and you may be aware of this, the pattern of development in 
Sydney since its inception has followed the pattern of public 
transport, and this was no better exemplified than wlienxwe electri­
fied the Western Line to Penrith in the first instance, on to 
Lithgow; the way housing development took place out there was just 
nobody's business. It was exemplified viien we electrified to Gosford, 
not for the purpose of opening up commuter movement but rather to 
enable us to operate the existing line much more economically, which 
we did; we avoided the quadruplification between Strathfield and 
Hornsby. It enabled us to do away with an expensive bank engine 
working on the Cowan Bank. I think it cost from memory B3 J million 
and it saved B3/4 million in operating costs straight away. It 
brought in its train this unexpected I think mass movement of people 
up in the Woy Woy-Gosford area who wanted to work in Sydney. I can 
well recall at the official opening up there that I made a very 
strong plea to the people not to allow the Gosford-Woy Y/oy area to 
become a dormitory suburb of Sydney, but to develop industry in those 
areas. But this I think exemplifies the important influence that 
rail transport has on development.
GIBEOHS: There is a related matter which ties in with this coordina­
tion that I'm concerned with, firstly the Public Transport Commission 
and secondly the Sydney Area Transportation Stud3r’s recommendations 
for machinery changes in Sydney. I assume that the recommendations 
for the revised governmental structure in Sydney were Nielsen's, 
were they?*
McCUSKER: I don’t know, I don't think so, in fact I don't knovr 
where they came from. They originated as far as I know from 
Government sources. Whether he had made any submissions, I don't 
know. I did not and still do not advocate a Commission as such. I 
don't believe, and I think experience has shown it hasn't been 
successful. Experience throughout the world has shown that commis­
sions per se are not entirely satisfactory, for two reasons. First 
of all, you tend to create a series of factions within Departments 
when you've got more than one boss, and this isn't good. If there's 
one man making the decision, everybody knows he's going to make it 
and they comply or else. From the governmental point of view, if 
he's not successful they have their remedies. A Commission to 
coordinate, as they're trying to do now, the railways, the buses and 
the ferries, is quite impracticable, quite unreal, quite unnecessary 
I think. If you just look at the buses and the rail, the railways 
radiate from the centre in three or four directions, the trains are 
operating on their own right-of-way, it's an intensive system 
operating at two minute intervals. The timetable is conditioned 
largely by the junctions. There's an optimum timetable that can be 
drawn and must be adhered to; if the Railway Department is operating 
efficiently it must run its trains to time. Given that circumstance, 
it’s virtually impossible to coordinate a bus with a train because
* Due to the wording of tne question, Hr HcCusker replied regarding 
the recommendations (which originated from the Ministry of Transport) 
re the P.7.0., not the S.A.T.S. Report itself.
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most coordinating buses operate transversely whereas the railways 
operate vertically, and their timetable is hopefully to meet at various stations across country three or four different sets of 
railway operations. Anybody who's had any experience in transport 
will know that coordination under those conditions, particularly 
when the road vehicle is not master of its own destiny but is con­
ditioned on everybody else who wants to use the road over which it 
operates, can't be maintained. I don't believe there was any 
serious lack of coordination between the buses and rail, tnere may 
have been a few instances where buses ran parallel to the rail but 
not many. There was and is some case for trying to coordinate buses 
and ferries but it seems to me that it should have started and 
stopped there. You've got a situation now in the Commission where 
the railways are the major component and must always tend to be.
The commuter section of the railways is no more than 20 per cent 
perhaps of the whole of railway operations, but when you bring in 
these coordination factors you find that of necessity the emphasis 
of the Commission's activities is devoted to the 20 per cent, and 
the rest of it is just swinging free, as it were.
GIBBONS: Would there be some advantage in splitting them? As an 
aside, Mr Morris said he was in favour, for a while anyway, of 
splitting urban and the country activities. Would that lead to a 
more efficient concentration of effort?
McCUSKER: I wouldn't think so, because the railways, whether
suburban (or urban), interurban or country, operate over one set of 
facilities, you just can't split them. I'd thought about this quite 
a deal. There may be justification for a metropolitan transport 
authority whose role it is to provide efficient transport for the 
metropolitan area, but leaving the Railways to contract to this 
authority for the services they require —  to operate them, and for 
the authority not to interfere with the operations of the Railways. 
They would say to the Railway Commissioner, these are our require­
ments. Sometimes you can meet them all, sometimes you can't. Bor example, you couldn't allow a slight improvement in commuter 
operations to deny the free movement of interstate passengers, they 
operate over the same tracks. People who come from Melbourne or Brisbane or Perth or the country, we used to timetable the trains 
deliberately to avoid the peak hours but at certain times you can't 
avoid conflict of movement. You can't just stop everything to let 
metropolitan commuters have their way. On the freight side, it's 
equally important because looking at the overall picture it's my 
view that the long-distance freight should be on rail, that's its 
proper place, and if you don't provide the efficient services it 
will go on to the roads and you'll have more and more congestion, 
not only in the country but also in the metropolitan area. One of ' 
the problems as I see it at the moment, which I tried to avoid, is 
these long-distance lorries coming into the metropolitan area because 
they're doing more to congest the movement of vehicular traffic than 
anybody realises. I was very strongly opposed to the lifting of the 
Co-ordination Tax, for two reasons. One, because railways were 
providing social community services without which I believe the 
country generally would have been severely disadvantaged, and they 
needed some protection because there wasn't enough volume for both 
rail and road, and after I retired they lifted the Co-ordination 
Tax with the result that railway services to the country areas have 
been cut to the bone and the roads are being chewed up by these 
heavy vehicles. So we're losing both ways and this doesn't take 
into account the intense congestion that the city roads are carrying 
with this heavy transport. I go out to the Airport a couple of 
times a month and it's amazing the number of big lorries that are 
out there taking up road space.
GIBBONS: Now you've mentioned the Airport, can we discuss the
Southern Suburbs Railway and CUMTAC's efforts to get a more 
efficient transport system for Mascot? Reading the (CUMTAC)
Minutes, two issues came up, one was the ability of the Railways to 
undertake its feasibility study and reliance on Treasury for the 
funds, and the second was the apparent reliance on a new railway 
system by CUMTAC and the fact that the railway didn't go through —  the difficulties CUMTAC had in carrying its planning into effect.
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McCUSKER: This is true and we had the plans but plans were of no
avail without Government backing, and tnis was where the hiatus 
took place. CUMTAC came up with some very sound planning but it 
stopped at that and the Government didn't pursue It. Taking the 
Airport as a case in point, I don't think there's any doubt^but 
that there will be an increasing demand to take people to and from 
hascot Airport, and there's not any doubt in the"world that the 
current road system won't carry them. In addition the Airoort 
problem will be compounded by the development of Botany Bay as a 
port; that will generate road traffic whether people like" it or 
not. it seemed to me, and CUMTAO agreed with me, that we must plan 
for a railway to the Airport so that people will have an opportunity 
to get to it free of all congestion, missing planes and the like.
We looked at two propositions, the first was the extension of the 
Eastern Suburbs Railway to the Airport —  I still think that's a 
reasonable, sound idea and a good investment; and the second, in the 
shorter term, was a link from the Illawarra Line just south of Tempe 
into the Airoort proper. That was feasible, relatively cheap and it 
provided, I think from memory, a 12 or 15 minute trip from the 
Airport into the heart of the city by train, on existing facilities, 
all we'd do is put in this link. Subsequently we hoped we1d provide 
a link with the Eastern Suburbs Railway so that we'd"have a circle.
I still think it's got to come. We're extremely fortunate in Sydney 
in my view in having the Airport right in the heart of the city and 
we want to take every advantage of it. It takes 40, 45 minutes to 
get from Melbourne's Tullamarine to the heart of the city, in normal 
times, in peak hour goodness knows how long you'd take.
GIBBONS: You didn't actually have much support from the federal 
authorities in trying to get that railway,"did you?
McCUSKER: No, the federal people didn't want to be in it at all.
There was no machinery really in the federal area to do this kind of 
thing. I was able to get them along with Malcolm Sommers to set up 
the Bureau of Transport Economics, that was initiated by me as a 
means of trying to get more Commonwealth money available for 
railways in Australia. We were successful in that but it was 
necessarily a long-term problem, they were interested more in inter­
state than intra-State traffic.
GIBBONS: Do you feel that the members of CUMTAC were fully committed 
themselves to the railway, did they try to push for it?
McCUSKER: Yes, yes, it went forward as a recommendation and we 
didn't put anything forward unless it was unanimous. What went on 
behind the scenes I'm not aware of. I had a job to do to run the 
Railways as well as chair CUMTAC.
GIBBONS: When the Southern Suburbs Railway was being considered, I 
suppose in connection with the link from Tempe, you wanted to employ 
consultants to investigate the v/ater table, etc.", in the area to see 
if the railway line was feasible. You made a point in the Minutes 
that the Railways didn't have the ability to fund that research, 
that you would have to do it by Treasury grant. Was that a general 
arrangement, what was its significance?
McCUSKER: No, as the Commissioner for Railways, this scheme, what­
ever it was, was going to be a losing proposition from my ooerational 
and financial standpoint, but it could have been of benefit*to the 
community generally. Erom my financial resources, I didn't have the 
money to engage people to investigate that kind of thing, I felt it 
was properly a Government responsibility, it was somewhat analogous 
to S.A.T.S. I saw no reason why they shouldn't fund this one. I 
personally didn't believe that the Southern Suburbs Railway would be 
built, I still believe that the proper thing is to go from the 
Illawarra Line across to that area, it was only a mile-and-a-half or 
something like that. The planning people were concerned about the 
Southern Suburbs Railway and one imust be fair and say it had some 
relevance I think to the Botany Bay port development", although my 
view of that development, and I put this forward very strongly, I
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advocated the development on the northern shores of Botany Bay 
because v/e had a goods line which could service it there, we had 
estimates taken out, we could duplicate it from Marrickville to 
wherever it was to go, it would have relieved tne whole of the road 
movement in that area. The freight would move over the goods, line 
as it does on all the other goods lines. I was always strongly 
opposed to requests that v/e put passenger trains on the existing 
goods lines because you can't mix them and run either successfully.
I remind you that freight is equally important from an economic 
standpoint as the movement of people.
GIBEONS: You put uo a proposal to the Treasury that they fund that 
investigation, I hope this wasn't typical of Treasury's involvement 
but you got a letter back from Sir Charles Cutler, then Acting 
Premier, saying no. You had the Treasury sitting there for years 
and you write to the Treasury asking for a relatively small amount 
of money and they write back saying no.
McCUSKER: Well this is so. It depended to a large extent on the 
Treasurer and the Under Secretary of the Treasury.
GIBBOUS: But he was on the Committee, wasn't he'
McCUSKER: He was on the Committee, yes. I think it wouldn't be 
telling tales out of school to indicate that while he was in agree­
ment with it as a member of the Committee, he indicated that there 
was no money in the coffers anyhow. We were bound to put it up. I 
found the Treasury fellows personally cooperative, v/e got on very 
well personally. They were of course influenced and advised or 
dictated to, whatever you like to term it, by the Minister or 
Government of the day, they had to conform to Government policy. My 
hunch is that the stronger the personality of the Minister, the more 
money he got for his Department.
GIBBOUS: You said that you would have liked CUMTAC to have had some 
statutory authority, could I suggest that that would have been a 
substitute for the Public Transport Commission? Would it have been 
a more satisfactory substitute, do you think:'
McCUSKER: I think it would have been. If it were a statutory
authority then its viev/s would have had more weight and it would have- 
been responsible to one Minister who v/ould then have been obligated 
to act. As it was an ad hoc and advisory authority, reporting to two 
or three Ministers, it got nowhere really —  that's not quite true, 
it didn't clinch the things. Had it been a statutory authority then 
the whole community would have taken more notice of what it said.
Eor example, the City Council set up a study under Clarke Gazzard 
and the rest; I think it fair to say that CUMTAC, through one or two 
of us, exercised a pretty substantial influence on that report.Clarke 
did come to discuss it v/ith us, he had certain preconceived ideas 
which w^e were able to disabuse his mind about. I think by and large 
he came up v/ith not a bad sort of report. I think it's fair to say 
that had it not been for CUMTAC, it could quite easily have been a 
very different report.
GIBBONS: Regarding yourpersonal role, you've already indicated that 
if CUMTAC was to get something done it was through your persuading 
people that it was in their best interest. Would that have changed 
v/ith statutory powrer, v/ould it have say been a meeting of ten men 
sitting around and voting on an issue?
McCUSKER: No, whilst ever I was chairman I didn't see it that way.
I think if you can get a consensus, getting people to do things 
because you convince them that that's the right thing to do, you're 
getting somewhere. If you take a vote and you get a majority, it's 
not satisfactory, because people's hearts are not in it.
GIBBONS: Isn't the resolution of conflict implied by tne governments
process? If you strike at home issues which are important to the 
metropolis, if you nave a conflicting viewpoint, then maybe it's a
matter of deciding what is the ’’common good"?
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McCUSKER: I agree, I think CUMTAC could have done that. There 
would have been occasions no doubt when of necessity a decision 
would have had to be forced. My experience has been that it deoends 
a lot on the chairman, whether you get the goodwill of people, or 
you get the confidence of them, more to the point. Provided the 
chairman's fair I've found that in these areas he has to take the 
leading role if he wants to get the organisation going anywhere. If 
they come to have confidence in the fairmindedness of the chairman 
they'll tend to fall into line pretty well. They'll express a point 
of view and they'll be prepared to compromise. I'm not
suggesting for exam-ole that a chairman knows everything, he doesn't, 
but his role 1 think is to draw out the views of everybody and try 
and assess them, sum up the good and the bad and put them in such a 
way that the others will see a total picture. Each one comes there 
with his own point of view but when you put them together it's auite 
a different picture.
GIBBONS: Mr Trott is now Chairman. He's in a different position to 
the one you were in. The Ministry is now playing a more Important 
role, especially in bringing the D.M.R. more into the fold. Bo you 
think he has perhaps an advantage over you by virtue of the fact that 
he has only a coordinative function and not a vested interest?
McCUSKER: I don't know', I haven't had very much contact with him. I 
think the value of long practical experience in this field would 
possibly outweigh any advantages that an independent chairman might 
have. My experience has been that a chairman can lead the discussion, 
he can exercise (if that's the term) a degree of compromise. Human 
beings, being what they are, are more prone to accept suggestions 
from somebody with a track record behind them than they are to accent 
suggestions from somebody on the outside.
GIBBONS: I might misrepresent you by saying that you had a vested
interest because the Railways had an established system, unlike the 
D.M.R. which was trying to push a new programme. The Railways already- 
had their construction done, there were adjustments to be made but 
you weren't exactly in that position of vested interest, were you?
McCUSKER: I had a vested interest in one wray although I feel that 
this was countered somewhat by the financial constraints and problems 
that I had as Railways Commissioner. I was looking for ways and 
means of easing my financial problems, and it would be fair to say 
that this would have had some influence on my thinking but I 
endeavoured to look at it on quite an impartial basis. I don't 
suppose anybody knew New South Wales more intimately than I did. I 
travelled N.S.W. regularly, I visited every railway station every 
two years in the time I was Commissioner, I met people and so on. I 
knewr the problems of the country and the metropolitan area perhaps as 
well as most people.
Australia is a developing country, it has only a limited 
amount of resources. It’s in the best interest of Australia and 
Australians if we deploy those resources where we’re going to get the 
greatest value. It didn't matter to me if the value was in roeds or 
rail or air or what. I was also on the committee on the second 
Sydney airport, I think I was able to take an objective view there.
I v/as on the committee on materials handling, and the National labour 
Advisory Council, all these things, I think very largely because it 
was felt I had e national outlook rather than a purely railway out­
look. It comes back largely I think to individuals and my experience 
in life has been that the greatest success comes through somebody who 
has an appreciation of human relations. It's as simole as that.
You can have all the academic qualifications, you can have all the 
other things but if you can't bring men together and get them to 
compromise, well what does it mean.'’
GIBBONS: That's the art of being a chairman.
\Tr> ^'']"Tc,F"FU *- ^  j  ^ inI've always had that philosophy and I practised
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Railways. I started off as Commissioner for Railways with 5£,000 
and finished up with about 43,000 people, it was what they did. I 
could bring their individual efforts into collective operation, I 
could lav down the nolicy and insoire them or lead them, but they were 
doing the work, not me.
GIBBONS: I don’t want to go into great detail but that’s where the
P.T.C. failed, isn't it?
McCUSKER: Oh my word, railwayrnen are a peculiar race of people for 
the reason that they operate in a service industry unlike any other 
you can find. It’s necessary for them to have confidence in trie man 
who leads them, whoever he may be, and they will only have that 
confidence, irrespective of what kind of individual they may be, if 
they feel that he knows what their business is all about. When I 
was there we had about one thousand locations and these fellows, 
living all over N.S.W., had a necessity to have confidence in the 
administration because their lives and those of their families were 
tied-up inextricably, they had no other job to go to. I've always 
felt a tremendous responsibility rested on me to make sure they were 
not let down. I think it’s as simple as that. They’d do anything 
for you, those fellows, if they respect you.
GIBBONS: It was disappointing as a student to have contact with
oeople who saw the Railways being virtually destroyed and quite 
deliberately. Mr Shirley had his ideas, and perhaps they were good 
ones, but it seemed to be a waste.
McCUSKER: It was. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. The
Railways are only as good as the men in them and as you can 
appreciate 99.8 per cent I think of railwayrnen come from no higher 
educational standing than the Intermediate Certificate, the other .2 
per cent or whatever are better than that. When you sift through 
this and you've got to bring men through into responsible positions, 
the opportunities for the administration to select good men are 
especially restricted. They only bob up here and there and part of 
my task was to make sure that the likely ones were given the opport­
unity. I had some particularly good men, they weren't academically 
qualified but they were very good, they had a flair for it. Most of 
the efficient operation rested heavily on these fellows. They're 
all getting out at sixty now, they're disillusioned; this is tragic,
I feel sorry for the new man, he's denuded. I believe from what I 
know you would be hard put to get half a dozen fellows who could 
manage the operating side of railways and it is the key side. The 
engineering side, the accounts side, the legal side, the signals 
side, they all service the operating section. I inculcated this 
into them. Now to pick somebody who could get their overall concept 
and performance isn't looking very easy.
* * * * * * *
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GIBBOUS: Mr Cox, can I ask you first about your idea, of 
transport policy generation and evaluation —  what is the 
role of URTAO in formulating transport policy?
SOX: Its role is in investigating: at the present moment 
I've got them dealing with the urban corridors. I look on 
them as a vital adjunct to this Ministry in as much as they're 
there to make an evaluation of the existing programmes and 
future works.
GIBBONS: Bo you find it helps you to co-ordinate the various 
Departments and put them in a perspective that is fair to all 
and yet is effective?
OCX: In the brief period 
to be extremely useful on 
concern or proposal I can 
opportunity of making the 
take place.
I have been Minister I've found them 
the basis that if I've got any 
refer it to them and I have the 
final assessment as to what should
GIBBOUS: Mr Morris told me that when Mr Fife became Minister 
he had a problem with the Department of Main Roads, and I've 
heard the same from many sources. Do you think that URTAO 
has been useful in bringing the D.U.R. more into line with 
Government planning?
COX: This was before I came in but URTAO did a review of
expressways and took the initiative at that stage and even 
though they didn't go as far as our policy, they certainly 
made some pretty drastic changes in planning that the D.M.R. 
has approved; fairly big changes took place there.
GIBBOUS: Would you agree with Mr Morris's assessment that 
at no stage was the D.M.R. required by the then Government to 
justify its programmes, to cost them?
OCX: I don't know what took place when Mr Morris was Minister, 
he didn't have control over the D.M.R. at that stage. I 
insisted on a works programme being submitted this financial 
year, which we got; I don’t know if it was the first time it 
ever occurred.
TROTT: If I may add to what the Minister has said, Mr Cox
has followed the line that Mr Fife followed when the D.M.R. 
came into the Transport portfolio. If he had been Wal Fife 
he would have done the same. I'd agree wholeheartedly with 
v/hat Mr Morris said: what he was saying, at least by 
inference, was that when the D.M.R. was brought into the 
Transport family it was increasingly exposed Qif that's the 
right word) to Government evaluation and appraisal of their 
programmes. For instance until the Department joined the 
Transport fold, it was the Commissioner for Main Roads who 
approved of programmes, it was the Commissioner who approved 
of grants to councils, but that's no longer so. There has 
been a provision in the D.M.R. Act for many years that it is 
subject to the direction and control of the Minister but it 
was only when they v/ere brought into the Transport /fold that 
that power was exercised and they are now obliged (and they 
accept it) to make submissions to the Minister for approval.
Une y mi, •htn't like it bis ■eu p- accented 1/
GIBBQUC : This reçu ire d fairly strong interver. t 
Minister'?
in fro:. c
4/2
COX: Yes.
?ROmT: Once having had that intervention they've accepted 
that hr Cox is fairly strong-rinded.
under the
they
COX: I supported that change, that the U.M.R.
^'ransoort portfolio, I ’d been saying for years 
should if we were to have a balanced transport 
You can’t have one Department operating on its 
completely independent of the major public transport systems.
come 
that
programme 
own wavelength,
4 l now rotGIBBONS: This would have changed URTAC's role, i 
a far more effective role. Is it now guiding the Governmen- 
in a strong v/ay —  when you get opinions from URTAC the 
Minister has already got a balanced view?
COX: I think it’s an instrument that we use. he have a
Cabinet sub-committee looking at expressways and we’ve come 
a substantial way to making a recommendation which will go 
soon to Cabinet. At the same time I ’ve asked URTAC to do 
this complete corridor review. I think its role is one 
of objectivity —  standing away from the Departments it 
makes its assessment. I think this is the proper system.
TROTT: As the Minister says, URTAC is just one instrument at 
the disposal of the Government for evaluating long-term 
transportation policy. URTAC is not supposed to deal with 
the detailed operations of the various undertakings. The 
Commissioners of those undertakings are members of URTAC; its 
is essentially a co-ordinating, policy advising role in 
urban transport. It does get ad hoc tasks from the Government 
of the day but it is essentially an overview role. It 
doesn't get involved in detailed matters. The Minister has 
other instruments at his disposal for implementing Government 
policy, such as the undertakings themselves.
GIBBONS: As for the Cabinet committees, are they very 
important? Mr Morris said that he liked using Cabinet 
committees because they cut down on the v/aste of time when 
one Department has to write to a Minister, he has to write 
to another Minister and he writes then to other Ministers —  
he thought there was often a dreadful waste of tine.
OCX: The Cabinet sub-committees that I ’ve sat on, the two 
major ones, the Newcastle Dockyard (which v/as a big job and a 
useful operation), and the Cabinet.sub-committee on express­
ways, have brought all the Departments together, have had 
discussions and got their views, and then went awaj^  as a 
Cabinet sub-committee and made the decisions. It does short 
cut the involved operations.
GIBBONS: Do you intend to leave the governmental framework 
basically as it is or do you think it might be desirable to 
say integrate the Departments more closely? I was thinking 
of the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administ­
ration's concept of ’’accountable management, where each 
Department is accountable for a particular f v - otter. l-: ' d down 
centrally, versus a structural, change, like the Public 
Transport Commission only all-embracing.
COX: What Department are you talking about?
GIBBONS: The D.M.R., Traffic Authority, Motor Transport, 
and P.T.C. as it is now.
TROTT: You mean a .much larger operating agency, something 
like the P.T.C. augmented, with day-to-day control! of main 
roads as well as running the trains.’
do you think it would be a good idee?GIBBONS : Y o c  c  *-• ,
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C07: No, I don’t think it would be, the P.T.C. is 
as it is now. I think it’s a bit unw’ieldly, we're 
at getting some reorga:.: sation in that structure, 
immense operation and we’ve got to get better line 
communication, Or Keiher is working tow rds that, 
discussions on it.
big enough 
looking
we 'v e had
TROTT: As I've explained to Robert, the J. has the
function of running the Government-owned buses, trains and 
ferries and we reckon they've got enough to do there without 
getting into other areas. If v/e had a larger organisation 
it would be completely unwieldly.
107: I shudder to think of it.
GIBBONS: I was looking back historically and 
Government did try something like that before 
work then.
the labor 
but it didn't
TROTT: You're talking about 60,000 people —  the P.T.O. 
now has about 45,000 ...
COX: It's got more, 44,000 in rail and the buses on top
of that.
TROTT: I thought they'd come below 50,000.
GIBBONS: Regarding new' planning (this is policy as distinct 
from administration), are you happy with the way the bus 
systems are presently running, especially in the suburbs?
00X: I ’m not very happy with the bus operations, one of the
big problems there is that it's such an old fleet: we can’t 
maintain services as advertised and that being the case we've 
got very little prospect of getting the people back to buses, 
if v/e' re forced to cut services each day —  this is happening 
now.
At this point Mr Cox v/as called away from the discussion.
GIBBONS: I didn't put that very well. I v/as thinking of
the S.A.T.S. recommendations, especially in terms of the bus 
system currently following the oid tram routes which were 
laid down before the turn of the century for the most part.
I v/as wondering if that's a handicap.
Mr Cox returned. 7
mR0Tm : Robert was saying that perhaps he could have put the 
cuestion a. little more clearly, with more emphasis on the 
rationalisation of bus operations, for instance v/e now have 
bus services parallelling train services in some areas.
COX: Bo you mean mainly the new suburbs?
GIBBONS: Providing a service not just on the main routes 
but providing a wider range of services.
'OX : It a matter of capital. The way we are approach­
ing it at the moment is —  let's improve what we've got.
basically our theme. I can see us in the next ev.
undertaking major new development although I ear seeyea.
problems in relation to 
little flak in that are;
private bus operations, we've had 
. If you can believe what thev si
some of them aren't going too v/e 
Cabinet committee having a look 
things, we're introducing a smal 
scheme to attract some off-peak
better clean? 
not in
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get into nev areas. At the moment our lorrer on buses are 
worse than on the rail services.
IEFOKS: One of the things that the 
tion Study pointed out was that bus 
ram routes of the last century.
Sy dn ei Arc a T ran s port - 
serv  i c e s  fo 11 ov t he ol :•
OX: he’ll have an opportunity when the Eastern Suburbs 
ailway starts of making some changes there, but I haver *t 
ad time enough to make an assessment of whether we mould 
hange particular bus routes which are operating at the moment, 
know that whenever we suggest a change we always have 
petitions sent in from local residents who object. You fix
up one group and disadvantage another group. There 
these factors to look at.
re ,11
The discussion finished at this point due to shortage of 
time. J
Appendix 5
The following interview with hr K .J 
finistry of Transport and Highways, 
} ovember, 1976. In the second part 
Peter Cox, M.L.A., Minister for Tra 
discussion in continuance of the in
. Trott, Under Secretary of the 
was held on Monday 29th 
of the interview the Hon. 
ns port and Highways, joined the 
terview of 19th 1ovember, 1976
(separate transcript). Mot to be cited or quoted without
permission.
Robert Gibbons.
IBBONS: 
;et u p  I
Gould we > 
understand
;tart with the history of the Ministry 
in 1932, is that corree* “f- ?
rp j^Qmm .
passed 
what came
The legislation, 
in 1932 as one of t 4
to be known a;
—  it was
Act, was
set up
sterial
Ministry
called the Ministry7 of Transport 
a number of Acts, but that didn 
the Ministerial Office. The Mi 
Office hasn’t been set up by statute but there has been 
of Transport formed by legislation. This Office did 
small Ministerial Office and for some years probably 
more than a co-ordinating post office. It was estab 
Colonel Bruxner and the first head of the Ministry w 
Railway officer, Mr Leo Grose, he held the job for s 
was succeeded by Mr Eric Holt. With the coming of Mr Holt the 
Ministry started to grow’ in importance, partly because of the 
competence of Eric Holt, partly through force of circumstances. 
Eric was a graduate in Arts from Sydney University and had had 
experience in other Departments before he joined the Ministry, 
was head of the Ministry through a very critical period, he was
start rj, o  r'<d  L CX
was 1ittle
lisheu under
as & seconded
ome years and
;ome
He
the
permanent head who 
ir the Ministry*
elevated the status of the permanent head's job
GIBBONS: He came in sometime in the 1950s?
TROTT: No, he came in I think in the late '40s, he had served under
Leo Grose for some period as his deputy, but when Leo retired Sric 
Holt took over as Secretary?- of the Ministry, as he was then called. 
He was Secretary and then Under Secretary for many years, I think 
from about 1949 through to 1970. It was in his time that the job 
was elevated...
GIDEONS: Very slowly, I take it.
TROTT: Yes, rather slowly. I came in as deputy to Eric Holt in 
1965. My coming coincided with the change in government, there had 
been a Labor Government in office for many years, and my coming was 
of some assistance to the Ministry at the time. I came from the 
Public Service, I knew my way around staffing, as well I had 
personal contacts at the Public Service Board which enabled us very 
ouickly to build up the staff of the Ministry. I think at one time.
relatively soon after 1965, well over 80/6 of the Mini;
V/e had an** infusion of experience from many Department: 
the Ministry. Soon after I took over I joined URTAC and then 
gradually the Ministry started to assume a much more positive 
role in relation to the administration of URTAC v/hich has now been 
done here for some time. Eventually I became Chairman of URTAC. 
The Ministry has also been strengthened to some extent by the 
addition of the Highways portfolio to Transport: soon after the 
transfer, after discussion with the then Minister, Mr V/al Life, I 
persuaded the Public Service Board to agree to a reorganisation of 
the Ministry. The main matter of interest to you, I wound tnink, 
arising out of the discussions, and assisted to some extent fortu-
■overnment Review1 that was current at 
m of Development Co-ordination under 
:d Gordon,'who is called the Chief 
the Federal Department of Transport,
;ry v/e re new 
comina irto
it ou sij by•-V the Mach inery of (
the time I we set up <•1 T ia jjivisL
Gordon Mes siter. V/e re cruiti
PIannin ry o A¿ministra tor, from
and vi 4Uh ois coming and the .
divisi 0n ) we now ha ve a very
• f i  i  — L ó -1 men who are pettno ing b'
advice + 0 the Minis ter. The
approval of the Developing
;ood policy core.
are
;ed before the establishment o:
still
this
,bini­
ne v c
na open 12
Division -so / •
Co-ordinalia
some top­
e d  icy
3 —  iiad 
instance we
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till have a plan to establish e container tcminai at Enfield
which
stand;
wa.
i b i '
planned n 
from its
jown
the Pub! 
Doint
a marvellous plan but 
was given to the road 
It
ic m rari sport Division suite und er­
oi view, for own
O '
wasn
the problem was that ver, 
works that are necessary
until flak started from local people
i r t e re s t . 11 w a s
litt]e attention 
around the terminal. 
that this war nicked
up. This would never happen again since the establishment of the
Development Co-ordination Division. Similarly a freight terminal 
has beer established at Tamworth but it's not functioning because 
there’s a demarcation issue between the Transport Workers Union and 
the Australian Railways Union over who is going to drive the road 
vehicles as a result of rail services being cut out. Again this 
would not happen under our new set-up. As you probably know the 
Urban Transport Study Croup, which is attached to URTAC, is also 
under the control of the Development Co-ordination Division.
I think we’ve got quite a good Ministry here. It’s been 
assisted in evolving to its present state by the growth in intensity 
of activity in Commonwealth/State relations in transport. The 
Development Co-ordination Division is very much caught up with 
Commonwealth/State relatione — the Ministry is the principal State 
agency concerned with relations with the Federal transport people. 
V/e're in daily contact with them and the officers of the Ministry 
are well known to officers in the Federal sphere. Of course 
Federal/State relations have increased in importance between the 
Commonwealth Government and other State Governments and again in 
turn between State Governments and State Governments. At one time, 
when I first came here, we barely knew the people in the other 
governments, Eric Holt might have known some of them, but now 
there's almost daily contact with other States. I think this is 
good for transport and good for Australia.
In brief then the Ministry is still a small co-ordinating 
agency. We try to ensure that v/e don't duplicate the work of the 
undertakings, we're concerned principally with providing the Minister 
with policy advice over the whole transport spectrum; we're 
particularly concerned that the transport undertakings speak with 
the one voice and with ensuring that one arm of the administration 
knows what the other arm is doing. That's harder than you might 
think because in some respects certain branches of the Transport 
Ministry —  I am talking of the Ministry overall —  have conflicting 
functions, road/rail for instance. We're also concerned with 
providing a legislative service to the Minister: draft legislation 
is prepared in the Ministry with the assistance of the undertakings. 
We put up proposals to Cabinet from here, either by initiating 
Cabinet proposals or by assisting the departments with proposals 
they have initiated. We try to ensure that we all work as*a team. 
That's one of the things I've noticed improving over the years, 
relations with the departments. The departments still tend to 
regard us as an unnecessary step in their communication with the 
Minister but they don't feel so strongly about us now as they used 
to.
GIBBOUS: Mr Morris hinted in his 
the Legislative Assembly) that at 
this Ministry was to be downgrade 
attitude?
recent exchange with Mr Cox (in 
one time there was a danger that 
d. Was that due to that hostile
'RCTT : Many oeoole f e 1 ■
direct policy advice to the Minister, but in fa 
work as a team, we're not in conflict, 
matter of conflict later; I'll fini 
Ministry. V/e provide the legisiativ 
provide a Cabinet service to him, wc 
for transport relations inter— State-,
;ric Holt was elevat e d in s>t o.t w
ist confess that Tr was onc of
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r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  s e r v i c e .  Th is  T suppose  you could  c a l l  the 
b r e a d - a n d - b u t t e r  a r e a  o f  the M in is t ry  . We g e t  more f l a k  through 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  problems than any o th e r  a r e a .  Hundreds o f  l e t t e r s  
come i n t o  the M in i s t r y  weekly and we dea] with e wide v a r i e t y  o f  
t r a n s p o r t  t o p i c s .  The p r o c e s s i n g  o f  t h e s e  l e t t e r s  r e q u i r e s  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  s k i l l .  We have a  number o f  f e l l o w s  here vho I hope 
have p o l i t i c a l  nous and a r e  aware o f  trie p o l i t i c a l  problems t h a t  
can be cau sed  to  a government by the m ish an d l in g  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  
to  th e  m i n i s t e r .  The m i n i s t e r s  o f  the day f i n d  i t  h a rd "n o t  to  
r e g a r d  t h a t  work a s  the most im p o r ta n t ,  f o r  f a i r l y  obvious r e a s o n s .  
The lo n g - te rm  p la n s  and the  t r a n s p o r t  " e t h o s ’’ ( i f  th e r e  i s  one) 
a r e  im p o rtan t  but the  m i n i s t e r  h as  a t a s k  a p a r t  from t h i s  e t h o s ,  
t h e r e ' s  not so  much urgency in  watching i t s  development.  H e ' s  go t  
t o  keep  h i s  government in  power and in  the t r a n s p o r t  a r e a  t h a t ' s  
t e r r i b l y  im portan t  b ecau se  e v e r y o n e ' s  concerned with t r a n s p o r t .  So 
we ha.ve q u i t e  a number o f  o f f i c e r s  h e r e ,  j u n i o r  and s e n i o r ,  who 
a s s i s t  in  the p r o c e s s i n g  o f  t h i s  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  work. Everybody 
in th e  M in i s t r y  g e t s  in v o lv e d  in i t  to  some e x t e n t ,  depending on 
im portance  — im portance  i s  not measured n e c e s s a r i l y  by the b i g n e s s  
o f  th e  m a t t e r  un der  rev u e ,  such a s  the  c a p i t a l  works programme o f  
the  P . T . C . ,  but a l s o  by whether the  m a t te r  i s  blown up to  some­
t h i n g  b i g  even though i t  might be tem p o rary .  A s t r i k e * f o r  i n s t a n c e  
can assume q u i t e  s i g n i f i c a n t  p r o p o r t i o n s ;  a  s t r i k e  in  one o f  the 
workshops can "b lo w -u p " ,  th e r e  might be an urgency motion in  the 
House which can assume some im p o rtan c e .  I th in k  you know what I 'm  
g e t t i n g  a t .
T h e r e ’ s one o t h e r  t h i n g  the M in i s t r y  b r i n g s  to  the t r a n s p o r t  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n :  we r e g a r d  o u r s e l v e s  a s  h av in g  an o b l i g a t i o n  to  
r e l a t e  t r a n s p o r t  t o  o v e r a l l  government p o l i c y  and w e 're  ex p e c te d  to  
know o v e r a l l  government p o l i c y ,  in  f a c t  we have c o n t a c t  with o th e r  
p o l i c y - m a k e r s  which the  u n d e r t a k in g s  might not  have .  Eor in s t a n c e  
we have very  c l o s e  c o n t a c t s  with the  P r e m ie r ' s  Department,  with the 
T r e a s u r y ,  in  f a c t  w ith  most o f  the  Departments  o f  any s i z e .  V.’e 
f e e l  we can b r in g  t h i s  wide p e r s p e c t i v e  o r  we car  s e t  a l a r g e r  scene 
in  which t r a n s p o r t  can o p e r a t e .  R e l a t i o n s  with the  u n d e r t a k in g s  
a r e  im proving  c o n s i d e r a b l y ,  c e r t a i n l y  r e l a t i o n s  between the 
permanent heads o f  th e  u n d e r t a k in g s  a re  q u i t e  good. We meet 
f r e q u e n t l y ,  w e 're  on the ’ phone to  each o t h e r  a l l  the  t im e ,  we meet 
a t  URTAC, we meet a s  a group a t  m eet ings  o f  the  A u s t r a l i a n  T r a n sp o r t  
A d v isory  C o u n c i l ;  I 'm  f r e q u e n t l y  in  the u n d e r t a k in g s  d i s c u s s i n g  
one m a t t e r  o r  a n o t h e r .  We're g r a d u a l l y  becoming a c c e p te d  a s  a 
n e c e s s a r y  p a r t  o f  th e  t r a n s p o r t  s c e n e .  I th in k  the  f a c t  t h a t  we 
s u r v i v e d  the  Machinery o f  Government Review i s  q u i t e  s i g n i f i c a n t .  
We've had the  P u b l i c  S e r v i c e  Board acknowledging the need f o r  the  ' 
M in i s t r y  and, in  f a c t  soon a f t e r  the  Machinery o f  Government Review, 
a g r e e i n g  to  i t s  s t r e n g t h e n i n g .
c o - o r d i n a t i o n  
snd he s a i d  no. 
fom  the l a c k  o f
: I a sk ed  Mr McCusker i f  he thought t h a t
between the  u n d e r t a k in g s  was good b e fo r e  CUMTAC,
I a sk ed  him to  i d e n t i f y  the  problems t h a t  a r o s e  . 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n  and he thought t h a t  the i n a b i l i t y  to  g e t  t r a n s p o r t  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  i n j e c t e d  in t o  l a n d  u se  p la n n in g  was the  m ajor  f a c t o r  
He s a i d  t h a t  when a new a r e a  was p lanned ,  s ay  Oampbelltown, 
in a d e q u a te  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  was g iv e n  to  t r a n s p o r t .  Would you ag re e  
and were t h e r e  o th e r  prob lem s?
TROTT: I do a g re e  and th e r e  were o th e r  prob lem s,  he
p a r t i c u l a r l y  I th in k  t o  the  urban a r e a  a l th o u g h  i t  a 
p la n n in g  g e n e r a l l y .  There i s  one o th e r  m a t te r  I can 
may r e f e r  to  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t r a n s p o r t  and 
P .T .C .  had p l a n s ,  and s t i l l  has  p l a n s ,  to  r a t i o n a l i s
he country a r e a s .  I t  has  been s u g g e s t e d ,  not r e c e s s
th" t  we sh o u ld  chop out branch l i n e s  in  the country
was r e f e r r i n g  
f f e e t e d  t r a n s p o r t  
th in k  o f  t h a t  
l a n d  u s e .  The 
e i t s  s e r v i c e s
t
f r e i g h t  s e r v i c e s  fo r m e r ly  p ro v id e d  by
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build un au awareness and a rapport between the various arms of the 
administration, cuite apart from our own knowledge of what’s going 
on. all this will stoo that sort of thing happening again.
understandable 
 ^finance. Just
tenders towards 1;
recent!
There’s another area of 
of co-ordination, the force o
years, we've managed to reach an apportionment of cost o 
associated with the Eastern Suburbs Railway. For instance
j * after : 
f the 
he
■orne
works
it Bondi 
. road bypassing 
need for this.
decision to have a sophisticated bus/rail interchange- 
junction meant that there was a need to provide < 
the shopping centre, everyone has recognised the 
The road authority quite understandably said I shouldn't have to pap 
for that road because if it hadn't have been for the station it 
wouldn't have been necessary. Part of the proposal for the 
interchange v/as to close off part of Oxford Street in Bondi 
Junction to all but buses and pedestrians and perhaps taxis. On 
the other hand, very obviously too, the P.T.O. said it’s a road, 
you the D.M.R. should pay for roads. In a similar category was a 
proposed pedestrian underpass linking Ocean Street V/oollahra with 
the Edgecliff interchange. Everybody agreed that there should be a 
pedestrian underpass, including the Traffic Authority, but no one 
wanted to pay for it. We had a real stand-off situation. Here were 
two projects which were government commitments but understandably 
the undertakings which were concerned with the projects were 
standing-off and didn't want to pay for them. That was resolved 
and it v/as resolved largely through persistence by ■ 
this persistence included taking the matter up with 
Ministers of Transport to get in touch with the Tre; 
day. In desperation we finally got the matter to Sc 
a separate issue but it got there with Cabinet's coi 
the Review- of the Eastern Suburbs Railway by the Board of Review
he Min istry ?
about four
.surer of the
.bin et, not as
.si de re.tion of
uo
in and
express.
covered
largely
issue r
by Ministry dragged it
It
for that purpose. Y/e dragged thi; 
the Board of Review-, but the 
through that we were able to solve the problem, 
olved in a rather draconian way, Cabinet had to say —  
this, and so on. But it was done in consultation, we 
heads together, specifically v/e had the Chairman of the 
Traffic Authority, the Commissioner for Main Roads, and the Chief 
Commissioner of the P.T.C. The Minister informed them that it
had to be sT> rp — • .C. pay
had all the
realised then that 
to make
would have to be a draconian-type decision, they 
something had to happen because he v/as directed by 
a decision: in one afternoon something v/as solved that had taken 
four years to solve. So that's another sort of lack of 
co-ordination.
CIBBOFS : This leads to another issue v/e were looking at the other 
day, the role of the Minister. You can only have an effective 
Ministry if you have a co-operative Minister or one who has the 
needs of co-ordination in mind.
TROrTirn • you've raised ven'/ important point.xes,
Secretary is only as good as his persuasive powers and 
to provide sound and acceptable advice to his Minister.
nothin 
The 
are in 
applies
only
without 
powers 
•elation 
al so to
untie r 
his abil 
He is 
own right
ity
his minister, he has no powers in his 
I might have in my own right as Under Secretary 
This is not an unusual situation, it' *• J. R'- ■to
the Premier's Department, he
powers in 
Secretary 
Secretary 
Secretary 
fact we've put 
can't disclose 
before Cabinet
might have quite minor
his own right. This is different say to the Under 
for Child V/e] fare who has specific powers; the Under 
of Mines has specific powers in his ov/n right. The TT 
of this Ministry hasn't got that. V/e may get that
nei er
i T1
a proposal to Mr Cox and he's agreed with it; I 
the terms to you but we'll be bringing the proposal 
as the opportunity presents itself.
GIBBOUS 
like to
I do have 
bring UTS i:
I would sagTROmm # yin
disagree with that, 
have them doing not
time we've pot to ensure that we don't
some idee , I think y ou were s ay - -i ng J -0 ne t y ou ' Q
as well?
y is wit h us n ow alt h■ough so:;îe p e li Q pl o Y/OUI g
I V/ l—iryj1—t 2 o ik e to bring T T r n  oU  a. »J clos ! C J1. 1; q U s an c ;
only u r ban V/ork but Sta te-w idc V ori; T i _ c  '  :’ t í
an d provi de t e c n n ical a sci s t a i .r j •V ■ • [■ 1 1 tne
attemp­ ivi _ u a
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of the undertaking? —  I don’t think we do, I ’m sure we dor.'t. 
GIEBONS: Well, there's nothing in them that brings them together.
the ^ • iristrvTRCmT : That's right. We have a counterpart, n Victoria;, 
is structured on the same lines with similar interests to our own. 
This emerged, to some extent through our coming together on the 
Australian Transport Advisory Council. I ’ve had one of my follows 
down there to see what they're doing and I'n in frequent contact 
with my counterpart who's known as the Director of Transport.
GIBBONS: As a last question before you have to 
deal with the growing importance of URTAC. We
go, I'd liki 
can't cover
to An
fully but you have been able to change it and make it a more 
effective body. Could you please say something on that?
n v D Q P im I've always felt since I've been in the Ministry that
and indirectly involved such as
of people like
you ought t
.t. Even if
the early 
evident. 
Railways,
r p -
CUMTAC and its successor URTAC are bodies that are natural mediums 
for getting things done in transport. Obviously if you've got the 
heads of all the undertakings directly involved with transport,
the Maritime Service Board, all 
;o be able to do something with s group 
that. S  you do nothing with them directly, 
the mere fact that they've come together has considerable spin-off 
benefits. This has been demonstrated time and again. Even during 
days of CUMTAC the benefits of such a spin-off were quite 
They still regarded themselves —  the D.M.R., the then 
the Department of Government Transport, the Department of 
Motor Transport —  as separate entities; they still regard, them - 
selves as such but there’s much more a spirit of "oneness'' than there 
used to be. This has been brought about partly through force of 
circumstance over the years, partly ■ 
partly through the efforts of Real M< 
into this position. I think Neal McOu! 
this organisation going. I feel that 
difficulties was that he himself was ’ 
organisation. He had the staff of GUI 
work done from his own organisation:
this service had a natural Railway bias and the matters that were 
brought up for consideration, if you look back through the old 
Minutes, tended to have either a Railway bias or an operating bias.
We got to the stage where we were looking in detail at v/hat traffic 
improvements were necessary at particular intersections. Though 
they may have been major intersections, we were still getting into 
an operating area that was patently the responsibility of the 
operating authority, now the Traffic Authority. I've always felt 
that URTAC should look at major policy issues and in fact I've done 
my best to ensure that this happens. If you look at the agenda now 
you'll find transport review such as where the URTAC Report 
emerged. Whether in fact one agrees with the findings of the URTA.C
trou crW g  o u  k-yhe er assoc iat ion 9
busker ard others to gui de them
.sker had quite a job p -p 4-4 O o ing
one of his g;reates t
tead of a lar■ge operatin rrorm a n  L ± and the administrat ive
the fellows providin ö  -x i with
Report,it's important and it's become accepted by a large body of 
people concerned with urban transport. An unanimous report of that 
kind would not have been possible in 1965. The fact that the 
present Government has accepted URTAC and has URTAC engaged in tne 
current corridor review is indicative of the success of URTAC. I 
think that when the Under Secretary of the Ministry became Chairman 
of URTAC it became much easier for URTAC to get involved in such 
broader issues than it was before. Por instance if the Chairmanship 
had passed from Philip Shirley to say the Commissioner for Main 
Roads, he would have had some difficulty with a broader treatment.
I find as Chairman of URTAC that I am in a marvellous oosition.
this h.appened during the preparation of the Reoort . It won d be
very difficuIt for one of the other members to assume this r-ole
and T think that they 've accepted the fact that there o houl u be an
TfTjrn Aw; ii.1 i i -/ and that it is right that the Under Secretary 0 th< r.- •try
shou “1a chair it . In fact after the change of gove rn . oen had a
round table discu ss ion and I asked each one if they wa n ted rri A 'A - 1 -  r. vy
and ecich one of thern sail yes.. They have a worry the­L U nm a n¡ a  fi ■ j :' 1 O'n------Q li 4-U
get nto too much detail and I unde re tend that worry • y,•e i i a v a
been o U O-fTp f- -} WU o C 0ions from various minis tors that we shou -Ld a  \ 1 pi v ’ v a ri ou s
bus c- p r- ices and that sort of thing but they’re not an?y n~ out
that , Pair on ou g11 i 've g e t  m a r t  n essaye and I agre e w i t - *
f n  t r •r  ^ ”  *
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’HIC POINT THE DISCUSSION Y/ÂS ADJOURNED AND RECOMMENCED
MR OCX’S OFFICE
GIBBONS: Last time I was going to a si: you questions about 
Public Transport Commission, the Department of Main Hoads ana 
We were discussing buses and we’d more or less finished. You
the ] 3 0 on
.d
that you hadn’t had time to look at the rationalisation of services, 
that this might come with the Eastern Suburbs Railv/aj  t ilid the 3 0far you were thinking more of maintaining present services
efficiently.
CCX: Since then, Robert, I've had the unions in with Mr Reiner anc 
Eric lindon, who’s manager of buses, on the basis of getting a 
working party comprising the unions and the administration, 
including an officer from this Ministry, to have a look at the 
nuestion of one-man bus operation and also to look at proposals 
that the bus people want to put up to us for the extension of 
services and the like. We’re at the stage of writing to the unions
VTD T*V i r  P'
would be a
setting out our proposals and asking them to agree to 
party being established which I think, if they agree,
very significant move in that are< ou can't do anything there
unless you have the co-operation of the unions. I do see the need 
for some rationalisation of buses and it won't come unless we get 
round the table and have these discussions. There’s got to be a 
bit of give and take.
GIBBONS: About the Public Transport Commission, when it was being 
set up v/as it intended to do a somewhat wider job than it is 
■presently doing: I ’m not sure of what the exact original concept 
was but I understand it v/as not going to just manage the existing 
services, it was intended to draw the different authorities into a 
more unitary structure.
what
': That’s not true 
happened in fact.
The original concept was wn 
We wanted a body which would
to the Government for the management of the publicly- 
rail and ferry services. There had been moves in the 
back to a transport hierarchy but the feeling of the 
ment was that the Commission would have enough to do 
getting into road administration. In trie event, in t 
buses for instance, we have that body regulating its 
which seemed to be somewhat wrong in principle. The 
sneak for the present Government.
at emerg 
be respo 
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GIBBONS: When I asked you last time you said the P.T.C. was too 
big as it is. Over the last fifty years there has been a good deal 
of discussion between Lang and Bruxner, and later other politicians 
administration was seen as one of the big problems of transport,
yet they never seemed to work out a. truly effective
Minister
olution. 
dministration
* s no doubt that there needs to be
.stration. Alan Reiher, the 0hie -f-L
lions with me on propose..Is he ha s in
s of administrai i on, anh they in turn
.ons —  in fact I think he has CJ —ven
COX: I think in the few months I've been
has been too unwieldly. W e ’re moving now to get better liner- 
established as to who conducts what and still have co-ordination 
to ultimate decisions. There 
changes in the present admini 
Commissioner, has had discuss 
mind to establish better line  
will go to the council of i 
them already very broad details of what he proposes.
TRCTT: I think Robert was casting his net a bit wider than that
referring to an integrated administration in which Main Roads arc 
the P.T.C. were combined.
CCX: If I might say, looking at what we’ve got at the moment, I
think it would be suicidal to grab other Department? ai uul the
in toge then bec ause y > * ’ d ha v e s o many p r o 11 e : ns that all you'd be
doing is solving the administrative problems y ii ’u have ere: red.
t t ink we’ve rea chad a time in history that we j u s t ’t afford
that 7 we ’ve got to get hold of what’s there e.r.d o  -j- t v  ‘i J c - nr e — o-- ~ ^
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TRCTm: Would you agree, Mr Minister, that policy co-ordination
necessary in transport clove a l l  else? In ;ny thinkin^ i t  lo­
in credible that i t  he.or. *t beer, done before, "’here hat been no 
policy co-ordination, o f  naking sure 
one voice.  I think there is  only one 
in n 
cl O£ 
po!
ly experience in the Ministry, the 
sely involved in nul3ing the undertaking* 
icy l e v e l .
that al­-i De partment s p peak
pe rs on who can do th at and
Mil i s t e r has had t 0 be .oi •
s together at 4- he hig
g tn a t , I would th i •k ,3 • t hat
v. l t n  
e
he st
other problems would be rgely taken care of.
OCX: T don’ t disagree with that. I would be the f i r s t  to admit
that there are some shortcomings that are quite apparent, be are 
start ing to move in that d irection.
GIBBONS: I would think that perhaps the Ministry", ir T r o t t ’ s
organisation, and U'TAC, the interdepartmental committee, would be 
o f  great help in enabling you to do your job without having to worry 
about administrative problems. I f  you give those age: cies your 
support, and say "this is the M in ister ’ s voice speaking...
be do do th a t .
TRCTT : I t  has to be that we are the M in ister ’ s v o ic e . . .
COX: Yes, but when the crunch comes, i t ’ s me who has got to 
de l ive r  i t .  I t  has to be done that way. I ’ m backed up by support­
ing recommendations and I ’ ve got to ensure that those recommend­
ations, i f  accepted, are in fact carried out.
GIBBOUS: mhere were days when the Cumberland 
Advisory Committee, the predecessor of URTAC, 
ministerial support and i t  was perhaps l i t t l e  
group.
Passenger "Transport
lacked adecúate
more than a discussion
COX: Chat’ s not so now, URTAC’ s very v iab le .  Me 
established an URTAC group in the Wollongong area 
community involvement, so that w i l l  flov through
’ve just 
, where v;c 
the main U
group and so in turn through to me.
TRCTT: I t  is t e r r ib ly  important fo r  URTAC to know what the Minister
is  thinking and to have ready access to him.
OCX: We are in front o f  the thinking in other Departments, fo r
instance in re la t ion to corridors we’ ve already- started — they ’ re, 
a l l  ta lk ing about the need to review a l l  ex ist ing corridors but 
th a t ’ s already under way. I t  was started about four months ago 
but we’ ve now got other planning groups saying they want a review 
o f  corr idors .
GIEjbOUS: I f  we can change the tack 
in your own electorate  with loca l  roads
l i t t l e ,  you’ve had problems 
and had hassles with the
.R.R. over the years. Elacktown has had similar troubli
Î 4-
, as nave
other fr inge areas where transport and land use weren’ t co-ordinated 
where a great deal o f  new urban population was put into rural areas 
without the upgrading of the rural roads. Can you see that changed 
now,, through the ■n T ? 9
OCX: I t ’ s rea l ly  a. matter fo r  planning, 
owh e lectorate has a population of about 
45,000 jobs, which from my point o f  view' 
industry. To overcome that would need a 
I anda’ s l e v e l .  Where do you se t t le  new i
i t ’ s Paul lands’ s area. 
45,000 and i t orovides 
is an overconcentration 
major decision at 'MrmT 
n dus try . Y ou ’ v e g o t t o
M r  •> n V  U  u  in at this on the b
a i r problems we have
poll ution go : There
Aubuin : d oy 0 u at a i
have oroblemp ** v re l o .
i ; 7 Ï anda’ s c i d . ::linis -X.
asis of ex isting pollution problems ax. 
in the Sydney basin as to where does t 
are a number of areas i t  goes when i t  
putting industries here when yon ’ re •. 
tior. to pollution. A l l  of that corner 
.ration.
4- ,
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1 r -  ^ ^  . It ties in with TJRTA3’s domain , doe £. y t j -, t • Elacktown
nuncil wrote to the I). '.R. ci fev times Ç- -p r:Cil- v..:. £-i.pG th r 4-O. U 4 O pT
v;aniel a feV i 0r» 't roads v.hicli JL. Ciicir opini on VU i t-r )T 0ads
u gra led. The  D .T .'T r* ^  .12 j. • i • Q CT, bookie 4- advis in g C OU2. Cl_L C how f, 0
f:ugly for1 assis tanee and at the end with regard to ecl et G: ifJ.cetior
4. t said t■U ^  4- .icA u unf ortunately du e t o 1 r._L C-.ck of finan ce in 1/i.ie mas 4- few
1 ?ears, v/e haver ’t beer, able to consider any application Q>• ■ • J_acktov
Was in a terrable condition and there v/as c onsidérabIe unre sP in
4-re area . I don ’t know if this part i ul ar issue ha c COme up but
V;ill the D.M. ft » OV • l- role change and assist loca] co uncP1 s more >
COX: V/e 11, if I can cay on assisting local councils, v/e assist
com ells more than any other State. On the question of finance, 
the' were relieved of the main roads levy a few years back and the
■p-tim.res that I have available indieste that as far as r:
corxemed we give more assistance to local government than any other 
State- There are pressures now that the Act should be amended, that 
we should be forced to get into that area, but you would just be 
taking it out of one rocket and putting it in another pocket.
There would be roads in the semi-rural country areas that would not 
get finance but I would hope that local government would 
the grants they’re getting from the Federal Government, be 
adequately assisted because it would appear that there 
continuing programme; they get 353 million throughout Australia 
We also have a programme of giving State grants to
we can lift the
assistance. The URTAC Report said that v/e should be < 
million a year on roads in the metropolitan area ...
TRCTT: But we can’t get 340 million.
this year.
local government and I would hope that
.now, v:it
.s now a
.u  i s.
,nt
level 0 40-L
P  A3 A gr 
“* *“0 1 A r\40
¡OX: V/e haven’t got 340 million but we are reviewing expressway
v/e ' ve :one a long wav there and theproposals as you know;
recommendations of the Cabinet Sub-committee will be going to 
Cabinet very soon. We’ll be making significant decisions here which 
will be announced before Christmas. I couldn’t give you a straight 
answer that v/e will be able to help local councils like Elacktov/n, 
bearing in mind the lack of funds that we've got.
When I smoke to Mr Morris, he said that the only reason 
the expressways had been put on the planning map was because the 
government had never asked the D.M.R. to justify its programme.
The D.M.R. has always seen itself as providing new roads: will 
there be a greater emphasis on improving existing roads rather than 
providing new roads?
COX: There will be a greater emphasis on improving existing roads,
on bottlenecks in some of the suburbs. One that I’ve had a recent 
look at was Punchbowl railway bridge, I’ve had a look at one in my 
ov/r electorate, where there are definite bottlenecks in the morning 
and afternoon which add up to significant delays. The-, very purpose 
of the Cabinet Sub-committee inquiring into expressways and the 
policy which would flow from that would be to improve existing roads,
TRCTT: V/e'll have to wind-up...
OCX: V/e could have another talk v/ith you, Robert.
so muon
1:. glannin »
GIBBOUS : As I've told Mr Trott, I’m mainly concerned not 
with planning except to the extent that in the weaknesses 
you can see the weaknesses of government. It’s the thing;- you can 
dr in planning and so on that illustrate the weaknesses in govern­
ment ...and administration. I’ve seen a greater effectivenei.
T  t r f !• -f- rv* ieveryone I’ve spoken to agrees, sino- URTAI really
8.210 
in ;
meaningful w'c-V , pi anning orocpsses haV 6 beco CDd more cffective,consid&raticms of piarming land use an t rans port ax■g iiQV be. in g
consistent1 7)"‘-«4 realise-d .
pi o p /- .■jUa . V/e.: 1> I ’ m. all for plani, f 1g but 4 -he re are nv*(; ' - ‘p m  Ç-xcried at
t i ne a, v/hich you know , which cCin step pi.armer*c r' ' C • tack
v orries me -j -P v ou a-sk Tie as c.r indio 4- dua i, 4- ’ , rL -1 c •D r v r r v | r ( P ç: o
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i n t o  areaT where we have ■ ''•ore p o l l u t i o n .  
I ' v e  spoken t o  t h e  p l a n n e r s  a bout  i t .  As 
be a s h i f t .
T h i s  w o r r i e s  me and 
I s e e  i t  t h e r e ' s  g e t  t o
Ct T
in
and
i'DOHC’ .- -'Uj . o . One o f  t he p r o b i e ws w i t h t h e Sydney i\ r e a Trans p ort . -i.c g
dy was t h ci t  th e d i s p e r s e J e f  f  e c t s o f a i r  poi l u t i o n  were ot
r i d e r e p'■ 9 n con 1 r a
o-p-pu: ci re  por j. T^ - a m ajor env ironmer t i p s1 9 7 3  ot* s 0 Olici u po H u t  on4-0S V.’OUl u con c e n t r a t e r-j V»ound P a r r a .¡!i3
y o u r own a r e a and o t h e r a r e a s .
'OU o
COX: We have  a problem  i n  my own e l e c t o r a t e .  We have  p h o to ­
c h e m ica l  p o l l u t i o n  t h a t ' s  h i g h e r  t h a n  Japan:  i f  you  t a k e  trie- 
r e a d i n g s  on t h e  equipment t h a t  t h e  J a p a n e s e  u s e  ( we do a more 
r e f i n e d  r e a d i n g  a t  i i d c o m b e ) ,  when you make an a d j u s t m e n t  o f  our 
r e a d i n g s ,  w e ' r e  up as  h i g h  a s  Tokyo.
GIE30HS: Y e s ,  t h a t ' s  s o m e th in g  t h a t  was dropped from t h e  Sydney 
Area  T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  S t u d y .
COX: I ' v e  had a l o o k  a t  a r e p o r t  which
c iu ite  c l e a r l y .
g o t  w h ich  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t
mROTT: Mr R e i h e r  h a s  a r r i v e d  and w e ' l l  have  t o  f i n i s h .  I f  I  may 
s a y ,  t h e  p r e s e n t  Government i s  v e r y  c o n s c i o u s  o f  t h e  e n v iro n m en t  
and I  would n o t  be s u r p r i s e d  i f  t h e  Government k e p t  t h e  C a b i n e t  
Su b -co m m ittee  l o o k i n g  a t  f r e e w a y s  g o i n g .
COX: W e l l ,  i t  i s  t h e  R e s o u r c e s  Com m ittee .
TRCmT : Y e s ,  t h a t ' s  r i g h t ,  i t  i s  a  s t a n d i n g  c o m m i tte e .
COX: Y e s ,  i t ' s  head ed by t h e  Deputy P r e m i e r  
i s  H arry  J e n s e n ,  Jack  Renshaw, Pat  H i l l s  and 
p r e t t y  s e n i o r  C a b i n e t  m i n i s t e r s .
t h e r e ' s  m y s e l f ,  t h e r e  
P au l  Panda or i t , a l l
TROTT: Y e s ,  i t ' s  g o t  a l l  t h o s e  i n t e r e s t s  r e p r e s e n t e d  and w i l l  
a b l e  t o  d e a l  a d e q u a t e l y  w i t h  t h e  i s s u e .
be
Appendix 6
The following interview with Mr K.J. Trott, Under Secretary of the 
Ministry of Transport and Highways, was held on the 21st December, 
i 976 , Mot to be cited or quoted without permission.
Robert Gibbons.
GIBBONS: Last time we covered the history of the Ministry and 
briefly URTAC and you finished with a point that the members of 
URTAG felt that their job lay on the policy side of government 
rather than administration. They don't think that it's their role 
to look over each other's shoulder to make sure that they are
carrying out the government's policy. You said that the prevailing
feeling is that they should have a policy role rather than an 
auditing role. Where do you draw the line between policy and 
administration, and more importantly, what's the role of the 
Ministry itself in the other side, the checking of Departments, the 
Minister's job?
TROTT: I'll attempt to answer your first question. Sometimes it's
very hard to draw a line, sometimes the line is drawn on an ad hoc
basis —  a problem will come up and a decision is made that this is 
something that would be better left to the department. A typical 
instance of that sort of thing was when Max Ruddock, the then 
Minister, after discussion with me, asked URTAG to undertake a 
review of private buses in the metropolitan area. URTAG members 
discussed this among themselves and we all felt (I agreed) that this 
sort of operational investigation wasn't a matter for URTAG. We 
made that decision in URTAG and we informed the Minister and he 
agreed. In the event there was a change of government before any­
thing got under way and for a number of reasons nothing has yet 
happened —  but that's another story. Another instance of on the 
one hand members of URTAG being pleased to receive recognition of 
that role, and on the other not being too anxious to get into 
detail was their reaction to the decision of the former Government 
to accept the URTAG Report. After that decision was made URTAC was 
asked to overview the implementation of the Report. The members of 
URTAC were quite pleased but the Public Transport Commission 
representative argued quite strongly that URTAG shouldn't be receiv­
ing progress reports on the number of train carriages they'd 
received under their capital works programme, or the progress of 
their resignalling programme. He felt that was a matter for the 
Commission and the Minister and/or the Ministry. We agreed with 
that. The sort of task that we're being given now —  apart from 
the overall policy advice that we give to the Minister and in a way 
we choose our own ground there, that is we don't get many ad hoc 
tasks, some that we get we've engineered ourselves —  our latest 
task is the review of transport corridors. We regard this as a 
proper exercise for URTAG. With the assistance of the Study Group 
we're looking at every corridor, major and minor, that's been 
reserved, either statutorily reserved or reserved more loosely in 
some other way. We're looking at all of those and we're making 
recommendations to the Government. These are not only road 
corridors, they are rail corridors as well. It's a major task and 
in some respects it's a bit like another SATS exercise, although 
we're trying to assure that we don't turn it into a SATS-type 
exercise. I can't answer you in more detail; if you have a look 
at our functions, they are what we're supposed to be doing. Those 
functions are cast in very broad terms. We're supposed to give 
policy advice but as with all organisations of this kind we find 
that we do get into the ad hoc situation, that's how we work, I 
don't see how we can work in any other way.
GIBBONS: When a marginal subject comes up you decide as a body...
TROTT: We decide among ourselves whether it should be left to 
individual departments or a group of departments operating outside 
URTAG. By and large URTAC works very well. I can't recall major 
differences of ODinion amongst the members, we seem to reach a 
consensus Quite readily on most things.
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There’s another ad hoc task that we've got. As you know the 
Government has recently received a Report from the Commissioner 
enquiring into Botany Bay. URTAC has a major role in responding to 
that and we’re meeting next Thursday in fact to make a co-ordinated 
response. There will be individual responses as well to the 
findings of the enquiry.
GIBBONS: Once a matter has been decided, say it’s a matter of
administration, staffing or financial policy or something like that, 
which is a matter between the P.T.G. or the D.M.R. and the Minister, 
what role does the Ministry have?
TROTT: We have a major role in what follows. The day-to-day
arrangement we in the Ministry have with the Minister works some­
thing like this, in say a major policy area: there may be a policy 
initiative from the particular undertaking or there may be a policy 
initiative from here, but very often once a policy issue has been 
raised we all get to know about it. Mr Reiher and I for instance 
frequently talk about the issue before it emerges as a proposal 
over here. When the proposal arrives here, say from the undertaking, 
it could go direct to the Minister or it could come to me —  it 
could even come addressed to the Minister but in an envelope to me 
after discussion with the appropriate Commissioner. In any event 
if it goes to the Minister direct it will come out to us, either 
just referred to us for processing in the normal way or if it’s a 
very important matter, something that is particularly interesting 
to the Minister, he'll mark it for me to discuss with him. Whatever 
happens we get hold of it and a Minister in most cases will not make 
a decision without a formal submission from the Ministry. In fact 
we will agree with nine major policy submissions out of ten, not because we’re rubber-stamping them but because we’re involved in 
working out the policy even though the final carriage of it might 
be with the undertaking. There are occasions when we can't work 
that way, for instance if proposals have emerged that require 
legislative action, very often we have to change what is proposed 
in not major respects —  we mightn't change the thrust, but we 
might have to change the details, perhaps because we know something 
that the undertakings don't know about a particular detail. We 
really come into our own when matters proceed to legislation or 
proceed to Cabinet. We have the carriage of final proposals to 
Cabinet. Sometimes we ask the undertakings to give us a draft 
Cabinet minute, sometimes we don't, but invariably we find that the 
Cabinet minute that they prepare doesn't go far enough. If there's 
any speciality here, it's our's, we know how to present things to 
Cabinet. Presentation is terribly important, you've got to relate 
the problem to overall Government policy or to overall transport 
policy. Sometimes Cabinet proposals finish up with Cabinet Sub­
committees and we get a piece of that action: one of my fellows or 
myself will serve the Sub-committee. Currently Cabinet is consider­ing inner-urban freeway policy and we're very much involved in that. 
We have an instance, and I'm sure the D.M.R. won't mind my mention­
ing this, where we have what might be called departmental policy 
being in conflict with the policy of the Government of the day.
This is where we have to step in. It's our job to service the 
Government of the day. We don't blindly follow policy, if we think 
policy of the day has some flaws in it, it's our job to point that 
out to the Minister. In fact we did point that out with respect to 
inner-urban freeway policy, we wanted to make sure that the 
Government was aware of the dangers in abandoning these freeways.
By and large we agree with the policy on the inner-urban freeways, 
fellows like Gordon Messiter have felt this for years, but we have 
to suggest to the Government that they'd better make clear that 
they’re not against freeways per se —  in fact I've read somewhere 
they weren't —  I said you'd better make that terribly clear because 
people seem to think you are. So we have to help them refine their 
policy.
In doing all this I like to think that we're working closely 
with the departments. The departments understandably are sometimes
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not very keen on us because they feel there's no real need to have 
an organisation of this type. I'm sure Mr Reiher would much prefer 
to deal directly with Mr Cox; in fact he does sometimes, but most 
of the time on major issues —  this does not just apply to Peter 
Cox but to all Ministers —  the Under Secretary is invited in. We 
bring to bear a much wider body of knowledge, we're supposed to have 
a knowledge of overall Government policy, we're supposed to have and 
we do have a knowledge of transport policy generally. In the past 
it has happened that one arm of the transport administration didn't 
know what the other arms were doing, and this applies particularly 
to road and rail matters. That doesn't happen anymore.
On the question of detailed checking of what the departments 
are doing, there's a bit of that but not a great deal, we try not to 
be petty about this. We get into the vetting or investigatory area 
in a number of ways. One main way is through representations that 
are made to the Minister on a variety of matters. We process these 
representations in a variety of ways. If it's a routine sort of
thing it's treated in a routine sort of way. If it's a major matter
I might undertake an investigatory role myself, I might go over to 
see the Chief Commissioner and say, well what about this, this and 
this, can we have a report on this, or what is the position, or I 
don't think the Minister is going to buy that, we'll need to go 
into it a lot more deeply. Or, I think you're quite wrong in what
you're doing, he won't buy that at all, you'll have to change your
policy —  that sort of thing arises. We do have a vetting role in 
other respects, we keep an eye on the loans programmes, capital 
works programmes or expenditure programmes. For instance Mr Cox is 
at present quite worried about the possibility of the P.T.G. 
underspending its capital works programme, after he's put up quite 
a battle in Cabinet to get them a substantial increase in their 
allocation. We're dealing with that on his behalf. He's 
particularly anxious to see how his fare reduction decision comes 
out, what the final result of it is, and he and I and Alan Reiher 
haven't been satisfied with the analyses that have taken place so 
far. This is partly because sufficient time hadn't elapsed to do a 
proper analysis. I don’t know if that answers your question but 
that's the sort of thing that we deal with here.
GIBBONS: On the budgetary side, you fit in somewhere between the 
Treasury and the undertakings.
TROTT: Yes. The detailed preparation of the estimates is left to - 
the undertakings and the Treasury. When they're getting towards 
completion we tend to buy in to find out what's going on and the 
final submissions to the Treasury come through here. I think it 
would be wrong of us to get too far in but because of the size of 
the P.T.C.'s operating deficit and the effect of its capital works 
programme on total State finances we have set up recently under the 
new Government a Ministerial Sub-committee comprising the Treasurer 
and the Minister for Transport and Highways, to overview finances 
and means of keeping finances within bounds. That meeting is 
attended by the Chief Commissioner, the Deputy Chief Commissioner, 
the Treasury heads, certain of the Premier's special advisers and 
myself. Arising out of the first meeting of that committee a 
number of sub-committees were established to look at particular 
problems. We're on about three of those in the person of Jim 
McDonnell from here. As I said to you earlier we've survived the 
Machinery of Government Review where other Ministries didn't, 
because I think of the recognition of the fact that there needs to 
be some sort of co-ordination of transport policy. I'm not suggest­
ing that we should buy in on the P.T.C.'s responsibility of co­
ordinating operational matters, such as when ferries meet buses and 
that sort of thing. That's not our role and we're not competent to 
do it anyway, it would be foolish if we attempted to do that sort 
of thing. It's even been suggested by some that we should undertake 
a professional inspecting role, for instance in assisting in the 
Dolicing of contracts, going out to the Commonwealth Engineering
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Company to look at the double-deck carriages under construction, 
inspecting major construction jobs. I don't think that's an area 
we ought to get into, not in a major way but we could perhaps have 
one or two fellows to go out on ad hoc tasks; it's surprising 
what you sometimes find.
Another area we've had to come in on and in which we've had 
some success is the question of who pays for what. It's amazing 
that this should arise; I think I've mentioned this to you before. 
You can get into quite sticky situations and someone has to come in 
and advise the Minister that this or that is what he should do.
The machinery for doing that varies, one way is appointing the 
Under Secretary as the convenor of a working group, the Minister 
saying you've got to come up with something, I want an answer to 
this tomorrow.
I think by and large we conform to the normal administrative 
pattern, I think you'll find most comparable organisations work 
this way. There is a common theme running through all the 
mechanisms we use, we must communicate, each party must know what 
the others are doing, it's a sight harder than you'd think.
GIBBONS: Do you think that your intervening in the budgetary
process has helped the undertakings? Keith King for instance has told me that the Railways always had a headache with Treasury.
TROTT: No, we don't intervene enough to be of assistance to them
in that way, we are more involved in protecting the Minister's 
interests in the budget. For instance we would want to see, if 
there are major policy commitments, if sufficient provision has 
been made for them. If we find that the estimate of expenditure 
for the year is revealing a greater deficit than we expected, more than we'd been led to believe, then we'd get very much interested, we'd be working with the Minister on this. We'd then seek to have 
fairly detailed discussions with the undertakings. We stay out of 
the day-to-day budgetary discussion that is necessary for the 
working up of the estimate, I don't think we've got a role there at 
all. Having said that, we've got a pretty good idea of what's 
going on and we have direct liaison with the Treasury ourselves,
I'm in constant touch with the permanent head of the Treasury one 
way or the other. He's a member of URTAG . We seek his advice and 
he seeks ours. For instance I came back from a meeting of the 
Australian Transport Advisory Council on the 3rd of December and 
one of the first things I did when I got back was to ring the 
Treasury head to tell him that it looks as if the Australian 
Government has agreed to Section 96 grants for transport, and that 
is of considerable significance to him under the new federalism 
policy. Because they've made that decision in transport that might 
lead them to make similar decisions in other areas.
GIBBONS: Is there anything else you want to say about the Ministry
generally?
TROTT: No, except that I'd like to see it not so much expand in 
numbers but I'd like to see it get more away from representational 
work and get further into policy. That is my personal view and many 
people would not agree. It is a fact that Ministers of the day are 
more immediately concerned with representational work because that's 
where the votes are. If people are unhappy about the administration 
of transport and make representations about it, if they don't get 
results they tend not to like the government of the day and that 
might be reflected in their voting. Ministers are very aware of 
that and you can't expect any Minister to accept long-term policy 
at the expense of this image-maintaining work. I personally would 
like to see the departments becoming much more alive to the 
importance of representational work to enable us to get more into 
the co-ordinative/policy-type role. I think in the long term this 
would have major benefits for transport. I'm trying very hard to
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get the departments to operate that way but while they draft letters 
for us in response to representations —  or we decide what we want, 
if someone writes in about something or makes a major reoresentation 
we decide how t h a t ’s to be processed, either by calling for a 
reoort or asking for a draft letter —  we find in the draft letters 
coming back some of the departments talking about departmental 
policy, the Commissioner feels this or the Commissioner feels that, 
but it's the Minister who matters. What the Commissioner feels 
might not be what the Minister wants, we frequently find this. The 
fellows here are in close touch with the Minister, they attend him 
in deputation and so on and know how he feels. The senior fellows 
are in a position to advise him on representational matters. For 
instance one of my senior men has become an expert on traffic 
arrangements in the Rockdale area because of the representations 
that arose and he knows exactly how the Minister feels, and in fact 
the Minister has been influenced by some of the things this fellow 
has put to him. We do have case work of this type arising in the 
Ministry and this is a good thing.
G-IBBONS: Dealing with URTAC now, the first question is why was 
CUMTAC replaced with URTAC?
TROTT: There were a number of reasons, some superficial, some 
deep-seated, I had a lot to do with this change. First, it struck 
me as being incongruous, or at least untidy, for an organisation 
called CUMTAC, the County of Cumberland Passenger Transport Advisory 
Committee, to be sponsoring a study covering the Sydney Area, which 
was the area of the Sydney Region Outline Plan, which was partly 
beyond the area of influence of CUMTAC. I also felt that an urban 
advisory committee of that kind should get into other urban areas, 
Newcastle and Wollongong and the growth centres. It was a result 
of this feeling, after Neal McCusker retired, that I set about 
trying to influence my fellow members to change. I was then not the 
Chairman. I went around to see them. There were two things I 
attempted to get done, to get the change in name and function, and 
also to get the President of the Maritime Services Board on. That 
in fact happened. I got agreement, I didn't have any trouble at 
all. The actual name URTAC emerged from a discussion I had with 
Russell Thomas, the then Commissioner of Main Roads. I suggested 
something that he didn't like and then he came up with URTAC and we 
grabbed hold of this and that's how we changed the title. In 
summary the title didn't cover something we were doing and we wanted 
to get into other areas.
GIBBONS: How would you assess the working of URTAC in contrast to 
the working of CUMTAC?
TROTT: I think URTAC's better but it's probably better because
CUMTAC existed. I think this group of senior people coming together 
has grown in that their relationship has matured. They've come to 
work better as a group. It hasn't been easy. You'd think on the 
one hand that here's a group of the most senior people in transport 
meeting, they must be able to come up with something. On the other 
hand it's very difficult to do that because you've got each 
department with its own area of responsibility, and each one is a 
major undertaking in itself, obviously they would regard their own 
organisations as more important than URTAC. They're not out to be 
putting things on the agenda of URTAC which is something they feel 
is their own concern. This is why there were some problems in the 
early days. I think also that the early CUMTAC was under the 
Chairmanship of the Commissioner for Railways, a respected and 
competent man, but having been given the job as chairman he 
naturally looked to his own people to service the organisation,
Keith King was appointed as the Executive Secretary. The matters 
that emerged for discussion were often operational re traffic and 
the railways and the agenda was controlled by people you wouldn't 
expect to have a broader knowledge of what's going on in transport. 
When the chairmanship of URTAC came here, or even before then 
because the executive functions came here before I became Chairman,
the type of matter considered changed perceptibly and I think 
changed for the better. The matters that are now considered are of 
much more significance than they used to be so 1 think it is a much 
better organisation. It's accepted by its members and it's helped 
us enormously in my view in our day-to-day relationship on other 
matters. The contact is excellent. The practice these days is to 
have lunch after URTAG meetings and all sorts of problems are 
resolved as a result of that contact and the camaraderie that builds 
up as a result.
GIBBONS: There is something connected with URTAG, the Transport
Development Committee. What happened to that?
TROTT: It's moribund because it was only set up to meet the terms
of the agreement with the Commonwealth for the Urban Public 
Transport Improvement Programme (UPTIP). The Commonwealth was 
seeking to get onto URTAG and have a large slice of the action on 
urban transport policy. In fact they only kicked the tin for quite 
a small amount. It was a device that they agreed to to enable the 
agreement to proceed. They would have liked to have got onto URTAG. 
You’ve raised a very important point, I would think that for the 
next assistance period they'll be screwing us to get onto URTAG or 
at least have a better organisation than the Transport Development 
Committee. That was set up under the Chairmanship of the Chief 
Commissioner, he's the chairman ex officio, and they've only met 
about three or four times and they're not very happy about that.
It was a device and we're using it as little as we can.
GIBBONS: As a matter connected with the way URTAC members meet and 
discuss things, do you think that individual organisations, with their own goals and specific tasks, tend to develop individual 
orientations which they like to protect, and protect their 
independence?
TROTT: Yes, that's natural.
GIBBONS: Firstly, has this ever been a major problem, and secondly
are the obvious conflicts that arise indicative of less obvious 
differences of orientation that might affect administration 
continuously?
TROTT: It's a bit hard to answer because this conflict is not
overt. I think probably each member goes back from a meeting of 
URTAC and he might very well say on occasions I've got to watch 
this mob, I'll have to watch this Trott, he's trying to get into 
our affairs too far. That's a very natural reaction but having 
said that, on matters where URTAC can be of assistance to the 
organisation or if there's a clear request from the Government for 
URTAC to do something, we seem to rise to the occasion. The best 
illustration I can recall of this "rising to the occasion" deals 
with the D.M.R. The road policy that emerged from the URTAC 
investigation which led to the URTAC Report was very much influenced 
by the D.M.R. attitude. The D.M.R. realised when URTAC was asked to 
undertake this task that it would have to cut the suit to the cloth, 
they realised that roads were not all. Other URTAC members would 
ask the Commissioner, what chance have you got of undertaking your 
current road programme with the money you're likely to get? The 
D.M.R. responded magnificently to this concept. The $40 million 
road programme which was put into the Report was substantially the 
D.M.R. programme. They responded to this feeling of URTAC. They 
would have had to have done something like this anyway, I would 
think.
GIBBONS: They were protecting themselves.
TROTT: Yes. There were amendments to their proposals but substan­
tially the road programme was worked up by the D.M.R. after 
discussion with URTAC. The point is that it was in the Department's 
interest as well as URTAC's to undertake that exercise.
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GIBBONS: What was the role of the Ministry and secondly the 
Treasury in developing the URTAG Report?
TROTT: The Report was prepared this way: we discussed the problem 
in general terms, we called for submissions from the organisations, 
we evolved a philosophy, we refined some of the ideas that were put 
up by the departments, then the actual drafting, the presentation, 
was done here in the Ministry. Gordon Messiter had a lot to do 
with it, I had a great deal to do with it personally and so did 
Bill Henry, the Treasury head. We had our differences, again 
presentation was terribly important —  y o u ’d know that yourself 
from your university assignments, unless you present the job 
properly you can fail in your work. We had something that had to 
be sold properly, this was very much a Ministry affair, Gordon 
Messiter and me. Bill Henry made a major contribution to the 
introductory sections but working mainly on the presentation of 
ideas that had emerged.
GIBBONS: What was the stimulus for URTAG? I know the general
background but what specifically came up? What did the government 
tell URTAG?
TROTT: It's a long story and perhaps I'd better tell it to you.
Wal Fife was the Minister at the time, when the government felt the 
need to develop an urban transport policy. He called me in one day 
and said we haven't got an urban transport policy. I said, well if 
you put it like that, you haven't really I suppose, these are the 
things your're doing...He said that's not good enough, we have to 
draw it all together. He asked how could we do this and I said 
URTAG's the body to do it for you and he said that that's alright.
He then organised a meeting with Sir John Fuller, the Minister for 
Planning and Environment, and Wal Fife and I and Bill Henry (who 
incidentally hapnened to come in on the meeting ) met with people 
from Planning and Environment. It was agreed that URTAG should be 
the body to undertake the review but it was suggested that URTAG 
might not be the right body to draw up the terms of reference or 
specification for the study. This was done —  it was like a build­
ing specification —  by the Planning and Environment Commission.
This was totally unacceptable to Bill Henry on the score that URTAG 
was trying to get into far too much. So one weekend, realising that 
I had no hope of getting this thing off the deck unless we brought 
the charter within manageable bounds, it occurred to me that we 
should look into urban road construction, traffic management and 
railway civil engineering works. Bill Henry agreed to that and we 
drew up a charter, put it up to Cabinet and we started on our 
reports. When we got under way we took a little licence with our 
charter, we went beyond the charter. All the way through we had 
some difficulties, I got a little resistance from Treasury on this,
I think they feared quite understandably that we would come up with 
something that would cost them more money —  they just didn't have 
that sort of money. Very well, transport might need more money but 
so do lots of other areas. I had this sort of problem but I must 
say that at the eleventh hour I had tremendous assistance from the 
Treasury blokes, both from the permanent head and his deputy.
GIBBONS: You say the P.E.G. actually wanted you to do more?
TROTT: Yes, get into a lot more.
GIBBONS: I've had no information on this but I would expect the
P.E.G. to have a funny relationship with URTAG because URTAG 
doesn't have any statutory power over land use and they do have.
To what extent are they willing to delegate policy decision-making 
to URTAG?
TROTT: They've been very good and co-operative so far. There was 
a move at one time by the State Planning Authority, when the 
Government of the day was looking at planning organisation, to
absorb URTAG into the S.P.A. I was engaged in talks with the two 
Ministers, Mr Morton and Mr Morris, and that didn't happen.
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There’s a move now to try to get more and more into transport
but I would resist that and so would the Transport Minister of theday.
GIBBONS: Do you have much contact with the P.E.C.'s own systemof committees?
TROTT: Not a great deal. I was ex officio a member of the S.P.A. 
for some time but all that has changed now. We have quite a close 
relationship with the P.E.C., mainly through URTAG, one of the 
Commissioners is on a sub-committee of URTAC, they're very much 
concerned with the corridor review and we work closely with them 
on that. The P.E.G. is the prime mover in the airport study that 
is going on at the moment, we're working very closely with them 
on that, there are about seven working committees and we're on 
quite a number of those. Other members of URTAG are also on these. 
So there is quite a close relationship, particularly in the 
transport areas, we don't get involved in statutory planning or 
anything like that unless it's of particular concern to us.
GIBBONS: Looking in from the outside it would seem to me that 
changes in the role of URTAG, the formation of the P.T.G. and 
later the Traffic Authority, the absorption of ferries into the governmental system (which was ad hoc), and the inclusion of 
Highways in the Transport ministry have all moved the transport 
administrative system in the same direction, that is towards closer 
co-ordination. Were these steps purely ad hoc and fortuitous or was there a logic behind them, a plan to improve co-ordination?
TROTT: There was a logic behind them. You'd better draw your own conclusions from that.
GIBBONS: What role did you have in those changes?
TROTT: Quite a significant role.
GIBBONS: I can understand that you can't really talk about it.
Apart from the present Government's use of the Resources Committee, 
have you had much contact in the past with Cabinet committees?
TROTT: Yes, quite a bit, in the transport area. The former 
Government used the sub-committee mechanism quite a bit and I 
usually attended those that were formed in transport, I served the 
Minister in the same way as any executive officer. Sometimes if 
the Cabinet sub-committee dragged on one of the officers of the * 
Ministry might have become executive officer. Since I've become 
Under Secretary, and even before my time with Eric Holt, we served 
the sub-committees in the same way. He in his own way had 
considerable influence on transport policy, particularly in his 
later days. I think he started the impetus of the Ministry and then I moved in and built on that.
GIBBONS: Looking back over the years, have many important decisions 
been made in Cabinet sub-committees as opposed to in Cabinet or by the Minister?
TROTT: My experience with the Liberal-Country Party Government 
was that they took a lot of notice of the Minister who had the 
prime responsibility. I can't recall a conflict with the minister 
of the day, they seemed to help him. This was not necessarily so 
all the time, sometimes I'm sure there were differences of opinion 
in Cabinet. The Labor Government is working its Cabinet sub­
committee machinery a bit differently. They have officers attending 
sometimes, sometimes they just meet on their own, on more occasions than not officers have been asked to leave before the meeting 
finished. This didn't happen before with the Liberals but I think 
it was only a matter of personal style. There was more frank and 
open exchange with officers with the Liberals.
GIBBONS: What specific circumstances led the Askin Government to think that a major administrative reform, in the shape of the
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P.T.C., was necessary?
TROTT: The notion to do something had been around for some time,
everyone concerned with transport felt that something had to be 
done. There was general talk about getting back to a transport and 
highways organisation. The Liberal Government wasn't too happy 
with that, they felt it would be too unwieldly. The impetus —
I keep talking about myself but after all it is my job — I had a 
talk to Milton Morris one day and I reminded him that Neal 
McGusker was turning 65 in October 1972; that Stan Berry, a man 
I had a lot of respect for, was 62; Dave Golman, the Commissioner 
of Motor Transport, was about to retire. I said you might be able 
to do something with that, if you don't have to await people reach­
ing retirement age it's a lot easier for you to get something done. 
Mr Morris grabbed this concept and we worried around the problem.
He asked me to work something out and I came up with a proposal for 
a British-type system where you have an urban authority covering 
all forms of transport and a country authority looking after the 
country rail. The Treasury fellows weren't happy about that; the 
Treasury fellows weren't happy about having a P.T.G., they weren't 
unhappy with the existing organisations. Anyway a Cabinet sub­
committee was set up after we sent a minute from the Ministry 
explaining these facts. The sub-committee was given a number of 
tasks and the P.T.C. emerged from its deliberations. I think I 
told you once before that we actually recommended to Cabinet the 
establishment of a Public Transport Corporation but Mr Askin him­
self changed the title to Commission. It was a great idea but had 
disastrous results in the first few years, but with the new Chief 
Commissioner it has a really good chance of working now. I still 
personally favour —  I've said this many times and everyone knows 
it — a separate urban authority to run all publicly-owned urban 
transport and have a separate organisation to run the rest of the 
railways.
GIBBONS: That's what I was getting at when I asked you those 
questions with Mr Cox, apart from other things.
TROTT: It's no secret, that's my strong view. Alan Reiher feels
that there's some merit in it and he's working towards something 
like that within the P.T.C. structure, where he'd have separate 
operating arrangements for the urban area. That doesn't obtain 
now, surprisingly enough.
GIBBONS: Milton Morris said that that might lead to political 
problems if you find the country passenger services losing more than 
the urban passenger services.
TROTT: That could be so, the Treasury men don't like that sort of 
thing for the same reason as Milton Morris, they might have to 
put more money into the total system.
GIBBONS: Would you like to say something about the difficulties
the Government had in finding the Public Transport Commissioners?
TROTT: You mean when it was first set up? Obviously these are 
very big jobs and you've got to pick the right people. The Liberals 
decided to employ consultants, W.D. Scott & Co., I had a lot of 
liaison with the consultants as you'd expect. The consultants were 
saying things like the salaries are too low, can you jack them up, 
in advertisements — did we want to advertise in Australia only or 
did we want to go abroad? (The decision was taken to advertise 
in Australia first and later on it was decided to try abroad.) 
Eventually, after interviewing a number of people who responded 
to advertisement and invitation, the consultants came up with a 
list of names. This list was processed through to a Cabinet sub­committee which made a decision —  I can't tell you what it was —  
while Milton Morris was away and he wasn't happy with it. Then the 
transDort administration was given the task of finding a Chief 
Commissioner. Old Sir Walter Scott was asked by Milton Morris to 
find someone overseas if necessary and Philip Shirley emerged from that. I think I might have told you how he came out here to be
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seen, how we kept him under wraps while I was dealing with him 
very personally over a long period of time. He came out to see and 
be seen; I was asked by Milton Morris to set up a luncheon with 
the sub-committee and Sir Charles Cutler —  I don't know how he 
came into it but I suppose they wanted to influence him to get moving and get a decision taken. We had lunch on one day, I think 
it was a Wednesday, and that afternoon Sir Charles Cutler persuaded 
the Premier to call a special Cabinet meeting and they selected the 
three full-time Commissioners and subsequently those Commissioners 
were consulted as to the part-time membership. As a matter of fact 
Phil Shirley and I again in great secrecy had lunch with Barry 
Unsworth in some obscure restuarant in the Eastern Suburbs to do 
a deal with Barry to join the Commission. Reg Watson, the other 
part-time Commissioner, was suggested to us by Scott's, Philip 
Shirley and I met him and had dinner with him one night and he agreed to serve.
When Philip Shirley retired the same process with a different 
firm was adopted for getting a new Chief Commissioner. I had quite 
a bit to do with the consultants but on this occasion at a 
particular point I was chopped off from further involvement. I 
don't quite know why that was, it was a decision of the Minister,
Tim Bruxner. It could have been for a number of reasons: I'm 
pretty close to Josh Trimmer as a friend, I don't always agree with 
him but I'm pretty friendly with him and probably to save him and 
me further embarrassment I was eased out. Alan Reiher I think 
emerged not through the consultants but from another source. You’ll 
find on both occasions we had the consultants and other people working.
GIBBONS: Mr McCusker made some comments about the Sydney Area 
Transportation Study. If you remember he said that after he retired 
URTAC didn't supervise SATS closely enough. Would you agree with 
that?
TROTT: No, I wouldn't agree.
GIBBONS: Regarding the influence of the D.M.R. on the final Report, 
which is seen in the recommendations, was this a reflection of the 
constraints on the Study rather than the direct influence of the 
Department?
TROTT: The constraints of the Study. I think Bob was asked to 
feed in the existing road planning. The only thing he went against 
was the Eastern Distributor, but it was part of his charter —  here's the road system, put it in.
GIBBONS: Did the other URTAC members beside the D.M.R. have any 
worries about that?
TROTT: No, not at the time. Roads didn't seem to be an issue, 
it wasn't until the change of government at the Federal level 
that people started to focus on so-called urban freeways. It just 
wasn't an issue —  sure, people could see that there wasn't much 
money about and people were thinking that perhaps more money should 
go into public transport, but there wasn't pressure to divert money 
from roads to public transport. People still then tended to regard 
the financing of roads and public transport as separate exercises. 
The roads people are still unhappy of course about any attempt to 
get an allocation of money for transport and then have someone say: 
out of this, that much for roads, that much for railways. But 
that's the way we seem to be going, federally anyway.
GIBBONS: What effect has SATS had since it was submitted to the 
government?
TROTT: SATS was never formally adopted by the government. It's
used by URTAC as a basic first reference for on-going studies.
The SATS study was perhaps the last of its kind, the grand transport 
study, I don't think we'll see those again, not so much because
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there's anythingwrong with the people who did it, the task was a 
bit unreal. But having said that I'd like to qualify it, I think 
it's always advisable and handy to have an overall plan to which 
you can work, on which you can fall back on and reject bits of.
It's better than having nothing. Transport planning is now much 
narrower in horizon than it was, SATS was for the turn of the 
century, transport planners the world over don't look so far ahead. 
So it was quite useful in some aspects but it was a bit unreal.
Another disadvantage Bob Nielsen was working under, although 
he didn't realise it at the time, was that the figures that he was 
using were wrong. It wasn't his fault, the population figures in 
particular were out; it wasn't until the so-called Borrie Report 
emerged that we realised how far out they were. Consequently much 
of the SATS Report was useless on that score.
GIBBONS: Was that part of the point for Jerry Arndt of De Leuw,
Cather's report on Parramatta?
TROTT: No, they were brought in under a Commonwealth initiative; 
Whitlam made overtures to us as you know to build a railway 
radiating out of Parramatta —  we give you the money and you 
operate it.
GIBBONS: However much of Arndt's work was demographic, all those 
technical bulletins and so on.
TROTT: Yes, that was a major part of their work.
GIBBONS: Do you feel that UTS has been able to realise the full
potential of having an on-going transport study building on SATS?
TROTT: No. UTS has been pulled off jobs to do ad hoc studies too
often to realise its full potential, but the Group has nonethelessbeen of great benefit to the government.
GIBBONS: What benefits have CUMTAC and URTAC gained from having 
the Treasury on them?
TROTT: Considerable benefits. The Treasury head and all Treasury 
people have a pulling-you-down-to-earth role. At the same time it 
is greatly important for the transport administration, and every 
other administration, to have the Treasury aware of what its 
problems and proposals are. Apart from that Treasury heads tend to 
be very bright people and they can make a personal contribution;
this in fact has happened with every Treasury head who has been on
the committees. The Treasury fellows are exposed to the whole 
spectrum of government administration, finance impinges on every 
aspect and they acquire a very useful background of knowledge 
beyond finance. I can see URTAC functioning without Treasury 
representation but it would be a much less effective organisation.
* * * * * * * *
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